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ABSTRACT
Neoclassical approaches to the analysis of the impact of a floating exchange regime on 
business have tended to take the form of models or econometric relationships between 
exchange rate volatility and trade volumes. These have tended to conclude that floating 
does not harm trade.
The rationale of this study is to examine the impact of prolonged currency overvaluation 
from the perspective of individual firms. The research method is a case study 
investigation of the impact of sterling overvaluation 1979-82 and 1990-92 on two U.K. 
companies in the auto and chemical industries in a comparative context with their German 
rivals. Further, the impact of US$ misalignment in the years 1987-92 on a U.K. exporter 
highly dependent on the U.S. market is compared with the impact on its German rivals, 
since both U.K. and German firms were at a disadvantage. In addition, the case is 
documented of a large U.K. firm which failed during the sterling misalignment which 
began in 1979.
It was found that external financial hedges offered no solution for managing misalignment 
and that internal financial, operational and strategic hedging is necessary. However, the 
necessary strategic adjustments only occurred with a lag, if at all. The lag is owing to the 
suddeness and unanticipated duration of currency misalignment. The two U.K. 
corporations were forced into retrenchment whereas their German rivals, with a more 
stable real exchange rate environment and/or a more balanced product/market strategy, 
gained a competitive advantage.
The implications for corporate and public policy are investigated in an E.U. context. 
Corporations must generate flexibility in their product-market strategies and if  they 
cannot do so, the consequences under prolonged currency overvaluation are serious.
It was also found that not only do German firms enjoy a more favourable currency 
background, but they also benefit from a range of other factors - determinable by public 
policy - which reduce uncertainty. The reduction in uncertainty from these sources, such 
as the absence of hostile takeovers, can be of greater importance to the firm than 
currency stability. Against this background, the conventional self-imposed restriction of 
the corporate treasury role to financial rather than strategic hedging - and the failure to 
effectively institutionalize responsibility for proactive strategic currency hedging 
elsewhere in the firm - will tend to reinforce the higher risk environment facing U.K. 
firms compared to their German and continental rivals. Thus as far as U.K. firms are 
concerned, corporations are partial and biased not only in the management of foreign 
exchange risk but also in the management of total risk.
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CHAPTER ONE
PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
1. BACKGROUND
Although a floating or managed floating exchange regime between major currencies has 
been in existence for over 20 years1, little attention has been paid in the literature as to 
how corporations manage foreign exchange risk. Thus far, the state of empirical research 
in over 20 years consists of only 12 surveys of corporations in the U.S., the U.K. and 
Germany2. These empirical investigations are surveyed in Appendix 2. Their object has 
been primarily to gather information on the practices of firms in foreign exchange 
management. This literature has simply addressed itself to three gaps in knowledge:
1. an investigation into and a classification of exposures;
2. a listing of the techniques to manage them;
3. an investigation into managerial perceptions of the effectiveness of these techniques. 
Such information from postal surveys can now be considered as adequate following the 
extensive Edelshain (1995) 1991 survey. What is inadequate is empirical information on 
the effects of prolonged exchange rate overvaluation and the problem corporations face 
in managing it.
Three main reasons can be advanced to explain the slow pace of research over the twenty 
years. One is that foreign exchange risk management is an interdisciplinary topic. It 
encompasses the disciplines of finance, economics, accounting, organizational behaviour, 
management science and international monetary relations. Researchers within the various
‘a semi-fixed exchange regime has only been in existence within the European Union since 1979. The 
floating regime between ERM currencies and the dollar and yen remains.
2A literature search was not attempted for Japan owing to a linguistic barrier. Only one survey is known 
to have been completed for French corporations. This was an unpublished mimeo dated 1977 from the 
LARE laboratory, University of Bordeaux. /
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disciplines have tended to take a partial approach to the problem (in particular finance 
theory), but in understanding how overvaluation has come about, an interdisciplinary 
approach is called for (see Chapters 2 and 3 and Strange 1970,1972).
A second reason for the limited research into the impact of prolonged exchange rate 
overvaluation in the U.K. is that in U.K. business schools, where the possibilities for 
interdisciplinary research are wider, corporate treasury management is usually taught as 
a minor option rather than a core subject3 and is treated as a peripheral topic for 
research. According to the ESRC (1994), the U.K. has more than 100 business schools 
employing 4100 academics. However, only a handful have published work on corporate 
treasury and currency risk management4. One of the most significant examples of 
persistent overvaluation is in sterling during the periods 1979-82 and 1990-92 (see Charts
1.1 to 1.45). Despite the magnitude of U.K. overvaluations and the high degree of 
vulnerability of U.K. firms (on account of the high proportion of trade in U.K. GDP - 
see Table 11.5) to exchange risk, it is surprising that relatively little resources in the 
U.K. have been devoted to research this topic.
3This is revealed in a check of the syllabuses of the more selective U.K. business schools of Ashridge, 
City, Cambridge, Cranfield, Henley, London, Manchester and Oxford.
4 The only U.K. researchers who have published empirical research on corporate foreign exchange risk 
management are Belk at Loughborough, Holland at Glasgow and Collier and Davis at Cranfield. Cooper 
and Franks at London Business School have developed performance evaluation measures in corporate 
treasury management but none of the above has investigated the management problem for firms of persistent 
exchange rate overvaluation.
5See section 2.2 for a definition of overvaluation. All the PPP charts in this study are constructed with 
the average nominal exchange rates from 1973-1989 as the base year. Had an exchange rate in a single year 
such as 1978 been chosen as the base year, the extent of overvaluation of sterling would have been 
substantially greater. As far as U.K. firms are concerned, 1978 is the more relevant base year than the 
average for 1973-89, since it is the firms themselves which have to manage the discontinuity between 1978 
and 1979-83.
In the charts, the thick line is the actual exchange rate (based on monthly averages) and the three thin lines 
represent a PPP band. When the actual exchange rate is above the band, the currency is overvalued, and 
vice versa. A band, rather than a precise PPP line is used, since a calculation of PPP rates always contains 
some sort of arbitrariness (see Swiss Bank Corporation 1994).
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A third barrier to research is the difficulty in access to corporate treasurers and the 
natural reluctance of treasurers and other line managers to give out confidential 
information on their firms6.
Corporate treasury management is itself only a partial framework for the management of 
foreign exchange risk. The role of other actors in the process remains unexplored, 
particularly the role of public policy. This again is surprising, since government is a 
significant actor in the creation of exchange risk and in the formulation of economic 
policy to limit it.
1.1 Conventional orthodoxy.
The purpose of this section is merely to quote, at the practitioner level, on what the 
conventional orthodoxy is perceived to be7.
Empirical evidence8 shows that firms’ perception of their exposures is biased and partial, 
and not only in relation to currency risk, but also total risk9. In managing currency risk, 
the bias is to use financial hedging, principally forward hedges. The question is why this 
bias exists, since this underlines the hypothesis that firms experience great difficulty in 
managing prolonged currency overvaluation.
In the training of treasurers, the Association of Corporate Treasurers uses the example 
of Laker Airways as an aberration (ACT "Currency Management Test 1" case study 
question 3). The Laker Airways example is also used in a key textbook (Shapiro
6For example, John Grout, treasurer of Cadbury-Schweppes, notified me of the currency hedging 
problem at MG. Grout had been finance director of BL at the time. However, Grout refused to comment 
on an MG case study which I prepared.
’The conventional orthodoxy at the academic level is summarized in Chapters 2 & 3. The definition 
of terms is given in section 2, Problem Identification.
8see Chapter 5 and Appendix 2.
9see Appendix 6.
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1992:244-245), and also in Blake (1982:32-33). Laker Airways failed in 1982 following 
a sharp rise in the real dollar exchange rate against the pound. The impact on Laker was 
magnified by the fact that its costs were largely denominated in US$ and its revenues in 
£.
All the analyses in the above sources have in common a similar theme. Laker Airways 
is concluded to be irrelevant as an example of currency risk contributing to corporate 
failure. The conclusion instead is that the airline was run by a risk-taking maverick in a 
business which is itself highly risky, and that Laker deserved to fail because it was badly 
managed and did not take the basic steps necessary to manage its currency risk. It is 
implicit that all Laker needed was a treasury which could have managed Laker’s currency 
and interest rate risk.
The "basic steps" which would-be treasurers should answer is that the US$-denominated 
costs for fuel and interest payments on leased aircraft should have been hedged against 
pounds by using forward and/or option contracts and that Laker, by not hedging, was 
taking enormous risks. The training of treasurers presents external hedging as a solution 
presumably because the treasury is responsible for external hedging.
Whilst most M.B.A. textbooks (eg. Shapiro 1992) stress the need for strategic hedging, 
why then are most firms not putting this into practice10 ? To implement strategic 
hedging, Walsh (1986:372-379) suggests a twofold strategy: to render traded products 
less tradable (via product differentiation), and to make non-tradable factors more tradable 
(via modifying sourcing practices, input mix and the location of production). The extent 
to which these are operational depends on the degree of tradability, price flexibility and 
substitutability of the firm’s products and factors of production.
At the practical level, one purpose of this study is to demonstrate that it can be extremely
,0see Belk & Glaum (1992:8).
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difficult, if  not impossible, for firms to take all, or any of the remedies indicated under 
the solution of strategic hedging. Whilst the ACT case on Laker acknowledges the need 
for strategic hedging by stating that means should have been found to increase US$ 
revenues to match US$ costs, such as by increasing the portion of tickets sold in the 
U.S., the problem is that such strategic adjustments are often not possible, yet they are 
presented as if they are. Further, the treasurer may not have any influence in the 
marketing function in order to implement strategic adjustments. Given this lack of 
influence, it is curious that the treasury literature should prescribe the goal that the 
currency denomination of costs and revenues should be matched, i.e. to create a "natural 
hedge":
"A simple method of reducing economic exposure is to change your currencies of cost 
to match the currency to which your business is exposed on its receivables. Foreign 
exchange losses on receivables will then be matched by foreign exchange gains on 
payables, and vice versa". (ACT1 1989:4601)
There is also no empirical evidence that firms put this into practice, even if they actually 
do have such a goal11. Still less can it be presumed that firms would easily be able to 
secure such a match. Difficulties are likely to be encountered in sourcing from overseas 
suppliers in the same foreign currency, or in setting up manufacturing facilities in the 
same foreign currency.
What the conventional orthodoxy neglects is basically twofold. Firstly, the financial 
hedge can only buy time. When the hedge expires, it may only be possible to renew it 
at a much less favourable rate. Secondly, the purpose of buying time is to permit 
strategic adjustments to reduce vulnerability to currency risk. However, because the 
treasurer is not assigned responsibility for such strategic adjustments, the risk is that they 
may never be made. What is remarkable is that this observation has not been documented 
in the form of case-studies in a way which would permit trainee treasurers to learn from
"Edelshain (see Appendix 2) found 61 % of firms have a goal of matching but that only 41% find it 
effective !
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the past hedging problems of companies which are not aberrant examples without a 
treasury, but which are typical household-name corporations which already have 
treasuries.
As an example of the conventional orthodoxy, it is notable that much of the literature on 
hedging in finance textbooks12 has focused on external hedging, i.e. via the use of 
financial instruments. This focus is even more marked in specialist journals. Examples 
for practitioners are "Risk", "Corporate Finance", "The Treasurer", "Euromoney", etc. 
These are replete with a plethora of techniques and gimmicks13 for addressing foreign 
exchange risk with financial instruments. This focus partly reflects the readership to 
which the journals are addressed, namely treasurers, and partly the drive by banks to use 
innovativeness as a marketing tool14.
By contrast, there is a wide gap in the practical literature on internal strategic hedging 
of currency risk. Banks do not generally sell services in internal hedging and very few, 
if any, consultancies have skills in this area. Thus the advertising revenue necessary to 
finance journals on internal hedging for the practitioner is minor compared to that for 
external hedging. If it is the corporate strategists who are responsible for strategic
12For example, Brealey & Myers (1984:741) describe the case of a U.S. exporter and state:
"you can insure yourself against currency risk by selling the foreign currency forward...Insure or speculate? 
We generally vote for insurance. First, it makes life simpler for the firm. Second, it does not cost much. 
Third, the foreign exchange market seems reasonably efficient...Is there any way that (the company) can 
protect itself against exchange loss? Of course. It can borrow foreign currency against its receivables, sell 
the foreign currency spot, and invest the proceeds in (the home currency).
Such a simplistic propagation of a solution would not be worthy of repetition here were it not for the fact 
that Brealey & Myers is the leading textbook used in MBA courses in English-speaking universities.
,3Banks were found to design new products, or differentiate existing ones, and then look afterwards if 
a need for them existed in corporate treasuries, rather than the other way round (Glaum & Belk 1992:74).
,4Market innovation does not provide a solution to prolonged overvaluation - see section 2.
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currency hedging, then literature on this subject should appear in journals addressed to 
them. However, such a literature has not developed. This is revealed in an examination 
of specialist journals such as "Long Range Planning". A possible reason is that currency 
hedging is perceived as only peripheral within the corporate strategy function.
In conclusion, the conventional orthodoxy is biased in focusing on what external hedging 
can do, rather than giving equal weight to what it cannot do, and this bias has been 
carried to extremes in designs for "optimizing" financial hedges. This bias has been 
fuelled at an academic level by the simplifications of neoclassical equilibrium 
(summarized in Chapter 2) and the approach of mathematical modelling. The result is 
that variables which may be crucial in the causal process may be omitted in the 
specification of the models. For example, the approach of the economics literature is to 
test statistical relationships between exchange rate changes (or proxies such as 
uncertainty) and trade volumes15 and to derive policy conclusions from such tests 
without regard to the causal process involved. The causal process needs to establish 
whether individual firms can manage exchange risk, either via their access to financial 
instruments (which may, or may not be granted), or via internal organizational and 
strategic adjustment (which firms may, or may not be able to make). It is argued in this 
thesis that failure to take full account of the causal process at the corporate level is 
completely the wrong approach.
15Such tests are listed in Chapter 2 and are still being performed eg. Peree & Steinherr 1989, 1994. 
The 1994 test found that the break-up of the narrow bands of the ERM in 1992 led to higher exchange rate 
uncertainty which depressed foreign trade in 1993.
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2. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
The problem of foreign exchange risk management has two distinct components. One 
concerns the setting up of treasury systems and strategies which reduce the firm’s 
exposure to currency risk. The second problem is that even when all the standard systems 
are in place, the firm can still suffer spectacular losses by authorized or unauthorized 
speculation.
What this study seeks to demonstrate is that the effectiveness of treasury systems to 
manage currency risk can be extremely limited for small and large corporations alike. 
The above-mentioned speculation is only one component of the limited effectiveness. The 
other component is that even when all the standard16 treasury systems are in place - (the 
whole range of the treasury’s activities is depicted in Figures 1.1 & 1.2 and the place of 
the treasury in the finance function in Figure 3.1) - they have only a limited role in 
managing the currency exposures of the firm.
In essence, the problem is fivefold. One is that it is impossible to consistently forecast 
exchange rates correctly, so that hedging decisions are necessarily speculative. Second 
is that the onset and duration of currency misalignment can take the firm by surprise. 
Third is that whilst overvaluation can persist for as long as five years, for example, and 
although long-term forward contracts and currency swaps have become available in recent 
years, treasurers are reluctant to use them for fear of locking the company into an 
unfavourable exchange rate17. Fourth is that the corporate treasury is given
16The functions of the treasury in large corporations are similar across countries. See Chapters 5 &
10.
17See Hilley et al 1981. Harrison (interviewed 7.6.94) comments that whilst deciding to hedge over 2 
years is a difficult decision to make, deciding on a 4-year time span is impossible. For example, ICI’s 
treasury may borrow $100 M for 10 years, but the treasury is forced to make the decision as the company 
needs the funds, but the treasury is not forced to hedge the position. ICI’s treasury is generally not prepared 
to cover for 5 years because it is too big a "gamble" for the treasurer to take in view of the uncertainty of 
future US$/£ rates and the uncertainty of ICI’s future cash flows.
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responsibility for managing currency risk, but the management of currency misalignment 
requires strategic hedging. However, the treasury has no control over product-market 
strategy18 and there may be no formal channels whereby it can even influence it. Even 
if the treasury did have control over corporate strategy, it is not at all clear that such 
control is sufficient to manage misalignment, since the adjustment of strategy is an 
unwieldy and uncertain instrument and its benefits accrue only after long time lags.
The fifth problem is to demonstrate that the above four problems for firms constitute a 
public policy problem. The concern for firms is that appropriate measures of managing 
currency risk depend on the cause of the currency risk. For currency misalignment, it is 
hypothesized that the cause is primarily government policy. If firms cannot manage 
misalignment via managing the symptoms, i.e. via external and internal hedging, then 
they need to act on the cause. However, if firms cannot act on the cause, then a real 
problem exists. It is hypothesized that this is also a public policy problem, since if  the 
mass of firms cannot manage currency misalignment, then serious public policy concerns 
arise at industry and macroeconomic level. All that it is intended to do in this thesis is 
indicate the existence of such a problem and recommend a means of addressing it. Space 
does not permit an appraisal of whether governmental objectives could have been better 
achieved by other strategies which would not have produced currency overvaluation. 
Speculation of what other strategies and their consequences might be is the subject of a 
separate thesis. Instead, if firms cannot change government economic policy which 
produces currency overvaluation, then a last recourse would be for firms to attempt to 
influence international monetary arrangements, since the whole point of an international 
monetary system is to influence national policies (Williamson 1987:210). This is 
investigated in this thesis in terms of European monetary integration and the possibility 
for corporate treasuries to use the ECU in place of an overvalued domestic currency.
The probl6matique and its definitions are considered as follows:
18See Chapter 3, section 2.
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2.1 Authorized speculation.
Returning to the problem of speculation, unauthorized19 speculation is a problem of 
management control and audit. This is outside the ambit of this study. Authorized 
speculation however is a key part of standard treasury practice. This is not because most 
corporate treasuries are acting as bank dealing rooms and engaged in outright speculation. 
According to the one U.K. survey (Touche Ross 1991), only 7% of U.K. companies run 
their treasuries as profit centres. Instead, the concern of this thesis arises because every 
decision on whether to hedge or not is a speculative decision20. Even if the treasury is 
highly conservative and the decision is taken to hedge all net uncovered positions, this 
decision is itself a speculative one. As an example of the management problem involved, 
Dunhill Holdings gave a profits warning (FT 13.8.1993:15) that because it decided to 
hedge future income up to 30 months out, sterling profits for the ensuing two years 
would be £19 M and £13 M lower than without the hedge. This resulted from an 
unanticipated rise in the yen against sterling.
This problem can be distinguished from one in which hedging is authorized but the 
authorizers are not in a position to assess their downside risk arising from that hedge. 
For example, in 1991 Allied Domecq’s21 treasury believed that the US$ would fall 
during and after the Gulf War. It attempted to hedge this by the receipt of premium 
income from writing US$ currency options. This strategy involved unlimited losses if the 
US$ rose instead, which it did. The speculation cost Allied Domecq £147 M and it cost
,9Royal Dutch/Shell announced (FT 22.2.1993:1) charges of £730 M as a result of unauthorized foreign, 
exchange contracts which its 50 % owned Japanese affiliate had entered into. These losses constituted 82 
% of the shareholder’s equity in the affiliate. The parent charged £131 M against its own profits for the 
1992 financial year. The chairman and president of the affiliate were forced to resign (Economist 
27.2.93:96).
^ o r  example, a U.K. wine importer may hedge its imports for the year ahead, but if competing U.K. 
wine importers do not and the French franc falls significantly against sterling, the fall may be enough to 
erase the hedger’s profit margin. An alternative interpretation, that hedgers are not speculators, is given 
in Jacque (1979).
21formerly Allied Lyons.
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the Treasurer, the Finance Director and the Chief Executive Officer their jobs. This 
example of hedging (or speculation) can be categorized as operational risk.
2.2 Exchange rate misalignment and the "Misalignment Syndrome".
The above examples are merely illustrative of the difficulty in hedging exchange rate 
volatility22. The basis of this thesis is that the problem of hedging exchange rate 
misalignment is of a far greater magnitude. The concept of exchange rate misalignment 
was introduced into the literature in 1983 by Williamson and refined by Camen and 
Genberg (1990). Williamson’s definition of misalignment is of "persistent departure of 
the exchange rate from its long-term equilibrium level" (1983:35). "Departure" refers to 
long-term swings of undervaluation or overvaluation in terms of the equilibrium level. 
The equilibrium level is defined in terms of a currency being at its purchasing power 
parity23 . This concept of misalignment can be distinguished from that of exchange rate 
volatility, in which currencies can move (mainly in nominal terms) according to random 
elements but do not display prolonged under- or overvaluation (i.e. in real terms).
The tefm "misalignment syndrome" is used in this thesis to denote a state of persistent 
overvaluation in which firms in the whole economy may be adversely affected, not just 
those in the tradable sector. The impact on the non-tradable sector can emerge as follows. 
Firstly, high real interest rates and an overvalued exchange rate can combine to cause a 
recession. The recession in turn reduces demand for firms in non-tradable and tradable 
sectors alike. Even if there is no recession, foreign firms may take advantage of the 
overvalued currency to penetrate the market. Governments should be concerned because 
of the risk of deindustrialization (Bigman & Leite 1978, Corden & Neary 1982) and 
hysteresis effects (i.e. the loss in output and employment is not reversed when the
“ PerSe & Steinherr (1989) nevertheless assert that short-term volatility may entail only small costs to 
firms as it can usually be covered in financial markets up to one year out.
^Doubts arise as to whether the definition of overvaluation in terms of purchasing power parity has any 
operational meaning. This is because of the difficulty in obtaining universal values of purchasing power 
parity. This problem makes it all the more necessary to critically survey the theory underlying currency 
risk. This is the task of Chapter 2.
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exchange rate returns to an equilibrium level).
It might be argued that since misalignment can also refer to persistent undervaluation of 
the exchange rate, then it can also give firms a competitive advantage. This need not 
necessarily contradict the problem that misalignment presents a major management 
problem for firms. Firms can neither forecast the occurrence of undervaluation nor its 
duration24. Secondly, the competitive advantage derived from undervaluation can yield 
windfall profits25, but also mask the need to control costs. Reduced cost efficiency can 
exacerbate the shock when undervaluation reverts to overvaluation. Both under- and 
overvaluation thus present management problems. It can a priori be argued that 
overvaluation is likely to present the greater management problem, since this must be 
hedged. By contrast, if a firm speculates that undervaluation will persist, it can 
implement this speculation by not hedging. However, it must suffer the consequences if  
undervaluation suddenly ends and the firm’s exposure remains unhedged. A company 
may be profitable when its home currency is undervalued, but it may not be when the 
currency is correctly valued and indeed it may be illiquid when the currency is 
overvalued. A significant problem is that a company’s internal control systems may not 
be geared to give warning signals of the effects of changes in the real exchange rates. 
Even if they were, persistent undervaluation would still be a significant problem for the 
individual firm because of the problems of adjustment when the exchange rate 
environment worsens. This thesis concerns itself with overvaluation and the term 
misalignment is accordingly henceforth taken to refer to prolonged overvaluation.
The problem for firms, then, to which the literature has given scant attention, has the 
following components. How does overvaluation arise; how does it impact on individual 
firms; how effective are firms in managing it; does it lead to a loss in competitiveness
24The theoretical basis for this is outlined in Chapter 2 (the Efficient Markets Hypothesis) and the 
empirical evidence in Chapter 4.
^ h ic h  is attractive to governments, not only in increasing the tax-take.
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and to what extent; does the way in which overvaluation arises have a bearing on what 
firms should do to manage it, or should they attempt to prevent it occurring in the first 
place ?
2.3 Economic exposure.
A useful framework for assessing the impact of overvaluation on firms is that of 
economic exposure. The concept of economic exposure was first introduced into the 
literature in 1972 by Dufey. It is defined as the change in the present value of the firm’s 
future cash flows as a result of unanticipated changes in real exchange rates. The 
definition of real exchange rates is important, since nominal exchange rates between two 
countries can remain constant, but if their inflation rates diverge, their real exchange 
rates have changed.
Real exchange rate changes can be calculated from the point of divergence of inflation 
rates, (or from a point in time such as the previous reporting date), thereby avoiding the 
methodological problem of calculating PPPs alluded to above. Changes in real exchange 
rates thus have an operational meaning, but it is another question as to whether firms are 
regularly monitoring real exchange rate changes.
Economic exposure arises because the firm cannot contractually fix, over sufficiently long 
periods of time, its sales level, price levels, or cost of inputs. These values are subject 
to change, and consequently so is the revenue and cost structure of the firm, as exchange 
rates change.
Two other exposures are conventionally classified in the finance literature (Wihlborg 
1978). These are transaction exposure and translation exposure. Transaction exposure is 
a subset of economic exposure, since it refers to the firm’s near-term cash flows. It is 
defined as the risk of changes in exchange rates between the time that a good is sold and 
the time that payment is received in foreign currency. Translation exposure refers to the
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risk that when the results of foreign subsidiaries are consolidated into the parent’s 
currency, translation gains or losses will arise between reporting dates.
It is generally acknowledged (Adler & Dumas 1984) that economic exposure is the 
dominant and most relevant exposure facing the firm. This is because of the difficulties 
in hedging future cash flows for long and unknown future periods. For transaction 
exposure, cash flows only have to be hedged for short periods into the future and for this, 
financial instruments (i.e. external hedging) are deemed effective.
2.4 Responsibility for internal hedging is diffused compared to external hedging.
Holland (1993:138) distinguishes four categories of hedging, and also reactive and 
proactive options in hedge decisions. This framework is adapted in Table 1.1 below:
Chapter 1 36
TABLE 1.1
CATEGORIES OF HEDGING AGAINST CURRENCY RISK AND DECISION- 
TAKERS RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH HEDGING
STRATEGIC INTERNAL
OPERATIONAL
INTERNAL
FINANCIAL
EXTERNAL
RESPONSE
DECISIONS
(REACTIVE)
React to recent real 
change by exploiting 
strategic flexibility
Alter marketing, 
production, sourcing.
Netting, 
Reinvoicing, 
Leading & 
lagging, asset 
& liability 
management
Buy risk 
management 
products from 
banks
TAKEN BY business units business
units/corp.strategy
dept.
corporate
treasury
corporate
treasury
RESPONSIVE­
NESS DECISIONS 
(PROACTIVE)
Install capacity to 
make real changes in 
strategy
Develop flexibility in 
operational decisions
Set up
treasury
systems
Establish close 
relationships 
with suppliers 
of risk 
management 
products
TAKEN BY managing board, 
advised by 
corporate strategy 
dept.
corp.strategy dept. corporate
treasury
corporate
treasury
Source: adapted and extended from Holland 1993.
Hedging against currency risk is conventionally subdivided into external and internal 
hedging. External hedging refers to the purchase of risk management products from banks 
and brokers. Internal hedging comprises internal financial hedging conducted by the 
treasury plus operational and strategic hedging. Responsibility for internal hedging tends 
to be blurred within the firm. From Table 1.1 it can be seen that decision-taking in 
internal hedging is blurred between the treasury, the corporate strategy department, the 
business divisions and the managing board. The treasury has no direct control over 
operational and strategic hedging. The treasury’s influence may lie in providing currency 
forecasts to the business divisions from which they base their own decisions. To 
distinguish the type of internal hedging undertaken by the treasury, the term internal 
financial hedging is employed here.
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Having made this distinction, it will be argued that the treasury’s role as a locus of 
responsibility for managing exchange rate misalignment and economic exposure is 
limited. It will be demonstrated (Chapter 5 and the case studies) that internal financial 
hedging and external hedging can be inadequate to hedge away exchange rate 
misalignment, depending on the circumstances of individual firms. Furthermore, because 
responsibility for the other categories of internal hedging, namely operational and 
strategic hedging, is diffuse, such hedging against currency risk is not considered a core 
part of the relevant decision-takers’ responsibilities. Instead, the decisions of the business 
divisions, corporate strategy department and managing board on business expansion and 
product-market strategy are taken on the basis of how the firm can create wealth by 
exploiting imperfections in national and international factor and product markets (Hymer 
1960, Kindleberger 1969) via the ownership-specific advantages of their firm (Dunning 
1981) and from cost reduction via internalization (Buckley & Casson 1976). To these 
decision-takers, internal hedging against currency risk is only a secondary consideration. 
More importantly, it is unclear who the practitioner is who is responsible for internal 
hedging. One purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate that responsibility is diffused 
throughout the firm. Furthermore, it is hypothesized, and investigated in the case studies, 
that because of the diffusion of responsibility, a coordinated approach to strategic and 
operational hedging tends to be lacking. The question is then raised that if the practitioner 
responsible for internal hedging cannot be identified, how is economic exposure managed 
and with what degree of effectiveness ?
2.5 Ineffectiveness of economic exposure management.
There is overwhelming empirical evidence26 that economic exposure is not generally 
managed at all, particularly in smaller firms (Belk & Glaum 1990 for the U.K., 
Herrmann 1989 for Germany, Cezairli 1988 for the U.S.). Further, where attempts are 
made to manage it, survey responses from large corporations indicate that managers
“ see Appendix 2.
Chapter 1 38
perceive that the methods used are ineffective (Belk & Glaum 1990 and Edelshain 1995 
for the U.K., Glaum & Roth 1993 for Germany, Cezairli 1988 for the U.S.).
The Cezairli and Edelshain surveys are the only ones to have gathered evidence on 
managerial perceptions of the effectiveness of economic exposure management. Their 
results were aggregative. No attempt has been made so far to investigate for individual 
corporations how and why the management of economic exposure is ineffective.
2.6 Causes of exchange rate misalignment neglected.
All the existing empirical research has taken exchange rate volatility as an exogenous 
factor. It is treated as an exogenous given in all of the 12 empirical investigations 
mentioned above. For example, Walsh (1986:8-70) surveyed evidence that the 
international parity conditions of finance theory27 tend to be violated and that this is a 
necessary condition for exchange risk to exist. However, despite using 62 pages to 
demonstrate the existence of violations of the parity conditions, the more relevant 
question of what are the principal underlying causes of the major violations is not 
addressed in Walsh’s thesis. This is consistent with the partial analysis of finance theory. 
Walsh focused on how arbitrage possibilities arise, but this misses the point that it is the 
banks who tend to employ teams of arbitrageurs, not corporate treasuries. The kind of 
financial arbitrage that corporate treasurers of MNCs are involved in is the arbitrage of 
differing countries’ tax systems to minimize their tax liability. However, the corporate 
treasury’s role even in this is limited, since its function would simply be to implement 
the instructions of the Tax Manager, who would probably be a lawyer in the firm’s legal 
department.
Thus it is not arbitrage possibilities in foreign exchange markets, but major violations, 
which are the relevant concern of firms. This is because it is the firms themselves who
^these conditions are defined in Chapter 2 - Finance Theory
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have to manage the violations. Walsh stated that the purpose of his investigation was 
(Walsh 1986:7):
"a description of the management of foreign exchange risk...(which) should lead to an 
improvement in the practice of foreign exchange risk management...(since) a complete 
catalogue of alternative tactics which may be used to manage foreign exchange risk is 
presented, based upon observed management practices".
The difficulty with this catalogue is that the tactics have differing degrees of 
effectiveness, depending on the type of exposure and the degree of exchange risk. In 
ignoring the underlying causes of the violations of the parity conditions and in basing the 
catalogue on observed management practice only, the catalogue cannot be complete.
What has been particularly neglected is the role of government policy in creating the 
violations of the international parity conditions. For example, Holland (1993:96) has 
added a taxonomy of imperfections to the international parity conditions and classifies 
government imposed distortions as one source of the imperfections. However, Holland 
perceives such distortions only in terms of a listing of currency regimes and of 
governmental regulation of financial markets. The exchange rate effects of government 
policy are not included in the analysis and exchange rate misalignment is not even 
mentioned.
The external environment facing the firm, particularly the public policy environment, 
cannot be ignored since there are linkages between government economic policy and the 
degree of exchange risk. Significantly, the degree of exchange risk facing firms varies 
across countries. Once it is demonstrated that firms’ management of their economic 
exposure is ineffective, then the adverse impact on those firms which are unable to 
manage prolonged overvaluation can be seen to be directly the result of government 
policy. Only one of the empirical investigations so far (Blin et al. 1981) has sought to
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draw public policy conclusions from corporate foreign exchange risk management28. 
However, the Blin et al. study is flawed for three reasons. One is that it concentrated on 
transaction exposure, which firms can'manage, and neglected economic exposure, which 
firms cannot easily manage. Secondly, it did not consider the problem of prolonged 
exchange rate overvaluation at all. It concerned itself instead with exchange rate volatility 
in a general sense. Thirdly, the Blin et al. investigation deliberately excluded small firms 
and addressed itself only to MNCs.
What is missing in the literature has two components. One is a failure to appreciate that 
responsibility for internal hedging is diffused within the firm. This has the consequence 
that exchange rate misalignment and the ensuing economic exposure is not effectively 
managed. The absence of a literature on strategic internal hedging can be explained in 
that it is a problem lying partly in the domain of organizational behaviour, partly in 
strategy and partly in finance, and researchers in the three disciplines do not usually 
interact. For example, the literature on the international parity conditions in finance - 
(developed in the early twentieth century eg. Cassel 1921) - has developed completely 
separately from the literature on imperfections in factor and product markets (developed 
much later by Dunning and the Reading school). Manufacturing firms create profits by 
exploiting (or arbitraging) such imperfections, but cannot easily, if at all, arbitrage major 
violations of the parity conditions in currency markets. Literature on how the firm should 
organize its resources such that it can exploit imperfections in factor and product markets, 
and in so doing also protect itself from violations in the international parity conditions, 
has yet to be developed.
A second component is the absence of an analysis of what an inability on the part of 
firms to manage exchange rate misalignment implies for public policy. Once these 
elements are included, the implications for public policy are likely to differ significantly 
from those of Blin et al.
28The public policy implications are examined in Chapter 11. At the corporate level, Blin et al. 
concluded that firms are coping with exchange rate volatility.
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2.7 Rival firms in rival states where the currency is not overvalued.
Chart 1.2 shows that sterling has exhibited significant periods of prolonged overvaluation 
against the DM. Currency overvaluation in the U.K. is associated with high real interest 
rates. The competitive significance of the impact of macroeconomic risk on the firm rests 
on two propositions.
Firstly, a problem for U.K. firms is that after interest costs, there is an inadequate 
margin of profit remaining compared to the situation in Germany (Eltis 1992:3). It might 
be argued that corporations with sophisticated treasuries could avoid high real interest 
rates in the U.K. by borrowing long term from capital markets. World long term real 
interest rates are broadly similar, as would be expected from the Fisher open 
condition29. However, only a small number of corporations, i.e. the largest, with a 
name in capital markets and a good credit rating can borrow at the world level of real 
interest rates. Small and medium-sized enterprises do not borrow from capital markets 
but from banks with credit lines at floating exchange rates which can be withdrawn at any 
time.
Empirical evidence for the U.K. (CBI 1994) indicates that for new investment, many 
firms require internal rates of return two to three times higher than the nominal interest 
rate, or unrealistically short pay-back periods30. This is important for U.K. firms for 
two reasons. One is that the much greater volatility in the pound’s real exchange rate 
compared to the DM gives rise to risk premia on sterling-denominated assets which 
penalizes U.K. firms with floating-rate borrowings. Secondly, most financial instruments 
are of much shorter duration than the firm’s product-market planning horizons.
The question of whether these hurdles are unrealistic needs to be balanced against
^see Chapter 2, Chart 2.1, for an explanation of the Fisher open condition.
“ Evidence also exists (Miles 1993) that U.K. firms face excessively high required returns for longer- 
term projects.
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whether firms are realistic in believing in a continuation of the boom-bust cycle in the 
U.K.31 In view of the experience of sterling overvaluation indicated in this thesis, firms 
would indeed be very short-termist if they were suddenly to reduce their hurdle rates in 
the belief that the U.K. boom-bust cycle had ended.
A second proposition on competitiveness is that the real profitability of corporations 
would be raised if fluctuations in production were reduced, yet the misalignment 
sydrome, by definition, produces fluctuations. Real fluctuations in capital expenditure 
(see U.K. volatility in Chart 1.7) and manufacturing output have been much less in 
Germany than in the U.K.
Thirdly, to increase profitability, it is necessary to reduce the productivity gap between 
the U.K. and its main competitors such as Germany. Raising investment (see Chart 1.8) 
is only part of the process of raising productivity32. However, the decision at corporate 
level on whether to invest would be favoured by prospects of relative security of market 
growth free from discontinuities such as currency misalignment. This is a background 
macroeconomic factor which favours German over U.K. firms.
2.8 Conclusion.
One of the hypotheses of this thesis is that exchange rate overvaluation has placed U.K. 
firms at a competitive disadvantage relative to their German competitors. U.K. exchange
^Misalignment can also occur under a fixed exchange rate regime, such as the overvaluation in the 
pound under Bretton Woods before the 1967 devaluation. See Appendix 4. The stop-go cycle in response 
to an exchange rate constraint was thus already characteristic of the 1960s (see Strange 1971).
32This is underlined in Buxton et al. (1994), who assert that it is not only instability in monetary policy, 
but also structural economic weaknesses, that underlie the U.K.'s boom-bust cycles. Buxton et al. argue 
that in the late 1980s, the true source of inflationary pressure was not wage inflation or a loose monetary 
policy, but supply-side obstacles to sustained growth. These include decades of under-investment in 
productive capacity, in education and skills and in research. Buxton’s hypothesis nevertheless lends further 
weight to the role of financial risk in limiting long-term investment, since during prolonged recessions 
associated with currency overvaluation, tax and corporate revenues are hit which in turn can lead to cuts 
in budgets for infrastructure and training.
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rate poliicy, underpinned by the monetarist prescription of "leaving the exchange rate to 
the market" may thus appear irrational33. One of the reasons why the U.K. government 
has been able to abjure responsibility for the exchange rate is because it derives support 
for such a stance from the theoretical base underlying finance and economics. One 
example is the Bank of England evidence to the House of Commons (1982) Treasury 
Committee that there is no evidence of a statistical link between exchange rate volatility 
and the volume and price of world trade and, by inference, growth. The public policy 
implication is that governments need not be concerned by exchange rate volatility. It is 
necessary to critically examine the methodology which can give rise to such a policy 
conclusion. This is the task of Chapter 2.
33The premise that markets are always right is attacked in Strange (1985:17).
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CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL APPROACHES - NEOCLASSICAL
1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter argues that shortcomings in the theoretical approach of finance and 
economics has led to flawed policy conclusions such as that exchange rate volatility does 
not harm trade. These shortcomings are a macroeconomic bias and partial analysis. The 
shortcomings stem from neoclassical methodology.
Neoclassical methodology comprises the design of normative models and the application 
of positive theories. Normative models are concerned with prescription, i.e. what ought 
to happen, whereas positive theories are concerned with explanation and prediction, i.e. 
what does happen1.
Firstly the basis of neoclassical methodology is described. Secondly, normative models 
in finance and economics relating to the corporate management of currency overvaluation 
are summarized. Thirdly, the relevance of positive theories, i.e. finance and economics, 
to deriving policy conclusions from currency overvaluation is investigated.
Strange (1988:11-12) presents an alternative interpretation of whether theories should prescribe or 
explain.
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2. NEOCLASSICAL METHODOLOGY
2.1 Definition
The two key assumptions of neoclassical methodology are that individuals (and firms) 
maximize utility (and profits) and that the market mechanism automatically equates prices 
and marginal utilities such that an efficient allocation of resources is achieved. Markets 
are assumed to clear and a state of equilibrium exists.
Scapens (1989/5) notes that the core elements of neoclassical economics are embedded 
in positive theories of accounting and that the methodology of investigation into corporate 
behavior has tended to be decision models based on the profit maximization postulate. 
These include linear programming models and capital decision models, for example.
Two broad types of normative approaches to corporate foreign exchange risk management 
can be discerned. The economics literature has focused on the firm’s strategic response 
to movements in exchange rates that alter relative prices. By contrast, the finance 
literature has focused on the design of securities and hedging operations with which the 
firm can lay off foreign exchange risk. Thus whereas models in economics focus on 
internal means of hedging via the firm’s strategic responses, finance models focus on 
external means of laying off risk in financial markets. The finance literature also argues 
that the hedging and borrowing decisions of the firm are inextricably linked. It might be 
argued that finance models are only peripheral to the problem of economic exposure 
management. This is because the finance literature focuses on external hedging and 
because economic exposure management is primarily based on internal i.e strategic 
hedging. The rationale for strategic hedging is to prevent advantage from currency 
overvaluation being exploited by competitors.
2.2 Normative models in finance.
A model which uses the neoclassical approach of linear programming is that of Lietaer. 
Lietaer (1971:8), in building a model of hedging against devaluation, notes that the 
problem for the firm contains three elements: expected costs, strategy risk, and
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operational constraints. The objective is to find a combination of financing and hedging 
strategy that minimizes expected costs and strategy risk and does not violate any of the 
operational constraints.
TABLE 2.1
NEOCLASSICAL APPROACH OF COST MINIMIZATION APPLIED TO HEDGING (LIETAER 1971)
Expected costs to be minimized Strategy risk to be minimized Operational constraints to be 
minimized
- the expense arising out of all the 
financing and hedging operations,
- and the expected devaluation 
loss.
- the risk generated from relying on 
future financing and hedging 
possibilities whose costs are not 
known with certainty,
- and risk arising from 
misestimating the devaluation.
- the financial requirements for 
each period in the planning 
horizon,
- constraints such as the 
availability of loans and swaps
- legal constraints.
Lietaer* s approach is one of minimizing hedging cost given the constraints of existing 
hedging instruments. Such an approach is the opposite of this thesis, which seeks to show 
that existing hedging instruments are quite unsatisfactory as a solution to currency 
misalignment. Further, in noting that Lietaer acknowledges that strategic hedging is 
necessary, this study seeks to show examples of firms that are not conducting such 
strategic management of economic exposure and seeks to explain why not.
An appropriate method to demonstrate this is case-study of the decision-making process 
of individual firms. However, the use of normative models which incorporate strategic 
hedging of economic exposure is subject to severe constraints.
Naumann-Etienne (1977) concluded that modelling economic exposure requires firstly, 
a knowledge of the sourcing and sales characteristics of the operation and secondly, the 
ability to analyze the effect of unanticipated exchange rate changes on future cash flows 
by including the ability to include anticipatory measures of competitprs’ reactions.
Without including the above, simulations of the impact of currency changes on a firm’s 
balance sheet and profit and loss account will be inadequate. Such a simulation is 
exemplified by the textile company Dawson International. This company calculated that
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in the six months to September 30 1992, profits would have been £400,000 higher if the 
US$/£ exchange rate had remained at the average of the previous year (FT 25.11.92/24). 
This simulation was based on calculations derived from crude simplifications of Dawson 
International’s business, namely that 50% of its sales are made in the U .S., 25% are 
exported to other parts of Europe and Japan and one-third of the remaining U.K. business 
is tourist related. The inadequacy of such simulations can be seen in the following. 
Firstly, the simplifications are only assumptions. They do not include factors other than 
exchange rate changes, such as recession in a particular market, changes in fashion, 
changes in marketing/distribution etc. which might offset the impact of an exchange rate 
change. Secondly, it is impossible to know in advance what competitors’ reactions and 
counter-reactions would be to exchange rate changes2.
Walsh (1986) attempted to overcome this problem by regression analysis3 in which he 
assumes that data for competitors* sales revenue and prices can be obtained4. Regression
^ e llo  & Parsons (1992:1) note that most models take the firm’s exposure as given and ignore changes 
in the competitive position created by exchange rate movements and the firm’s strategic responses. They 
have created a model in which the firm’s ability to exploit its competitive position depends upon the degree 
to which its flexibility is matched with an appropriate hedging strategy.
■The mechanics of the regression approach are as follows. Assume a U.K. company whose costs are 
solely in £ and whose sales are split equally between the U.K. and Germany. Assume that the real £/DM 
exchange rate rises from the start of year 2. Cash flows from period 0 for the year are assumed given. 
Because of the rise in the real exchange rate, cash flows for year 2 are likely to be lower than for year 1, 
assuming all other variables remain the same. Net economic exposure for year 2 can be calculated as 
follows:
Cash flow in year 1 minus cash flow in year 2 = change in cash flow x PV factor = PV
Gamer and Shapiro (1984) suggest a regression which does not involve sensitivity analysis to competitor 
reactions. They regress the firm’s cash flows on the average exchange rate prevailing in the past period. 
The rationale is that variations in a firm’s domestic currency cash flows are correlated with variations in 
the nominal exchange rate. Of the output of the regression, a high correlation coefficient indicates high 
exposure of the firm to exchange rate changes. In the regression, R squared measures the percentage of 
total cash flow variability that is due to the currency fluctuations. A low R squared will indicate that 
currency fluctuations are not an important determinant of overall firm risk even whilst domestic currency 
cash flows are highly correlated with exchange rate changes.
4In reality, it is impossible to know what competitors' cost structures are, which would permit sales 
revenue and profits to be calculated under different exchange rate assumptions.
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analysis as a means of quantifying the impact of economic exposure rests on the 
assumption that, although the firm’s economic exposure cannot be directly observed, it 
is constant. In reality, a firm is likely to change its exposure if exchange rates change. 
Capel (1991) notes that if there are adjustment costs, the firm’s optimal strategy in each 
period depends on its previous decisions. Exposure is thus variable and therefore a 
regression does not yield a reliable measure for it.
Given that regressions will not give a good approximation to economic exposure (Capel 
1991), it is necessary to map out the possible reactions and strategies that the firm and 
its competitors are likely to pursue. For this purpose, models can be of use. However, 
not one, but several possible reaction patterns may be plausible. Each reaction pattern 
might also proceed under several different exchange rate scenarios. Thus to obtain a true 
picture of economic exposure requires a vast range of calculations based on what may be 
incorrect assumptions concerning the price elasticity of demand, incorrect judgements 
regarding the pricing flexibility of competitors and incorrect forecasts of future inflation 
and future real exchange rate changes.
To illustrate in practical terms the problems in calculating economic exposure, assume 
a firm comprises several business units in several countries. Then for each business unit, 
calculating the potential impact of exchange rate changes must incorporate the effects on 
export sales, local sales where the product is in competition with imports, costs of 
imported inputs, and local inputs with an import content as well as the general level of 
demand. All these factors will in time have an effect on the capital employed in each of 
the business units which will also be a factor in the level of future earnings.
Whilst it is possible to assign a value to each of these items for a given point in time and 
derive a NPV for each business unit in separate currency zones, the resulting number will 
be of little practical use to the corporate treasurer since it will be dependent on the use 
of a large number of forecast variables which, as noted above, may not be predictable.
An additional methodological problem exists. The sensitivity of the PV of future
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cashflows to real exchange rate changes is a nebulous concept. An attempt to correlate 
a certain current market value with a future random variable (exchange rates) is ill- 
conceived (Bromwich 1977, Bromwich & Wells 1983). The unknowns are so significant, 
such as competitors’ future reactions, that the unknowns in turn determine the 
significance of exchange rate changes on future cashflows.
2.2.1 Conclusion.
Given the above problems, economic exposure cannot be usefully modelled.
2.3 Normative models in economics.
An advantage of economics models of foreign exchange risk management over finance 
models is that economics models incorporate various aspects of the theory of the firm, 
such as market structure and output and pricing policies (eg. Krugman 1987, Baldwin 
1988 and Baldwin & Krugman 1989). The economics models motivate hedging by price 
adjustment ("exchange rate pass-through" -see Goldstein 1978, Feenstra 1987) in response 
to exchange rate changes. The extent of price adjustment, if any, depends upon market 
structure ("pricing-to-market") and firms* own flexibility ("adjustment costs"). Assume 
a firm has a monopolistic position in an export market and it faces strong demand and 
an inability to increase production to meet that demand. The prescription for its pricing 
policy, given depreciation of its domestic currency, is not to cut export prices. The lower 
exchange rate benefits the firm via an increased profit margin. The impact of exchange 
rate changes is therefore felt via changes in profits. It is the impact on profits that 
provides a decision rule on whether to hedge externally or not.
The effects of exchange rate volatility on firm entry and exit behaviour have been 
modelled by Dixit (1989). In Dixit’s model, higher levels of volatility lead to lower 
incidence of entry.
The effects of exchange rate uncertainty on investment have been modelled by Pindyck 
(1988). It is concluded that uncertainty leads to less investment in risk neutral models 
which assume imperfect competition and asymmetric costs of adjustment.
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The effects of exchange rate fluctuations on foreign direct investment have been modelled 
by Weinblatt & Lipsey (1980), Itagaki (1981) and Cushman (1985). From his model, 
Itagaki concluded that an expected devaluation of home currency always increases the 
incentive for foreign production and sale of final goods. Other things being equal, then 
by the same logic, an expected overvaluation should have the opposite effect. However, 
such a conclusion cannot be drawn because the key point in the definition of economic 
exposure is that the real exchange rate appreciation is unanticipated.
Cushman has drawn up four models of direct investment assuming various relations 
between foreign and domestic production. In these models, the direct effect of risk- 
adjusted expected real foreign currency appreciation lowers foreign capital cost. This 
would normally be expected to stimulate inward direct investment. However, Cushman 
found that when costs of other inputs are also affected, induced productivity changes or 
output price changes may offset the direct effect and thereby reduce inward direct 
investment. The result of exchange rate changes is thus inconclusive.
The impact of exchange rate volatility on the capacity decisions of firms has been 
modelled by Bell & Campa (1991). Bell & Campa, in assuming risk neutrality, imperfect 
competition and infinite costs of adjustment, find a positive relationship between exchange 
rate uncertainty and capacity for an export-oriented plant in the U.S. chemical industry. 
The authors define uncertainty as comprising three elements - exchange rate volatility, 
market demand and supply costs. They acknowledge however, that these elements can 
work in opposite directions, again leading to an inconclusive result.
2.4 Conclusions.
Dombusch (1988) has outlined three separate directions of research which models should 
take, yet he eventually concludes that "case studies seem a suitable approach" (p.307). 
Whilst the models summarized above can provide useful benchmarks for the purpose of 
formulating hypotheses, a drawback is that the results of the models depend essentially 
on how they are formulated.
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Normative economic models such as Baldwin & Krugman can be useful in predicting in 
what direction prices may change in response to exchange rate changes, subject to 
constraints. However, the models are not able to provide evidence that firms are not able 
to hedge a rise in the real exchange rate by corresponding rises in export prices in foreign 
currency terms. For this, it is necessary to gather empirical data. The models can predict 
that it is a theoretical possibility that such an outcome can occur, but cannot predict more 
than this.
Given the limitations of models, the approach of modelling will be eschewed in this 
thesis. Sections 3 and 4 investigate whether positive theories which are concerned with 
explanation and prediction constitute a more suitable approach for addressing the research 
probldmatique.
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3. FINANCE THEORY.
3.1 Contribution of finance theory to corporate currency risk management.
The contribution of finance theory to the topic of foreign exchange risk management is 
threefold. One is concerned with the properties of markets, such as the efficiency of 
foreign exchange markets (Burt, Kaen & Booth 1977, Frenkel & Mussa 1980, Bergstrand 
19835) and the integration of capital and money markets across countries (Fama & 
Farber 1978, Aliber 1978, Levich 1985, Akhtar 1987). The conclusion of this literature 
is that financial price equilibrium exists in developed countries, given highly mobile 
capital. However, the evidence for a major equilibrium in the financial parity relations 
is problematic. One reason is that the PPP condition does not hold in the short and 
medium term and that other imperfections exist which inhibit full integration. For 
example, the Fisher condition is rejected for equity markets (Holland 1993:116) and the 
unbiased forward rate hypothesis is disputed (Cornell 1977), but owing to risk aversion, 
not to foreign exchange market inefficiency6.
Second is portfolio theory and the prescription of risk management via diversification 
(Markowitz 1952, Aliber 1970, Hughes,Logue & Sweeney 1975, Frankel 1979, Soenen 
1979, Kohlhagen 1977 & 1981, Errunza & Senbet 1981, Siegel 1983)7. Given market 
efficiency, the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (Fama 1970) holds that firms cannot forecast 
exchange rates and systematically beat the market by attempting to do so. Given this 
limitation, then modem portfolio theory (MPT) indicates a strategy of managing exchange 
risk via the diversification of a corporation’s businesses across currency zones. The 
general conclusion of portfolio theorists is that international diversification improves a 
portfolio’s risk-retum characteristics by enlarging the available asset set and by 
diversifying business cycle risks. However, there are costs in obtaining these portfolio
5Bergstrand concludes that the foreign exchange market is no less efficient than domestic money and 
capital markets.
6Inefficiencies in financial markets are summarized in Wadwhani (1987).
7This is a different literature from that which views imperfections in factor and product markets as the 
determinant of FDI. See Dunning & Robson (1987) and Dunning (1990).
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gains through the creation of exposure to political and foreign exchange risk. Thus 
foreign exchange risk still has to be managed even with diversification.
A third contribution of finance theory is a long literature on optimal financing and 
investment decision rules for corporations and investors. These decision rules in 
corporations are classified (Naumann-Etienne 1974, Aliber 1978b, 1978c) into the 
strategic investment, financing and dividend decisions which have the overall goal of 
maximizing shareholder wealth.
3.2 Neoclassical equilibrium and imperfections to equilibrium.
Under the neoclassical equilibrium conditions (see Diagram 2.1), certain decision areas 
are deemed irrelevant (Senbet 1979) for the firm to make. These are decisions on capital 
structure, dividends, cash or working capital managment, and currency and interest rate 
risk management. Regarding currency risk management decisions, the theoretical 
underpinnings which deem these as irrelevant are surveyed in Dufey & Srinivasulu 
(1983). They summarize the neoclassical equilibrium position as follows:
"Foreign exchange risk does not exist: even if it exists, it need not be hedged; even if it 
is to be hedged, corporations need not hedge it"
Foreign exchange risk does not exist when all the parity conditions (Diagram 2.1) hold 
(Giddy 1976,1977). However, in the real world, the assumptions underlying the parity 
conditions do not hold (Solnik 1978) and the parity conditions are themselves 
interdependent.
Under neoclassical equilibrium, hedging decisions are irrelevant for reasons stemming 
from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH). 
Applying the CAPM (Sharpe 1964), it is systematic foreign exchange risk that matters, 
since unsystematic exchange risk can be diversified away by investors in the process of 
constructing their security portfolios. The principle of the CAPM is that for any asset, 
a direct relationship exists between risk and expected return. Thus if hedging reduces the 
risk of a firm, shareholders will require a lower return. On this basis, it is unnecessary
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DIAGRAM 2.1
NEOCLASSICAL EQUILIBRIUM RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTEREST RATE, 
INFLATION RATE AND EXCHANGE RATES
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for the firm to hedge risk since the change in risk profile will be offset by an identical 
change in its expected return. Secondly, the EMH indicates that a treasurer engaged in 
selective hedging will not be able to earn consistent foreign exchange profits in excess 
of those due to risk taking.
Against the theoretical precept that hedging decisions are irrelevant is the observation that 
firms are indeed concerned by greater variability in net cashflow from exchange risk, 
since this increases the risk of bankruptcy. Secondly, a treasurer may seek to hedge not 
because of a desire for excess returns, but to achieve a desired level of risk/return with 
which the company’s management feels comfortable.
Under neoclassical equilibrium, it is asserted that individuals, not corporations, should 
hedge currency risk, since reducing risks at the corporate level which are diversifiable 
at the portfolio level does not benefit stockholders (Makin 1978, Jacquillat & Solnik 
1978). This conclusion stems firstly, from the extension of the Modigliani-Miller theorem 
internationally (Feiger & Jacquillat 1981), such that shareholders themselves hedge via 
diversification (Grubel 1968, Levy & Samat 1970). If firms hedge and this reduces the 
risk of the firm, shareholders will require a lower return, which invalidates the need to 
hedge. Secondly, modem portfolio theory (MPT) states that exchange rate fluctuations 
in earnings are desirable for individual investors and that corporations should not hedge 
them (Feiger & Jacquillat 1981). In line with MPT, Senbet (1979) demonstrates that 
hedging by individual investors is valid if they are to bear systematic, i.e. non- 
diversifiable risk. Diversifiable risks are not "priced" by sophisticated investors and hence 
do not affect the stock market’s required rates of return.
Empirical evidence on capital market imperfections and agency costs however, suggests 
that firms, not individuals, are better placed to hedge currency risk. Capital market 
imperfections include bankruptcy risk from currency volatility; institutional barriers to 
individuals (as opposed to firms) to use hedging instruments; the possibility that firms can 
mediate risks internally (Cohn & Pringle 1973); and information asymmetries in favour 
of the firm rather than the investor (Lee & Sachdeva 1977).
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3.3 Conclusions.
The concept of agency costs recognizes the existence of other claimants to the assets of 
the firm, namely managers, workers and government. Finance theory is not interested 
in the utility functions of these groups and their interests are excluded from financial 
models, which are primarily shareholder or capital-oriented.
Given imperfections to neoclassical equilibrium, the policy recommendation is that firms 
should hedge their cashflows and shareholders should hedge their consumption bundles. 
Thus finance theory has long accepted that imperfections to the neoclassical equilibrium 
exist, and the firm is viewed as either passively accepting market forces, or alternatively 
reacting to market imperfections8 (Holland 1993:9). This view contrasts with that of the 
international business literature which perceives the firm as proactive and able to fashion 
the economic environment to its own requirements (Williamson 1975, Strange et al 1991, 
Strange 1992). The relevant question as far as prolonged currency overvaluation is 
concerned is to what extent MNCs can act proactively to avoid overvaluation. A bias in 
finance theory exists in explaining the causes of overvaluation in terms of deviations from 
the parity conditions, but at the same time ignoring the causes of the deviations. For 
example, Dince & Umoh (1981:25) write:
"We are not going to review here the ... causes of instability in foreign exchange. We 
take it as given that the relationships between domestic inflation rates and foreign 
exchange rates cause fluctuations. Given the environment in which the MNC must 
operate, what are the techniques available to protect against those risks ?"
Such an approach fails totally to capture that the currency risk environment facing the 
firm differs markedly across countries and that this environment must not be taken as 
given but explained. For example, if prolonged overvaluation is caused by government 
policy, then corporate-govemment diplomacy is a core means of protecting against the 
risk of overvaluation.
imperfections present an opportunity for firms to exploit them via opportunistic cash and working 
capital management decisions.
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In view of cross-country differences in the currency environment, it would appear that 
increased financial market integration would be desirable for corporations. With 
integration, corporate capital costs in a country, and consequently return requirements in 
real terms, will increasingly adjust to the movements in the global interest rate level. By 
contrast, under financial market segmentation, prolonged currency overvaluation based 
on high real interest rates raises a corporation’s capital costs and the price of its exports 
in foreign currency terms. With a higher level of financial integration, improved 
opportunities will exist for corporations to allocate risks without concern for currency 
risk. Further, a greater likelihood of increased welfare would arise because corporations 
would be better able to achieve their desired trade-off between risk and expected return 
(Fukao & Hanazaki 1987).
The current degree of financial market integration9 must be seen in relation to the 
yardsticks for such integration.
After Oxelheim (1990:4,5,37), four definitions can be distinguished. These delineate 
differing levels of integration. The highest form is (1) total financial integration, which 
in turn consists of (2) direct and (3) indirect financial integration. Monetary integration 
(4) is the integration of foreign exchange markets under a single currency.
Oxelheim defines direct financial integration as capital market integration. Fukao & 
Hanazaki (1987) conclude that the international capital market has become highly 
integrated in the sense that a tendency exists for a convergence of real interest rates,
9see Oxelheim (1990). Financial market integration can in turn be divided into two elements: integration 
in capital markets and in foreign exchange markets. The distinction arises from the fact that capital markets 
deal in the allocation of financial claims over time, whereas the foreign exchange market is engaged in 
trading differing national means of payment.
Dufey and Giddy (1978:5-7) suggest that a separate component of capital markets can be distinguished, 
namely the international money market. This is not the foreign exchange market, but the Eurocurrency 
market and its linkages with other segments of national markets for credit. They emphasise that the foreign 
exchange market is not part of the international money market because the foreign exchange market is not 
a market for credit. For convenience, the remainder of this study will keep to the conventional distinction 
within financial markets between the capital and the foreign exchange market.
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especially at the long end.
TABLE 2.2
HIERARCHY OF FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
TYPE OF FINANCIAL INTEGRATION DEFINITION NECESSARY
CHARACTERISTICS
1. Total financial integration Direct and Indirect financial 
integration.
see below
2. Direct financial integration Capital market integration. This exists when the investor 
can expect the same risk- 
adjusted returns on financial 
securities in different markets.
3. Indirect financial integration This refers to a situation in 
which the return on an 
investment in one country is 
directly linked to the return on 
investments in other countries. 
The indirect linkage is via 
other markets, namely the 
product market and foreign 
exchange market.
Perfectly integrated goods and 
foreign exchange markets. 
Highly coordinated economic 
policy such that the gap 
between political risk premia is 
zero.
4. Monetary integration Single currency Foreign exchange markets are 
integrated by way of a single 
currency.
However, they note that as real interest rates are not unambiguously defined, the extent 
of this convergence is difficult to assess, i.e. a condition for real interest rate 
convergence is for exchange rates to follow PPP, but they do not necessarily do so.
Indirect financial integration exists with perfectly integrated goods and foreign exchange 
markets together with such a highly coordinated economic policy that the gap between 
political risk premia is zero. Clearly no such conditions exist. Even within individual 
highly integrated countries, such as the U.S., monetary integration does not necessarily 
indicate that financial integration exists (Oxelheim 1990:5).
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Across countries, global total financial integration is decreasing (Oxelheim 1990:344). 
This is because under total financial integration, the "expected real interest rate" should 
be the same globally, but since the 1980s it has displayed marked divergence for OECD 
countries compared to the 1970s. Oxelheim ascribes one cause as increased deviation in 
PPPs between currencies. This can ensue from the autonomy of governmental interest 
rate policies. This is illustrated in continued divergence in interest rates across countries 
by more than can be explained by risk premia, exchange rate expectations and "normal" 
transactions costs.
A result is the associated increasing disintegration between goods markets. Whereas 
prices in financial markets adjust rapidly to new information and may overshoot 
(Dombusch 1976, Frankel & Meese 1987), goods markets are slow to adjust (Wilson & 
Takacs 1980, Bordo 1980). Increasing foreign exchange risk premia (reflecting 
uncertainty on the course of divergent governmental policies) helps to explain the decline 
in total financial integration. However, this does not exclude the possibility that global 
capital market integration has increased. Thus indirect segmentation of both capital and 
product markets can occur by way of foreign exchange markets (Oxelheim 1990:5).
The potential role of the foreign exchange market in the indirect segmentation of both 
capital and product markets is only latent and has awaited other trends to develop to 
become powerful. Four major features of the foreign exchange market stand out since the 
commencement of floating in 1973. These are the increase in both nominal and real 
volatility (Kenen & Rodrik 1986); the increase in size of the market (Bank of England 
1986, 1989, 1992); the change in the principal actors involved10; and the change in the 
justification of the market’s usage from being one based on trade flows to one driven by 
speculation11 (Bank of England 1989), fuelled by chartism12. The foreign exchange 
market has become essentially an inter-bank market in which the underlying trade
10Up until the abandonment of floating, the principal actors were central banks. These have been 
superseded by private actors such as banks and brokers.
"illustrated in "bandwagon" effects and overshooting (Dombusch 1976).
12See Goodman 1982:135, Curcio & Goodhart 1992.
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transactions of industrial corporations play a relatively insignificant role.
Chapter 2
4. ECONOMICS.
One of the hypotheses examined in this thesis is that exchange rate overvaluation has 
placed U.K. firms at a competitive disadvantage relative to their German competitors. 
One problem is defining competitiveness. As both governments and corporations would 
a priori acknowledge the desirability of a competitive exchange rate, what is the link 
between the exchange rate and competitiveness ? What factors other than the exchange 
rate determines whether an individual corporation is competitive or not ? What is the 
best approach for analyzing these other factors ? Are they properly captured using 
neoclassical methodology ? What economic evidence exists to presume that governments 
and corporations should prefer a fixed over a floating currency regime ? What theoretical 
evidence can shed light on the link between exchange regime and whether a currency is 
under- or overvalued ? Finally, if corporations are dissatisfied with floating, what does 
theory specify on how exchange regimes can be changed ?
The contribution of relevant aspects of economic theory is examined under the following 
headings:
4.1 Exchange rates and competitiveness.
4.2 Rationale for investigating exchange risk and the individual corporation.
4.3 Evidence on macroeconomic performance under fixed and floating regimes.
4.4 Microeconomic performance under fixed and floating regimes.
4.5 Tools for measuring currency overvaluation.
4.6 Is currency overvaluation more likely under fixed or floating regime?
4.7 Monetary integration to preclude overvaluation.
4.8 Theory on how exchange regimes change.
4.1 Exchange rates and competitiveness.
Economics defines the competitiveness of an economy in terms of unit labour costs 
adjusted for exchange rate changes. Thus economics would explain changes in a country’s
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competitiveness in terms of variables bearing on unit labour costs and on exchange rates. 
Variables bearing on unit labour costs include the structure and pattern of wage 
bargaining and an economy’s propensity to invest. Both can be strongly influenced by 
government policy. Variables bearing on real exchange rates include exchange regime and 
macroeconomic policy and these are strongly influenced or determined by government 
policy.
At the public policy level, yet another definition of economic competitiveness is 
prevalent. This is that a country is perceived as competitive if it is in balance of payments 
equilibrium (Muellbauer 1992, Bergsten et al 1992). A chronic balance of payments 
deficit, for example, would impose a constraint on economic policy. Such a constraint 
might be deflation to remove the deficit. Thus, under this definition of competitiveness, 
unit labour costs adjusted for exchange rates can be perceived as a factor contributing to 
uncompetitiveness and thus the overall balance of payments position.
From the standpoint of corporations, the economics definition of competitiveness has 
severe limitations. Firstly, it fails to take into account that the aggregate competitiveness 
of an economy is the sum of the competitiveness of its individual firms. At firm level, 
unit labour costs are only one element in a firm’s ability to compete in world markets. 
Market structure is likely to be significant (see Geroski & Jacquemin 1985 in the 
European context). Multinationals can, a priori, also offset an adverse trend in unit labour 
costs in the home country by locating production abroad.
4.1.1 Conclusion.
No generally accepted definition of competitiveness appears to exist and that 
competitiveness means different things to different actors13. The economics definition 
based on unit labour costs adjusted for exchange rates essentially emphasizes the 
importance of price in competitiveness. Economic theory has little to say about non-price
13Krugman (1994) has outlined public policy implications arising from differences between trade and 
inter-firm competition. However, Krugman did not make reference to the role of real exchange rate 
changes, or to exchange rate policy.
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factors - (which reflects the bias in the literature toward macro- rather than 
microeconomics) - except for one non-price factor. This is market structure. Market 
structure in economics is a theoretical analysis of price and output decisions under 
monopoly, imperfect and perfect competition (see models in section 2.3). Empirical 
research on how market structure affects specific firms in specific industries has not 
generally been conducted in economics but in the international business literature.
4.2 Rationale for investigating exchange risk and the individual corporation.
Foreign exchange risk is conventionally defined as the additional riskiness in financial 
outcomes that results when economic activity is conducted in markets where the currency 
of determination differs from that of the home market. A completely different research 
method from that of the models listed in Section 2.3 is macroeconomic. This is to assess 
the impact of additional risk by testing whether or not a causal link exists between 
exchange rate volatility and variables such as world trade volumes. The principal 
examples of this method are listed in Table 2.3.
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TABLE 2.3
ECONOMETRIC TESTS OF THE IMPACT OF EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY
Exchange rate changes regressed 
against:
Authors Findings
trade volumes between selected 
countries
IMF 1984,
Akhtar & Hilton 1984, Cushman 1986, 
Gosling 1986, Gagnon 1989
no negative impact on 
trade volumes detected
ditto Farrell et al. 1983, Kenen & Rodrik 
1986, Gros 1987, de Grauwe & de 
Bellefroid 1987, de Grauwe 1988, Peree 
& Steinherr 1994,
Bini Smaghi 1990
adverse effects detected
output of three U.S. industries Ceglowski & Hilton 1987 output is adversely 
affected in two industries, 
but not in the third, which 
is nontradables
employment in three sectors of U.S. 
economy
Branson & Love 1988 U.S. employment declined 
with US$ appreciation 
1980-85
U.S. auto competitiveness Richardson 1988 trends in competitiveness 
are consistent with 
changes in exchange rates 
1976-85
U.S. corporate profits Moens 1993 U.S. profits rose when the 
US$ was overvalued
A critique of the differing specifications of tests that have been conducted did not emerge 
until 1990 when Bini Smaghi demonstrated misspecification and erroneous results. A 
further example of such misspecification is Moens’ (1993) finding that U.S. corporate 
profits rose when the US$ was overvalued in the early 1980s. This is the only test which 
uses data on individual firms.
A methodological problem with Moens’ study is that the exchange rate may influence 
operating profits through several channels and within different time runs. Since the 
sample consisted of 50 large U.S. MNCs, it can be expected that a significant part of 
profits were derived outside the U.S. However, changes in the US$ value of foreign 
currency profits would only be reported according to the MNC’s reporting conventions 
and thus need not be instantaneous. Changes in the real US$ exchange rate operate
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through more subtle, indirect and slower channels. It is these channels that need to be 
investigated.
Bean (1988) used a crude econometric model of the U.K. economy to investigate the 
impact of sterling appreciation 1978-81 on U.K. trade and found some evidence of 
hysteresis effects. However, this evidence is tentative, since it is at aggregate 
macroeconomic level, not at corporate level. Bean concluded that "further empirical 
work, most probably at an industrial level, would be fruitful" (p.64). This begs the 
question as to why Bean did not investigate the problem at the level of U.K. firms in the 
first place. The Moens, Branson & Love, Richardson and Ceglowski & Hilton studies 
are mis-specified in using data at the industry level since currency risk is not managed 
at industry level.
4.2.1 Conclusion.
The limitations of the regressions in Table 2.3 are that they do not prove causality and 
secondly, that they are open to misspecification14. Thirdly, because they do not include 
the decision-making processes and constraints that individual firms face in managing 
foreign exchange risk, their conclusions reflect the partial nature of their analysis.
14For example, a correlation exists between the share of investment in GNP and GNP growth (De Long 
& Summers 1991). It would be more appropriate to examine the impact of currency overvaluation on 
investment at corporate level, (which this thesis seeks to do), than the impact of exchange rate volatility 
on world trade volumes.
Chapter 2 6 7
4.3 Evidence on macroeconomic performance under fixed and floating regimes.
One reason why governments should prefer one type of exchange regime over another 
is the prospect of a better macroeconomic performance. A methodological problem in 
comparing performance under two regimes is that different time periods need to be 
compared. Thus to test whether ten years in the EMS has brought about a better 
macroeconomic performance than if the member states had stayed with floating is a 
counterfactual proposition. However, because obtaining a better macroeconomic 
performance was a primary justification for moving to a system of managed exchange 
rates in the form of the EMS in 1979, the decades before and after 1979 can be compared 
to investigate whether a better macroeconomic performance did result. The result is that 
anti-inflationary policies have acted to suppress economic growth (Melitz 1988).
De Grauwe (1989) has surveyed empirical evidence comparing the two decades 1963- 
1983 for OECD economies. His finding is that macroeconomic performance has been 
much worse under floating than under fixed exchange rates, but that this worse 
performance has not necessarily been caused by floating. In the decade following the 
switch to floating in 1973, at a global level inflation was higher (IMF 1984), GNP 
growth was slower15 and payments imbalances were much greater than in the prior 
decade under fixed exchange rates.
However, a better macroeconomic performance under fixed than floating rates could be 
coincidental without specification and testing of the channels whereby exchange rate fixity 
can lead to a better macroeconomic performance. These channels are detailed in De 
Grauwe (1989:223-228). In summary, at a global level, higher inflation was not caused 
by the switch to a floating regime; that world trade has expanded under floating exchange 
rates; that there was no evidence of a causal link between floating and the slowdown in 
global GNP growth; and that floating does permit payments imbalances to be reduced. 
Thus economic theory cannot answer why macroeconomic performance has been worse 
under floating than under a fixed regime.
15falling from an average 4.4% p.a. between 1960 - 1973 to an average 1.7 % between 1973 - 1986.
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One reason for the lack of an explanation is that the evidence cited above on 
macroeconomic indicators is at an OECD level, not at a country level. Some countries, 
notably the U.S. and U.K., allowed inflation to rise dramatically in the 1970s. Thus a 
more complete explanation of regime performance lies in policy analysis and the 
priorities given by individual governments to managing the various components of 
macroeconomic performance16.
The policy-making context in which exchange regimes are selected cannot be ignored, 
nor can the role of individual firms in the adjustment process under floating exchange 
rates. The performance indicators on which the above evidence is based are all 
macroeconomic. Yet the major impact of floating exchange rates on an economy would 
be transmitted via the mass of individual firms. How firms react, or are unable to react, 
to exchange rate changes is an aspect of microeconomic performance. Yet economic 
theory has little to contribute in this subject other than the theory of the firm and the 
models deriving from it, which were summarized in section 2.3 above. The definition of 
competitiveness in economics refers to the competitiveness of economies, not firms. How 
then can the competitiveness of the firm be reconciled with the definition in economics 
based on exchange rates and unit labour costs ? The concept of economic exposure is an 
indicator of the competitiveness of the firm, but this is a much wider definition than the 
economics definition.
4.3.1 Conclusion.
From the above, the economic evidence on whether flexible exchange rates are preferable 
to a regime of fixed exchange rates is inconclusive.
16For example, if macroeconomic performance under the ERM is to be assessed, an appropriate 
yardstick is against the performance of two proponents of floating, namely the U.S. and U.K. in the years 
following 1979. ERM member-states, in linking their currencies to the DM, prioritized lower inflation over 
higher growth in the short-term in the belief that this would lead to more robust growth in the long-term.
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4.4 Microeconomic performance under fixed and floating regimes.
Methodological difficulties similar to those noted in the previous section make a 
comparison between corporate performance under fixed and floating regimes in different 
time periods, or between different countries in the same period, subject to serious 
qualification. Marin (1982) has nevertheless investigated whether the policy of fixing the 
Austrian schilling to the DM has led to a better performance at corporate level. Marin 
outlined three principal channels whereby a hard currency regime17 could serve as a 
discipline on Austrian firms and thereby improve Austrian macroeconomic performance.
These channels are firstly, that pay bargains are struck with the expectation of relatively 
low inflation rates continuing. This in turn reinforces the competitive position of firms. 
By contrast, given the devaluation policy in the soft currency countries, employers may 
be more willing to grant inflationary pay claims on the basis that the higher inflation will 
be offset by depreciation. Rising wage costs lead to price increases, which fuel higher 
pay demands. This in turn exerts pressure for further depreciation.
Second, the framework of a hard currency policy forces firms in exposed sectors to raise 
their productivity. With an appreciating currency, firms have an incentive to cut costs. 
By contrast, a devaluation policy to match past losses in price competitiveness does not 
have such a property.
Third, an appreciating currency in nominal terms encourages firms to reduce the price 
sensitivity of their products by focusing on quality segments of the market. This need to 
focus on quality can have three effects. Quality products can command a higher price and 
can generate a higher profit margin; the need for quality encourages innovation; 
innovation in turn encourages investment; and the higher profit margin can provide a
nA hard currency regime is defined as one in which the government uses a monetary discipline to 
maintain a low rate of inflation and attempts to avoid imported inflation by allowing the exchange rate to 
appreciate.
By contrast, in a soft currency regime, the government allows the exchange rate to weaken to offset an 
unfavourable inflation differential with hard currency countries.
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surplus to finance the investment.
4.4.1 Conclusions.
The virtuous circle model stemming from a monetary discipline has three main features. 
At a macroeconomic level, exchange rate firmness can act as an instrument to stabilize 
the price level since nominal currency appreciation can reduce the risk of importing 
inflation. Second, exchange rate firmness can be a precondition of a successful incomes 
policy. Third, devaluations are unlikely to secure significant improvements in a country’s 
trade balance unless a country’s import and export elasticities are high, but under such 
conditions, the adverse effects of currency overvaluation would be reinforced.
Research is needed to answer whether U.K. firms would display the same benefits from 
a monetary discipline that Marin found for the sample of Austrian firms.
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4.5 Tools for measuring currency overvaluation.
Methods to measure whether a currency is overvalued or not are surveyed in Artus 
(1978). The purchasing power parity (PPP) and fixed equilibrium exchange rate (FEER) 
are the principal methods.
In its simple form, PPP holds that exchange rates adjust to reflect differential inflation 
rates. The mechanism is via arbitrage in goods markets. Thus the parity condition states 
that the correct exchange rate between any two countries is the one which equalizes the 
price of the same traded item in both countries. As a measuring rod of whether a 
currency is overvalued or not, the PPP method has three main drawbacks from the 
standpoint of the individual firm (see Balassa 1964, Officer 1976, Dombusch 1980, 
Darby 1980). First is that the result is heavily biased by the choice of base year, second 
that the inflation index may not be appropriate for particular firms and third that a PPP 
measure is between only two currencies, whereas a firm may trade with several currency 
areas. For example, the pound may be overvalued against the DM, but not against the 
dollar, because the dollar itself may be grossly undervalued. By using real effective 
exchange rates18, the U.K. government would be theoretically correct to declare that the 
pound is not overvalued.
Regarding the bias stemming from the choice of base year chosen, the conventional 
answer is to select a base year when the exchange rate of the country being analyzed is 
in equilibrium. This is taken to mean that exchange rate which results in a balanced 
current account. The asset market approach to exchange rate determination (see Section 
4.6.3) suggests that such an equilibrium exchange rate can, in the case of the U.K. at 
least, only be determined with great difficulty and caution, if at all.
There are other reasons to expect that prices across countries would not be equalized as 
PPP theory would suggest. Market structure, differing consumption patterns and the ease 
of goods arbitrage are relevant considerations. Whilst Manzur (1993:20) found that the
18Real effective exchange rates are obtained statistically by weighting exchange rate movements 
according to international trade and correcting for inflation relativities.
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PPP hypothesis holds in the long-run - which he defines as 5 years - firms cannot wait 
for exchange rates to return to equilibrium values in the long-run as they may be 
bankrupted in the short-run.
To make up for these shortcomings of PPP calculations, an alternative method is that of 
Fixed Equilibrium Exchange Rates (FEER)(Williamson 1983). These use macroeconomic 
models to estimate the exchange rate at which the economy can return the trade account 
into rough balance in the medium term. Whilst much depends on the validity of the 
macroeconomic models used, the U.K. National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research calculates, under the FEER method, that the pound was overvalued during its 
ERM membership in the years 1990-92 by much more than that calculated under the PPP 
measure.
4.5.1 Conclusion.
The PPP and FEER methods are sufficiently ambiguous to permit their conclusions to be 
manipulated to suit the purposes of the user.
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4.6 Is currency overvaluation more likely under fixed or floating regimes?
4.6.1 Overvaluation under Fixed Exchange Rates.
The main question is whether the coordination rules under which the regime operates are 
sufficiently flexible to permit downward exchange rate adjustment which could prevent 
overvaluation from occurring. A second question is the effectiveness of exchange rate 
fixity as a discipline on cost pressures, which in turn may preclude the need for 
downward exchange rate adjustment.
4.6.2 Conclusion.
To the extent that a fixed exchange regime may contain cost pressures better than a 
floating regime, then overvaluation may be precluded under the fixed regime.
4.6.3 Overvaluation under Flexible Exchange Rates.
Theory19 had, up to 1985, asserted that one of the main advantages of a flexible regime 
was that exchange rates would be correctly valued, since they would reflect market 
expectations of the real economy. This was because imbalances in trade flows were 
assumed to determine changes in exchange rates.
The claim that a flexible regime would permit exchange rates to be correctly valued was 
underpinned by monetarist theory. Monetarists argue that interest rate volatility is the 
converse of exchange rate volatility, and that to maintain fixed exchange rates implies 
volatile interest rates which can be even more damaging to the corporation than volatile 
exchange rates (Friedman 1970, Bergstrand 1983, Wood 1988). Evidence for the EMS 
up to 1988 (Taylor & Artis 1988) contradicts this.
Theoretical expectations were quickly proven wrong once floating commenced 
(Williamson 1985), except for one - that floating would enhance the power of monetary 
policy. A new theoretical paradigm was required to explain how persistent overvaluation 
can exist under floating exchange rates.
•’Lanyi 1969, Kouri 1977, Balassa 1980.
Chapter 2 74
A forerunner of a new paradigm was the Mundell-Fleming model (Fleming 1962)20. 
This shows that exchange rates could be determined not only by trade flows, but also by 
capital flows. Second it shows that floating could permit countries to insulate themselves 
to demand or inflation shocks in the rest of the world. This was because the model 
assumed (unrealistically - see section 3.3) rapid adjustment of trade flows to exchange 
rate changes, whereas the asset market comes into equilibrium only slowly with less than 
perfect capital mobility (Black 1977:28). This unrealistic assumption indicates that the 
model did not take into account the empirical behavior of corporations. Thus to show that 
the exchange rate could become grossly overvalued in a floating regime through capital 
inflows had to wait until new literature emerged.
This became known as the asset market approach to exchange rate determination. 
Previous theory assumed that trade flows were the dominant influence in exchange rate 
determination and that capital movements were merely accommodating to offset current 
account imbalances. By contrast, the asset market approach recognizes that currencies are 
held for their own intrinsic properties. The trade balance depends on competitiveness and 
the exchange rate depends on the interaction between goods and asset markets. Thus a 
currency can be demanded on the basis of its asset properties and irrespective of whether 
the trade balance reflects the competitiveness of the economy, i.e. capital account flows 
can be autonomous. The attractiveness of an asset depends on its supply and by the 
distribution of world wealth - underlining the U.S. power of seigniorage. The asset 
market approach accordingly offers a channel whereby current account imbalances may 
influence exchange rates.
Under a floating exchange regime, where there are no rules on international coordination 
of macroeconomic indicators such as interest rates, there is clearly nothing preventing an
“ Previous models of exchange rate determination assumed capital immobility. This was in keeping with 
the post-war order in which controls on capital flows were an accepted feature at Bretton Woods. The 
Mundell-Fleming model shows that with less than perfect capital mobility, a deviation of the domestic 
interest rate from the foreign interest rate will set up an inward or outward flow of capital to reduce the 
differential. In the case of perfect capital mobility, the model showed that the domestic and foreign interest 
rates will be driven to equality. The net capital inflow plus the surplus in the current account of the balance 
of payments determines either the exchange rate (under a floating regime) or the amount of reserve gain 
or loss due to intervention (under a pegged regime).
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individual government from raising its real interest rate differential as high as it likes (see 
White and Woodbury 1980).
4.6.4 Conclusion.
It is possible for a country to experience prolonged overvaluation in its exchange rate 
under both fixed and floating regimes. However, economic theory cannot answer whether 
and why overvaluation might occur under both regimes.
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4.7 Monetary integration to preclude currency overvaluation.
Monetary integration in the E.U. is unlikely to be durable if existing currencies are 
maintained in a fixed exchange rate regime21 (Gros & Thygesen 1991). Whilst a hard 
currency regime serves as a monetary discipline22, neither the existence of a fixed 
exchange rate regime nor a monetary discipline under floating are a sufficient condition 
to prevent prolonged overvaluation23. The existence of a floating exchange rate regime 
in the U.K. and in the U.S. during the imposition of a monetarist discipline was not the 
only factor permissive of overvaluation, since overvaluation had occurred under fixed 
regimes in both the U.S. and U.K. Thus an additional factor is missing which might 
explain why governments should choose one particular exchange regime over another, 
and in particular why in the E.U., governments should proceed beyond economic 
integration to monetary integration. Economic theory cannot answer either of these 
questions, since the E.U. is not an optimal currency area24. Given high labour 
immobility, the case for proceeding to a single currency is whether the benefits of a 
credible monetary policy exceed the risks deriving from the absence of both MundelTs 
(1961) criterion of high factor mobility25 and from the absence of a fiscal union. In 
theory, countries that have similar economic structures may benefit from monetary union 
but only when fiscal union is in place to cushion adverse effects stemming from labour
21see Chapter 10.
^The advantages and disadvantages of a hard currency regime are summarized in section 4.4.
^From a policy point of view, however, there is a major difference between them. Under fixed 
exchange rates, the impact on firms of overvaluation emerged gradually in the 1960s in the U.K. General 
agreement in the IMF that a fundamental misalignment existed in the value of sterling permitted its 10% 
devaluation in 1967. Under floating rates however, the impact can emerge suddenly and more pervasively.
^However, Sherman et al.(1990) make the case for monetary integration from the imperative of 
economic integration via the Single Market. The Single Market can increase the benefits of a single 
currency in the E.U., complicate national monetary control and threaten the viability of the EMS.
Bofinger (1994) argues Europe is an optimal currency area.
25The potential for countries to join a monetary union depends on the extent of real exchange rate 
changes that may be necessary between them if they formed a monetary union. If they enjoy a high degree 
of factor mobility, unemployment would not pose a significant problem and there would be no need for 
individual countries to have their own exchange rate instrument.
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immobility.
4.7.1 Conclusions.
Given the risks, it needs to be recognized that proceeding to a single currency is a 
political objective and the case needs to be made that the political benefits exceed the 
costs26.
“ see Goodhart (1990) for the economic costs and benefits.
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4.8 Theory on how exchange regimes change.
Economics can point to reasons why exchange regimes might change. For example, the 
balance of advantages and disadvantages of fixed versus floating regimes can change 
depending on changes in the external environment and other factors. Or the theory itself 
which underlies exchange rate determination might change to more accurately reflect 
changes in the external environment.
The question to be addressed here is whether economic theory was important in setting 
up the EMS and in decisions taken in favour of monetary integration in the E.U.
Conventional explanations of exchange rate determination in the international economics 
textbooks (for example Dombusch 1980:175-215, Winters 1991:397-432) all take the 
exchange regime as given. Two problems exist with the literature on exchange rate 
determination. One is that the models can be, and often are, wrong. Second is that 
economics neglects how the given regimes come into existence. These two criticisms are 
considered in turn.
Firstly, taking merely the example of floating exchange rate models, the empirical 
validity of such models is aptly put by MacDonald & Taylor (1989:xvii):
"Although the very early, flexible-price monetary models of the exchange rate, which 
assume continuous purchasing power parity, were quickly replaced by a sticky-price 
version which allows temporary movements in the real exchange rate, or overshooting, 
the degree of volatility in real exchange rates over the period (1973-1988) still provides 
a major puzzle. Moreover, other puzzles such as the failure of exchange rate models to 
outperform simple random walks in forecast tests, the very weak mean-reverting 
tendencies of deviations from purchasing power parity, and the empirical failure of the 
efficient markets hypothesis for many foreign exchange markets are all phenomena that 
have yet to be satisfactorily explained."
Secondly, the neglect in the economics literature of how exchange regimes change may 
be explained in that the transition from one regime to another represents a discontinuity. 
Such discontinuities are not readily applicable to model-building or general theorizing. 
Economics can explain the breakdown of the Bretton Woods regime in terms of several
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economic variables, such as the higher inflation and structural balance of payments 
deficits in the U.S. A more complete explanation would include a whole range of 
political, as well as economic factors, in the switch to floating in 1973. It can broadly be 
concluded that the decision was taken on the expectation that the benefits of floating to 
the actors concerned would exceed the underlying costs of maintaining the fixed exchange 
regime. This focus on the actors and their relative gains and losses is an entirely different 
methodology from that of economics. If this methodology is used, then the unexplained 
"puzzles" of MacDonald & Taylor are not "puzzles" at all.
Yet Williamson (1985) argues that economic theorists did play a role in the switch to 
floating because of their overwhelming advocacy of floating. However, they did not play 
a role in the regime change back to exchange rate fixity in the form of the EMS. 
Williamson (1985:57) argues that the role of the new theories in the movement to set up 
the EMS was marginal; neither the asset market view nor the Nurske (1944) vicious 
circle hypothesis seems to have played a central role in motivating the adoption or form 
of the EMS. Instead, the EMS is more an instructive political response to crises than 
conditioned by a coherent body of theory.
4.8.1 Conclusion.
Economic theory says little about the process of regime change27.
4.9 Conclusions.
The economics definition of competitiveness is partial; macroeconomic approaches to 
investigating the relationship between exchange rate volatility and trade volumes are 
flawed; macroeconomic performance is found to be worse under floating than under a 
fixed regime; a fixed regime can act as a discipline on firms and thereby assist in 
creating a better microeconomic performance than under floating; tools for measuring 
currency overvaluation are ambiguous; economic theory cannot answer whether and why 
overvaluation might occur under fixed and floating regimes; economic theory cannot
^That economics omits a full understanding of power in international affairs has long been put forward 
by Strange (1970, 1972, 1982b).
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answer why countries in the E.U. should proceed to monetary integration; economic 
theory cannot explain how corporate actors can change exchange regime.
5. CONCLUSIONS.
The neoclassical methodology of economics and finance with its emphasis on equilibrium 
states is one of the factors sustaining the policy conclusion that exchange rates should be 
left to market forces and that governments should not attempt to "buck the market". The 
questions that are asked, such as econometric relationships between exchange rate 
volatility and trade volumes, are framed by what the researchers themselves believe can 
be answered within the limits of their disciplines..
The question then is to specify what theoretical approaches other than neoclassical can 
usefully be applied. The three contributions of finance theory noted in section 3 are 
incomplete in the following ways. The treasurer is given the task of managing the 
currency risk of the corporation, but decisions on "portfolio diversification" of product- 
market strategy are taken by other individuals in the corporation. Similarly, finance 
theory offers a rule of thumb in the form of economic exposure, but it does not provide 
a blueprint of how it should be managed. Organization theory and strategic management 
accounting appear more suitable approaches. Thirdly, finance theory specifies that 
exchange rate overvaluation arises because of deviations of exchange rates from their 
purchasing power parities, but it does not explain why these deviations occur. Neither 
does economic theory. Once it is acknowledged that government policy is principally the 
cause of exchange rate misalignment, then the literature on how corporations manage 
currency risk can be seen as misguided in that it does not deal with the cause, but merely 
the symptoms of the problem.
Alternative theoretical approaches which eschew a macroeconomic bias and instead can 
be applied to examine the problem of currency misalignment from a corporate standpoint 
and which may yield differing policy implications than neoclassical approaches are 
examined next.
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CHAPTER THREE
THEORETICAL APPROACHES OTHER THAN NEOCLASSICAL.
1. INTRODUCTION.
This chapter investigates what appropriate theoretical perspectives from accounting, 
business strategy, and organization theory can be applied to the research probldmatique. 
It is acknowledged that other disciplines are also suitable in addressing the research 
objectives, as indicated in Table 3.1, and it would be desirable for completeness to 
include these, were it not for space constraints.
TABLE 3.1
DISCIPLINES SUITABLE IN ADDRESSING THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
Impact of prolonged currency overvaluation on 
competitiveness
The economics definition of unit labour costs 
adjusted for exchange risk is partial. It is necessary 
to add a balanced trade account to the definition, but 
the definition is still not complete. Suitable 
approaches are corporate strategy and market 
structure.
Impact of prolonged currency overvaluation on the 
individual corporation
Economic exposure cannot be measured. Analysis of 
accounts and corporate strategy would better 
illuminate the case studies.
Adaptability of individual corporations to prolonged 
currency overvaluation
corporate strategy 
organization theory
Evidence on micro-and macro- performance under 
fixed and floating regimes
social and institutional factors in economics 
organizational behaviour
Exchange regime and potential for currency 
overvaluation
regime theory
Theory on how exchange regimes change regime theory, political integration theory
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2. ACCOUNTING METHODS AND STATEMENTS.
The purpose of this section is twofold. One is to indicate the usefulness of accounting 
information for the case studies. Second is to point to the information that is needed but 
is not available in the accounting statements.
2.1 Usefulness of accounting information for the case studies.
The international accounting literature’s contribution to the problem of foreign exchange 
risk management is twofold. One is that it specifies the various categories of foreign 
exchange exposure for accounting purposes. Second, for multinational corporations, it 
indicates how foreign exchange gains and losses should be consolidated.
In categorizing exposure, the literature (eg. Belk & Glaum 1992) commonly distinguishes 
between accounting and cash flow exposure to foreign exchange risk. As noted in 
Chapter 1, the accounting concept frequently uses two standard definitions - transaction 
exposure and translation exposure (Wihlborg 1978).
However, cash flow, or economic exposure, is the principal concern of this thesis since 
the objective of the case studies is to demonstrate that U.K. corporations experienced 
difficulties in managing prolonged currency overvaluation. The transactions to which 
economic exposure pertains are uncertain with respect to both amount and timing. 
Nevertheless, even transaction exposure can be difficult to manage under prolonged 
overvaluation as hedging contracts may only be renewable at less favourable rates.
As the periods examined in the case-studies are in the past, information on profitability 
and a full ratio analysis can be calculated from the accounting statements to provide 
evidence of such difficulties. Where possible, this can be supported by information such 
as the trend in export sales, how exports compare to domestic sales and to competitors’ 
sales. By such means, it can be investigated whether German competitors to the U.K. 
companies improved their market share in the U.K. and derived a competitive
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advantage.
2.2 Information that is needed but is not available in accounting statements.
In a sample of 520 U.K. companies’ annual reports, Company Reporting (1994) showed 
that only a quarter provide any meaningful disclosure of foreign currency exposure. This 
is an improvement on 1991, when the survey authors had found that only 15% of 
companies analysed their currency exposure in any detail in their reports. In the 1994 
survey, it was found that most firms rarely provided quantified data of currency exposure 
for company debt, assets, cash flow and general treasury management measures. The 
small minority which did offer some analysis considered indebtedness and a small 
proportion analysed assets by currency. Only one company - Reuters - analysed cashflow 
by foreign currency exposure. Given the above indication of the dearth of information, 
this section focuses on five main data which would be desirable to have for the case 
studies, but which are not obtainable from the accounting statements.
Firstly, the internal cash flows of each firm and the currency denomination of its sales 
would be useful in order to perform a sensitivity analysis of real exchange rate changes 
on profits.
Secondly, even if cash flow information by currency could be obtained, or guessed, it is 
not known what external hedges the firm has transacted. The accounting statements also 
do not include information on internal hedging the company already has in place. It is not 
possible to guess what customized hedging, such as operational hedging, the firm has 
organized. Such information is not visible, but it needs to be, in order to make a full 
appraisal in the case studies of the relative capability to hedge prolonged currency 
overvaluation.
Thirdly, even where accounting statements are mandated to specify the translation method 
used, it is not known from the accounting statements whether translation exposure is
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hedged or not. One factor bearing on the decision to hedge is whether foreign currency 
cash flows are regular and predictable. If they are not, treasurers are reluctant to put a 
currency hedge on a foreign cash flow which is indeterminate, since this could lock in 
a loss. The translation of overseas subsidiaries’ results in the group accounts has two 
different effects - the impact on the balance sheet, and hence gearing, and the impact on 
profitability, and hence earnings per share. For the ICI case study, it was found that 
translation exposure is managed, principally because fluctuations in the year-on-year 
average £/US$ rate can cause significant changes to reported earnings (Lyle 1992:18). 
However, it is not known from the accounting statements whether and what translation 
hedges have been transacted. Without such information, it is impossible to calculate ICI’s 
income statement and balance sheet on varying exchange rate assumptions.
Fourthly, comparisons between corporations in countries with differing accounting 
standards for translation exposure add to the problem of assessing the impact of currency 
risk. For this reason, such a comparison using accounting data is not attempted in the 
case studies, but it is nevertheless worthwhile specifying the problems that can arise for 
the treasurer.
One of the reasons for the lack of a universally adopted translation accounting standard 
is that there are four principal conceptual methods of translation (Houston 1989, Nobes 
& Parker 1991:313). The differing methods give widely differing results, ranging from 
a large loss to a large profit, depending on the method chosen. The U.S. mandated the 
temporal method in FAS-8 in 1976. In 1977, the U.K. standard ED21 specified two 
acceptable methods, but it was not mandatory for firms to use the temporal method as 
it was in the U.S. The temporal method proved highly unpopular among MNCs because 
it led to wide fluctuations in earnings (Lassen 1982:125-126). These fluctuations arose 
because the U.S. standard disallowed firms to establish reserves by which the impact of 
exchange rate fluctuations could be smoothed out by adjustments to, or charges against, 
the reserves. Because of the undesirability of large fluctuations in earnings, treasurers 
found that they were forced to hedge translation exposure in order to report a more stable
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earnings trend. Thus financial decisions were being taken purely on financial criteria. 
After the replacement of the temporal method by the current-rate method in FAS-52 in 
1981, a U.S. survey (Doukas 1984) found that the number of firms hedging translation 
exposure fell from 60% to only 3%. Walsh (1986:75-76) concluded from this:
"Translation exposure has been excluded from consideration in this thesis because it is 
no longer an important issue...Given both the apparent lack of management and 
shareholder interest in translation exposure, it will be ignored."
Later surveys (see Appendix 2) found that firms do regard translation exposure as 
important and are indeed managing it (eg. Lyle 1992). The relevance for the case studies 
of differing translation accounting standards relates to competitive advantage. However, 
because it is not possible to quantify this competitive advantage from the information in 
the accounting statements, a possible channel in which competitive advantage can arise 
from differing translation methods will be noted.
In Germany, there are no national legal requirements on which translation method 
companies should use (Beck 1989:9). This is in keeping with the German tradition of 
permitting companies to keep hidden reserves. German corporations, like those of the 
U.K., are subject to E.U. accounting rules. The relevant E.U. regulation is the 7th E.U. 
accounting directive. This, however, does not specify rules for translation. Thus, as far 
as German corporations are concerned, there is complete freedom to choose translation 
methods (Institut der Wirtschaftspriifer in Deutschland e.V. 1985:753). However, the 
effects of exchange rate changes on the company’s results and the selected translation 
method must be noted in the company’s financial statements (Hauptfachausschuss des 
IdW 1984:588, IdW 1985:754). By contrast, the U.K. has followed the U.S. in adopting 
standards as to which method for translation accounting should be used.
One reason why later surveys contradict the finding of Doukas relates to the 
appropriateness of various translation methods under differing currency environments.
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A comparison of the mechanics and effects of the temporal and closing rate methods and 
the appropriate circumstances when the methods should be used is given in Lassen 
(1982:130-135). In summary, the temporal method is suitable when the home currency 
is strong and the current method when the home currency is a weak one. It is notable that 
the U.K. and U.S. both abolished the choice/obligation of using the temporal method just 
as the pound and US$ entered periods of prolonged overvaluation.
The significance of the U.S. translation standard extends beyond U.S. firms since foreign 
firms are forced to comply with the U.S. standard in order to seek a listing on U.S. stock 
exchanges and gain access to U.S. debt markets as per Securities and Exchange 
Commission regulations. The question for competitiveness as it relates to the corporate 
treasury is whether the benefits of access to the U.S. capital market are greater than the 
costs of complying with Securities and Exchange Commission regulations. The relevance 
for the case studies concerns only the option open to large MNCs to fund US$ assets with 
US$ liabilities more cheaply in the US equity market than by borrowing US$ in their 
domestic markets. The peripherality of such benefits to German corporations can be seen 
in that in the case studies, Daimler-Benz is the only German corporation which has 
followed this strategy.
A fifth source of information to illuminate the case studies which is not available in 
accounting statements relates to economic exposure. Whilst a minority of corporations 
may maintain separate internal accounts on their future cash flows and their sensitivity 
to exchange risk, there is no consensus on how such accounts should be formulated. The 
theoretical requirements which would enable accounting reports to provide a measure of 
economic exposure are highly restrictive. Perfect and complete markets1 would need to 
prevail (Debreu 1959, chapter 7). Given the assumption of complete markets, all the 
assets and liabilities of the firm have market values. This means that the balance sheet
‘In perfect markets, all traders are price-takers, there are no indivisibilities, and markets clear in a 
frictionless, costless and instantaneous manner. Complete markets are organized markets which permit trading 
in all goods and factors.
Chapter 3
87
value of net worth equals the market value of the firm. With perfect markets, the present 
values of all assets will equal their current replacement cost or their net realisable value. 
Given these assumptions, the consolidated net worth will equal the present value of the 
firm’s future cash flows. However, the perfect and complete markets assumption is not 
only unrealistic, but contradictory (Bromwich 1977, Bromwich & Wells 1983). One 
reason is that under perfect and complete markets, currency risk would not exist. 
Incomplete markets will lead to many assets being non-marketable, and asset valuation 
and the net present value of corporate cash flows would be ambiguous.
Given the impossibility of calculating economic exposure from accounting statements, a 
proxy for the results of economic exposure can be derived via a strategic management 
accounting exercise similar to the following (Simmonds 1989:10):
TABLE 3.2
STRATEGIC ACCOUNTING INDICATORS
Volume Unit Revenue Unit Cost etc.
Ourselves 
Current position 
Change over period
Lead competitor 
Current position 
Change over period 
Position relative to ourselves
Close competitor 
Current position 
Change over period 
Position relative to ourselves
Laeeard competitor 
Current position 
Change over period 
Position relative to ourselves
It is not pretended that all the above information can be obtained from competitors’ 
accounting statements. ICI and its German competitors produce hundreds of products, 
thus requiring considerable guesswork to draw up unit costs and unit revenues. The 
framework is nevertheless conceptually useful in the absence of any other operational
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means of assessing economic exposure.
As noted by Simmonds, such reports do not mean that relative performance indicators 
become objectives in their own right. Achievement of relative performance does not 
imply a strategy that will maximize present value. In fact, it is the other way around. The 
indicators are the effect, not the cause. If the strategy increases present value, the 
increase will show through in increased relative volume, increased relative market share 
and lower relative costs (unless present value is maximized by running down competitive 
position).
An additional useful accounting concept is that of variance analysis. Given that economic 
exposure refers to unanticipated changes in real exchange rates, any adverse impact on 
the company’s future performance will be a function of the variance between the expected 
exchange rate trend and the outturn trend, and the extent to which the company is able 
to offset the economic risk.
2.3 Conclusion.
The critique of the accounting concept is essentially that it is backward-looking and refers 
to accounts drawn up at a past date. It is virtually impossible to calculate transaction, 
translation and economic exposures from published financial statements. These criticisms 
are not a handicap for the purposes of the case studies. Instead, to investigate whether 
a deterioration in performance occurred at the time of sterling overvaluation, a ratio 
analysis is performed where accounting statements are available (ICI, Lesney) and sales 
data are used as a proxy where accounting statements are not available (Jaguar).
It is not suggested that accounting statements are necessarily amiss in not including the 
information outlined in Section 2.2 above. Nor is it concluded that the case studies are 
inadequate because the firms would be unwilling to disclose such information. Disclosure 
on currency exposures and hedging activities would be undesirable from the corporate 
standpoint for three main reasons. Regarding foreign exchange exposure, disclosure could
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spur am undesirable critique from stock analysts on the firm’s product-market strategy 
before the strategy comes to fruition, thereby potentially sabotaging it. Secondly, 
disclosing information on foreign currency cash flows is equivalent to giving away up to 
date information on the firm’s trading position to competitors. Thirdly, the corporate 
treasury would not want to disclose its hedging strategy, as it can be ridiculed if  the 
strategy turns out to be wrong.
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3. BUSINESS STRATEGY LITERATURE
3.1 Introduction.
The international business literature makes a significant contribution over that of 
economic theory in addressing currency risk management. This contribution appears at 
first sight to diminish the problem of currency risk via a diminution of trade theory in 
economics.
The basis of trade in classical economics rests on differences in relative factor costs. It 
was shown in Chapter 2 that economics defines competitiveness in terms of unit labour 
costs adjusted for exchange rates. The significance of currency risk is that it adds to 
costs. However, the business strategy literature asserts that relative factor costs are not 
the crucial determinant of trade. This therefore tends to diminish the significance of 
currency risk.
The international business literature comes to this conclusion via its empirical work in 
market structure and via an analysis of strategy at the level of the individual firm. The 
degree of exposure to currency risk depends on the degree of competition. Relative factor 
costs are crucial in the classical trade model because of the assumption of perfect 
competition. Such an assumption illustrates how economics has treated market structure 
largely in theoretical terms. The business strategy literature, by contrast, is realist in 
incorporating imperfect competition. Its contribution is that it has developed an extensive 
empirical literature dealing with the competitive position of individual firms and even of 
nations (Porter 1990).
The purpose of this section is to provide a theoretical rationale for the approach of the 
case studies. This approach is based on the early Harvard framework of strategy dating 
from the 1950s.
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3.2 Matching qualifications and opportunities.
Strategy is seen as a match between qualifications (what a business does well) and 
opportunity (the firm’s environment). The firm’s environment is analysed in terms of 
threats and opportunities which give rise to key success factors. The firm’s qualifications 
are analysed in terms of its strengths and weaknesses. The interaction between 
qualifications and opportunities then give rise to strategic alternatives and the choice of 
appropriate product-market strategy. Product-market strategy refers to what products the 
firm should produce and what markets it should be in. These therefore are the main 
options facing the firms in the case studies.
Once the concept of prolonged overvaluation is introduced, the options may become 
constrained because of an adverse effect on, for example, cash flow. The treasury 
literature prescribes that strategy should be modified where possible towards the goal of 
creating a natural hedge. The remainder of this section reviews relevant strategy literature 
to investigate whether it supports or rebuts the treasury principle of creating a natural 
hedge.
The basic matching approach from the 1950s has since been extended such that the 
literature on strategy can be broadly divided into three perspectives. These are 
organizational, political and economic.
3.3 Organizational perspective.
The organizational perspective (Chandler 1962) focuses on the linkages between structure 
and strategy. Its contribution is in postulating that certain kinds of organizational forms 
give rise to certain types of strategy. Thus the concept of generic strategy was introduced 
into the literature. Generic strategies are of three types - cost leadership, differentiation, 
and organizational forms. A cost leadership strategy can be undermined by prolonged 
overvaluation, whereas a strategy of differentiation can serve to reduce the impact of the 
overvaluation. As regards organizational form, the questions to be addressed are whether 
a particular strategy requires a centralized or decentralized treasury and secondly,
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whether the management problems of prolonged currency overvaluation require a 
particular organizational form. These organizational questions are addressed in Section 
3.
3.4 Political perspective.
The political perspective (Cyert and March 1963), focuses on the bargaining process 
within organizations and between organizations and their environment. It perceives 
strategy as a consequence of this bargaining process. The question here is how to resolve 
the contradiction between the treasury prescription for a natural hedge and the lack of 
responsibility on the part of any entity within the firm to create a natural hedge. In 
political terms, why does the treasury have a relatively weak influence in effecting its 
desired state of a natural hedge, i.e. why is the treasury reactive rather than proactive ? 
This question is examined in Chapter 10.
3.5 Economic perspective.
The economic perspective, led by Porter (1980,1985) has come to dominate the strategy 
literature since the 1980s. Because of its dominance, it will be discussed at greater length 
than the other two perspectives.
A distinguishing feature of the economic perspective is its distinction between corporate, 
business unit and functional strategy. Corporate strategy refers to analysis of which 
business the corporation should be in. Business strategy refers to analysis of how to 
compete in a given business. Functional strategy refers to the initiatives needed to enact 
the business strategy.
From the point of view of the firm, the best way to compete in a given business is to be 
in a monopoly position and to maximize profits. Literature in industrial economics has 
since 1945 postulated other objectives of the firm, such as sales maximization (Baumol 
1959), managerial theories (Williamson 1963), organizational theories such as satisficing 
(Cyert & March 1963 ). Porter (1985) has turned industrial economics on its head and
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returned to an analysis of how firms can extract monopoly rents. The functional strategy 
he has devised postulates five forces of competition. He prescribes that firms should 
choose a strategy that positions themselves against these five forces. The ways in which 
this can be accomplished are via cost leadership and product differentiation.
Two conclusions emerge if currency risk management is applied to Porter’s analysis. One 
is that the positioning of the firm in its market is important. To the extent that firms can 
extract monopoly rents through a superior product range which is relatively price 
inelastic, the impact of currency risk is diminished. The second conclusion is that to the 
extent that cost leadership is necessary before a desired market position can be attained, 
the impact of currency overvaluation can be significant enough to inhibit the investments 
required to acquire the necessary market positioning.
The remainder of this section summarizes Porter’s application of the above principles of 
a firm’s functional strategy and the diminution of the role of factor costs. It then 
introduces currency overvaluation into the diamond model of a country’s competitive 
advantage.
It is widely accepted that factor comparative advantage is an inadequate explanation for 
trade to exist and for intra-country differences in competitiveness (Porter 1990:14). Porter 
cites that the internationalization of competition and globalization of industries has 
decoupled the firm from the factor endowment of a single nation. Porter thus concludes 
(p. 15) that differential factor costs are less important in explaining comparative advantage 
than how effectively the factors are deployed.
What explains the effectiveness with which factors are deployed hinges on the elements 
missing in the Ricardian theory of comparative advantage. This did not take into account 
economies of scale, product differentiation, technical change and changing demand 
patterns. These factors reflect imperfect markets, not the perfect competition implicit in 
Ricardian theory. Thus a technical advantage gives firms the power to circumvent scarce
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factors via new products and processes. Technical advantage can therefore be more 
important than low labour costs in comparative advantage; indeed technical advantage 
might put a reverse process into operation. The need for high quality, personnel may 
mean the most attractive location is an area of high labour costs; this is reinforced by an 
additional attraction of being near the market. This weakens the case that sterling 
overvaluation is offset by lower labour costs in the U.K. than in Germany.
Low labour cost, low-skill locations -(such as the U.K., in E.U. terms)- might be 
important for low-factor cost-sensitive industries. However, if low factor costs are the 
only advantage of a location, the basis of comparative advantage is likely to be transient 
(Porter 1990:15). The globalization of competition involves sourcing worldwide, and 
shifting factor advantage means that sourcing can be shifted to where production becomes 
relatively cheaper elsewhere. In effect, this argument reinforces the disincentive to 
produce in the U.K. under prolonged currency overvaluation.
Given that it is imperfect markets that lie at the root of the critique of the Ricardian 
theory of comparative costs, the basis of this imperfect competition requires explanation. 
Porter argues that technology gap theories (Wells 1972) do not explain which nations will 
gain it, nor why the gap is often sustained, rather than diminished. Vernon’s product 
cycle theory (1966) introduces the dynamic missing from the Ricardian analysis by 
emphasising the firm’s domestic market as a stimulus to new products. But it does not 
explain why technical and competitive advantage is sustained.
The growth of multinational corporations, which exploit strengths gained in one nation 
in order to establish a position in other nations, underline the market structure of 
imperfect competition. The strengths of MNCs also suggest why the gap might be 
sustained. However, the question is left unanswered as to why and how MNCs from a 
particular nation develop advantages in particular industries. Porter’s (1990:18) thesis is 
that conditions in the domestic economy are of crucial importance in this process. This 
refutes any notion that the globalization of industries and the internationalization of
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companies has reduced the role of the nation in the international success of its firms2. 
Both trade and growth theory in economics look solely at cost and ignore quality and 
differentiated products in competition. The concept of the diamond (Fig.3.1) is 
introduced to depict four dimensions of competitive advantage of the home environment. 
These four determinants of national advantage operate as a mutually-reinforcing system 
and Porter observes (1990:72) that the effect of one determinant is contingent on the state 
of the others. Moreover, the operation of the determinants and the interactions among 
.them lead to powerful external economies within the nation, often within a particular city 
or region, that are difficult to tap from another home base (1990:72, footnote 7).
By the same token, it can be hypothesized that the same interactions can lead to powerful 
external diseconomies if the determinants in the diamond become adverse. This is 
precisely the case of a discontinuity such as prolonged exchange rate overvaluation. The 
question is whether the effect of currency overvaluation in one country is large enough 
and of sufficient duration to play an important role in shifting comparative advantage to 
a rival nation whose currency is not overvalued3.
The process whereby shifts in comparative advantage from currency overvaluation can 
occur can itself be plotted using the diamond map. Starting with factor conditions, if  a 
country’s exchange rate becomes overvalued by a sufficient margin, this could raise the 
price of the entire stock of factors relative to that of a competing nation. If the 
overvaluation results from high real interest rates, it implies that demand conditions, the 
second determinant of national advantage, are being depressed. Depressed demand 
conditions usually coincide with falling profits and investment levels. If these lead to a 
marked decline in investor confidence and cuts in output, the loss in capacity could in 
turn reinforce the downward demand spiral as imports are encouraged by currency
2Thus Jaguar’s German rivals Mercedes-Benz and BMW derived a competitive advantage partly from the 
benefits accruing from domestic German production.
3This question is considered for the U.K. auto and chemical industries in Chapter 13.
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overvaluation and by the failure of domestic suppliers.
There thus exists a direct link with the third determinant of national advantage, namely 
related and supporting industries. If these are domestic (which the diamond theory 
asserts as being a source of competitive strength), then by definition, the overvaluation 
of the domestic currency will render their output more expensive relative to foreign 
competitors. This will act as an incentive to source abroad and therefore a possible 
disincentive for the further development of domestic supplier industries.
The fourth determinant, firm strategy, structure and rivalry, illustrates the essentially 
defensive nature of corporations in the face of exchange rate misalignment. Faced with 
uncertainty as to the duration of the currency overvaluation and the depressed demand 
conditions, it would appear a rational strategy to postpone new investment until the 
demand outlook becomes clearer. If no dates can reasonably be forecast for the end of 
the overvaluation, then it might appear rational to change strategy and switch production 
abroad, writing off the heavy sunk costs in the domestic industry.
Bearing on such a decision would be the structure of the industry. Technical constraints 
in the form of discontinuities in the production process might render heavy new 
investment abroad unviable, unless it could be shown that the overvaluation is permanent. 
Furthermore, firms might not be able to switch production abroad because suppliers 
might not exist; the very reason that Porter cites the existence of related and supporting 
industries as a strength can become a weakness if all operators in an industry are subject 
to the same rise in costs from the overvaluation. Moreover, the intra-firm rivalry that is 
seen as essential in the diamond model for efficiency and innovation is constrained by the 
fact that all firms in the industry in that country face the same overvaluation. Whilst the 
impact of the overvaluation on their profitability will differ according to, among other 
factors, the degree of dependence on the domestic economy, the existence of global 
competition indicates an erosion of home demand and exports. Even with intra-firm 
rivalry, the strategic choices available are limited - to cut output and source or produce
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abroad.
The logic of the argument presented here is that instead of an industry flourishing and 
building on the existence of the favourable features of the diamond, just one major 
adverse factor such as prolonged overvaluation of the domestic currency can act as a 
discontinuity and set in train a process of disinvestment. This can erode the large external 
economies which act as a source of advantage to the industry. An opportunity is provided 
for firms in the country whose currency is not overvalued to supplant those in the 
economy with the overvalued exchange rate.
The question then remains as to why Porter did not incorporate the significance of 
exchange rate shifts into his analysis. The effect of an overvalued exchange rate is to 
raise domestic factor costs relative to those abroad. The fundamental basis of Porter’s 
analysis is a critique of the importance of relative factor costs. Thus a stress on the 
importance of exchange rates would appear to undermine Porter’s conclusions. Porter 
cites (1990:3), mentioning Germany and Switzerland, that nations have enjoyed rapidly 
rising living standards despite appreciating currencies. However, this neglects to 
distinguish between nominal and real appreciation. Nominal appreciation merely offsets 
the lower rates of inflation in these two countries. Porter questions whether a 
"competitive" nation can be defined as one whose exchange rate makes its products price 
competitive in international markets. He argues (1990:8) that the expansion of exports 
because of low wages and a weak currency, at the same time as the nation imports 
sophisticated goods - (which its firms cannot produce with sufficient productivity to 
compete with foreign rivals) - may bring trade into balance or surplus, but lowers the 
nation’s standard of living. This argument is relevant in a comparison between the U.K. 
and Germany.
Here Porter is acknowledging that a nation can have a "strong" currency because its 
economy is strong. Thus the independent determinants of national advantage within the 
diamond are such that the economy can offset the seeming disadvantage of relatively
Chapter 3
99
higher factor costs - from a currency which is appreciating in real terms - by generating 
productivity increases. The productivity increases accordingly make possible the real 
currency appreciation.
From this standpoint, it can be seen that the exchange rate is a dependent variable and 
that the four determinants of national advantage are independent variables. Thus the logic 
of why Porter placed the independent variables within the diamond and the exchange rate 
outside the diamond is clear.
However, the result is to underemphasize the importance of exchange rate changes. The 
question is whether Porter’s standpoint of the exchange rate as a dependent variable is 
the more valid one as far as the U.K. is concerned. Porter neglects that exchange rate 
overvaluation can be of a size and duration that it inhibits the process of investment 
necessary for both market positioning and for generating the productivity increases. 
Secondly, the model, in placing the government sector outside the diamond, also 
underemphasizes the importance of government. This is a serious omission given the role 
of government policy in prolonged currency overvaluation.
Developing on from the economic perspective in strategy, it is appropriate to review three 
fundamental tensions in the perspective of strategy. These are a positional versus a 
competence perspective; a voluntaristic versus a deterministic perspective; and a 
deliberate versus an emergent perspective. These will be briefly summarized and applied 
to the problem of currency overvaluation.
3.6 Positional versus competence perspectives.
Already from the mid-1960s to the 1980s, the link between a corporation’s qualifications 
and environment had focused strategy literature on "resource analysis", also termed the 
"distinctive competences" of firms. It is argued (Nelson & Winter 1982) that it is this 
bundle of competences that constitute the enduring sources of competitive advantage 
rather than Porter’s assertion of the firm’s position in the market. The resource based
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perspective has been further developed by Hamel and Pralahad (1985) to focus on the 
core competences of an organization as the key to strategic advantage.
Porter’s positional perspective implies that competences can be bought in the 
marketplace. The resource based perspective asserts that market position can be eroded 
via competition and that it is not enough simply to be concerned with position, i.e. to 
choose a strategy and to implement it well. Instead, they stress that it takes time to 
accumulate core competences. History matters in that the past choices a firm makes 
endows it with resources which may be difficult to replicate by "buying in" as Porter 
claims.
The relevance of prolonged currency overvaluation is that the core competences which 
might have been built up over years can suddenly be rendered uneconomic. A prime 
example of such vulnerability is the U.K. aircraft industry. U.K. aircraft-makers cannot 
suddenly transfer production to another country not subject to currency overvaluation. 
Similarly, skilled aircraft workers cannot be bought easily in another country unless 
poached from competitors. Thus both the positional and competence perspective support 
the notion that currency overvaluation can represent a discontinuity which cannot be 
managed. Whilst Bartlett & Ghoshal (1991) emphasize organizational capability and the 
ability to transplant innovations from one part of the world to another, the reality in 
industries such as the aircraft industry is quite different.
3.7 Voluntaristic versus deterministic perspectives.
Organizational theorists stress that firms can be "prisoners" of their environment. This 
"trap" represents a voluntaristic perspective of strategy. Hamel and Pralahad (1989) 
emphasize the need for a strategic intent or mission, i.e. a deterministic perspective of 
strategy. This implies that to escape the effects of currency overvaluation, corporations 
must plan their operations to minimize the risk of currency misalignment. This in turn 
implies global diversification and divestment from dependence on any one country which 
could be subject to prolonged currency overvaluation.
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3.8 Deliberative versus emergent perspectives.
The notion of rational analysis leading to strategic intent and action underlined by Hamel 
and Pralahad is not shared by Mintzberg (1990a, 1990b). Mintzberg asserts that in the 
deliberative perspective of strategy, intended strategies are assumed to lead to realised 
strategies. Mintzberg notes that intended strategies are often not realised and that realised 
strategies are often not intended. Such unintended realised strategies are termed emergent 
strategies. This notion accords with the crisis management necessitated by such a 
discontinuity as exchange rate overvaluation. However, emergent strategies are hardly 
a recipe for managing prolonged currency overvaluation, since by definition, the 
strategies only emerge when the damage has already been done.
The literature on emergent strategies has been extended to include a further distinction 
between experiential and inertial organizations. In experiential corporations, strategies 
unfold as corporations would learn from the lessons of currency overvaluation elsewhere, 
whereas inertial firms may simply go bankrupt.
Experiential strategies constitute a further critique on the school of strategy represented 
by Porter. Firstly, the learning process depends on the people in the organization. 
Rethinking may only be possible if existing managers are replaced. Secondly, it 
underlines that strategic change is costly. Dent (1990) advocates strategies for subsistence 
in that all organizations should have an implicit model of how they interact with their 
own environment for survival. This is the closest the literature on strategy has reached 
to prescribing models of how firms should in strategic terms monitor and manage 
exchange rate overvaluation and the ensuing effects on their competitiveness.
3.9 Conclusions.
The 1950s literature on strategy based on analysis of a firm’s strengths and weaknesses 
and opportunities and threats is useful to apply in the case studies. The purpose is to 
focus on the options and constraints facing the case study firms when subject to prolonged 
currency overvaluation. The options and constraints then determine whether the elements
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of strategy outlined in this section, (which can be applied to diminish the significance of 
factor costs), are operational for the case study firms. It needs to be stressed that the 
options and constraints are unique to each firm. This further underpins the rationale for 
the case study approach employed in this thesis.
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4. ORGANIZATION THEORY.
4.1 Problem Identification.
The major difference between transaction/translation exposure and economic exposure is 
that transaction and translation exposure present operational problems which can be 
covered at a cost to the firm. Economic exposure cannot be covered, but can be reduced 
via diversification. The management of transaction and translation exposure is a routine 
function and lies solely within the ambit of the corporate treasury function. By contrast, 
the management of economic exposure is an aspect of the firm’s strategy. This is largely 
a function of the firm’s investment policy, over which the treasury generally has no 
control except over capital budgeting.
Applicable literature from organization theory investigates the optimal organizational 
structure within the corporation, subject to constraints. The literature is also concerned 
with the design of methods of performance evaluation which are consistent in that they 
do not distort efficient resource allocation within the corporation.
The purpose of this section is to assess whether this literature can provide useful insights 
to the problem of how the firm manages prolonged currency overvaluation. The central 
problem is that the overall functional responsibility for currency risk management is 
usually vested in the treasury, when a firm has one4. The treasury’s time horizons tend 
only to be as long as those of financial instruments. Yet it is production decisions that 
generate the exchange risk in the first place. These investment decisions in production 
are not taken by the treasury but by the business units. The decisions of the business units
The majority of the 116 responses to Edelshain’s (1995) survey of "Times 1000" 
corporations did not have treasuries. If these companies are too small to set up treasuries, 
it might be deduced that they are also too small to justify having a corporate planning 
department to manage prolonged overvaluation strategically. These observations are 
consistent with this thesis on the difficulties firms face in managing misalignment, since 
a substitute finance department is hardly likely to have more expertise than a specialist 
treasurer or specialist corporate planner.
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may be subject to the approval of the board, as advised by the corporate planning or 
strategy departments. This raises two questions relating to the effectiveness of currency 
risk management. One is that to the extent that the interaction between the two 
departments is sub-optimal, sub-optimal decision-making is likely to result. Second stems 
from the prescription of portfolio theory. If prolonged currency overvaluation can only 
be effectively managed via diversification, what conclusions follow for the internal 
organization of the corporation ? Should the role of the treasury function be widened to 
embrace the corporation’s investment decisions ?
Within the above problem formulation, it should be noted that the treasury function is 
limited even within the finance function of the corporation and is only part of the team 
reporting to the finance director. The organization of the finance function in a typical 
large organization is illustrated below:
DIAGRAM 3.2
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE FINANCE FUNCTION IN A TYPICAL LARGE 
CORPORATION
FINANCE DIRECTOR 
! , -  (  1
Financial Controller Treasurer Audit Manager Tax Manager
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The diagrammatic representation indicates that considerable liaison exists between
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treasury and financial accounting and management accounting staff as well as with tax
specialists. This liaison may involve decisions on hedging currency and interest rate risks 
on the balance sheet, on identifying project cash flows and on assessing the tax 
implications of new projects and of financial decisions. In contrast to the dominance of 
the purely financial role of the finance function by the treasurer, the finance director will 
generally focus on issues other than risk management (Holland 1993:17).
The relationship between the treasurer and finance director is a reporting one. Unlike the 
accounting and audit aspects of the finance function, the treasury has a strong cost 
reduction or profit maximization orientation. However, in procedures for managing 
foreign exchange risk (Diagram 3.3), the treasury’s reporting is not to the other business 
divisions of the corporation, but upwards to the finance director. Thus it is the finance 
director, not the treasurer, whose liaison with the senior management necessitates a seat 
on the board and at least equal status to the heads of the business divisions.
The question is how the treasury can proactively (Diagram 3.4) influence the business 
divisions and whether its subordinate position in relation to the heads of the business 
divisions is a handicap.
4.2 Contribution of Organization theory.
Organization theory sees the firm as a pluralistic organization and emphasizes that totally 
comprehensive rational analysis and its consequent implementation extending right across 
a major corporation is impossible to achieve (Tomkins 1991:207). The basis of this 
conclusion is threefold.
One is that the totally comprehensive analysis of an organization is by its very nature so 
complex that by the time it is completed it will no longer be rational because life moves 
on before the implementation is complete.
Second is that the necessary specialization of functions is not necessarily consistent with 
action rationality.
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Third is that internal barriers to change exist as the natural consequence of attempting to 
combine together multi-interest groups possessing different power and influence. The 
combination can be a set organizational schema in which some approximate balance of 
interests has been achieved. Once the organizational schema is broken, the internal 
barriers to change arise because change affects some interests more than others.
Organization theory concludes that because some interests in the corporation will only 
perceive how they are affected as the change unfolds, successful change needs ongoing 
management until a point is reached where stability is reattained.
Applying the theory to corporate currency risk management, the objective is to integrate 
the treasury and corporate strategy roles in managing exchange rate misalignment. The 
theory indicates that resistance will arise from three sources. One is from the 
specialization of functions which results in a lack of understanding of each other’s 
expertise. Second is from the possibility that the treasury and corporate strategy 
departments have merely an advisory role to the heads of the business divisions. Third 
is from concern as to whether the functions of the treasury and corporate strategy and 
business division heads will be upgraded or deemphasized in relation to each other in the 
corporate hierarchy.
This latter concern is understandable because if one of the functions is upgraded in the 
decision-making process, a fear would arise on the part of each interest of not having the 
necessary expertise to make "rational and correct decisions". The treasurer’s expertise 
lies in short-term financial management and not in product-market strategy. Similarly, 
the corporate strategist’s knowledge of financial strategy may be limited. For the above 
reasons, organization theory’s contribution to the problem of economic exposure 
management is only partial at best.
As the above conflicts and separation of interests reflect similar conflicts in the academic 
literature, it is necessary to delineate the links between finance theory and strategic
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analysis, and organization theory and strategic investment decisions.
The literature linking finance theory with strategic analysis has to deal with the fact that 
finance theory typically treats investment decisions as a self contained financial problem 
and nothing to do with strategy. The real conflict between strategy and finance relates to 
the firm’s attitudes to risk and this is linked in with organization theory in that personnel 
preoccupied with day-to-day decisions cannot focus on the long-run. Thus finance theory 
dictates that investment decisions be based on discounting the net present value of cash 
flows arising from the investment, but the treasury staff who might be monitoring such 
calculations can only make them in tangible areas of invesment. Non-tangible, or strategic 
benefits of the investment, would be excluded.
The literature has attempted to overcome this problem with portfolio matrices, pioneered 
by the Boston Consulting Group in 1970. In these matrices, performance is measured by 
growth/market share axes and the discounted cash flow technique is not used. The 
critique of portfolio matrices is that they provide only very broad views of what kind of 
activities a firm may wish to invest in, rather than providing direct assistance in 
formulating assumptions to drive any financial appraisal.
The literature linking organizational decision processes and strategic investment decisions 
indicates that major investment decisions are iterative and only part rational on account 
of internal political bias and cognitive overload (early work on this topic is Braybrook 
and Lindblom 1963). In addition, the literature highlights that the investment decisions 
involve complex learning processes which organizations are poor at (Argyris 1977).
The above brief survey does not include the whole range of strategic factors that can 
outweigh currency risk. The analyses of strategic investment appraisal by Simmonds 
(1987) and Bromwich and Bhimani (1989) both recognize the need to trace the benefits 
of strategic investments on a range of market factors. The authors show that such 
appraisals involve significant pitfalls. For example, a broad assessment of increased
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market share without an analysis of order-winning criteria is unsatisfactory. General 
statements that investment appraisals should include data on, for example, product 
enhancement, diversification, risk reduction and increased internal benefits do little more 
than say that something more is needed.
The problem of decision rules in investment appraisal with regard to currency risk is 
similarly complex. This is well borne out in Steven’s (1977) claim that a currency 
adjustment can produce virtually any result regarding the relative profitability of domestic 
versus foreign production. Thus a devaluation of the dollar may discourage U.S. direct 
investment abroad, encourage it, or leave it unchanged, depending on how it affects the 
relative profitability of foreign production. This in turn depends on the dollar- 
denominated content of the foreign subsidiaries* cost function, the degree of 
substitutability of domestic and foreign production and the slope of the revenue function.
4.3 Conclusions.
Two important points emerge from the above literature. Firstly, it underlines the bespoke 
nature of the procedures managing currency risk. Secondly, it underlines the importance 
of the role of the marketing, product development, purchasing and functions other than 
treasury, in managing exchange risk and the need for close cooperation between them. 
However, organization theory does not provide a blueprint of how organizational 
integration between the functions should be accomplished. Not enough is known about 
the role of the Currency Committee indicated in Diagram 3.4 and future research is 
needed before conclusions can be drawn.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
Conventional accounting statements are backward-looking and provide little information 
on how a corporation is managing foreign exchange risk. Accounting theory makes a 
useful contribution in pointing to the need for internal accounts based on the present value 
of future cash flows, which is the essence of economic exposure. However, a practical 
means for the treasurer to quantify economic exposure remains undeveloped. Strategic 
management accounting and variance analysis provide an indication to the company of 
its economic exposure. Lack of information prevents these techniques being used in the 
case studies, but ratio analysis nevertheless is adequate to give an indication of how the 
subject company fared during past periods of currency overvaluation.
The business strategy literature has deflected attention away from exchange risk by 
highlighting the importance of non-price factors. What the case studies attempt to 
demonstrate is that in instances of prolonged currency overvaluation, price factors can 
become of such overriding importance that they outweigh the non-price factors.
The contribution of organization theory is complementary to that of the business strategy 
literature in diminishing the importance of price factors (and therefore exchange risk) by 
highlighting optimal forms of organizational structure which can deal with exchange risk. 
However, empirical reality has not caught up with theory. The limitation of the role of 
the corporate treasurer in the strategic management of currency risk is probably not 
related to the complexity of integrating treasury strategy with product-market strategy. 
Instead, it is the impact of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis that is likely to explain the 
lack of progress in the setting up of ''optimal" organizational structures. The hypothesis 
that firms cannot forecast exchange rates enforces a reactive pattern of adjustment on the 
part of corporations to exchange rate changes.
If corporations cannot change their organizational structure to deal with exchange rate 
fluctuations and misalignment, an alternative strategy is direct action at the cause, namely
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government policy. Such direct action might take two forms. One is via the political 
process to change exchange regime. The other is via treasuries’ own use of a basket 
currency in place of volatile national currencies.
Chapter 3
113
CHAPTER FOUR
METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES
1. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES & APPROACH
HYPOTHESES
APPROACH &
CHAPTER
INDEX
1. firms experience major difficulties in managing prolonged currency overvaluation. 
Sub-hypotheses:
a. the role of the corporate treasury in the management of foreign exchange risk is 
limited.
b. other organizational entities within the corporation are also neither channelled to 
effectively manage prolonged overvaluation, nor indeed may be capable of such 
management.
c. whereas the onset of currency misalignment can be very sudden, strategic changes to 
manage it are slow and reactive, rather than proactive. In consequence, firms can be 
forced into retrenchment.
2. Prolonged overvaluation may adversely impact the competitiveness of individual firms.
case-study of 
corporate policy
CHAPTERS 6 TO 
8
3. The adverse impact on firms that are vulnerable should also be evident at industry- 
level and, depending on circumstances in individual countries, in the macro-economic 
competitiveness of the economy. In this case, the interest of government as a stakeholder 
should therefore be significant.
replication of data 
in 3 countries 
CHAPTER 10
QUESTIONS ARISING FROM THE ABOVE ARE:
1. How does prolonged currency overvaluation arise ? Does the way in which 
overvaluation arises have a bearing on what firms should do to manage it ?
analysis of the 
causes of 
misalignment 
CHAPTER 10
2. Should firms attempt to prevent prolonged overvaluation occurring in the first place 
i.e. can firms collectively influence governments to preclude prolonged currency 
overvaluation ?
interview of 
pressure groups and 
interpretive review 
of corporate- 
govemment 
relations 
APPX. 1 & 5
3. If not, can currency exposures be managed jointly (including business divisions) or 
separately (only by the treasury) ?
Future research 
CHAPTER 11
4. Can international monetary reform, such as regime change, aid in preventing exchange 
rate overvaluation and what shape should such reform take ?
APPX. 4 
CHAPTERS 2,11
5. What is the place of currency risk in the overall risk facing the firm ? CHAPTER 9
6. What is the significance of factors other than currency risk - which are determinable 
by public policy - in reducing the risk environment facing the firm ?
APPX. 6
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The hypotheses are investigated using a twofold classification of research type: 
exploratory, and comparative/descriptive.
The investigation is exploratory because the impact of prolonged overvaluation on 
individual corporations and how corporations have attempted to manage misalignment has 
not so far been documented. It is similarly exploratory because corporate treasurers’ 
preferences on exchange regime have also not so far been investigated. Belk’s survey of 
U.K. corporate treasurers* attitudes (which were found to be positive) to the ERM was 
not until 1993.
The investigation is comparative because of the need to compare U.K. firms with their 
competitors based in a country which is not subject to prolonged currency overvaluation 
(see Charts 1.1 to 1.6). This permits the formulation and testing of hypotheses. One 
hypothesis is that the competitors derived an advantage from the exchange rate policy of 
their home government. Additionally, it permits a dynamic to be introduced by an 
investigation of what strategies and counter-strategies competitors actually pursued in 
response to the misalignment in one country. Not one of the empirical investigations 
made so far has included a study of competitors’ reactions. This is outside the scope of 
the survey research method. The approach of this study is therefore backward-looking 
in that it investigates the actual decision-making process of firms in the past. This 
backward-looking approach is not considered a limitation to the topic’s usefulness since 
there is little in current international monetary arrangements to prevent governments, 
notably the U.S. and U .K ., from pursuing policies which lead to prolonged currency 
overvaluation again.
The conventional distinction between pure and applied research is too rigid in the sense 
that in the social sciences, applied research can generate its own theories. The relevance 
can be seen in whether empirical evidence substantiates a rebuttal o f the policy 
implication of basic monetarist theory, namely that exchange rates should be left to 
market forces.
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2. RATIONALE FOR EMPIRICAL APPROACH
2.1 Review of research methods used in previous investigations. 
The table below provides a quick guide.
TABLE 4.1
RESEARCH METHODS PREVIOUSLY USED IN INVESTIGATING CORPORATE CURRENCY RISK 
MANAGEMENT - A SUMMARY.
Category number
of
previous
investig­
ations
of which include economic exposure, or competitors’ reactions.
Theoretical
1.finance theory
2.economics
1.abstract models
2. econometric 
relationships
3.actual experiments/ 
simulations
several
several
3
2 Naumann Etienne 1977, Mello & Parsons 1992
1 Moens 1993
2 Rodriguez 1980, Walsh 1986
Empirical
1. postal survey
2.multiple interview
3.case study
8
6
several
4 Broder 1984, Cezairli 1988, Herrmann 1989, 
Edelshain 1995
3 Beck 1989, Belk & Glaum 1990, Glaum & Roth 1993 
1 Holland 1993
The above-mentioned contributions are summarized in Chapter 2 or Appx.27
The finding is that the majority of studies have not even included Economic exposure as 
a subject of investigation. This is true of the early empirical studies but it is particularly 
so of the theoretical investigations.
2.2 Disadvantages of the neoclassical approach.
The finding in Chapter 2 is that the usefulness of models to incorporate competitors* 
reactions is limited by informational requirements. As this study seeks to investigate the 
actual decision-making process whereby actual firms have attempted to manage prolonged 
currency overvaluation, modelling is an inappropriate medium compared to one of 
investigating the actual decision-making structures and constraints facing the individual
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firm.
Hypothesis-testing via econometrics is also rejected, since to test the relationship between 
U.K. corporate profits and periods of sterling overvaluation omits essential detail of the 
structure whereby individual firms can or cannot manage overvaluation. Further, the 
likelihood of misspecification as per Moens’ study1 is significant. In particular, aggregate 
data for corporate profits would include MNCs which derive a significant part of their 
profits from foreign operations and would not include in the sample those firms that 
ceased to exist because they had failed during the overvaluation.
The merits and demerits of the research methods are summarized as follows:
1see Chapter 2.
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TABLE 4.2
MERITS AND DEMERITS OF RESEARCH METHODS IN INVESTIGATING CORPORATE CURRENCY 
MANAGEMENT - A SUMMARY
Approach Merits Limitations
models can be used to generate 
predictions or hypotheses
-models of economic exposure are non-operational because it is 
impossible to obtain data on competitor reactions 
-the predictions are about limited issues, with heroic 
assumptions
econometric
tests
can obtain exact data on a 
relationship
-do not prove causality 
-open to misspecification
-represent partial analysis as aggregate data is used
actual
experiment
can assess exactly the 
impact of exchange rate 
changes on the firm
-costly. Firms are unlikely to cooperate unless the researcher 
indemnifies them against losses.
-results apply to subject firm only.
-exchange rate changes would be those of the market, not 
those desired by the researcher
postal survey -can obtain data for a large 
sample
-useful when little is 
known on the sample 
-inexpensive
-responses depend on quality of questions
-responses depend on who responds and their motivations in
replying
-lacks explanatory power (see section 7.2)
multiple
interview
-avoids problem of non­
response in postal surveys 
-avoids ambiguity and 
response errors possible in 
postal surveys
ditto
case study -permits detailed 
information on economic 
exposure and its 
effectiveness to be 
investigated 
-permits competitor 
reactions to be investigated
-time consuming to gather data
-cannot replicate to the whole population of firms
2.3 The empirical approach.
Previous postal surveys are’exhaustive, but they are concerned with exchange rate 
volatility and they do not refer to any particular period of exchange rate misalignment. 
Further, as the firms are all anonymous, it is impossible to trace how exchange rate 
misalignment has affected individual firms and how they, and their competitors, have 
reacted to it. For this, a case-study approach is the most suitable medium.
Whilst surveys2 find that firms are not managing economic exposure effectively, if  at all,
2see Appendix 2.
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they do not prove the hypothesis that prolonged exchange rate overvaluation cannot be 
managed at the level of the firm. Evidence such as output cutbacks and profits crises are 
required. Surveys include only the surviving firms, not those firms that have failed. An 
additional reason why the postal survey method is unsuitable to investigate the impact of 
prolonged currency overvaluation on firms is that the most pronounced overvaluations in 
sterling and the US$ were in the early 1980s and the actors who were responsible for 
managing their impact are likely to have moved on.
2.4 Typology of the case study method.
The advantages of a case-study approach are principally fivefold (Scapens 1989:7-9). 
Applying these to the management of prolonged overvaluation, the method can describe 
the existing system of management within individual firms. Differences or similarities in 
practice between different companies can be highlighted. Secondly, illustrative case- 
studies can illustrate new or improved practices and their effectiveness. Thirdly, 
experimental case studies can examine the difficulties of implementing new procedures 
for managing prolonged overvaluation and to evaluate the benefits and costs of such 
procedures. Fourthly, exploratory case-studies explore the reasons for particular 
management practices as a first step for generating hypotheses for empirical testing at a 
later stage. Fifthly, explanatory case-studies attempt to explain the reasons for particular 
management practices to seek out specifics, rather than to produce generalizations.
It is necessary to select methodologies for illuminating the case-studies to address the 
research objectives. Cases are not a methodology but a method. As a method, their 
advantage is that they can investigate the actual practice of foreign exchange risk 
management within firms. The basis of the case-study method (see Mohr 1985) therefore 
lies in positivism, whereas the research method of models is based on normative theories. 
The methodological advantage o f the positive approach is that it is concerned with the 
way in which variables interact in the real world, but it is quite separate from the 
normative decisions which are up to individual decision-makers (Scapens 1989).
i
2.4.1 Conclusion.
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Case-studies can provide an analysis of how firms can or cannot manage prolonged 
overvaluation that other research methods cannot.
2.5 Disadvantages of the case-study research method.
As a research method3, the principal risk is that the cases selected are special cases4 and 
not generalizable.
A second risk is lack of rigour in the collection, construction and analysis o f the 
empirical data that give rise to the case-study. This lack of rigour is linked to the 
possibility of bias. Bias may be introduced from two sources. One is the subjectivity of 
the researcher, i.e  the evidence presented is the investigator’s interpretation o f the 
evidence (Yin 1993:70). Second is possible bias from the field informants on whom the 
researcher relies to obtain an understanding of the case under investigation (Hamel 
1993:23). Relevant data may be ignored.
A third risk is that the subject may request anonymity. This may mean that data has to 
be disguised and altered, such that the case becomes mere fiction (Easton 1982:2).
The above disadvantages need to be assessed in the context of the purpose o f the 
research, which is basically to validate a hypothesis. Hypotheses can be formed from a 
focused critique of the literature relating to the subject under investigation. Indeed, 
explanatory theories were all preceded by descriptive theories on which they could base 
themselves (Houle 1986:45). The case-study research method is descriptive and is
3As an illustrative, or teaching method, disadvantages of cases are principally fourfold. Cases can become 
obsolete. Secondly, learning from case-studies does not necessarily translate into better business performance, 
either on the part of the individual student or of the organization which is the subject of the case.
A third criticism of cases is that they rarely provide a holistic view, despite claims to the contrary; that they 
may ignore the dynamic process of management; and that cases tend to be solution- and information-oriented, 
not people-oriented.
Fourthly, cases do not stimulate real-time learning of business management in that cases do not tend to simulate 
learning under conditions of uncertainty. The case also lacks the essential ambiguity and the stress of reality. 
Business schools can use an additional teaching aid that may make up for shortcomings of cases, namely project 
work.
4Easton 1982:1 defines a case-study as a description of a situation facing an organization.
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espoused to permit an understanding of the empirical foundations of theory, since the test 
of a theory is its empirical validity. Theory must then be validated through a specific 
object of study based on deductive reasoning. Thus all theories are initially based on a 
particular case. The in-depth study of this case will tend to elicit more hypotheses that 
can be validated by other cases. This process will assess the general applicability of the 
cases (Hamel 1993:29).
Thus whilst the case-study research method is microscopic, "it has nevertheless become 
the ideal tool for micro-(sociological) investigation. Studying other cases makes it 
possible to moderate not only the limits, but the failings, of such a micro-study, as 
comparison between the cases puts the first study into perspective" (Hamel 1993:34).
Giddens (1984) asserts that the case-study is only microscopic for want of "a sufficient 
number of cases" but that the appropriate number of case-studies depends on the study’s 
actual aim. Thus the value of representativeness is not so much a function of the case 
under investigation as it is a function of the object of study5. In this thesis, the object 
is to investigate whether the firm can immunize itself from the effects of prolonged 
currency overvaluation. Thus the investigation can be constructed from a single case, so 
long as the single case proves adequate to meet the objectives of the investigation (Hamel 
1993:35). Hamel goes further and states that (p.35):
"Even if  the number of cases is a significant factor in the definition of an... 
investigation, it is not a paramount issue. Nor could this issue, in and o f itself, serve 
to define such an investigation. In other words, although the number of studies conducted 
is important, no...investigation can be defined on the basis of that issue alone."
To move from the microscopic to the macroscopic, the case may be regarded as an
5The virtue of models is that the explanation for a phenomenon determined through a model has general 
applicability and thus does not necessarily apply to any particular case or even adequately address the object 
of study.
The model and case methods can be reconciled in terms of the object of study. Thus, for example, econometric 
models showing that world trade volumes have increased under floating exchange rates is a general observation, 
but it may not apply to specific cases of exchange rate volatility (eg. misalignment) and to particular firms.
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experimental prototype. This makes an analogy with laboratory tests in the exact or 
natural sciences. General applicability results from the set of methodological qualities in 
the selected case, and the rigour with which the study, or the analysis resulting from this 
experimental prototype case, is conducted. Yin (1989:21) has introduced a distinction 
between analytical generality and statistical generality. Yin believes that the case-study, 
"like the experiment, does not represent a ’sample’, and the investigator’s goal is to 
expand and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies 
(statistical generalization)".
Regarding bias and subjectivity, according to Hamel (1993:31):
"Recent research on ideology and common sense tends to show that the value of 
meanings given by actors to their social experiences is relative to such experiences. 
Under such circumstances, it would be difficult to confer a negative status (of bias) on 
them, because these meanings constitute the direct knowledge that social actors have of 
their experience or of their social reality."
Regarding bias introduced from field informants, it should be noted that the natural bias 
of treasurers is to show that they have performed well, rather than to provide evidence 
to the researcher that they did not do what the treasury was supposed to do, namely 
manage foreign exchange risk. What the case-study can uncover instead from treasurers 
is that they did what they were able to do within the constraints facing them. Thus one 
value of the case-study is to examine the constraints and indicate whether these 
constraints are also likely to be present in other firms.
2.6 Previous case studies.
Only very few examples of the case study approach exist. Millman (1990) has written 
cases for a non-specialist readership on how selected U.S. MNCs set about managing 
their currency risk. Srinivasulu (1981) has written a brief case study on how Volkswagen 
has changed its strategy between 1970 and 1980 in response to changes in the US$/DM  
nominal (but not real) exchange rate. By neglecting real exchange rate changes, 
Srinivasulu neglected both economic exposure and currency overvaluation. Collier & 
Davis (1985,1990) have used the case study method to compare how U.K. and U.S. 
MNCs manage transaction and translation exposure. They do not examine economic
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exposure. Lewent & Kearney (1990), both treasurers of Merck & Co., have written a 
case study which includes details of how Merck manages its economic exposure. The fact 
that Merck is a pharmaceutical company renders the case study less useful to other 
companies with low value-added production and differing risks. The only known 
academic documentation of individual companies’ economic exposure management is that 
of Holland (1993). However, these are brief illustrations of a few paragraphs rather than 
valid examples of the case-study method. To date, no case-studies have been documented 
which have the purpose of demonstrating that firms have not been able to manage 
exchange rate misalignment, in the sense that they have been unable to immunize 
themselves from its adverse effects.
If firms are not able to manage exchange rate misalignment, the key question for 
treasurers is how misalignment arises in the first place and what they can do to prevent 
it arising. One aspect of the empirical research is to investigate the attitude of U.K. 
corporate treasurers to exchange regime. The postal survey method has been selected to 
investigate this (see section 7).
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 Research Design
A two-stage survey was used to investigate how corporations manage economic exposure. 
The first stage consisted of preliminary interviews with relevant actors to assess the 
suitability of companies as subject material for case studies. The process whereby the 
case studies were selected is described in section 4. The second stage involved the 
documentation of case-studies. These appear in Chapters 6 to 8.
3.2 Sample Structure & Selection Method.
Which corporations are selected for analysis is an important choice. This is because, 
firstly, no corporation is the same in terms of its exchange risk profile and secondly, no 
country is the same either.
3.2.1. Selection of countries.
• The U.K. and Germany are selected as they represent two contrasting financial 
environments facing firms in each country - one of sporadic misalignment in the U.K. 
and relative real exchange rate stability in Germany (up to 1994). The two countries also 
exhibit a high ratio of trade to GDP; a high degree of openess in terms of access and 
competitiveness given that the two sample countries produce similar goods; a high degree 
of interaction between firms and governments on exchange regime; and a high degree of 
interaction between governments in deciding exchange regime6.
The U .K .’s largest export market is Germany. Sterling overvaluation is most crucial 
against the DM. Since 1973, except for a brief interlude in 1990-92 when the pound was 
in the ERM, and in the mid-1980s, when the pound shadowed the DM, the U.K. and 
Germany have pursued differing exchange policies. The German authorities have pursued 
a policy of currency stability whereas the U.K. has not. Furthermore, the U.K. has 
experienced massive lobbying on the part of firms regarding the value o f the exchange
‘These latter two factors are not evident to the same extent between an E.U. member state and the U.S. and 
Japan, as they are between E.U. member states.
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rate7. Corporations in both countries are active lobbyists on exchange regime through the 
Association for the Monetary Union of Europe (AMUE). Moreover, the E.U. provides 
a ready institutional framework in which corporate concerns can be both articulated and 
acted upon in public policy. In terms of international monetary relations, the most 
realistic prospect for the creation of an alternative world currency to the dollar is 
emerging from the E.U. Thus the role of corporations in this formative stage in 
international monetary relations is of significant interest.
The selection of these two countries stems additionally from the differential in growth 
performance that has for long been a focus of the economics literature. However, this 
literature (see, for example the survey article by Crafts 1992) has focused on macro- 
economic variables in the two economies. The research that has been conducted at 
company level in turn focuses on comparisons of technical organization and education and 
training levels of the workforce (eg. NIESR 1994 on the chemical and engineering 
industries). No research has been traced which examines the impact o f currency 
overvaluation on individual competing firms and how these competitors are able to 
manage it on a comparative basis, either via treasury hedging or via adjustment in 
product-market strategy.
The selection of the two time periods 1979-83 and 1990-92 is precisely because these 
were periods when the U.K. currency was grossly overvalued, as illustrated in Charts
1.1 to 1.4. The 1987-92 period is selected to investigate how a U.K. exporter and its 
German competitors fared under US$ misalignment.
An additional reason for selecting the two periods of sterling overvaluation is to examine 
whether two selected U.K. companies were able to learn from the first period by adapting 
themselves when the second period occurred.
The above focus on the U.K. should not deflect attention from the fact that corporations 
in other countries have also been subject to major discontinuities in the domestic
This has found institutionalized form in the CBI.
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exchange rate. For example, Swiss companies suffered from the sharp real appreciation 
of the Swiss franc in 1978-80. U.S. companies similarly suffered prolonged 
overvaluation of the US$ between 1980 and 1985 (Charts 1.5 and 1.6). Whilst an 
investigation of how individual U .S. corporations fared would be timely, this would 
involve researching several additional case studies. Time and space constraints do not 
permit inclusion of U .S. corporations.
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4. SELECTION OF CORPORATIONS.
The effects of changes in real exchange rates will be significant on firms when three 
factors are present. First is a high ratio of exports as a percentage of domestic turnover. 
Second is a highly competitive market place. Thus not only export markets are lost under 
overvaluation, but significant inroads are made by competitors into the domestic market. 
Thirdly, the production process is subject to significant indivisibilities. Long lead times 
exist before investment projects come onstream and production cannot easily be 
transferred to locations where exchange rates are not overvalued. The above three 
features are characteristic of much of manufacturing industry.
Having narrowed down the selection of firms according to the above three factors, five 
further selection principles are applied:
4.1 Membership of the Association for the Monetary Union of Europe (AMUE). 
Three reasons for attempting to draw the entire sample from AMUE members can be 
advanced. One is that corporations would not rationally lobby for a single currency unless 
they believed that they could benefit. Thus members recognize the saliency of the linkage 
between currency risk and monetary integration and secondly, believe that they need to 
express their political weight in favour of a single currency. Thirdly, it is hypothesized 
that firms are forced into political action out of desperation at not being able to manage 
currency overvaluation.
Investigation of the motives of the AMUE founders supports the expectation regarding 
issue saliency, but not the hypothesis that they formed or joined the AMUE because a 
single currency can prevent prolonged currency overvaluation. The founders were all 
MNCs8. None has suffered a profits crisis or a severe management problem on account 
of currency misalignment. The currency risk profiles of the companies display marked 
differences. Total Oil and BAT are both heavily weighted to a US$ exposure, whereas 
the other companies are not. Fiat, Solvay and Robert Bosch’s main production is
“principally Total Oil (France), Fiat (Italy), Philips NV (Holland) and in the U.K., BAT.
Chapter 4 127
domestic, but both are heavily dependent on exports to other E.U. member states. Only 
Philips produces throughout the E.U.
A principal motive for setting up the AMUE is "the elimination of unwanted costs 
stemming from the present multiplicity of currencies" (AMUE 1992). However, all the 
founders, being MNCs, have sophisticated treasuries employing currency dealers to profit 
from currency trading. The fact that the AMUE states that it "is greatly pleased to take 
in SMEs, which will get the most benefit from the elimination of unwanted costs" 
(AMUE 1992) suggests that the founding MNCs have set up the pressure group for 
benevolent reasons. Lending weight to such a hypothesis is evidence that Philips 
deliberately engages in price discrimination, given the non-transparency of prices arising 
from the multiplicity of currencies in the E.U. Further evidence of the benevolent motive 
is that the chairmen of Fiat (Agnelli 1991), Philips (van der Klugt 1989) and BAT 
(Sheehy FT 9.7.1993:20) have all frequently made speeches exhorting the use of the 
ECU, yet none of these companies has put their chairmen’s exhortations into practice9.
Why these companies founded the AMUE is stated as "following suggestions from the 
founders of the EMS and of the ECU, namely the French President and the German 
Chancellor" (AMUE 1992). The founding chairmen are all an exceptional part o f the 
business elite in terms of their desire to influence public policy10.
4.1.1 Conclusion.
Given the above factors, AMUE member? are not suitable to use as case-study material 
to demonstrate the difficulties firms experience in managing prolonged currency 
overvaluation.
4.2 Degree of domesticity/multinationality.
A second criterion for sample selection would be to use companies across a broad
9Why corporate treasuries have not been able to substitute into the ECU in place of an overvalued domestic 
currency is the subject of a separate investigation (Jenkins 1994).
1(The chairman of Total, for example, is a former President of the European Commission.
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spectrum, from purely domestic to multinational, in order to demonstrate that examples 
from all categories could experience difficulties in managing prolonged overvaluation. 
Table 4.3 indicates a broad scale of such domesticity/multinationality.
TABLE 4.3
CLASSIFICATION OF FIRMS BY INVOLVEMENT IN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL MARKETS
Type of firm Product markets Factor markets Foreign
subsidiaries
Debt capital Equity capital
Domestic 1 D D D D
Domestic 2 I I D D
MNC 1 I I I D D
MNC 2 I I I I D
MNC 3 I I I I I
I =  high involvement internationally 
Source: adapted from Holland (1993:3)
Ideally, it would be useful to select case studies from each of the above categories. The 
scale is also useful to indicate how companies change their rankings in response to 
diversification or to currency risk management. BL is an example of "MNC 1", but BL’s 
individual subsidiaries of Jaguar and MG/Triumph during the 1979-83 overvaluation can 
be considered to be in the "Domestic 2" category, since neither produced abroad. At the 
highest tier, ICI is in category "MNC 3".
4.3 Relative sophistication of treasury.
Given the obvious conclusion that the absence of a treasury in small companies is a 
handicap, case-studies of large companies should be selected in order to investigate 
whether the highest degree of sophistication of the treasury is essential for management 
of prolonged overvaluation.
The degree of sophistication can be scaled according to degree of 
domesticity/multinationality, but such a classification is misleading if  it suggests it is a 
yardstick of the effectiveness of the treasury. The treasurer of a small firm might have 
a seat on the board and take initiatives in product-market strategy, eg. Lesney, thereby 
reaching the highest level of treasury involvement in product-market strategy which is
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called for in this thesis.
By contrast, ICI’s treasury, which is in the highest category of MNC 3 on account of its 
degree of involvement in international financial markets, will be shown in the case-study 
to have little input in strategic adjustments.
The scale can also be used to compare competitors. ICI’s treasury can be categorized as 
more sophisticated than those of its German rivals, since during the 1979-83 
overvaluation, ICI was already issuing debt and equity in foreign currencies. The case 
study will investigate whether ICI treasury’s sophistication is an advantage in terms of 
the management problems arising from overvaluation. The limited role of the corporate 
treasury however, can be seen in that BL treasury’s international involvement was 
hampered by BL’s credit rating.
4.4 Degree of product diversification.
In general, a company with a single or narrow range of products has less opportunity to 
make strategic adjustments - such as to diversify its product range - in response to 
prolonged overvaluation than a company which already has a diversified product range.
Jaguar is a good example of dependency on a single or narrow range of products. ICI is 
a good example of a company with a diversified product range with part of turnover 
coming from high-margin pharmaceuticals and paints which may be able to withstand 
currency overvaluation.
The system of classification in Table 4.3 can also be used to demonstrate that the 
German competitors to the subject companies of the case studies had higher involvement 
internationally in product markets, but have tended to remain domestic in debt and equity 
markets. This will be useful to investigate whether the greater involvement in product 
markets conferred a more significant advantage to the German companies than being less 
involved internationally in debt and capital markets than their U.K. competitors.
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4.5 Degree of geographical diversification of production.
In general, restricting production to the domestic economy can be expected to increase 
vulnerability to prolonged overvaluation of the domestic currency. By contrast, a high 
involvement internationally in factor markets should diminish the impact of an overvalued 
domestic currency.
Jaguar and Lesney can be considered to be good examples of companies whose 
concentration of production in the domestic market and high dependence on exports left 
them vulnerable to sterling overvaluation. By contrast, ICI is a good example of a 
company which is highly diversified geographically. Could this protect ICI from 
prolonged overvaluation, particularly in relation to its German competitors, which may 
also be geographically diverse ?
The significance of geographical diversification can be seen in that in the auto industry, 
BMW did not produce outside Germany until 1994 and its sourcing in factor markets was 
also largely domestic. However, although BMW’s involvement has been largely domestic 
in terms of factor markets, BMW could not be placed in the "Domestic" category since 
its involvement in product markets has long been international. This is evidenced in 
BMW’s strong marketing and distributional skills. However, the high international 
involvement in product markets leaves BMW vulnerable to possible DM currency 
misalignment on account of its high export dependence. Daimler-Benz can be categorized 
as "MNC 1" during the 1979-83 sterling overvaluation period of the case study, but has 
since transformed itself into "MNC 3". Similarly, BMW has transformed into "MNC 2" 
but has not felt it desirable to seek an overseas stock market listing which would place 
it in the highest "MNC 3" category. Reasons for the preference of the German companies 
to remain at the domestic level in capital markets are summarized in Appendix 7. 
Similarly, in the chemical industry, Bayer, BASF and Hoechst are all in the "MNC 2" 
category, whereas ICI is in "MNC 3".
4.6 Conclusion.
The above system of classification for selecting case studies is not necessarily complete 
for additional reasons to those mentioned above. Differing industries have a differing
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optimal firm size. The larger the firm size, the more likely it can be expected that the 
firm will be able to manage exchange risk. One reason is because the firm is more likely 
to have a treasury department which would provide expertise in managing transaction 
exposure11. A second reason is that large firms are more likely to have the resources 
to withstand prolonged overvaluation by, for example, diversifying abroad. However, the 
larger the firm size, the less the involvement the treasury may have in strategic 
adjustment12 - and the less easily the firm may be able to strategically adjust itself 
compared to a smaller, nimbler enterprise. Also, firms which are diversified may not 
derive their income from any one particular industry, but from several. The significance 
of this is that the industries may not be balanced in terms of economic exposure, and the 
firm’s industries may all be highly vulnerable to currency risk eg. Daimler Benz’s 
involvement in both the aircraft and car industries.
In conclusion, the selection of appropriate case studies is not a simple matter. However, 
for the purpose of documenting disequilibrium situations, the simplistic system of 
classification in Table 4.3 is adequate.
“though it is not assumed that the existence of a treasury department will result in the ability to manage 
exchange risk, i.e. including economic exposure.
12One of the treasury's roles is to provide input to business divisions on future exchange rates, but the 
treasury’s role in the strategy of business divisions is diminished by the fallibility of forecasts.
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5. SAMPLE SIZE.
The selected case-studies are not a randomly-picked sample at all but are hand-picked 
according to the above selection criteria. This does not indicate that the case studies are 
special cases, for four reasons.
Firstly, it is not the case-studies alone that provide the evidence, but the previous 
surveys, summarized in Appendix 2, to which the case studies are merely an adjunct.
Secondly, the case-studies permit far richer detail of a different type than that gathered 
by the surveys. The strategies of the individual firms and their constraints, compared with 
competitors, require substantial detail. Given the limit on length of Ph.D theses, a 
doubling of the number of case-studies would involve the sacrifice of necessary detail.
Thirdly, once it is demonstrated that the treasuries of MNCs cannot manage exchange 
rate overvaluation, then small firms without treasuries can, a priori, be expected to fare 
even worse.
Fourthly, the three case-studies examine the problem of currency misalignment from a 
different angle (see sections 4.4-4.6).
5.1 Conclusion.
Although preferable to have more than three case studies, the three are arguably sufficient 
to demonstrate the hypotheses of this thesis.
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6 . DATA COLLECTION METHODS.
6.1 Primary sources.
Firm-specific primary data was collected via a mailed questionnaire and via semi- 
structured face-to-face and telephone interviews and written correspondence. The direct 
interface was necessary to obtain unpublished information on German corporations’ U.K. 
sales and profits and to assess the reactions of U.K. companies to the sterling 
overvaluation. Similarly, the case-study on the possibility of ECU-denomination was 
highly dependent on the cooperation of the finance directors and treasurers in the subject 
companies. An additional reason for the semi-structured multiple interviews was that the 
case-studies focused primarily on how the subject companies manage their economic 
exposure. This is itself a highly bespoke function since each company’s market position 
and vulnerability to currency risk is different.
6.2 Secondary sources.
Secondary data comprised three main sources.
Firstly, company annual reports provide information on trends such as profitability. 
However, they are of limited usefulness since they often do not separate out the 
profitability of sales across borders, or may not even give data on sales in specific 
countries.
Secondly, secondary sources such as the Financial Times Top 100 U.K. exporters provide 
aggregate data on exports, and rankings of companies in terms of exports. Data from a 
variety of sources such as brokers’ circulars and press articles, industry surveys from the 
Economist and Financial Times, can be used to build up a picture of the company’s 
strategy prior to interview, when the unknowns can then be addressed.
Thirdly, macroeconomic data was accessed from statistics published by the OECD and 
IMF. Time series on various indicators was charted using Datastream.
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7. SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
7.1 Objective
Using financial instruments to hedge a currency exposure is in reality an attempt to 
manage the symptoms, rather than dealing with the underlying cause. To the extent that 
treasurers perceive this, the logical corollary would be for treasurers to recognize that 
they should seek to prevent currency misalignment from occurring in the first place. To 
investigate whether this is the case for the U.K ., U.K. treasurers’ preferences on 
exchange regime were surveyed. The rationale is that one constraint on governmental 
freedom to produce currency misalignment would be obligations which result from 
belonging to an exchange regime. The U.K. is a founder member of the EMS, but the 
U.K. government refused to join the ERM at the time of its foundation in 1979. Six 
member states agreed to keep their exchange rates within narrow 2.25 % bands either side 
of a central rate fixed to the DM. Throughout the 1980s, U.K. corporate treasurers had 
to manage far greater real volatility in their domestic currency than their German 
competitors.
The survey was conducted six months before the U.K. joined the ERM in October 1990 
and one objective therefore was to ascertain whether U.K. corporate treasurers wanted 
the U.K. to join the ERM, at what rate and within what bands, and whether the regime 
change should be taken further to monetary integration.
It is noteworthy that no previous investigation has been made and that none of the 
empirical investigations into foreign exchange management provided any information 
from which conclusions can be drawn. Every one of the empirical surveys assumed the 
exchange regime as exogenous and simply asked respondents what their management 
practices are, given existing institutional arrangements. These arrangements are floating 
for the U .S. and U.K. and, for Germany, a combination of semi-fixed exchange rates 
within Europe and floating against the US$ and yen. Thus new work had to start 
completely from scratch.
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7.2 Advantages and disadvantages of the survey method.
The survey was necessarily postal on account of the wide geographical spread of the 
sample and the large size of the sample. Alternative methods of personal or telephonic 
interview would have been far too expensive. The defined group was of corporate 
treasurers only. Other possible respondent groups could be chairmen or chief executive 
officers. Responses from these groups on exchange rate preferences - but not regime - 
were already obtained by the CBI from its members. Thus one purpose of the research 
was to investigate whether any significant differences existed between the preferences of 
U.K. corporate treasurers and those of their superiors. An additional advantage of the 
postal survey method over multiple interviews is that respondents are given time to 
consider their answers.
Limitations to the postal survey method are firstly, the researcher defines the questions 
and the responses are only as good as the questions that are set. The questions were 
therefore kept as simple as possible and the range of responses to each question kept to 
a minimum.
A second drawback to the survey method is its lack of explanatory power of the practices 
used by firms. It was recognized in advance of the survey that whilst U.K. treasurers 
might favour monetary integration in the E .U ., such a response could be inconsistent with 
their actions. For example, if  they acknowledge the risk-reduction properties of the ECU 
as against sterling, then why are U.K. treasurers not using the ECU on any significant 
scale ? Similarly, if  survey responses indicate that treasurers are in favour of monetary 
integration, then are they taking action to secure monetary integration and if  not, why 
not? The lack of explanatory power of the responses inherent in surveys would thus 
logically involve hypotheses to be formulated which would require further research.
7.3 Procedure.
In April 1990, the entire membership of the U.K. Association of Corporate Treasurers 
was mailed a questionnaire (see Appendix 1). Four measures were taken as an aid to 
maximizing the response rate:
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Firstly, to avoid the problem of misdirection, the questionnaire was mailed directly using 
the names of all members of the ACT as per its regularly updated mailing list. A high 
degree of pesonalization was thus achieved. The envelopes bore the name of the 
Association. The intention was to reduce the possibility that the questionnaires would be 
regarded as unsolicited junk mail.
Secondly, the questionnaire was accompanied by a signed letter from the Secretary 
General o f the ACT requesting members to complete it. This acted as an official 
endorsement.
Thirdly, the anonymity of respondents was guaranteed. It was hoped that this would both 
facilitate response rates and prevent respondents answering in a "public relations 
manner".
Fourthly, to avoid misinterpretation, the questionnaire was kept as short and simple as 
possible. To avoid pre-programmed responses, the concepts o f exchange rate 
misalignment and economic exposure were purposefully not mentioned.
7.4 Nature of sample.
The membership of the ACT comprises those with a broad range of experience, ranging 
from treasurer and finance director of large MNCs to those who have just passed the 
association’s examinations and have a minimum of two years’ practical experience in 
treasury work. Not all the firms represented are manufacturers nor are all firms British. 
Most firms represented are U.K.-domiciled, but the subsidiaries o f foreign MNCs in the 
U.K. are well represented. In consequence, a good representation of treasurers’ views 
on exchange regime could be obtained.
7.5 Typology of Questions.
The first three questions sought treasurers’ opinions on the completion of the single 
market and its relation with internal exchange rate stability. Questions 5 to 7 sought 
treasurers’ preferences on the desirability of sterling joining the ERM and at what rate 
and within what bands. Questions 8 to 12 sought treasurers’ preferences on exchange
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regime and, if  in favour of monetary integration, what form this should take.
The questions were of four types:
1. those which require a tick to record a certain classification.
2. ratings scales.
3. open questions.
Only four questions out of twelve were considered to warrant an open category. No 
questions requiring rankings were included in order to avoid subjectivity.
The first type of question produces nominal data which could be analysed using 
crosstabulations. Ratings scales produce ordinal data. In statistical terms, correlation 
analysis should not be applied to ordinal data, but in the social sciences this restriction 
is widely ignored13.
7.6 Analysis of results.
Of the 1150 questionnaires sent out, 210 were returned, giving a response rate o f 18.3 
%. This was disappointing when it is considered how highly personalized the mailing of 
the questionnaire was and considering its ACT endorsement. However, in terms of the 
general yardstick for response rates in the social sciences of around 20%, the response 
can be considered adequate. This is particularly in view of evidence that the respondents 
tended to occupy senior positions in their firms and had definite views on the subject 
matter. By contrast, the poor response from relatively junior members of the treasury 
profession can be deduced to result from their relative lack of knowledge of the subject. 
Thus their views can be considered to be of less interest to the research. In consequence, 
the poor response is not a serious impediment to obtaining useful conclusions from the 
survey.
13According to Havliceck and Peterson (1976:1334), the Pearson correlation coefficient can be used in 
nearly all situations in which there is a need for a measure of the relationship between two variables regardless 
of the shape of the distributions of scores or the type of scales being used. Thus Pearson’s r can be computed 
between samples of scores which are skewed in the opposite direction or same direction, when one distribution 
is normal and the other non-normal, when the type of scale used for either or both measures is non-interval, 
or any combination of these violations, and know that probability statements will be fairly accurate.
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The data from the responses was not analyzed statistically. This was partly because it was 
not intended to classify the data according to industry, size of firm, nationality o f firm 
etc. Another reason was the massive uniformity of the response, with 86% in favour of 
sterling joining the ERM. The small minority of responses against exchange rate fixity 
was not significant. In several instances, multiple responses for the same firm gave 
conflicting results, eg. BAT Industries pic.
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8 . CONCLUSION.
The U.K. and Germany are selected for an empirical study of the comparative impact of 
exchange rate misalignment on corporations. The impact of sterling overvaluation on ICI 
and Jaguar is documented for the periods 1979-1983 and, in the case of ICI, also for 
1990-1992. The impact of US$ misalignment on Jaguar is documented for the period 
1987-93.
To obtain a comparative effect, how German competitors fared relative to ICI and Jaguar 
is also examined.
A large U.K. corporation which failed at the time of sterling overvaluation, Lesney 
Products, is also documented.
8.1 Overcoming the disadvantages of the case-study research method.
The three risks noted in Section 2.5 were avoided in this thesis by the following means. 
Firstly, replicability was tested by examining whether the impact of currency 
misalignment on the subject firms was also evident in industry-wide data. Where 
comparison is made with Germany, macroeconomic data is also cited. This nevertheless 
leaves open the possibility that certain industries might be better able to manage 
misalignment than those selected in the case-studies. This nevertheless does not invalidate 
the cases.
It is useful to delineate two polar cases in which deductive reasoning might lead to the 
expectation that firms should be able to manage prolonged currency overvaluation without 
difficulty. One concerns protection from foreign competition via the production of non­
traded goods. The other concerns the production of traded goods which are protected 
from foreign competition by patents.
The polar case of the production of non-traded goods is that of the barber, who also 
enjoys additional protection from local customer loyalty. This still does not mean that
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barbers are immune from the effects of currency overvaluation; the misalignment 
syndrome and associated high interest rates, recession and unemployment may result in 
a significant cut in demand for haircuts, particularly in localized areas of high 
unemployment. This therefore underpins the thesis even in the case of non-traded goods. 
Whilst other factors, such as a change in fashion to shorter hair, can offset the impact on 
barbers of the misalignment syndrome, a strength of the case-study approach is that it is 
intended to include all possible factors. To avoid bias, the proper procedure is to use 
rival hypotheses and rival theories as quality control (Yin 1993:112).
A second polar case which might invalidate replicability is where the effects of 
overvaluation might be diminished even in the case of traded goods. For example, 
patents, such as on pharmaceuticals, may give rise to very high margins and protection 
from foreign competition. One of the case-study firms, ICI, derived 67% of its profits 
from pharmaceuticals in 1992, yet this did not prevent it from suffering a profits crisis 
during the 1990-92 sterling misalignment.
Regarding subjectivity, the advantage of the case-study method is that it permits 
investigation of alternatives. Thus in the example of barbers, barbers can be asked what 
they themselves believe impacts on their business more - is it changes in hair fashion or 
recession or some other factor ? Similarly, the possibility of omitting vital information 
was reduced by asking the key practitioners to read the case-studies and inviting their 
comments. Thus where some information is unobtainable, such as the exact details of the 
external hedges which Jaguar and its German rivals implemented, the information is not 
necessary, since the treasurers can be asked themselves how they perceive the 
effectiveness of their external hedging. Similarly, the academic discipline underlying the 
case-studies was not one but several, so that the broad question "What are the major 
problems here?" - aside from currency misalignment - could be addressed in each case. 
For instance, the business strategy literature could be applied to ask whether "other 
factors" than currency risk, in the case of Lesney, for example, could be low price, a 
large unfocused customer group, or low distributor margin, providing reasons for 
inadequate distribution. Instead, it was found that significant "other factors" were a lack 
of expertise in product development and in selecting appropriate acquisitions. Similarly,
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organization theory could be applied in the case of ICI to investigate whether organization 
was a hindrance to managing currency overvaluation. Similarly, ICI Paints was compared 
with that o f Hoechst’s paints subsidiary to investigate the significance of product quality 
and market penetration as "other factors" than overvaluation.
The third possible disadvantage of case-studies, that they become fictional in order to 
safeguard anonymity, was avoided. Only actual examples using actual data were selected.
The limitations of the case-study research method need to be seen in context - that whilst 
case-studies are special cases in that they are all individual, so too is the impact of 
currency misalignment. One of the hypotheses of this study is that firms need product- 
market flexibility in order to manage misalignment. The three case-studies selected are 
good examples of this requirement for flexibility. Jaguar, for example, was chosen as an 
example of what a high degree of inflexibility in both product and market strategy can 
mean for a business. One reason why Lesney was selected is because it benefited from 
a high degree of flexibility, with low fixed costs, based on inexpensive die-casting and 
makeshift rented factories; and low variable costs, based on the use of flexible female 
labour on part-time contracts. Yet even this high degree of flexibility was insufficient to 
prevent Lesney’s failure. ICI was selected partly for its flexibility stemming from 
substantial geographical and product diversification, plus the resources (a strong balance 
sheet in 1979) to generate flexibility. Yet if a company such as ICI could not immunize 
itself against overvaluation, then it is difficult to conclude that many other U.K. 
companies could do so.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE CORPORATE APPROACH TO THE MANAGEMENT OF CURRENCY RISK 
- THEORY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
1. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the theoretical basis to the hypothesis that the 
conventional approach of corporations to currency risk management is inadequate to deal 
with the problem of prolonged currency overvaluation.
Section 2 outlines the conventional corporate approach to currency risk management. 
Sections 3 to 5 summarize theory on currency risk management and document empirical 
evidence of what corporations themselves perceive their role is in the management of 
currency risk.
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2. CONVENTIONAL APPROACH OF CORPORATIONS TO CURRENCY RISK 
MANAGEMENT - AN OVERVIEW
As Currency Committees only exist in the largest corporations, the organizational form 
for managing currency risk in most firms is the treasury, if these firms are large enough 
to have treasuries. Indeed, the treasury is conventionally assigned sole responsibility for 
currency management within the corporation.
The justification the Association of Corporate Treasurers has given for the delegation to 
the treasury of currency risk management is that currency exposure must be centrally 
controlled and integrated with liquidity management (ACT 1 1990:S. 14). Whereas the 
treasury is assigned direct responsibility for liquidity management, the treasury’s 
capability for liquidity management is encumbered in that it has only indirect 
responsibility for working capital control (Diagram 1.1).
For the treasury to effectively perform the other three tasks in the core, it is essential that 
it has an overview of the flow of working capital. Yet working capital control is part of 
the liquidity management function of the finance department of a corporation. The 
linkages are illustrated in Diagram 1.2.
Given the treasury’s lack of control over working capital, except for an overview over 
budgets, it is necessary for the treasury to have frequent contact with the relevant line 
managers (ACT 4 1989:11.1). The purpose is to enable the treasury to have advance 
warning of any changes, adverse or positive, affecting working capital. Since the treasury 
is responsible for managing cash and forecasting cash flow, the cash forecast will in turn 
reflect parts of the product-market strategy. The cash forecast involves the treasury in a 
twofold function of forecasting both the size of the currency exposure and of the future 
cash flow. If suppliers are overseas firms which are paid in their own currency, the link 
between currency management and cash management can be seen immediately.
The uncertainty facing the treasury is that both the future local currency cash flows and
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the exchange rate at which they can be converted into domestic currency are uncertain. 
In terms of parent company cash flows then, changes in real exchange rates can have a 
potentially dramatic impact. The treasury’s approach to the problem is depicted in 
Diagram 3.3.
As described in ACT 1 1990:S. 14 "the generally accepted methodology of currency risk 
management has the following six elements:" The treasury must first define the types 
of currency exposure; secondly identify exposed positions within the corporation; thirdly, 
attempt an assessment o f exchange rates at future dates, at least within a range of 
expected values; fourthly, make a simulation of post-tax effects of exchange rate 
changes on the corporation; fifthly, decide whether to accept risk or to avoid it via 
hedging; and sixthly, once the senior management of the corporation has decided on its 
risk preference, it is up to the treasury to design a hedging strategy and to implement 
it.
The treasury’s organizational role in the above is limited in three senses. As noted in 
Chapter 1, exposed positions are generally created by production and marketing 
personnel. The treasury’s role is thus mainly reactive and reliant upon the production and 
marketing personnel for information on exposed positions. The treasury may nevertheless 
be consulted in the budgeting process.
Secondly, exposed positions can be subject to rapid change and reports can be out o f date 
by the time they are received and consolidated by the central headquarters. In 
consequence, changes in foreign currency positions need to be anticipated (ACT 1 
1990:S. 14). Thus a need exists for the establishment of a forecasting system for future 
revenues and payments.
Thirdly, the issue of whether to accept risk or hedge it is generally not for the treasurer 
to decide, but is determined at board level (ACT 1 1990:14.1). Differing companies will 
have a differing attitude to risk which will be a natural outcome of differing industry 
characteristics, market structure, product and trading terms. Differing companies will
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have a differing ability - or need - to use varying hedging techniques. The simulation 
exercises above will give an indication of exposure and of whether the company can bear 
it or need to hedge it fully. This reflects the bespoke nature of the treasury function.
In addition to the above limitations to the treasury’s role, three additional constraints on 
the capability of firms to manage currency risk remain unanswered in the approach to 
currency risk management recommended by the ACT:
1. firms perceive that economic exposure is important to manage but many manage 
transaction and translation exposure instead (Walsh 19861, Beck 1989, Belk & Glaum 
1992, Edelshain 1995).
2. firms perceive that the methods they use to manage economic exposure are ineffective 
(Cezairli 1988, Edelshain 1995). See Tables A.4 and A.5. This is because the methods 
used are principally financial, particularly the use of forward contracts and currency 
borrowing (Table A .3). Strategic and organizational adjustments necessary to manage the 
exposures are made by entities other than the treasury.
3. An additional and important part of methodology, though not included among the six 
listed by the Association of Corporate Treasurers, is that an ex post evaluation should be 
made of the corporation’s efforts at currency risk management. If firms measure the 
effectiveness o f hedging, it would provide an indication of the cost of hedging and 
indicate whether treasuries perceive themselves as risk averse or willing to accept risk. 
Empirical evidence is that firms perceive themselves as highly risk averse in currency 
risk management objectives (Blin et al 1981, Cezairli 1988, Panic 1991, Edelshain 1995). 
However, as the majority of firms do not appear to measure the true cost of hedging2, 
it is necessary to examine the theory underlying corporate risk aversion to assess whether 
corporations actually are risk averse or not.
*In Walsh’s survey of 20 U.K. MNCs, 14 of the sample believed that currency risk management meant 
only the management of transaction exposure.
2see section 5.2.
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3. IS THE TREASURY RISK AVERSE OR A RISK TAKER ?
It was noted in Chapter 1 that only a small minority of corporate treasuries resemble 
banks in employing dealers to actively trade foreign currencies. However, if  the bulk of 
firms are opportunistically exploiting currency movements in other ways, treasuries may 
still be risk takers rather than risk averters.
3.1 Defining risk.
Risk can be distinguished from uncertainty in that risk refers to the variance of a known 
probability distribution of outcomes. Uncertainty exists when all the possible outcomes 
are not known or when the probability distribution is unknown. The possible outcomes 
and the probability distribution of outcomes to changes in real exchange rates for a firm 
is not known, unless that firm is able to forecast perfectly future events. Such an 
assumption is unrealistic. Thus the current situation facing the firm is one of uncertainty, 
not one of risk. Lietaer (1971:12) asserts that a risk situation can nevertheless 
approximate the uncertainty problem. It can be concluded that the concept of currency 
risk is a valid one for practical purposes.
Oxelheim and Wihlborg (1987:9) also add the concept of financial risk to that of currency 
risk. Financial risk refers to the magnitude and probability of unanticipated changes in 
interest rates and costs o f different sources of capital in a particular currency 
denomination. The authors stress the need to relate interest rate changes to changes in the 
general level of demand in the economy. However, they neglect that it is not only the 
cost of funds but the availability of external funding that is a major concern to the 
treasurer in dealing with crisis situations stemming from prolonged exchange rate 
overvaluation. Here the institutional factors associated with corporate funding are of 
relevance, since these differ across countries (see Appendix 6 for a comparison between 
the U.K. and Germany).
Oxelheim and Wihlborg (1987:9) subdivide currency risk into two elements, namely
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exchange rate risk and inflation risk. This reflects the empirical observation that the 
purchasing power parity doctrine is unlikely to hold.
3.2 Finance and Economics Literature on Corporate Risk Aversion.
The purpose of this section is to note that a theoretical vacuum exists on the justification 
for the treasury and its stance on risk aversion.
Traditional finance theory normally takes a neoclassical view of the functioning of 
markets and its explanation of why the firm exists and its treatment of financial risk does 
not explain whether the firm is risk averse or not. The existence of the firm is explained 
in terms of (mainly) linear production functions with the rationale that indivisibilities in 
production factors enables some firms to reap economies of scale and or scope such that 
perfect competition does not exist. The value of the firm is totally determined by the 
value of its future cash flows. The financial structure is totally uninteresting as long as 
financial markets are perfect and real and financial decisions are taken separately from 
investment decisions. The financial model therefore cannot explain whether the firm is 
risk averse or not.
Knight (1921) argued that uncertainty was the reason for the firm to exist. The firm can 
earn "above economic rent" since entrepreneurs may believe they can assess the 
uncertainty better than the average individuals of the perfect competition model.
Coase (1937) argued against this on the grounds that those with more perfect information 
on the uncertainty could sell this information and that the entrepreneurs with the better 
information do not have to be an intrinsic part of the firm. Coase accordingly argued that 
the justification for the firm is that it replaces market transactions with command 
structures.
This approach was extended by Williamson to justify the firm on the basis of transactions 
costs and bounded rationality. Coase’s approach was thus a forerunner of the literature 
on the implications of splitting ownership from the control of the firm. The relevance for
Chapter 5 148
risk aversion is as follows.
In Chapter 2 it was noted that although shareholders are motivated to diversify their 
portfolios to reduce risk, this does not imply that firms should also diversify. Instead, in 
assuming efficient capital markets, finance theory implies that corporate diversification 
is redundant. This is because individual investors can diversify risk themselves just as 
efficiently, since they do not face higher transaction and information costs than 
corporations. The conclusion then is that firms do not need to be concerned about risk 
in their decisions and should focus instead on maximizing the expected return on their 
investments.
The above conclusion of finance theory is based on the assumption that shareholders are 
the only stakeholders in firms and that markets are completely efficient. The economics 
literature comes to a completely different conclusion on the corporate approach to risk 
by assuming that there are a range of stakeholders in the firm and that market 
imperfections exist. Once other stakeholders are introduced, pressures3 are exerted for 
the firm to behave in a risk neutral manner (Oxelheim and Wihlborg 1987:33).
Finance theory has nevertheless come to recognize (Dufey & Srinivasulu 1983) that if  the 
costs of defaulting in the form of explicit bankruptcy costs and constraints on the use of 
assets are substantial, then rate of return variance should be a management concern even 
if  it is the shareholders’ interests which are ultimately the prime concern of management. 
The finance theory justification is that this variance could be related to the probability of 
default and, therefore, the probability that debt and stockholders will suffer direct costs 
arising from bankruptcy.
3Direct costs are associated with unanticipated fluctuations in a firm’s output level, since the higher 
probability of insolvency threatens debtholders and employees and management. In addition, there are 
default costs such as the undervaluation of assets on liquidation. Fluctuations in output imply associated 
adjustment costs in terms of employee cutbacks and excess inventories. Cutbacks affect other, less direct 
stakeholders such as government and suppliers and lead to a more risk averse approach toward customers 
embodied in such forms as long-term contracts. Conflict between managerial and shareholders’ objectives 
have long been part of the economics literature (eg. Baumol 1959, Cyert & March 1963). The conclusion 
of this literature is that shareholders’ interests (i.e. maximizing the value of equity) are not necessarily the 
prime concern of management.
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The above, whilst implicitly recognising risk aversion, has still not addressed the stance 
of the corporate treasury on risk aversion. Williamson (1975) argues that the 
"individuals" of the traditional neoclassical theory of finance will have problems in 
handling the complexity of an uncertain future and they will have to arrange costly 
conflict resolution models to manage the uncertainty. The uncertainty is too complex for 
the market to resolve in a transaction-cost efficient manner and has to be resolved via 
hierarchical sequential decision-making within a firm.
Such a justification for the treasury is an alternative contribution to that of Knight, from 
whom it is inferred that the treasury’s role is the management of uncertainty. From 
Knight’s approach, the existence of information asymmetries and incomplete markets 
logically result in the firm trying to establish systems to predict the future outcome - i.e. 
to create treasury information systems. Such a deduction is consistent with a primary 
motive of risk aversion.
If managing uncertainty is the principal justification for the treasury, then it may a priori 
be deduced from this approach that the treasury should be risk averse. What the above 
does not explain is why the firm engages in financial activities, how it develops its 
financial exposure over time and whether these are consistent with risk aversion or not.
If the explanation is cost advantage and know-how, this does not necessarily yield a 
prediction that the treasury is risk averse. Indeed, given the existence of segmented 
financial markets, manufacturing firms can circumvent regulations applying to banks and 
gain by doing so, whereas banks cannot. This suggests behavior consistent with risk 
taking rather than risk aversion. However, the operational activities o f manufacturing 
firms can give these firms a natural hedge in their financial activities, signifying risk 
aversion.
Given that theory gives mixed results, it appears more appropriate to seek further 
evidence on the question of treasury risk aversion from empirical sources.
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3.3 Differing Structures and Motivations of Corporate Treasuries.
Corporations have responded to a floating exchange regime by the assignment of 
specialist staff specifically to manage the financial risks arising from international 
transactions. The purpose of this section is to summarize the way in which such specialist 
staff are structured and what their motivations are in order to gain insights into the 
treasury stance on risk aversion.
3.3.1 Structure of Treasury Operations.
Before the onset of floating exchange rates, treasury departments were principally 
engaged in corporate funding, the investment of surplus funds and the management of 
interest rate risk. With floating exchange rates, both nominal and real interest rates 
became much more volatile, presenting a much bigger task of financial management to 
the corporation. Thus corporate treasuries have experienced a much expanded role and 
not only because of the additional assignment of responsibility for currency risk 
management.
However, not all firms had treasuries before the onset of floating exchange rates, nor do 
all firms have them now. Even if  they do have treasuries, the level of sophistication of 
their activities is likely to differ significantly. This reflects the fact that the treasury is a 
bespoke function. In small firms, there is likely to be only piecemeal and haphazard 
management of interest rate and currency risks. It is accordingly appropriate to document 
the levels of development of the corporate treasury.
The development can be seen as part of the organizational response of corporations to 
their background environment. Large corporations in E.U. member states, particularly 
the smaller member states, have typically developed large international sales in relation 
to domestic sales. U .S. firms, by contrast, in benefitting from the size of the domestic 
market, have conducted their international operations within an "international division" 
whilst European firms often proceeded from a domestic structure to a global structure 
without passing the intermediate stage of an international division (Stopford and Wells 
1972). This split between domestic and international business has also tended to have a
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profound effect on the relative organization of treasury departments between U.S. and 
European firms. U.S. treasury activities have tended to be decentralized, reflecting a 
dualistic structure between domestic and international business. European firms, by 
contrast, have tended to evolve centralized global treasuries. The background factors that 
have contributed to this evolution include the fact that E.U. MNCs tend to have a much 
higher proportion of international sales and production in relation to sales and production 
at domestic member-state level. E.U. MNCs have long been acquainted with the need for 
multi-currency funding to balance the currency mix of assets. The need to obtain capital 
abroad at advantageous terms when national capital markets may be non-existent has 
necessitated a high profile treasury with a more global view than in the U.S. where 
funding problems could be solved domestically.
Motives for a centralized structure, such as improved financial control, indicate risk 
aversion. It is nevertheless not clear cut that the transition to a global treasury in E.U. 
MNCs has necessitated greater centralization. However, there are also motives tending 
to decentralize activities, such as the increasing complexity of international operations.
A paradox exists in that if currency management is centralized in the treasury, as it is in 
most large firms, then this should take responsibility for decisons having significant 
currency and risk implications away from production staff, which in turn makes the firm 
a risk-taker. In a study of 50 Swedish MNCs, Ahlander (1990:362) found that the 
financial activities of the firm have become very centralized, and that the industrial units 
increasingly have been left without responsibility for the structure of their balance sheets.
Three principal developments appear to account for this. First is that new technology and 
new ways to finance the firm’s operations require that large amounts are borrowed and 
there is a need to borrow cost-efficiently directly via capital markets. Second is that a 
need exists to reduce working capital when the cost of borrowed funds increases. Third 
is that an essential reason for centralization has been the large gains that firms are able 
to reap from their treasury’s external activities. These derive from centralized cash 
management which not only reduce transactions costs but, in Knight’s (1921) view of the
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firm, transform previously uncertain cash flows in differing currencies into assessable 
amounts, thereby transforming uncertainty to risk. With centralized borrowing in the 
capital markets and centralized currency management, the role of the banks has been 
transformed into one of providing local funding for working capital in the subsidiaries 
and in the sale of financial instruments to facilitate the firm’s external hedging.
Such centralization is seen in the literature as essential in the management of transactions 
exposure (Collier & Davies 1985:328). In the Belk & Glaum survey of 17 UK firms, 
only one was found to have a completely decentralized exchange risk management 
function. Ankrom (1974) argues that without centrally set rules applicable to all 
subsidiaries, the MNC will not be able to implement a rational and consistent exchange 
risk managment strategy on a group-wide consolidated basis. It will in particular be 
unable to utilize the full range of exchange risk management tools available, such as 
netting, leading and lagging etc.
Given the requirement for centralized currency risk management, the conclusion for firms 
which do have treasuries is that risks which are normally taken by line management ought 
to be instead transferred to the treasury, whilst SMEs (small and medium-sized 
enterprises) which do not have treasuries may not be managing the currency risks at all. 
Ahlander (1990:380) concludes that the treasury function has turned into a line 
management function, in line with the notion of a "heterachical" firm with different units 
on the same hierarchical level as those they interact with.
3.3.1.1 Conclusion.
Only if the currency risks are properly managed can it be concluded that the operations 
of the treasury are risk averse. The treasury is risk averse and cost efficient in the 
management of transaction exposure. The trend to increased centralization suggests more 
efficient management of translation exposure, which again suggests risk aversion. 
However the lack of an effective treasury role - or of other entities - to manage economic 
exposure indicates that the firm is laying itself wide open to currency risk.
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3.3.2 Motives of Corporate Treasuries - Empirical Evidence.
Kenyon (1990) distinguished three types of treasury - "dealers, smoothers and lockers" - 
in terms of their key risk attitudes. Dealers are treasuries which have been charged to 
profit by currency trading in the same way as the corporation does from its product 
market activities. Smoothers are treasuries which seek to smooth out the impact of 
exchange rate changes on the corporate results. Lockers are treasuries which seek to lock 
their exposures into current exchange rates as as far as financial instruments reasonably 
permit.
Kenyon does not elaborate on whether his taxonomy of treasury risk attitudes is 
associated with particular industries, market structures, countries, or types of firms. 
Jacque (1979) notes that MNCs tend to be smoothers, deriving from the portfolio effect 
of diverse investments which serve as a natural hedge.
The key question is to what extent treasuries can be described as dealers, since the other 
two categories signify risk aversion. Risk aversion can be defined as an objective of 
minimizing the risk of losses. The surveys in Appendix 2 tended not to ask this question 
in the format of an objective, but rather to ask whether corporations perceive themselves 
as risk averse or as profit centers/loss avoiders.
Only 2 out of the 17 U.K. MNC treasuries surveyed by Belk & Glaum (1990) were run 
as profit centers. Yet in these two treasuries, the setting of profits targets from trading 
in foreign exchange was seen as arbitrary. This reflects the difficulty in setting up 
performance evaluation measures for the treasury function (Cooper & Franks 1987). It 
also reflects on why Lietaer (1971:14) specified that the treasurer’s risk preference curve 
must be quadratic, i.e. the treasurer is more willing to risk a £1,000 loss with a 
probability o f 50% than a loss of £50,000 with a probability of 1 %. Empirical evidence 
underpinning such a risk attitude is Edelshain’s finding that 53% of respondents believed 
it important to hedge Ml exposures arising out of currency trading.
An even more risk averse picture is evident in the 10 German MNCs surveyed by Beck
Chapter 5 154
(1990). Two of the MNCs followed a policy o f complete hedging of every open net 
position. Any diversion from this norm had to be given permission from the board. The 
single goal of currency management in these corporations was to limit possible exchange 
losses to a minimum. In 7 of the other corporations, an additional goal was added of 
leaving open the possibility of exchange gains. In these corporations, written regulations 
specified limits for open positions in each currency to a maximum of the currency stream 
ensuing from the underlying product market business in any period. In 9 of the 10 
corporations, it is forbidden for the treasury to build up open positions which are 
supplementary to that ensuing from the cash flows of the underlying business, even in the 
case of a positive currency trend. In the tenth corporation, currency dealers were allowed 
to run their own positions, but only to a limited extent.
3.4 Conclusion.
Empirical evidence indicates that corporate treasuries like to perceive of themselves as 
highly risk averse. This is underpinned by additional evidence (Appendix 1) indicating 
the preference of corporations for exchange rate stability and that exchange rate 
uncertainty is undesirable because it adds an extra element of risk to other, more 
traditional business risks. However, risk aversion does not preclude treasuries from 
taking advantage of favourable exchange rate movements.
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4. METHODS CORPORATIONS EMPLOY TO MANAGE PROLONGED CURRENCY 
OVERVALUATION - THEORY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE.
4.1 Objectives.
Theory (eg. Cornell & Shapiro 1983, Shapiro 1992:250-277) indicates that prolonged 
overvaluation can only be managed by internal strategic means. Internal techniques are 
aimed at reducing or preventing an exposed position from arising4. The purpose of this 
section is to summarize the limitations to internal techniques for managing prolonged 
overvaluation.
4.2 Internal hedging by product divisions.
The ACT makes a fourfold classification (ACT 1 1990 S.43 to 46):
1. to price in the currency of costs.
2. to insert exchange rate variation clauses when bidding for export business.
3. to match costs and revenues in the same currency.
4. to retain the right to withdraw from the market if  exchange rate movements become 
adverse.
In practice, only the last option may be feasible for U.K. exporters, though the options 
are individual to each corporation. By contrast, empirical evidence (Herrmann 1989) 
indicates that German exporters can price in DM, thus shifting the foreign exchange risk 
of exports entirely on the importer.
4.3 Internal hedging by the treasury.
Four main organizational techniques exist:
1. the centralization of currency risk management within the head office treasury itself. 
Physical centralization of currency exposure management involves physically channelling 
payments through a management centre. Such centralization permits two advantageous
4Extemal techniques are used to insure against the possibility that exchange losses will result from the 
exposed position which the internal measures have not been able to eliminate.
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systems to be set up, namely for netting (centralization of intra-firm currency payments) 
and reinvoicing (centralization of Ml currency payments). However, the advantage is 
merely that it minimizes external hedging, but external hedging is in any case not 
effective in managing prolonged currency overvaluation (see section 5.2). Further, 
leading or lagging payments is only feasible in a timescale of months, which is hardly 
effective for managing prolonged misalignment which might last several years.
2. the creation of formal reporting channels between the treasury and production and 
marketing functions.
To forecast non-contractual currency exposures, formal reporting channels with the 
production and marketing functions need to be set up. The object is to structure the firm 
in such a way to facilitate currency matching.
Shapiro (1992:251) lists four proactive marketing and production strategies that firms can 
pursue in response to anticipated or actual real exchange rate changes:
TABLE 5.1
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF ECONOMIC EXPOSURE
Marketing Initiatives Production Initiatives
Market selection & segmentation 
Product strategy
eg. product innovation, timing of market penetration 
or withdrawal, targeting of products.
Pricing strategy
whether to emphasize market share or profit margin 
how frequently to adjust prices
Promotional strategy
to include exchange rate considerations
Product sourcing
shift production among own plants globally 
Input mix
increase global outsourcing 
Plant location
produce abroad when outsourcing is infeasible or 
simply to diversify
Raising productivity
cut costs when exchange rate is adverse
Source: adapted from Shapiro (1992)
One of the purposes of the case studies in this thesis is to indicate how difficult it is for 
U.K. firms to take such initiatives to immunize themselves against prolonged currency 
overvaluation. For example, to perfectly match the currency of costs with the currency 
of revenues requires, among others, the totally unrealistic assumptions of no
Chapter 5 157
indivisibilities in the production process and the perfect forecasting of exchange rate- 
adjusted costs and revenues. These difficulties exist even if the objective is less than 
perfect matching.
The treasury role in the management of economic exposure is severely limited. It is up 
to the production and marketing functions of the corporation to forecast future non­
contractual cost and revenue streams. With real exchange rate uncertainty, such forecasts 
can turn out to be merely vague estimates. The input of the treasury in this process is 
merely in providing a range of estimates of future exchange rates.
3. Asset and Liability Management.
Because strategic marketing and production adjustments can take considerable time to 
take effect, strategic asset and liability management can be applied in the interim. This 
involves the liability structure of the entire MNC being set up in such a way that any 
change in the inflow on assets owing to a currency change should be matched by a 
corresponding change in the outflow on the liabilities used to fund those assets. This can 
be secured via control over the currency denomination of financial variables such as cash, 
short term investments and debt with the objective of reducing net exposed financial 
assets. A second, and more important means in theory is via control over the currency 
of financing. In currency of financing policy, a distinction needs to be made between 
aggressive and defensive stances (see Appendix 3 for the mechanics).
Asset and liability management is only an interim strategy and its effectiveness depends 
essentially on being able to forecast when currency overvaluation will occur and when 
it will end. Thus it is only suitable for changes in the real exchange rate outlook, not for 
constant states when the pound remains overvalued for several years.
4. Planning for Exchange Rate Changes.
An organizational means of integrating production and marketing decisions proactively 
to develop strategic alternatives to exchange rate changes is via the establishment of a 
Currency Committee o f the firm’s most senior executives.
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Shapiro (1992:265) perceives the role of the treasury in such integrated currency 
management as fourfold. These are to provide forecasts of inflation and exchange rates; 
to identify and highlight the risks of competitive exposure; to structure evaluation criteria 
so that the remuneration of personnel is not affected by unanticipated exchange rate 
changes; and to estimate and hedge whatever operating exposure remains after the 
appropriate marketing and production strategies have been put in place.
Actual planning for economic exposure management is depicted in eight steps in Table
5.2 below:
TABLE 5.2
A FRAMEWORK FOR ECONOMIC EXPOSURE MANAGEMENT
1. Formulate domestic and foreign alternatives for a foreign operation.
2. What are the adjustment costs of switching between alternatives?
3. Specify the adjustment lag or indicate how frequent the existing strategy will be reviewed.
4. What is the appropriate planning horizon for the operation?
5. Give the nominal exchange rate expected for all future periods within the planning horizon. Forecast 
the relevant prices. Calculate the implicit real exchange rates._________________________________
6. Obtain an estimate of real exchange rate uncertainty in all future periods within the planning horizon.
7. Determine the cashflow maximizing strategy.
8. If the risk implied is not acceptable, formulate strategy with the next highest expected cashflow.
Risk has to be evaluated as part of the entire conduct of business, i.e. how does it affect the firm’s total 
exchange risk?
Source:adapted from Capel (1991).
4.3 Conclusion.
Theory indicates that misalignment should ideally be managed strategically, and the 
enormous difficulties in doing so indicated in this section should also be part of teaching 
in texts such as Shapiro. Those surveys that have requested information on strategic and 
organizational measures to manage long-term non-contractual exposures find a surprising 
lack of use of such methods. In Belk and Glaum’s survey (1992:8) of 17 large U.K. 
corporations, none of the sample used any means of managing economic exposure than 
financial means. It is accordingly necessary to assess the effectiveness o f financial 
hedging.
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5. EFFECTIVENESS OF EXPOSURE MANAGEMENT METHODS
5.1 Which currency exposures are important - 
contradictions between theory and empirical evidence.
Underlying the constraints in section 2 is a dichotomy between theory and practice. The 
finance literature concludes that translation (i.e. accounting) exposure is not a useful 
concept to manage (Dufey 1972). Walsh (1986:374-5) concludes that transaction 
exposure can be routinely managed and that the focus of corporate efforts should be on 
the management of economic exposure.
Actual practice contradicts these conclusions. The more recent surveys indicate that 
transaction exposure is the central focus of most companies’ management of foreign 
exchange risk5. This is consistent with the finding that by far the most frequently 
occurring method of management is the forward currency contract. Economic exposure, 
by contrast, is not given the attention by firms that the academic literature asserts is 
warranted678, given the difficulties noted in the previous section. Further, translation
3Prior to the replacement of FAS 52 and SSAP 20 in the early 1980s, the centrepiece had been 
translation exposure.
6 Whilst the Rodriguez (1980) survey was aware of the existence of economic exposure, the concept 
of economic exposure at that time had not yet been defined adequately or indeed accepted into the empirical 
literature. Indeed, 86 % of respondents in the Rodriguez survey stated that translation exposure was part 
of economic exposure !
^ lin  et al (1981) noted that because economic exposure is difficult to measure, that little attention 
would be paid to it in relation to transaction and translation exposure. Indeed, only two pages were devoted 
to consideration of economic exposure out of a paper of 100 pages.
®In Beck’s (1989) survey of ten German MNCs in the auto and chemical industries, four did not 
recognize economic exposure (p. 85) and the same four hilly covered their transaction exposure. The 
remaining six managed their transaction exposure but they also included in their definition of exposure all 
non-contractual foreign currency cash flows which were forecast four and eighteen months forward (p. 86).
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exposure is not ignored but is actively managed by a large number of corporations9.
Table A.3 compares the results of the three surveys which have included questions on 
exposure management objectives10. Major objectives are the avoidance of foreign 
exchange losses, the reduction of net economic exposure, minimizing earnings 
fluctuations and balance sheet protection. A key conclusion is that profiting from 
exchange rate volatility was considered of much lesser importance for the sample 
companies than avoiding loss.
However, regarding effectiveness, to the extent that firms do not calculate the cost of 
hedging, they do not make a valid evaluation of alternatives, such as internal hedging.
5.2 Theory on the cost of forward hedging.
It was noted in section 2 that most firms rely on external hedging and that an ex post 
evaluation of hedging should be made. This section argues that the opportunity cost of 
forward hedging11 can be significant.
In banking circles, it is often claimed that the cost of forward hedging is relatively low. 
From the standpoint of the banks (Swiss Bank Corporation 1987:67), the cost quoted to 
the customer is the forward premium or discount and the bank’s spread. The premium 
or discount is the difference between the forward rate and the current spot rate and is 
computed as a percentage of the spot rate.
9A surprising result of Belk and Glaum’s survey (1990) is that 13 of the 17 MNCs regarded translation 
exposure as important. Soenen & Aggarwal (1989) similarly found a high proportion of their sample 
managed translation exposure.
10Whilst the BNAC survey posed seven types of objectives, the survey did not include questions on the 
effectiveness of exposure management methods.
“Hedging an income stream in a foreign currency can be similarly accomplished by borrowing the same 
foreign currency now to lock in an exchange rate. This is of use where developed markets in financial 
instruments in certain currencies do not exist.
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Ankrom (1978:53) notes that this is totally misleading as a measure of the true cost of 
hedging. The true cost is instead the difference between the forward rate and the spot rate 
at the time the forward matures, not when it is first taken out. This opportunity cost 
measure explicitly compares hedging with its alternative - purchasing or selling the 
foreign currency spot when a payment occurs.
Giddy (1982:175) notes that this "true" measure of the cost of hedging has two significant 
flaws. Firstly, it does not explicitly provide a decision-making criterion that assists in 
determining whether or when a firm should hedge. Secondly, the cost of a fixed-in- 
advance hedge cannot be directly compared with a risky open position. The relevant 
comparison is between the forward rate and the treasurer’s own forecast of the future spot 
rate, assuming he has a forecast.
Once the necessary "own forecasts" are inserted into the comparison, the decision-making 
criteria become as follows, taking two cases as examples:
Case 1, The forward is at a discount, i.e . the subject currency is cheaper for forward 
delivery than spot. If the discount underestimates the treasurer’s forecast depreciation, 
the treasurer should consider selling the currency forward. If the discount overestimates 
the treasurer’s forecast depreciation, the treasurer should use the spot market instead or 
consider buying the currency forward.
Case 2. The forward is at a premium, i.e. the subject currency is more expensive for 
forward delivery than spot. If the premium underestimates the treasurer’s forecast 
appreciation, the treasurer should consider buying the currency forward. If the premium 
overestimates the treasurer’s forecast appreciation, the treasurer should use the spot 
market instead or consider selling the currency forward.
A number of serious qualifications apply to the above "decision rules".
Most significantly, they presume that the treasurer is able to forecast future spot exchange 
rates. Not even MNCs have economics departments which are large enough to presume
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that their own exchange rate forecasts might be better than those already reflected in 
market expectations. For smaller companies without economics departments, the treasurer 
is reliant upon the forecasts of the banks or of screen-based subscription services. These, 
however, already constitute market expectations and are already built into current rates. 
In any event, in smaller companies, the treasurer’s own forecast is no more than 
guesswork. The MNCs may have their own full-time economic forecasters and their own 
econometric models, but their forecasts may turn out to be even more wrong than the 
hunches of the treasurer of a small company. The end effect is to make a nonsense of the 
above decision rules which are based on the "superior" information of the treasurer.
This conclusion is embodied in the Efficient Markets Hypothesis. Assuming market 
efficiency, the forward rate should be an unbiased estimator of the future spot rate. This 
is confirmed in tests of Kohlhagen (1975) and Levich (1978,1982). Kohlhagen found that 
measured ex post, a consistently long or short position in the forward markets in six 
currencies would sometimes yield profits and sometimes losses, but in the long run, these 
average profits or losses have not been significantly different from zero. The conclusion, 
therefore, is to reject the idea of hedging consistently, since the benefits are zero. Even 
if  the gains and losses cancel out in the long-term, this is no policy in favour of not 
hedging, since in the short-term the firm can become illiquid. The alternative strategy 
is to develop criteria for selective hedging.
Criteria for selective hedging require the specification of probabilities for alternative 
future currency values as well as an assessment of the firm’s risk aversion. Giddy 
(1982:176) notes that selective hedging is no more than speculation based on a forecast. 
If a selective hedging strategy is to be successful, the corporate treasurer must believe 
that he is a superior exchange rate forecaster. The surveys find that the majority of 
MNCs do indeed hedge only selectively, though some, particularly in Germany, have a 
policy of full hedging of all their transaction exposures.
The two strategies reveal a paradox. If consistent hedging yields no benefits, why do 
corporations engage in it ? Secondly, it was already noted above that treasuries are
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unlikely to have superior forecasting abilities than market expectations. Why then do a 
majority of corporations have a policy of selective hedging ? The answer to the above 
paradoxes lies in the risk aversion of the corporation and the place assigned to the 
treasury in the corporation’s organizational structure.
A risk averse firm which perceives the treasury’s role as defensive will seek to avoid 
losses and forego gains from currency volatility. This is consistent with full hedging. As 
regards the cost of hedging, ACT 1 1990:73.2 states that the cost is known only with 
hindsight and that it "will be of academic interest only to the company, which wished to 
eliminate foreign exchange risk". However, the management report of the treasury of 
such a company would probably not include foreign exchange losses, i.e. the real cost 
of hedging, because all transaction exposures are hedged.
The key point is that the cost of hedging is often not of academic interest only12. Belk 
& Glaum (1990) found evidence from one U.K. MNC where a hedge had produced a 
large loss and the management dismissed the treasurer. In such a corporation, the 
treasury reporting procedure to the management must have incorporated "ex post cost of 
hedging" results. At first sight, it would appear in this example that the management of 
this MNC is risk averse because the hedge produced a loss. Instead, the management 
expected the treasury to speculate in the form of selective hedging and to speculate 
correctly. The apparent inconsistency with the Efficient Markets Hypothesis can be 
explained in that the treasurer does not beat the market, but instead moves with it. The 
treasuries of large MNCs resemble those of banks in that they have "inside information" 
in the form of real-time price information and employ staff specifically to monitor it. By 
such means, corporations can profit from exchange rate volatility via selective hedging.
12In March 1993, George Wimpey pic announced a £25 M provision against the cost of unwinding 
interest rate futures contracts, hi 1988, the company had taken the view that interest rates would remain 
high. The fall in rates after the pound’s withdrawal from the ERM made it cancel this bet - at a heavy cost 
(FT 22.3.1993:9).
Dunhill revealed losses of £32 M over two years owing to currency hedging (DT 14.8.1993). Tiphook pic 
reported a £36.2 M debit for "financial breakage costs” which involved breaking an interest rate hedge 
consisting of interest rate swaps. The Finance Director was dismissed (ST 15.8.1993).
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The majority of SMEs do not have the inside information to enable them to move with 
the market. To them, hedging has been likened to a type of insurance premium. Ankrom 
(1978:54) argues that hedging is analogous to insuring only in that it limits the firm’s 
exposure. The forward rate for currency will be received no matter what happens to the 
spot rate on maturity of the forward. However, the cost of limiting the exposure is not 
analogous to an insurance premium, for the cost can really only be determined after the 
fact. More importantly, the forward market does not eliminate exchange risk for 
continuous cash flows. Hedging instruments have a fixed maturity and only during this 
fixed period are they of use in reducing the variability of cash flows. Thus forward 
contracts can be used to lock in current exchange rates but once the contract expires, 
ongoing cash flows have to be hedged at the new forward rate. This new rate could be 
significantly worse if the currency outlook has changed in the meantime13. Thus fixing 
a rate by hedging only acts as insurance for the duration of the forward contract.
5.2.1 Conclusions.
External hedges are only a short term palliative which enable the firm to lock into a 
certain exchange rate for the duration of the contract. Yet it was also shown from the 
surveys that the principal hedging that most firms are conducting is exactly this - the use 
of forward contracts for the management of transaction exposure. Economic exposure 
in the great majority of cases is left unmanaged.
Further, the use of financial instruments is no solution at all to exchange rate 
misalignment since they deal with nominal exchange rate uncertainty, whereas it is real 
exchange rate uncertainty which firms need to manage.
13 Further, there are penalties in breaking forwards and currency swaps. Where there are no penalties 
for breaking contracts, such as in futures, liquidity is thin beyond the near months. For a corporation such 
as Rolls-Royce seeking to hedge a 10-year export contract worth US$ 250 M, transaction costs on currency 
futures would be prohibitive. More importantly, futures 10 years ahead are not obtainable, so that long time 
horizons cannot be hedged.
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5.3 Empirical evidence on why corporations are NOT managing economic exposure. 
An additional conclusion of the empirical research is that the standard threefold 
classification of exposures is too simplistic (Edelshain 1995). Corporations reported 
giving greater attention to managing their more easily quantifiable exposures than to those 
exposures they regard as having the greatest impact on profitability.
Yet in the Belk & Glaum (1992:8) survey of 17 MNCs, only three MNCs stated that 
exchange rate considerations played a role at all in non-fmancial decision-making areas, 
and the role even then was only a minor one. An additional surprising conclusion from 
the Belk & Glaum survey is the lack of perception among U.K. MNCs of the importance 
of economic exposure, since the fact that all 17 firms in the sample are large corporations 
does itself indicate that economic exposure should be important to them.
Four reasons can be advanced to explain the paradox. One is that the respondents did not 
perceive foreign exchange risk as a strategic factor. A reason given for this is that 
companies appeared not to be aware of the important longer-term effects of exchange rate 
changes and the risks involved.
Second is that in the case of other corporations which were aware of these longer-term 
implications, the respondents stated that they did not know what to do about them.
Third is that some corporations did not feel very susceptible to the longer-term economic 
effects of exchange rate changes.
Fourth is that corporations felt themselves committed to their particular business, which 
they stated did not allow them any flexibility within the time available in such matters as 
sourcing, location of production facilities etc.
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6 . CONCLUSIONS.
Theory is ambiguous as to whether corporate arrangements to manage currency risk are 
adequate or not, since it hinges on whether the interests of stakeholders in the firm are 
included in decision-making or not. If they are, (as in Germany), then theory prescribes 
that corporations should be risk averse. However, corporations are not managing their 
economic exposure and yet perceive themselves as being risk averse. Corporations are 
clearly deluding themselves that they are risk averse.
The complexity of managing economic exposure to the risk averse firm14 presents such 
great informational needs and constraints on the firm’s product market policy - (namely 
the need to match the currency of revenues with the currency of costs) - that firms are 
unlikely ever to be able to effectively manage it. This is demonstrated in the following 
case-studies.
This leads to the conclusion that it is easier for U.K. firms to act on the cause - to lobby 
the government to prevent prolonged exchange rate overvaluation from occurring - than 
to attempt to manage the symptoms.
14A firm which believed it could forecast exchange rates would not want a matching policy. It would 
sell into markets whose currencies it believed would appreciate and source from where it believed 
currencies would depreciate. However, in Edelshain’s (1995) survey, only 4% of respondents did the 
former and only 2% believed that it was highly effective. Only 7 % of respondents did the latter and only 
3 % believed that it was highly effective.
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CHAPTER SIX
LESNEY PRODUCTS & CO. LTD.
1. OBJECT OF CASE-STUDY
Case-studies on Lesney Products & Co.Ltd., manufacturer of Matchbox toys, have been 
documented by Constable (1980) and Rivett (1983). Neither has investigated how Lesney 
attempted to manage currency risk and with what effectiveness. Instead, their focus was 
on general business strategy. This case-study adds to the previous studies by focusing on 
currency risk and benefits from access to the treasurer at the time, P.F. Slade.
The hypothesis to be investigated is that inability to manage currency risk, on top of a 
lack of flexibility in product-market strategy, can precipitate corporate failure.
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2. ANATOMY OF CRISIS.
Table 6.1 provides an anatomy of the financial deterioration of the company:
TABLE 6.1
LESNEY PRODUCTS & CO.LTD., SUMMARY PROFIT AND LOSS £000
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
TOTAL
SALES
33306 43528 56440 63339 88964 106733 90057
INTEREST
CHARGES
553 773 606 642 1900 5638 7048
PRE-TAX
PROFIT
3861 6851 10191 8015 5119 -3609 -1095
9
RATIO ANALYSIS
CURRENT
RATIO
1.88 3.01 3.91 2.97 1.92 1.48 1.28
QUICK
RATIO
1.00 2.23 2.09 1.47 0.97 0.61 0.55
GEARING 6.36 17.81 16.55 • 10.61 22.6 47.1 56.5
INTEREST
COVER
5.98 7.86 15.82 11.48 1.69 -1.64 -2.55
PROFIT/
SALES
11.59 15.74 18.06 12.65 0.57 -034 -12.17
ROCE 14.55 23.31 25.92 18.82 5.65 -15.87 -59.62
STOCK
TURN­
OVER
4.08 4.49 3.85 3.60 2.97 2.56 4.56
SALES/
FIXED
ASSETS
2.90 3.80 4.20 3.99 3.18 3.42 3.99
Source: calculated from annual reports.
The ratio analysis in Table 6.1 does not indicate the underlying cause of the failure of 
Lesney Products, but points to the symptoms. These are a massive increase in gearing 
and a major deterioration in the interest cover ratio. Liquidity and profitability also 
declined dramatically.
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3. HYPOTHESES.
Lesney’s failure was partly owing to the rise in the real sterling exchange rate, that 
Lesney could not increase prices to compensate, that it lost sales in consequence, 
particularly export sales, and became highly indebted. Inability to service the debt caused 
the company’s demise.
The ratio analysis above is not enough to substantiate this hypothesis. Instead an 
investigation of the product market background is required, using data from the report 
and accounts to back up the analysis. This is followed by an investigation into the role 
of the treasury in its management of the rise in the real sterling exchange rate.
The factors that would support the above hypothesis are firstly, evidence of the 
vulnerability of the business to adverse shifts in the financial market background and, 
secondly, evidence of the relatively strong market position of the company’s products. 
It also needs to be demonstrated that if the failure was owing to the rise in the pound, 
that there was little or nothing that the management could have done in changing its 
product-market strategy in the short-run to stave off bankruptcy. Each of these factors 
are examined below.
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4. VULNERABILITY OF LESNEY TO THE £ MISALIGNMENT SYNDROME.
If currency risk were the only factor, then in the toy business a highly successful product 
should be able to sell on account of its intrinsic qualities irrespective of the x% added to 
its price because of currency overvaluation1. The main problem is that currency 
overvaluation combined with high interest rates and recession is highly significant in the 
toy business. This is because demand is highly seasonal and orders from retailers tend 
to be concentrated in a relatively short period. This is the few months after the spring toy 
fairs to October of the same year. Such vulnerability is nevertheless of lesser significance 
than the vulnerability of Laker Airways arising from the mismatch in the currency 
denomination of costs and revenues.
Rising real interest rates can impact on cash flows of both retailers and manufacturers in 
the toy industry in two ways. One is via the increased cost of holding stocks. This would 
tend to cause retailers to delay ordering and shift the interest burden on to manufacturers. 
Second is via the impact on consumer demand. The effect on consumer spending can be 
magnified by expectations regarding recession, unemployment and increased saving under 
the contingency motive.
Although Lesney already had the advantage of well developed export distribution 
channels, in 1979-80 it could not offset macroeconomic contraction in the domestic 
market by higher export sales because of the rise in the real exchange rate of the pound. 
In 1978 minimum lending rate had been as low as 6.5%. It almost trebled to 17% in 
1979. On the back of high real interest rates, the pound rose to over DM 5 in 1980.
The company’s direct exports in 1980 amounted to £42.931 M but collapsed to £28.2 M 
in 1981. This dramatic decline in such a short space of time coincided with the rise in 
sterling. It is difficult not to conclude that a link existed between exports and the
Nintendo games, for example, enjoyed record sales at Christmas 1992 despite their high price and die 
fact that much of the E.U. and the U.S. were in recession.
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exchange rate. Otherwise it would have to be demonstrated that exports were lost because 
of a new rival product range from a competitor. Yet no new directly rival product 
emerged over this period. It is nevertheless acknowledged that since the 1960s, a wider 
range of toys and games became available.
If exports were only a small part of sales, then the loss of export markets could have 
been managed. All the firm would have had to deal with would be the possible loss of 
market share in the domestic market because of a rise in imports sucked in by the 
overvalued exchange rate. Instead, the enormous relative importance of direct exports to 
the company can be seen in the following table:
TABLE 6.2
EXPORTS FROM THE U.K. AS A % OF TOTAL SALES, 
LESNEY PRODUCTS & CO. LTD.
1975 58.62
1976 56.79
1977 51.63
1978 49.36
1979 40.46
1980 40.22
1981 31.31
Source: calculated from annual reports.
In the years before the rise in sterling in 1979, exports amounted to around half o f total 
sales. From 1979, exports collapsed both in absolute terms and as a percentage of total 
sales.
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5. PRODUCT-MARKET BACKGROUND 
- LESNEY’S STRONG MARKET POSITION.
The charge can nevertheless be levelled that the adverse exchange rate and interest rate 
background is only one out of a number of factors which affect the success or failure of 
a business. It can also be argued that the sudden adverse change in the financial 
environment cannot be isolated as the cause of the company’s failure. This section makes 
the case that the market position of Lesney Products and Co.Ltd. was a very strong one 
but that even this was not enough to permit it to forestal bankruptcy. First a brief 
competitive analysis of the company is made, followed by an appraisal of factors which 
underpin the hypothesis that it was exchange and interest rate risk that caused the 
company’s failure.
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TABLE 6.3
PRODUCT-MARKET BACKGROUND, LESNEY PRODUCTS & CO.LTD.
STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES
1. Stable product range, rather than fickle as is 
typical in the toy industry.
2. No direct rival in its own product range. Corgi die- 
cast models were larger-scale and priced two or three 
times higher.
3. Matchbox had survived and learnt from the 
onslaught of Mattel’s "Hot Wheels" in 1968.
1. By the late 1970s, a wider variety of toys and 
games became available. Matchbox was narrowly 
focused on die-cast vehicle models. It was not 
diversified within the toy business, but this is hardly 
critical (T a b le  6.4).
2. Attempts to diversify out of the toy business were 
difficult eg. Lesney bought MCW Ltd, a specialist in 
aluminium die-casting with a turnover of £10M, in 
1976, but it made losses.
3. The company had been run for decades by its 
founding directors. These had no experience of 
running any other business. From their failure to 
diversify, it could be inferred that the management 
had become complacent.
OPPORTUNITIES THREATS
1. The company had by far the highest turnover of 
U.K. toy manufacturers (T.6.4). It had the resources 
to diversify in its growth years (see profits figures in 
T.6.1).
2. Diversification could have been into other 
businesses which were less vulnerable to currency and 
interest rate risk. Alternatively, production could have 
been diversified out of the U.K.
Lesney looked at several opportunities for acquisitions. 
The difficulty was in finding a suitable match (Slade, 
interviewed July 1993 & private correspondence).
1. Costs were principally in sterling. The company 
was highly vulnerable to any rise in the real sterling 
exchange rate.
After 1979, around 20% of sales came from U.S. 
production (see T.6.7). However, these were 
vulnerable to dollar misalignment.
2. Because of the nature of the toy business, the 
company was highly vulnerable to rises in real interest 
rates.
If the company’s failure lay exclusively or primarily in its product-market strategy and 
not in the financial environment facing the firm, the following three hypotheses can a 
priori be expected to hold:
1. If the narrow product range of Lesney was the cause of its demise, then it might be 
expected that rival firms in the same business with a much wider product range would 
have prospered. Such diversified toy manufacturers included Dunbee-Combex-Marx, at 
one time the largest toy maker in Europe, and Mettoy. However, both these firms failed 
(in 1980 and 1981 respectively).
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In 1980, the leading U.K. toy manufacturers by turnover were as follows:
TABLE 6.4
LEADING U.K. TOY MANUFACTURERS BY TURNOVER, £M
YEAR
ENDING
COMPANY TOTAL 
TORN 
OVER £M
TOY
TURN­
OVER
£M
EXPORTS 
AS A % OF 
SALES 
1979/80
FAILED
Jan. 1980 Lesney 106.7 96.0 40.2 1981
April 1980 Cowan de Groot 44.1 10.1 3.6 -
March 1980 Air fix 42.0 42.0 20.3 1981
Dec. 1979 Mettoy 32.5 32.5 40.9 1981
June 1980 MY Dart 20.8 12.1 21.3 -
Dec. 1979 Berwick Timpo 16.8 16.8 15.1 -
Source: created from information in Rivett (1983).
Of the above six largest firms, three failed. Dunbee Combex Marx’s assets were obtained 
cheaply by M.Y. Dart. The position of Cowan de Groot is quite different from that of 
the others. Only a quarter of its turnover consisted of toys. It did not suffer from real 
appreciation in sterling as the others did, but benefited from it. It was an exclusive and 
highly profitable importer of toys from China and the USSR. Its exports were re-exports 
and not affected by sterling overvaluation, since the profit margins on the imports were 
substantial.
2. A second premise that would pinpoint Lesney’s product-market strategy as the cause 
of its failure would be if its downturn in sales in the 1979-80 period was unique. Instead, 
Table 6.5 shows that for the U.K. industry as a whole, sales showed a 16% decline after 
5 years of increases in nominal terms.
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TABLE 6.5
U.K. TOY INDUSTRY FACTORY SALES, IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 1975-80, £M
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Manufacturers' Sales 193.5 226.5 259.2 297.1 323.3 271.6
Exports 61.5 76.3 87.1 101.2 111.6 109.1
Imports 41.8 59.6 70.3 83.8 107.1 171.7
Die-cast model 
imports
1.0 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.9 3.2
Source: Business Monitor
3. A third indicator underlining the importance of currency factors is that whilst the toy 
industry’s total exports did not show a marked decline, total imports rose phenomenally 
by 60.3% between 1979/80 (T.6.5) on the back of the rise in sterling. By contrast, in 
Lesney’s market sector, total imports rose by much less. Table 6.6 gives data on imports 
in the main categories.
Once the total import figures are related to Lesney’s total sales, it can be seen at once 
how insignificant a challenge rival die-cast imports presented to Lesney. Table 6.5 
shows that competing imports rose only slightly in 1980 to £3.2 M. Thus total U.K. 
imports of die-cast models constituted only 2.99 % of the firm’s 1979 sales !
Underpinning the hypothesis that it was the rise in sterling that undermined Lesney’s 
sales is the collapse in exports. It is in this that the die-cast model sector did differ from 
the whole U.K. toy industry. In sterling terms, die-cast model exports declined 32.38 % 
between 1979 and 1980. Lesney’s direct exports from the U.K. actually rose in nominal 
sterling terms by 19.25 % in the same year. However, the following year they fell by 
34.31 %. This nevertheless does not prove a unique failure on the part of Lesney’s 
product-market strategy.
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TABLE 6.6
IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF TOYS BY CATEGORY 1978-1980, £000
1978 1979 1980
Wheeled toys IMPORTS 2,626 4,620 4,447
EXPORTS 2,183 1,447 1,849
Constructional toys IMPORTS 5,361 6,856 8,446
of plastic EXPORTS 2,909 3,069 2,706
Die-cast miniature IMPORTS 1,989 2,933 3,158
models of metal EXPORTS 42,058 48,174 32,572
Other IMPORTS 4,202 4,825 5,618
EXPORTS 8,167 9,526 5,213
Source: Business Monitor, 1980 and 1981
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6 . THE LIMITED ROLE OF THE TREASURY.
If the receivership of Lesney was owing to failure to act quickly enough to manage the 
real rise in sterling, to what extent was this failure to act the result of negligence or the 
result of normal limitations on the ability of the firm to respond effectively ? To assess 
these issues requires an analysis of possible changes to the product-market strategy and 
secondly, empirical evidence on how Lesney’s management perceived the role of the 
treasury and how the treasury itself perceived the problem at the time. This section 
examines this treasury role. Possible changes to the product-market strategy are 
considered in the following section.
Of the three conventional exposures, Lesney managed only transactions exposure2. The 
board gave the treasury a mandate to hedge in the forward market, but only to hedge 
sales and not orders. Export prices were not denominated in sterling but set in the 
currency of the particular export market. The rate selected was known internally as the 
"standard exchange rate". If this standard exchange rate appeared to the treasury to be 
at variance with currency market developments, the treasury fully hedged sales which 
were already contracted for.
The role of the treasury in managing Lesney’s currency risk can be seen as highly limited 
in three principal ways:
Firstly, as only existing sales were hedged, but not orders, the time horizon of hedging 
was very short. Three-month forward contracts were the norm. The longest period for 
which sales were hedged was only six months forward. This was only for one market, 
Latin America. Sales to this market were small by comparison with the largest markets 
of the U.S. and Germany. In the face of the duration (1979-83) of sterling misalignment, 
a policy of hedging only 3 months forward can be viewed as completely inadequate.
Secondly, Lesney had no option but to price in local currency and hedge its exports itself.
2 Translation exposure need only have been managed after 1977, when Lesney started making U.S. 
acquisitions.
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This was not considered a problem up to 1979, since the treasury believed it could itself 
gain from sterling weakness, rather than its distributors3. The fully-owned distributors 
would have had to hedge, yet they did not have the skills or the size necessary to employ 
staff to
Thirdly, economic exposure was not managed. Board policy was one of never taking 
unmatched foreign exchange risks. Its instruction not to hedge all orders (i.e. transaction 
exposure) was because it considered this risky. The board logically perceived that 
hedging non-contractual exposures was even riskier. In this, it might appear that the 
board was completely misguided. Instead, the board was guided by its bankers and had 
to accept their advice. The extent of forward cover was deliberately restricted along with 
the company’s normal bank borrowing facilities.
The Group Treasurer stated (July 1993) that economic exposure could not be hedged 
anyway, even if Lesney had been free of bank conditions. He questioned how a treasurer 
could defend a position where the treasury had taken forward cover for 3 years ahead but 
failed to meet its sales targets. The contracts would then have to be closed out, which 
could cause substantial losses. Slade noted that stronger companies than Lesney have 
failed because of such gambling and he questions whether external hedging of economic 
exposure is good practice. Further, Slade doubts whether banks would normally offer 
facilities for such hedging anyway to companies below the MNC category.
The treasury was not to blame for the failure to manage economic exposure, since the 
instrument for managing it is the product-market strategy over which the treasury has no 
direct control.
3though the chairman had already stated in the 1976 annual report: "The new year has opened with 
another appalling collapse in the international value of sterling. Whilst a low exchange rate is often claimed 
as a benefit for exporters it should not be thought of as other than a dangerous drug".
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7. LIMITED ABILITY TO ADJUST PRODUCT-MARKET STRATEGY.
There are two principal options which the management could have pursued to create a 
partial natural hedge which might have enabled the company to survive the rise in 
sterling. One is diversification to reduce the dependence on die-cast models. The other 
is to produce abroad to secure a better match between the currencies of costs and 
revenues.
Given Lesney’s relatively strong market position, it can be argued that the management 
saw little urgency in changing strategy to offset possible adverse shifts in the financial 
background. This lack of urgency appears rational when it is considered that the rise in 
sterling and interest rates in 1979 took place suddenly and without precedent. The historic 
experience which did influence strategy was the loss in market share which arose in 1968 
from a rival product - Mattel’s Hot Wheels. This led management to believe that they 
should never again be dependent on a single product. Accordingly, in 1977 the priority 
of strategy became one of diversification.
The hypothesis investigated is whether the diversification strategy reduced Lesney’s 
vulnerability to currency risk. The policy of diversification could have been combined 
with one of production abroad towards the creation of a natural hedge.
Regarding diversification, in April 1977 a holding company was formed which presided 
over three divisions. One was responsible for non-toy activities. It was a stated objective 
that non-toy activities would rise to 20% of group business in the ensuing five years. In 
1978, a US metal castings company (MCD) was acquired. Its £11M turnover constituted 
a quarter of group sales at the time. Other diversifications were into US toy companies. 
These were Vogue Dolls and AMT Corporation, a major manufacturer of plastic 
construction kits.
Regarding overseas production, during the 1960s, overseas sales subsidiaries were 
established in the US, Canada, Australia, West Germany and Belgium. In the 1970s, the 
overseas distributors were bought out and Lesney had company-owned operations in
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twelve countries. However, it was only from 1977 that Lesney produced abroad when it 
made its first acquisition, that of Vogue Dolls.
TABLE 6.7
RELATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF LESNEY’S SALES FROM OVERSEAS PRODUCTION, £000
1978 1979 1980 1981
Total Sales 63,339 88,964 106,733 90,057
Sales from production 
abroad
- 20,034 20,236 25,437
Direct exports from 
U.K.
31,266 36,000 42,931 28,200
Overseas Production as 
a % of total sales
- 22.52 18.96 28.24
Source: annual reports.
Table 6.7 illustrates the magnitude of sales from overseas production. More important 
than sales, however, is their profitability.
In the 1978 AGM, it was announced that Lesney sought a minimum £1.5 M objective of 
profit from the new subsidiaries. The US toy companies were bought for their potential 
as turnaround opportunities. However, Vogue and in particular AMT, took much longer 
than predicted to turn around. MCD never lived up to its profit expectations. Thus 
instead of improving cash flow with the benefit of it being in dollars, the new companies 
actually constituted a drain on cash flow. This was also at a time when the rise in sterling 
and in U.K. interest rates began to hit U.K. operations.
The conclusion from the above is that whilst the strategies were correct, their 
implementation was a failure. A natural hedge was never created since overseas 
production was only dollar based, leaving the DM exposure uncovered. With hindsight, 
it might have been a better hedge to have produced in DM-bloc countries, since the dollar 
entered a period of prolonged overvaluation in 1980.
Lesney’s response to the rise in the pound in 1979 was to accept reduced margins and 
try to retain market share. In 1979, the result was that turnover increased by only 8%. 
A fallback in orders from retailers meant that in the interim report which appeared at the
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end of 1979, inventory rose to £42M, almost 6 months sales, and borrowings were over 
£40M. In early 1980, over 20% of the workforce was made redundant as output was 
reduced to halt the build-up of stocks. In June 1980, the founding management was 
replaced, (underpressure from the bank creditors), by "company doctors". In the October 
interim results, loans exceeded shareholders’ funds. The firefighting strategy the new 
management pursued was further output cutbacks and stock disposals. Significant 
improvement was seen in the 1980 report which appeared in June 1981. Borrowing was 
cut by 38%, inventories by more than 50%, debtors by 47% and ten of the company’s 
thirteen factories were closed. The banks’ guarantee of support was extended to 
Christmas 1981.
In the 1981 interim results, turnover was down over 30% and gearing was 175%. There 
was no more room for cost cutting. When the bank’s guarantee of support expired, the 
company was forced to appoint receivers. Three years of prolonged overvaluation of 
sterling had taken its toll.
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8. CONCLUSION.
The Group Treasurer, commenting on this case-study, stated (July 1993) that 
overvaluation of sterling was the most important factor in Lesney’s failure, but that there 
were other causes. These were firstly, that there was too much internal capital investment 
which was non-productive and which was in acquisitions which produced negative cash 
flows. Secondly, the toy market was becoming diversified in the late 1970s and die-cast 
models no longer had a dominant place in the toy market. Thirdly, Lesney’s vertical 
integration was an advantage when sales were increasing because profits could be earned 
from both manufacturing and local distribution. However, when sales fell, the group was 
vulnerable to trading losses, overstocking and high borrowing right through the chain 
from manufacture to distribution overseas.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
JAGUAR CARS LTD
1. OBJECT OF CASE-STUDY
The Lesney case-study sought to demonstrate an instance of the closure of production 
with a significant causal factor being that currency risk could not be managed. The 
Lesney case can be criticized for involving a product with low margins and serving a 
mass market, and thereby being highly vulnerable to currency risk.
The purpose of the Jaguar case-study is to make the hypothesis that corporations cannot 
immunize themselves against prolonged currency overvaluation more watertight. This is 
attempted by demonstrating the impact of currency risk on Jaguar Cars Ltd. - makers of 
a highly differentiated product with a high income elasticity of demand and which is 
positioned in a niche market with a premium price, which might be expected to enable 
it to surmount the hurdle of currency misalignment.
2. BACKGROUND
Jaguar was part of an MNC, BL, which had a diversified product range and, up to the 
1980s, geographically diverse markets, though production was concentrated in the U.K. 
However, belonging to BL was not a source of strength for Jaguar as the group was 
weakened by a history of strikes, low profitability and underinvestment. Thus currency 
misalignment could have a more pervasive impact than in a stronger, more profitable 
firm. Indeed, a considerable literature already exists on the problems of the U.K. motor
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industry in the 1970s and 80s but this has neglected misalignment1. BL’s biggest single 
export market was the U.S. where it dominated, then totally lost, the small sports car 
market when it withdrew from the business in 19812. Low profit margins on U.S. sales 
meant that real sterling appreciation against the US$ in the late 1970s resulted in a loss 
on each unit sold in the U.S.3
Similarly, currency risk management was acknowledged as a major problem in Jaguar’s 
offer-for-sale document in 1984. This stated (Section 18) that the directors did "not 
consider it appropriate to make a profit forecast for the year to 31.12.1984 because of 
the sensitivity of the Group’s results to changes in the sterling/dollar exchange rate". This 
is an implicit admission that BL (which was responsible for Jaguar’s hedging at the time) 
could neither correctly forecast exchange rates nor manage the exchange risk.
Indeed, the offer-for-sale document includes a sensitivity analysis table of how Jaguar’s 
results might have looked in 1983 under differing sterling/dollar exchange rates. This is 
reproduced below.
‘Dunnett (1979) investigated the impact of twelve government policies on BL and concluded that they all 
contributed to the company’s demise. However, in 201 pages, he nowhere mentions exchange rate policy. 
Williams et al (1987) investigated the malaise of the Austin Rover division of BL from the standpoint of the 
failure of business strategy and industrial policy. In their case-study of 150 pages, the exchange rate background 
is only given a mention five times.
In Germany, Daimler-Benz (1990) has conducted its own research on the impact of currency risk.
2around 80% of MG/Triumph output, reaching a maximum of 80,000 cars p.a., was exported to the U.S.
3Management accounts for MG are stored in Rover’s archives and R.J. Cripps, Head of Business Strategy, 
applied for me to obtain access. Rover’s Finance Director refused (28.7.93) on the grounds of commercial 
sensitivity because the MG sports car was being relaunched. However, the archives may be available to future 
researchers.
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TABLE 7.1
JAGUAR’S 1983 RESULTS UNDER DIFFERING EXCHANGE RATE ASSUMPTIONS.
Average Exchange Rate, £1 =US$ Operating Profit/Loss £M
2.00 -5
1.80 15
1.60 38
1.524 51
1.40 70
1.20 112
Source: "Offer-for-sale Document, Jaguar", Hill Samuel, 1984.
Given such uncertainty, it is important to investigate how Jaguar managed its exchange 
risk and to draw implications from this management for its competitiveness.
3. HYPOTHESES.
BL was responsible for Jaguar’s treasury management until 1984, and until 1984, Jaguar 
had no independent position. It is hypothesized that Jaguar’s currency risk (i.e. including 
economic exposure) could neither be managed via BL’s treasury, nor its own treasury 
after 1984, nor via its product-market strategy. In consequence, Jaguar was forced into 
massive retrenchment during sterling misalignment 1979-82 and during prolonged 
currency depreciation in Jaguar’s principal export market (the U.S.) between 1986-92. 
This further weakened the company in relation to its German rivals.
4. METHODOLOGY
The methodology to test these hypotheses is a comparative examination of the 
vulnerability to exchange risk of Jaguar and its two German rivals; a comparative 
examination of how the treasuries of the three competitors acted to stem their
41.52 was the average sterling/dollar exchange rate in 1983.
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vulnerability; and how the three attempted to internally hedge, and with what results for 
Jaguar’s competitive position.
An indication of the currency management problem facing the treasuries of Jaguar and 
its two principal competitors is given in Table 7.2:
TABLE 7.2
EXTENT OF NATURAL HEDGE IN THREE COMPETITORS, 1993
JAGUAR BMW MERCEDES-BENZ
Currency Denomination 
of Costs
75% in £
25% in DM 
US$ negligible.
85% in DM. 88-90% in DM. 
Remainder invoiced 
mostly in US$ or 
currencies linked to the 
US$.
Currency Denomination 
of Revenues
Variable. Approx. 
50% in US$
25% in £
15% E.U. currencies.
100% invoiced in DM. 
Currency risk 
management 
transferred to importer. 
BMW states that 58.1% 
of its revenues were in 
foreign currencies in 
1992
100% invoiced in DM
Sources: Jaguar Cars Ltd., Dr.Peter Siebourg, Head of Accounting, BMW Munich, 11.8.92, 15.6.93; Dr. 
Anton Frantzke, Mercedes-Benz, Stuttgart, 15.4.91, 14.6.93
Jaguar’s mismatch in the currency denomination of costs and revenues is substantially 
greater than that of its German rivals. The extent of currency exposure also depends on 
the share of exports in total sales (Chart 7.1). The export shares of the German 
competitors have tended to be relatively stable since 1977. By contrast, the export share 
of Jaguar’s output has been highly volatile, ranging from 43.2% in 1979 to 83.3% in 
1986. A more significant problem than forecasting what percentage of output to hedge 
is that of forecasting output itself. Jaguar’s output has been highly volatile, whereas that 
of its German competitors is much more stable in percentage terms5 (Chart 7.2). A 
similar pattern is evident in profits figures (Chart 7.3).
3For example, Jaguar’s unit output fell by 60.3% from 51,939 cars in 1988 to 20,601 in 1992.
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CHART T.l
VOLATILITY IN JAGUAR’S SHARE OF EXPORTS IN TOTAL SALES COMPARED TO
BMW & MERCEDES-BENZ
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CHART 7.2
VOLATILITY IN JAGUAR’S OUTPUT COMPARED TO BMW & MERCEDES-BENZ
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CHART 7.3
VOLATILITY IN JAGUAR’S PROFITS COMPARED TO BMW & MERCEDES-BENZ
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The difficulty in forecasting demand and output in future years given such volatility raises 
major problems for the treasury, not only in hedging currency exposures but also in 
forecasting funding and working capital needs. In this study, these latter problems are 
ignored, but the magnitude of the problem for Jaguar’s treasury of cash forecasting and 
liquidity management is noted, particularly in relation to its German rivals.
To indicate Jaguar’s competitiveness, changes in Jaguar’s financial position cannot be 
traced out because of the absence of financial information. During sterling’s overvaluation 
1979-82, Jaguar was part of British Leyland. When sterling was overvalued again 
between 1990-92, Jaguar was already part of Ford in 1989. Both parents have declined 
to provide management accounts for the relevant years. Financial information is available 
for its period of independence from 1984 to 1989. This period partly coincided with a 
U.S. boom and a strong dollar up to 1986 at least. This not only boosted U.S. sales in 
absolute terms but also made Jaguar highly profitable. This thesis, however, is about how 
companies manage adverse real exchange rate shifts, not positive ones, so the period of 
independence will not be examined6. A further rationale for not including the period of 
independence is that the individuals responsible for management of currency risk during 
and after privatisation did not change, and that the adverse US$ exchange rate trend 
which started in 1986 was not followed by overall losses in Jaguar’s P/L statement until 
after Ford’s purchase.
In the absence of annual accounts for the relevant periods, data for Jaguar’s market 
position is used as a proxy for competitiveness. This assumption may be considered 
unreasonable as market position is not necessarily a reliable indicator of long-term 
success, whereas profit/loss figures7 are. This is because market position does not equal
6It is hypothesized here that Jaguar’s profits during independence between 1984 and 1989 were made at the 
expense of necessary investment for long term competitiveness. This is because after Ford’s takeover, 
investment of US$ 1 bn in new models was necessary, yet Jaguar had little prospect of making such investment, 
or even staying solvent, had it remained independent.
7See Table 7.7 for an example of how BMW’s U.K. profits increased with a lag following spending on 
marketing infrastructure.
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profit or indeed cash flow. However, in the absence of any other information, market 
position is a crude guide to competitiveness.
In the periods 1979-82 sterling overvaluation and 1986-92 US$ misalignment, Jaguar’s 
vulnerability to currency risk is analysed in terms of unit sales in the relevant market and 
comparisons are made with Jaguar’s two German competitors.
Secondly, the efforts BL and Jaguar made to hedge Jaguar’s currency risk via the 
treasury in the two periods are investigated and compared with those of BMW and Mercedes.
Thirdly, the strategic options open to Jaguar to manage its economic exposure are 
investigated and compared with those of its two German competitors.
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5. VULNERABILITY OF JAGUAR TO REAL STERLING APPRECIATION 1979-828
The rise in the real sterling exchange rate can render Jaguar’s products less competitive 
in the U.K. market as foreign rivals could potentially undercut Jaguar by the extent of 
the appreciation. Secondly, Jaguar would become less competitive in its main export 
market, the USA, and also in third markets. If the decline in price competitiveness led 
to a decline in sales, then profitability would be adversely affected as fixed costs per unit 
of output rise. The decline in profitability in turn makes it less easy to increase 
investment to regain competitiveness via non-price factors, such as improved quality and 
new product design.
Table 7.3 shows that Jaguar’s U.K. sales collapsed by over 40% between 1979-83, 
whereas those of its German rivals rose dramatically.
TABLE 7.3
UNIT SALES IN U.K. MARKET
JAGUAR BMW MERCEDES-BENZ
1977 11,445 8,481 6,981
1978 11,952 10,506 6,935
1979 7,946 14,058 7,914
1980 10,755 13,451 8,876
1981 5,281 17,086 10,667
1982 6,795 22,977 11,792
1983 6,616 25,178 13,108
% change 1977-83 -42,2 +296.8 + 187.8
It needs to be investigated to what extent Jaguar’s sales collapse was owing to price 
factors (which would underpin the hypothesis that currency overvaluation was a cause), 
and to what extent it was owing to other factors. The significance of recession is
8In 1983, sterling depreciated by over 30% against the DM. Data for 1983 is nevertheless included because 
of the existence of time lags.
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diminished by the dramatic rise in German rivals’ sales in the U.K.
By 1983, after years of weak demand, a significant recovery in the total U.K. car market 
was bound to occur (Table 7.4) but Jaguar’s market share declined by 27% between
1978-83, whereas those of its German rivals increased dramatically. As the units sold in 
the elite sector rose by 62 % over the period, Jaguar’s decline in absolute sales is 
disturbing. Indeed, the bigger increase in the elite sector than in the total U.K. market 
can be inferred to be owing to the growth in company cars, and that supply creates 
demand. Thus why Jaguar’s German rivals should dramatically increase supply to the 
U.K. market at a time of U.K. recession could be owing to the product superiority of 
German rivals, but more significantly, the rise in the real sterling exchange rate made 
German products highly price competitive and provided an incentive for the German 
rivals to invest in marketing infrastructure in the U.K. Further, both BMW and 
Mercedes-Benz offered a wider range of cars, with smaller engine sizes, in the U.K. 
luxury market segment, whereas Jaguar did not, thus increasing the size of the U.K. elite 
sector.
TABLE 7.4
UNITS SOLD IN TOTAL U.K. MARKET, IN ELITE SECTOR & SHARES IN TOTAL U.K. MARKET
UNITS SOLD 
IN TOTAL U.K. 
MARKET
UNITS SOLD 
IN U.K. 
ELITE 
SECTOR x
JAGUAR
%
BMW
%
MERCEDES-
BENZ
%
1977 1,323,524 28,122 0.86 0.64 0.53
1978 1,591,939 30,717 0.98 0.66 0.44
1979 1,716,275 31,265 0.74 0.82 0.46
1980 1,513,761 34,397 1.16 0.89 0.59
1981 1,484,713 34,315 0.55 1.15 0.72
1982 1,555,027 42,369 0.76 1.48 0.76
1983 1,791,699 45,535 0.63 1.41 0.73
% change 
1977-83
+ 35.4 + 61.9 -26.7 + 120.3 +37.7
x including Rolls-Royce.
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5.1 Comparative vulnerability to currency risk of BMW and Mercedes-Benz 1979-82.
The vulnerability of Jaguar to overvaluation in the pound can be seen in Tables 7.5 and 
7.6. BMW and Mercedes-Benz both have the advantage of costs denominated in a more 
stable currency. A further advantage is that both are far less dependent on export markets 
than Jaguar and also that their export markets are more diversified than Jaguar’s. Their 
exports as a percentage of total sales were lower than that of Jaguar 1977-83. With the 
collapse in Jaguar’s demand in the U.K., it became even more dependent on exports at 
a time when the real sterling exchange rate was grossly overvalued. Chart 7.1 shows 
export shares of the three competitors. Table 7.5 indicates how these shares have 
changed.
TABLE 7.5
EXPORTS AS A % OF TOTAL SALES
JAGUAR BMW MERCEDES-BENZ
1977 53.9 47.0 48.4
1978 54.9 47.6 44.0
1979 43.2 48.0 44.6
1980 44.5 55.0 47.7
1981 64.0 55.7 45.4
1982 69.2 61.1 49.3
1983 76.4 59.8 50.0
% change 1977-83 + 41.7 +27.2 +3.3
Sources: annual reports, Jaguar:SMMT
Jaguar was forced into massive retrenchment in the years to 1981 but rebounded (on the 
back of dollar overvaluation) only to face another period of massive retrenchment (Chart 
7.2). Neither BMW nor Mercedes-Benz was subject to such damaging fluctuations in 
demand and output. This will be shown to be partly the result of more diversified markets 
than those of Jaguar.
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6. LIMITED ROLE OF THE CORPORATE TREASURY IN MANAGING STERLING 
OVERVALUATION 1979-82.
6.1 Hypothesis.
It is hypothesized that the limited role of the treasury in managing sterling overvaluation 
was a handicap to Jaguar, but not to BMW and Mercedes-Benz.
6.2 Similarities in treasury management of the 3 competitors9.
The German U.K. subsidiaries were responsible for their own hedging from 198110. 
Jaguar did not have its own treasury until 1983. Prior to this, external hedging was 
performed by British Leyland’s central treasury.
From Table 7.6 it can be seen that the treasury hedging capabilities of the three 
competitors were similar in that only transaction exposure was managed. The uncertainty 
in Jaguar’s sales and output meant that it never covered its transaction exposure beyond 
6 months. The 12 months of the German rivals was only a potential advantage, since with 
sterling rising in real terms and staying firm against the DM, the German rivals did not 
need to hedge (their exports to the U.K.), whereas Jaguar djd need to hedge its exports.
The German rivals only needed to hedge the 30% fall in the £/DM rate in 1983. Whether 
they could do so is investigated in the case of BMW.
^This section derives from interviews with the following:
Mercedes Benz (U.K.) Ltd.: S. Mason, Treasurer, 6.7.1992, July and August 1993.
BMW (G.B.) Ltd: E. Phillips, Chief Accountant, February 1991.
Jaguar: C. Wiener, former Forex Dealer, BL, 17.5.1994; John Burke, Treasurer, Jaguar 9.8.95
10Prior to this, the importers were responsible for hedging.
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TABLE 7.6
COMPARISON OF £ HEDGING STRATEGIES OF TREASURY ONLY, 1979-83
JAGUAR (by BL’s 
treasury)
BMW(GB)Ltd, 
from 1981
MERCEDES- 
BENZ(U.K)Ltd, 
from 1981
PLANNING 
HORIZON OF 
HEDGING
6 months 12 months 12 months
TARGET 
BENCHMARKS 
FOR HEDGING 
FORECAST 
RECEIVABLES
100% of forecast 
receivables, but forecasts 
never went beyond 6 months. 
No active management.
Cost of sales: 10-50% 
on
discretion
50% but
entirely
discretionary.
EXTENT OF 
COVER
never beyond 6 months, 
mostly rolling 30-day 
hedges.
never beyond 12 
months
6-12 months
INSTRUMENTS
USED
mostly 1-6 month forwards 
& options.
1-12 month forwards. 
Sometimes options.
forwards & 
options.
CENTRALIZED 
TREASURY & 
NETTING 
PERFORMED
yes, in BL. no no
COST OF
HEDGING
APPRAISED
no yes. The hedges are 
already included as part 
of the cost of sales at 
the time of purchase of 
the forward contracts. 
Hedge gains or losses 
are entered into the 
accounts of BMW G.B. 
when the hedge is 
unwound.
no
FORECASTING
FUTURE
RECEIVABLES A 
PROBLEM
yes Not for the groups as a 
whole. As the U.K. 
market was targeted by 
both, both expected 
sales increases.
In December 1982, BMW (GB) Ltd. had forecast liabilities of £212 M for the following 
year. It had forward hedging in place amounting to DM 375 M in forward contracts from 
1 to 12 months. This represented approx. 50% of the 1983 cost of sales of £212 M. 
Payables, i.e. cost of sales, are booked at the exchange rate at the time of purchase, and
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the rate is fixed once per month. The efficacy of the hedge is judged against this rate.
The limited role of the treasury in hedging can be seen in that not only was the hedge a 
partial one, but also the hedge profits were classified as foreign exchange gains by the 
Inland Revenue and taxed at standard corporation tax rate of 52 %. Thus of a 100% 
exposure, with partial hedging of around 50 %, less future tax, the real hedge was only 
to the value of 52% of 50% =26%  of DM invoices, and then only for a maximum of 
12 months out. The hedge had to be renewed at much lower rates in December 1983 
when forward cover amounted to DM 385 M. This again was only a 50 % hedge.
BMW (GB) Ltd. itself perceives that its effective hedge against sterling depreciation in 
1983 was not so much the hedging performed by the treasury but the fact that it was able 
to raise its prices without any negative impact on sales. Table 7.3 shows that U.K. sales 
actually rose in 1983.
A similar hedging problem occurred in 1992. In 1990-92, BMW (GB) Ltd.’s treasury 
believed that the U.K. government’s commitment to hold sterling in the ERM would be 
effective. It decided to cut the percentage cover in its forward contract hedge to a much 
lower level than in the previous ten years and consequently lost out when sterling 
depreciated in 1992.
6.3 Conclusions.
BL needed to hedge Jaguar’s sterling currency risk 1979-8211 but could not as 3-month 
forwards were grossly inadequate. Both BMW and Mercedes, by contrast, were able to 
benefit from sterling overvaluation. However, this does not mean that overvaluation is 
always an opportunity from which easy profits can be reaped. The case of BMW 
underlines that it is difficult for the treasury to know when the period of misalignment 
is to end and when to institute a hedge in readiness.
“With hindsight, the ideal situation would be to have no hedge in place in 1983 in order to take advantage 
of sterling’s depreciation.
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7. DIFFICULTIES IN ADJUSTING JAGUAR’S PRODUCT-MARKET STRATEGY
1979-83
7.1 Jaguar.
Given that BL’s treasury hedged only for 30 days, the strategic options to manage the 
overvaluation were to cut costs; source abroad; and switch production to its largest 
market, the U.S.
Jaguar was not able to pursue these strategies for the following reasons:
1. Jaguar, as part of BL, could not realistically consider the solution of producing in its 
largest market. BL was only kept afloat with government funds with one object being to 
keep jobs in the U.K. It did not have the resources to invest in new production facilities 
in the U.S.
2. A rapid switch to sourcing components from the U.S. was impossible. One reason is 
that many components were specific to Jaguar’s models. Suppliers could not be changed 
quickly in response to currency changes.
3. Cutting costs was also problematic. Mechanization required investment. Jaguar did not 
have the investment funds to update its model range in the late 1970s. It was starved of 
investment funds by BL and did not have its own source of retained earnings. Cost- 
cutting by reducing staff and raising productivity was also problematic as relations with 
trade unions were delicate.
7.1.1 Conclusion.
With costs rising as a result of the rising real exchange rate and with the collapse in 
demand in the U.K. market, Jaguar in 1980-81 was forced into a strategy of massive 
retrenchment, i.e. massive cutbacks in output and employment.
7.2 Opportunistic strategies of BMW and Mercedes-Benz.
By contrast, both BMW and Mercedes-Benz used the opportunity of sterling misalignment 
to expand aggressively into the U.K. market (Table 7.3). Moreover, they also
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aggressively increased their total output over the same years in which Jaguar was forced 
to retrench (Table 7.7).
TABLE 7.7
TOTAL OUTPUT OF JAGUAR AND ITS GERMAN RIVALS, 1977-1981
JAGUAR BMW MERCEDES-BENZ
1977 24,853 290,236 401,255
1978 26,485 320,853 393,203
1979 13,988 x 336,981 422,159
1980 19,380 341,031 429,078
1981 14,677 351,545 441,000
% change 1977-81 -40.9 +21.1 + 9.9
Sources:SMMT, annual reports, 
x 1979 output was cut by strikes.
Table 7.8 shows that the German rivals’ profits also grew over the 1977-81 period, 
except BMW in 1980 and 1981. Data is not available for Jaguar. It can be inferred, 
though without evidence as the management accounts are not available, that the collapse 
in Jaguar’s output resulted in costs per unit sold increasing.
TABLE 7.8
NET INCOME, BMW AND MERCEDES-BENZ 1977-81, DM M
BMW MERCEDES-
BENZ
1977 242.5 587
1978 374.6 593
1979 400.7 638
1980 298.1 709
1981 245.6 826
Source:annual reports
Indeed, BMW used the years of sterling misalignment to build up a U.K. dealer and 
servicing network, providing the base for the high profits from the U.K. market which 
were reaped from 1988 (Table 7.9). The result is that the U.K. has become by far the
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second largest export market of BMW after the U.S.
TABLE 7.9
BMW’S PROFITS IN THE U.K. AND % OF COSTS DENOMINATED IN DM.
ANNUAL PROFIT IN £ 
M
ANNUAL PROFIT IN 
DM M
% OF COSTS 
DENOMINATED IN 
DM
1980 4.6 21.5 86
1981 8.5 36.6 78
1982 6.4 24.5 85
1983 5.3 20.9 77
1984 10.1 36.9 85
1985 16.0 56.7 83
1986 4.0 11.5 92
1987 2.6 7.8 85
1988 33.3 106.8 82
1989 47.3 128.6 88
1990 36.0 104.0 84
Source: BMW, Munich.
Similarly, Mercedes-Benz strengthened its marketing base in the U.K. during the years 
of sterling overvaluation, bringing its U.K. sales up in line with those of its other large 
European markets of Italy and France.
Further, whereas Jaguar needed to source abroad but could not, the German rivals were 
at an advantage in not sourcing in the U.K. to match the sterling exposure which they had 
opened up by their export success.
7.3 Conclusions.
Jaguar’s product-market strategy was too inflexible to hedge sterling overvaluation by 
internal means. Not only did BMW and Mercedes not have to face such difficulties, but 
they were instead able to exploit sterling overvaluation. Both pursued an offensive 
marketing strategy in U.K.
Chapter 7
201
8. VULNERABILITY TO REAL US$ DEPRECIATION 1986-92.
The period 1982-86 was one of dramatic expansion for Jaguar as US$ overvaluation 
coincided with a U.S. boom. This was followed by prolonged dollar weakness and 
recession in the U.S. Charts 1.1, 1.2 indicate the real depreciation of the US$ against 
the pound and the DM.
TABLE 7.10
COMPARATIVE VULNERABILITY TO REAL DOLLAR DEPRECIATION
JAGUAR BMW MERCEDES-BENZ
Location of production 
up to 1993
U.K. only Germany only Germany only 
(except commercial 
vehicles)
% Dollar input sourcing 
up to 1993
negligible less than 10% less than 10%
Year Units sold in 
U.S.
1986 24,901 96,800 99,300
1987 22,919 87,800 89,900
1988 20,727 73,400 83,700
1989 18,967 64,900 75,700
1990 18,728 63,600 78,400
1991 9,376 53,300 58,900
1992 8,681 65,700 63,300
% change 1986-92 -65.1 -32.1 -36.2
Sources: Jaguar Cars, Coventry; BMW and Mercedes-Benz annual reports &. interviews
Jaguar and its two main German competitors have comparative currency exposures in the 
extent of mismatch between US$ costs and revenues (Table 7.10). Similarly, the largest 
export market of all three is the U.S. However, Jaguar is much more vulnerable than 
the Germans because of its much higher dependence on the U.S. market (Table 7.11). 
It was a competitive advantage for Jaguar that its competitors were also European and did 
not have a US$ cost base, but one denominated in DM. According to Scott (1987),
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Jaguar noted that the price-setter for the U.S. luxury car market was Mercedes-Benz. 
Because Jaguar believed that its costs, particularly the combined costs o f wage rates and 
social security contributions, were well below that of its German competitors, it 
perceived it had a competitive advantage in the U.S. market. How then can Jaguar’s 
worse (Table 7.10) comparative performance 1986-92 be explained ?
TABLE 7.11
U.S. SALES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL SALES
JAGUAR BMW MERCEDES-
BENZ
1986 65.5 21.7 16.7
1987 55.4 19.0 15.0
1988 43.5 15.1 11.3
1989 39.4 12.4 10.9
1990 44.7 12.1 13.6
1991 40.8 9.6 10.2
1992 42.1 11.0 11.9
% change 1986-92 -33.1 -49.3 -28.7
Sources:
Jaguar - Jaguar Cars, Coventry. BMW & Mercedes-Benz - annual reports. All data refer to unit sales.
Over 65% of Jaguar’s sales were in the U.S. in 1986. If the unit sales of Canada are 
included, the exposure to the dollar is even greater (73%), given the link between the US 
and Canadian dollars, (though Jaguar hedged the two currencies in isolation). In 1986, 
the dollar exposure of BMW and Mercedes-Benz as far as the U.S. market is concerned 
was many times smaller. This needs to be recognized when assessing the collapse in 
U.S. sales as a percentage of total sales of the three companies. Jaguar’s relatively 
weaker position is also seen in that the collapse in sales affected Jaguar’s two main 
competitors to a much lesser extent than it did Jaguar. BMW and Mercedes’ exports to 
the U.S. were at a much higher absolute level - both over four times Jaguar’s exports in 
the peak year 1986. This much higher level could engender economies of scale in 
marketing and servicing in the U.S. Because of the costs of infrastructure for marketing 
and servicing, it is possible, in the absence of information on management accounts, that
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both German rivals have lower breakeven points in the U.S. than Jaguar in the event of 
sales downturns. Their lower vulnerability than Jaguar is also illustrated by the fact that 
their decline in exports to the U.S. in percentage terms was much less than that of 
Jaguar’s (Table 7.10).
The difficulty in interpreting the differing vulnerability of the rival companies lies in 
principally two factors. One is the extent to which they were the product of U.S. 
recession rather than dollar misalignment. A second factor is that economic exposure 
refers to the firm as a whole, and that the competitors’ activities other than car 
manufacture need to be included in a comparison with Jaguar. Whereas Jaguar produced 
only luxury cars, BMW and Mercedes-Benz belonged to holding companies which had 
other activities.
8.1 Impact of U.S recession.
It is notable that luxury cars are premium-priced but highly income-elastic. The decline 
in incomes and job-insecurity in a U.S. recession is thus a factor in the collapse in U.S. 
sales of all three firms. An additional factor is that in 1991, the U.S. imposed a luxury 
car tax of 10% on cars priced above US$ 30,000. This did not affect all three 
competitors equally, since BMW and Mercedes-Benz were able to exploit the fact that 
they already marketed smaller models below the US$ 30,000 threshold.
For Jaguar’s German rivals, the relatively small percentage of U.S. sales out o f total 
sales meant that their survival was not threatened even if they lost the entire U .S. market. 
By contrast, Jaguar’s enormous dependence on the U.S. market meant that adverse 
changes in the U.S. could be critical to its survival. Indeed, prolonged depreciation in 
the real US$/£ exchange rate came at the same time as recession in the U .S. It is not 
significant that the two effects cannot be separated out. Moreover, whilst BMW and 
Mercedes-Benz both registered significant declines in U.S. sales as a percentage of total 
sales, they were able to make this up by increased sales elsewhere, whereas Jaguar could 
not. Total sales of both companies increased, whereas Jaguar’s total sales fell 
dramatically.
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8.2 Diversification of the German rivals.
The concern from a currency management perspective is whether activities other than 
luxury car manufacture increased or reduced their vulnerability to US$ depreciation.
8.2.1 BMW.
As the period considered is up to 1992, it does not include BMW’s acquisition of Rover 
in 1994. This acquisition reduced BMW’s exposure to the US$ as a percentage of total 
currency exposure.
Up to 1992, BMW was less vulnerable than Jaguar to US$ depreciation on two fronts. 
Firstly, whereas Jaguar has been dependent for many years on sales o f only two models - 
(a saloon and sports car) - BMW makes a much wider range o f models and smaller 
models have a wider market. Secondly, BMW manufactures motorcycles and has a joint- 
venture with Rolls-Royce in the manufacture of aircraft components. However, the 
percentage of total turnover accounted for by these latter activities is minor (3% of 
turnover).
8.2.2 Mercedes-Benz.
Mercedes-Benz belongs to a conglomerate, Daimler-Benz, which includes Deutsche 
Aerospace (10% of group turnover), with sales largely denominated in US$ and costs in 
DM, and AEG (16% of group turnover), with costs largely denominated in DM, but less 
vulnerable to US$ revenues. Mercedes-Benz turnover and profits are around 70% of 
those of the group. 30% of Mercedes-Benz’s sales volume consists o f commercial 
vehicles. Dollar exposures to U.S. commercial vehicles sales are to an extent matched 
by U.S. production.
8.3 Conclusions.
Daimler-Benz is much more diversified than both BMW and Jaguar but Daimler-Benz’s 
netted exposures are more vulnerable to US$ depreciation than those o f BMW. However, 
the objective here is merely to investigate changes in competitive position in only one 
segment, i.e. U.S. luxury car sales. It is reasonable to focus on one segment since the
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car division of Mercedes-Benz has independent managerial responsibility and it 
core activity, whereas other segments are not.
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9. LIMITED ROLE OF THE CORPORATE TREASURY IN MANAGING US$ 
MISALIGNMENT.
9.1 Hypotheses.
Jaguar has been hailed as a pacesetter in corporate treasury attempts to manage economic 
exposure12. Before 1990, Jaguar had a rolling two-year plan of currency hedging but 
in 1990, lengthened this to a rolling five-year plan. This laid down maximum percentages 
of forecast receivables to be fully hedged, using 5-year forward and option contracts. The 
percentage was 75% in the first year, declining to 50%, 40%, 30% and 25% of forecast 
receivables in consecutive years. This reflects the difficulty in forecasting future output 
levels. The rationale was not to introduce a system of automatic hedging that would 
override the discretion of the treasurer. Such traditional discretion could arguably worsen 
rather than improve hedge performance on account of the virtual impossibility of 
accurately forecasting real exchange rates. Instead, Jaguar’s system was highly 
discretionary and closely monitored based on business plan forecasts, unit economic profit 
reports and changing market views on exchange rates.
The hypotheses to be investigated here are twofold. Can Jaguar’s boldness in hedging 
externally 5 years out be recommended to other companies seeking to manage economic 
exposure ? Secondly, can a system of hedging based on benchmarks produce, a priori, 
better hedge results ?
9.2 Similarities in hedging needs and treasury management of the three competitors.
The basic problem facing all three competitors was that because they could not forecast 
the US$/£ exchange rate beyond the near-term, they could not forecast unit sales in the 
U.S. For Jaguar, the problem was much worse - it consequently could not forecast its 
future output levels.
The conventional response of the treasury literature to such uncertainty, to use options,
12T. Harrison, President of the Association of Corporate Treasurers, interviewed 19.7.93.
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did not present an effective solution for the three competitors since they required cover 
up to 5-years out, but prices quoted beyond two-years were unusable i.e. options were 
useless for when they were most needed.
A second similarity is that a need for continuous hedging existed in all three competitors, 
given the duration of US$ weakness.
TABLE 7.12
COMPARISON OF US$ HEDGING STRATEGIES OF TREASURY ONLY, 1986-92
JAGUAR BMW MERCEDES-BENZ
PLANNING 
HORIZON OF 
HEDGING
2 years 1984-90 
5 years 1990-94
3 years max. of 5 years based on 5 year cash 
forecasts, but acknowledged that exchange 
rate forecasting not reliable 5 years ahead !
TARGET
BENCHMARKS FOR 
HEDGING 
FORECAST 
RECEIVABLES
From 1990: 75% in 
year 1, then on 
declining scale to 
25% in year 5, but 
flexibly interpreted
none.
entirely discretionary.
EXTENT OF COVER totally discretionary, 
despite the target 
benchmarks
discretionary discretionary.
Receivables hedged on a rolling 
basis,usually of short-term duration.
INSTRUMENTS
USED
mostly 5-year 
forwards. Some 
options up to 2 
years out. No swaps
forwards & options. No swaps
USE OF US$ 
FUNDING
yes. Commercial 
paper issued by 
Jaguar pic, but not 
enough to hedge 
US$ receivables
yes yes. US$ Eurobond issue. New York stock 
exchange listing was not until Oct. 1993.
CENTRALIZED 
TREASURY & 
NETTING 
PERFORMED
small size of 
operation meant 
only one treasury.
yes Up to 1991, foreign subsidiaries acted 
independently. Since 1991, to cope with 
the enlargement of the Daimler-Benz 
group, the treasury was centralized.
COST OF HEDGING 
APPRAISED
no yes, but details 
not available
no
FORECASTING
FUTURE
RECEIVABLES A 
PROBLEM
yes not for the 
group as a 
whole.
not for the group as a whole, but a big 
problem in forecasting U.S. sales.
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A third similarity is that the best means of continuous external hedging is via borrowing 
the equivalent of U.S. sales in US$ and converting the proceeds to lock in current 
exchange rates. Locking into US$ borrowing at high real interest rates, when the outlook 
was for declines in interest rates, was not an attractive proposition. Instead, all three 
purchased forwards and options, but did not use swaps, reflecting the dangers in locking 
into long-term rates.
9.3 Difficulties for Jaguar to externally hedge its US$ risk13.
One benchmark to judge the effectiveness of external hedging is the extent to which it 
corresponded to the hedge that would have been installed if perfect foresight existed. The 
principal reason to believe that discretion is superior to benchmark hedging is that there 
are times when the balance of probabilities favour a particular exchange rate outlook. One 
such circumstance was 1985, when the US$ had already been grossly overvalued for five 
years. Given the internal and external imbalance in the U.S. economy, a treasurer with 
intuition could have deduced that such an imbalance could not last indefinitely into the 
future, particularly in view of the impact of the distortions on the U.S. economy from 
the US$ overvaluation. Moreover, given the long duration of US$ overvaluation, the 
probability that it would go higher was lower than that the US$ would weaken. With 
hindsight, it can be seen that discretion to lock in favourable 1985 forward rates for the 
entire duration of the prolonged US$ weakness, would have yielded better results than 
short-term hedging.
However, this is purely hindsight analysis. No perfect foresight existed which could have 
forseen that a six-year forward hedge would be necessary. As future exports to the U.S. 
would not be known in advance, it can be assumed that the forward contracts would need 
to be to the value of US$ sales in 1986. However, the actual outturn o f sales in each of 
the years to 1992 was significantly lower than that existing in 1986 (Table 7.10). The 
forward hedge should have yielded a profit sufficient to offset the decline in sales that 
actually occurred.
13Alison Cambage, Jaguar’s Foreign Exchange Manager since 1986, interviewed 22.7.93
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What Jaguar actually did can now be compared with the above benchmark. Jaguar’s 
boldness in using 5-year forwards can be recommended to other companies to hedge 
economic exposure, but only if the treasurer is confident on the currency outlook and the 
size of future cash flows. In reality, treasurers do not have perfect foresight and thus 
cannot be confident enough to use discretion to commit the firm to current 5-year rates.
A second critique is that Jaguar’s hedging plan was not comprehensive since only a small 
proportion of non-contractual exposures were hedged in further-out years. According to 
Burke, Jaguar’s treasury had no ambition of managing economic exposure. This reflects 
that the process of forecasting receivables is subject to severe limitations.
The target percentages to be hedged were routinely ignored, reflecting the emphasis of 
the treasury on constant market monitoring and short-term market moves. Firstly, target 
US$ exchange rates were calculated at which Jaguar could make a profit on car sales in 
the U.S. Alongside the "target exchange rates" were "forecast exchange rates". If the 
forecast could be relied upon, then the difference between the target and forecast 
exchange rates served as a benchmark for forecasting Jaguar’s profits. If the forward rate 
gave a better rate than the forecast rate, then this served as a decision rule to purchase 
forwards, since the forwards permitted Jaguar to lock into a better exchange rate than 
both the forecast and the target rate and thus lock in a profit. The risks to these tactics 
are considerable. Firstly, the forecast rate may turn out to be conservative and Jaguar 
might have obtained a much higher profit had it not hedged. Secondly, if  the forecast 
exchange rate turns out to be optimistic and Jaguar has in consequence not already 
hedged, or delayed hedging via forwards, forward rates can quickly turn unfavourable, 
leaving Jaguar with adverse exchange rates. This is particularly significant given that only 
a low percentage of dollar receivables in further-out years were hedged at current rates, 
though the actual percentage hedged depended on market rates.
A second reason why Jaguar’s hedging plan was not on autopilot is that 5-year forward 
contracts could only be bought provided it was permitted within Jaguar’s bank limits. 
Sometimes capital adequacy problems prevented the treasury from conducting the extent
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of 5-year hedging that it planned. Whether owing to restriction or to override, the use of 
shorter contracts such as 1-year forwards, meant that they could only be renewed each 
year at a less favourable rate. For example, in 1987 Jaguar’s US$ revenues for that year 
were hedged at $1.38 to the pound, but in 1988 this hedge could only be renewed at the 
worse rate of 1.55, a difference of £50 M to £60 M in annual pre-tax profits. The results 
were nevertheless better than if Jaguar had not hedged at all and simply used the spot 
market (spot 1.64 and 1,78 respectively). In 1989, the 75 % hedging was at a rate of 
$ 1.70 to the pound. On Jaguar’s own figures, in 1989 every 1 cent decline in the value 
of the dollar against sterling was forecast to reduce profits by £3 M to £3.5 M.
Thirdly, there was no automatic hedging plan for interest rate risk. The dramatic rise in 
real U.K. interest rates from 1988 was not hedged. Instead, Jaguar had a commercial 
paper programme for arbitrage, but this was stopped subject to the Ford takeover in 
1989.
9.4 Conclusions.
Jaguar’s 5-year hedging plan was highly discretionary and the target benchmarks reflected 
a "comfort level", not a system for imposing controls over treasury discretion.
Over the period 1984-91, Jaguar made a net profit of £250 M from its forward hedges, 
as compared with the spot rate (Chart 7.4). This can be considered a strong 
performance. Hedge losses occurred at the period of dollar strength up to 1986, and also 
in the 9 months of 1989.Burke notes that not hedging up to 1986 would not have been 
risk averse. Overall, hedges outperformed spot rates.
The hedging policy still left exposures uncovered. Foreign exchange gains/losses are 
entered on the balance sheet as "Other Reserves". These amounted to £3.5 M in 1988, 
1 % of pre-tax profit. However, they still compensated only partially for the decline in 
the dollar.
Jaguar’s treasury was not a pacesetter in managing its economic exposure, and it had no
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ambitions to manage it. If Jaguar could be successful in such management, why were 
German rivals not emulating Jaguar ?
Jaguar’s treasury nevertheless could not have reasonably performed any better than it did. 
If it had not instituted a 5-year hedging plan, it could be criticized for not attempting to 
hedge non-contractual exposures. If Jaguar had not hedged at all against the possibility 
that US$ strength up to 1986 would not last, it would have maximized profits. But had 
the real US$/£ rate suddenly weakened, the treasury could have been criticized for not 
having a hedge in place. Thus Jaguar’s treasury, like those of its rivals, was merely a 
pawn of the external environment.
The fact that in 1993 Ford cut Jaguar’s hedging plan to 2 years and that BMW’s and 
Mercedes’ hedging plans were shorter than 5 years (Table 7.12) merely reflects the 
difficulty in forecasting future exchange rates and therefore future cash flows. This 
recognizes that key variables such as sales and output, cost of inputs and even model 
ranges cannot be forecast five years ahead. Thus whilst the planning horizon for hedges 
during overvaluation should conceptually be as long as possible, in practical terms this 
is only of benefit with perfect foresight. Nevertheless, Jaguar is currently in discussion 
with Ford to reintroduce a 5-year hedging plan. Given the speed with which a currency 
outlook can change, discretion is highly advisable, as opposed to running a hedging plan 
on auto-pilot.
BMW’s14 hedging schemat is based entirely on discretion. It attempts to forecast cash 
flows 36 months out15, and depending on the exchange rate outlook, a decision is made 
as to whether to hedge the currency risk, whether to cover it fully or partially and
^Source: Norbert Meier, Head of Corporate Finance, BMW Munich, 24.8.93
15Meier recognizes that although some economic exposure as well as transaction exposure is included in the 
treasury’s 36-month planning horizon, he states categorically that the responsibility for managing BMW’s 
economic exposure does not lie with the treasury. Instead, responsibility lies with the Group Strategy 
Department. It is implicit from this that the role of BMW’s treasury is perceived internally as more one of 
financial management rather than one of strategic management.
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whether to cover it for the full 36 months forward or not. One contrast with Jaguar is 
that its German rivals and Ford had no problem of bank restrictions on account of their 
financial strength.
However, this does not mean that the German rivals had any better success than Jaguar 
in hedging against a possible decline in the US$. BMW used options between 1981-85, 
and when the treasury had greater confidence in an outlook of US$ depreciation, more 
aggressive strategies using forwards were used. Unlike Jaguar, BMW has no benchmarks 
for hedging certain percentages of forecast receivables, which therefore places a premium 
on getting the forecast right.
For the period of US$ weakness between 1986-92, BMW did not wish to state whether 
its US$ exposure was covered fully or partially for the 36-months planning horizon from 
1986 or for any of the period. However, Meier stated that BMW’s USS hedge could only 
be renewed at less and less favourable rates. It is also not clear that the treasurer in the 
selected firms is aware of the ex post figures himself. Without precise knowledge o f the 
partial effectiveness of external hedges, it is not possible to make a valid comparison of 
alternative hedging strategies such as sourcing or production in a US$-denominated base. 
In BMW, the cost of hedging is calculated by the Financial Analysis department, which 
is separate from the treasury. The appraisal of this cost is in the form of a discussion 
with the treasury. This leads to recommendations for future policy, such as whether to 
be more conservative in strategy. This can take the form of increasing the proportion of 
forecast receivables that is hedged. Proof that BMW was not able to immunize itself 
against US$ undervaluation is contained in the following BMW internal data:
TABLE 7.13
BMW’ PROFIT/LOSS IN THE U.S. MARKET 1986-92, DM 000s
1986 n.a.
1987 66,663
1988 173,533
1989 18,591
1990 -17,537 LOSS
1991 -13,332 LOSS
1992 -46,000 LOSS
Source: Niemann & Kerle, BMW Munich, 3.8.1993
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Mercedes-Benz was unwilling to give detailed information on its US$ treasury hedging, 
but the treasuries of none of the three competitors could hedge away the dollar exchange 
risk.
Although Ford bought Jaguar in 1989, it did not integrate Jaguar’s treasury with its own 
until 1994. Jaguar’s policies and hedging strategies remained with Jaguar until April 
1995. Jaguar can nevertheless make suggestions to Ford’s treasury as to how its 
exposures should be managed. The question investigated here is whether being part o f 
a major MNC such as Ford has solved Jaguar’s currency management problem16.
Interest rate risk management17 was transferred to Ford, with Ford acting as a bank to 
Jaguar’s treasury. Jaguar’s purchase price of £1.56 bn was financed by issuing US$ 
denominated bonds in the name of Ford Capital BV. The decision to denominate the 
financing in US$ rather than pounds was significant. Firstly, a US$ liability matches 
Jaguar’s high exposure to US$ revenues. Secondly, by financing in US$, Jaguar escaped 
the dramatic rise in real sterling interest rates from mid-1988 to 1992. Had Jaguar 
remained independent and had it been financed in sterling, Jaguar’s problem of currency 
risk 1990-92 would have been magnified by massive interest rate risk.
16see section 9.2.
17N.Layard, Interest Rate Risk Manager, Ford Europe, interviewed 27.7.1993.
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10. DIFFICULTIES FOR JAGUAR TO ADJUST ITS PRODUCT-MARKET 
STRATEGY TO CREATE A NATURAL HEDGE 1986-92.
10.1 Comparative analysis of how US$ risk was internally hedged 1986-92.
The purpose of this section is to show that major changes were needed in Jaguar’s 
product-market strategy to internally hedge US$ depreciation, whereas theproduct-market 
strategies of BMW and Mercedes-Benz were much closer to the elusive goal o f securing 
a natural hedge. In the case of Jaguar, with 65% of its sales arising from the U.S. in 
1986 (or almost 73% if Canada is included), creating a natural hedge would involve 
matching US$ cash inflows with US$ cash outflows. To implement this principle, the 
major changes needed in Jaguar are a combination of producing/sourcing in its major 
market, the U .S., and of diversifying its markets. Table 7.14 compares how well Jaguar 
accomplished this compared to its German rivals.
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TABLE 7.14
STRATEGIC OPTIONS OF JAGUAR TO MANAGE ECONOMIC EXPOSURE COMPARED WITH BMW 
AND MERCEDES-BENZ, 1986-1992
OPTIONS IN MARKETING INITIATIVES
Market selection and segmentation 
Jaguar
Diversification of markets was accomplished with some success (Table 7.18). However, Jaguar still remained 
highly dependent on the U.S. market, resulting in a collapse in Jaguar’s total sales in the years 1986-92. Jaguar 
never had the necessary volume sales in other markets to support fixed costs when US$ depreciation squeezed 
margins and sales.
BMW and Mercedes-Benz
Both had already accomplished significant currency matching as both had a much higher proportion of sales in 
home currency and EMS currencies than Jaguar did. Both had already invested in a global marketing 
infrastructure whereas Jaguar had not. Thus neither of the German rivals were dependent on the U.S. market 
(Table 7.11). Both German firms had the strength to focus on markets other than the U.S., eg. Japan. After 
beginning in the early 1980s, both were selling over 30,000 cars p.a. to Japan ten years later.
Only by 1988 had Jaguar invested in the necessary infrastructure to double its sales in Japan, but its 1124 units 
sold in 1988 was one-twentieth the level of BMW and Mercedes-Benz.
When the U.S. 10% luxury car tax was imposed in 1991, BMW had the capability to increase sales of smaller 
3-series cars. Jaguar and Mercedes did not.
Product strategy 
Jaguar
Jaguar had no resources to bring out new models. Declining profitability (Chart 7.3) forced it to scrap plans for 
a new "F-type sports car" in 1990. Jaguar was forced to cut capital spending from £132M in 1990 to £44M in 
1991.
BMW and Mercedes
Both had the resources to bring out new models. Neither companies cut their R&D budgets. Capital expenditure 
remained relatively stable during the collapse in their sales in the U.S. market (see Table 7.16).
Pricing strategy
Jaguar’s response to dollar depreciation was a complete inability to raise prices. From the autumn of 1987 to 
February 1989, Jaguar was unable to impose any price increase in the U.S. and was forced to defend existing 
levels (FT 16.3.1989)
BMW and Mercedes
Price passthrough was similarly restricted, but whilst profit margins on U.S. sales suffered, both companies 
were sufficiently diversified to increase total profits from other markets.
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TABLE 7.14 (cont.)
OPTIONS IN PRODUCTION INITIATIVES
Product sourcing 
Jaguar
Instead of sourcing from countries with currencies linked to the dollar, Jaguar’s strategy was to augment its 
sterling-denominated sourcing. Jaguar’s policy was one of minimizing "days on hand". This refers to the number 
of days from acceptance of components to shipping of finished goods. Jaguar believed that the use of foreign 
suppliers would require more stocks to be held in order to avoid stoppages owing to late delivery.
No investigation was made of the cost savings from reducing inventory by using U.K. suppliers as compared 
with reducing economic exposure arising from a better match of the currency denomination of costs and 
revenues.
(Jaguar’s % of sourcing denominated in DM at 25% was also much higher than DM revenues. This gave rise to 
another currency mismatch).
BMW and Mercedes-Benz
Neither bothered to increase their relatively small volume of U.S. sourced components 1986-92. The reason 
given by Mercedes is that US components were too expensive (Frantzke 1993).
Plant location 
Jaguar
Jaguar was free to choose plant location when it became independent in 1984, but did not have the resources to 
produce in a US$ cost area.
BMW and Mercedes-Benz.
German rivals had the resources to shift production but saw no need. Both had a deliberate "Made in Germany" 
policy.
Raising productivity 
Jaguar
In mid-1988, Jaguar was forced into a major cost-cutting programme. Whilst the target was a 5% across-the- 
board cut in costs, there were limits to the extent to which investment and costs could be cut. In 1984, the 
average age of Jaguar’s machine tools was 25 years (FT. 16.3.1989).
From 1988, Jaguar’s capital investment budget was cut to 10% of turnover and R&D spending to 5 % of 
turnover. Turnover was itself declining.
When Ford took over, two production lines dated from 1955. In 1993, a new single line could produce 25 cars 
per hour instead of 16, giving a maximum capacity of 50,000 p.a.
Ford increased productivity by 50% and cut the breakeven point by one third.
Table 7.14 indicates how limited the options of Jaguar were to strategically manage its 
economic exposure compared to its German rivals, yet they were far better placed to 
manage them. In marketing strategy, the collapse in Jaguar’s sales in the U.S. was not
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offset by gains elsewhere, as was the case with BMW and Mercedes-Benz.
Faced with the inability to raise prices in the U.S. market, Jaguar’s options were limited 
to selling at a loss or cutting output. It was forced into the latter option.
Whilst the above constraints are consistent with the hypothesis that Jaguar was unable to 
manage prolonged US$ undervaluation, they do not constitute a proof. The factors that 
might have enabled Jaguar to surmount misalignment are, in marketing strategy, a 
superior product and, in production strategy, cutting costs18 to offset the US$ 
depreciation. Neither of these strategies were operational. To make Jaguar’s product the 
best available on the market and superior to that of its German rivals would have 
necessitated massive expenditure on research, development and capital expenditure and 
on marketing. However, Jaguar’s capital expenditure was only a fraction of that o f its 
German rivals (Table 7.15).
TABLE 7.15
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE OF JAGUAR AND ITS GERMAN COMPETITORS 1986-92
JAGUAR 
£ Millions
BMW
DM Millions
MERCEDES-BENZ 
DM Millions
1986 94 2237 na
1987 132 2112 na
1988 104 1911 na
1989 74 1820 3003
1990 70 2066 3083
1991 44 2123 3207
1992 46 1975 3119
Source: annual reports. Jaguar :Coventry
18Jaguar’s chairman stated that the potential for cost saving was limited. However, the fact that Ford later 
cut Jaguar’s breakeven point (this can be defined in terms of sales or export volumes) by one third reveals the 
contrary. What is not known is the capital expenditure that Ford undertook in order to cut the breakeven point. 
If Jaguar on its own did not have such funds available for capital expenditure, then this would underline the 
inflexibility of its options in managing currency misalignment.
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Jaguar could thus only be a follower, and not a pacesetter, to its German rivals. In this 
sense, Jaguar had only its "British craftsmanship" to sell to the U.S. yet this precluded 
switching production to a cheaper cost location. Only years later (FT. 12.4.1994) was 
Ford quoted as stating that British manufacturing was not crucial to Jaguar’s future 
success and marketing image19.
If cutting costs is an instrument of managing exchange rate misalignment, it needs to be 
explained why both BMW and Mercedes-Benz were able to increase total sales in 1986- 
92 even though their cost base in Germany was supposedly higher than that o f Jaguar in 
the U.K. Moreover, Jaguar’s lower costs did not prevent it from falling into massive 
losses from 1989 onwards. The relevant question is to what extent the German rivals* 
higher costs were an impediment and what scope existed to cut their costs. The key point 
is that they had enough flexibility between 1986-92 not to need to change strategy. After 
1992, the strategic change was in response to the entry o f Japanese manufacturers to the 
luxury car market20. The Germans had to cut costs to match Japanese rivals.
In view of the Japanese threat, the three luxury car manufacturers could not remain as 
they were, nor could they turn themselves into mass manufacturers such as VW or Fiat. 
The strategic options are summarized in Table 7.16:
19However, this statement may have been a negotiating ploy to obtain subsidies for new plant for Jaguar’s 
new small car.
20Access to cheap capital and longer working hours give the Japanese an immediate 10 % cost advantage 
(Niefer, CEO Mercedes, E:4.3.1993:41) on top of lean manufacturing. Mercedes estimates that to become truly 
competitive with Japanese rivals means a reduction of 20 to 30 % in the Mercedes cost base (Hubbert, Head 
of Car Division, Mercedes in E:4.3.1993:41). Edzard Reuter, Chairman of Daimler-Benz, links the need to cut 
costs with the need to produce abroad for exchange rate reasons: "Unit output of Mercedes-Benz will increase 
quite visibly...These additional vehicles probably have important markets outside Germany or even outside 
Europe. This means that for exchange rate reasons alone we needed to consider producing abroad" (FT 
8.3.1993:30).
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TABLE 7.16
STRATEGIC OPTIONS OF JAGUAR TO MANAGE ECONOMIC EXPOSURE COMPARED WITH BMW 
AND MERCEDES-BENZ, FROM 1992
Options in marketing initiatives Options in production initiatives
Market selection and segmentation 
Jaguar
Still heavily dependent on U.S. for 44% of sales in 
U.S. in 1993. Hopes that balance will be shifted 
towards European sales when it brings out smaller 
model, but not until 1998.
BMW & Mercedes 
Already global.
Product strategy 
Jaguar
Ford allows US$1 BN for new model range.
BMW & Mercedes
Both plan to meet a much wider range of market 
segments, eg. estate cars, jeeps.
Pricing strategy 
Jaguar
Can only hope that premium price on new models and 
less dependence on U.S. market will reduce 
vulnerability to US$ risk.
BMW & Mercedes
Mercedes’ strategy is to use "target pricing" to cut 
costs. Method is to estimate what the customer is 
willing to pay in a particular product category, 
compared to its competitors, add a profit margin and 
then cost every component to produce the vehicle at 
the target price.
BMW’s strategy is to continue to seek a premium 
price on all its models, but at a competitive level by 
reducing costs.
Product sourcing 
Jaguar
Cheaper sources from Mexico are only realistic if it 
builds its own plant within the North American Free 
Trade Area (NAFTA).
BMW & Mercedes.
Jan. 1993 - both cut costs by collaborating in parts 
manufacture, representing a major cultural shift in the 
two firms. Previously there had been no such 
cooperation between the two firms.
Both cut costs by increased sourcing outside Germany.
Plant location 
Jaguar
Only considering production in Portugal and in 
existing Ford factories within NAFTA, but in reality 
is restricted to U.K.
BMW & Mercedes
Both go global to cut costs eg. BMW’s U.S. costs are 
projected at one-third lower than in Germany.
Raising Productivity 
Jaguar
Recognition that overhead costs are more important 
than U.K. wage costs, which amount to only a modest 
percentage of unit costs. Nevertheless 
workforce cut by one-third.
BMW & Mercedes
Both announce job cuts in Germany, representing a 
significant cultural change.
10.2 Conclusions.
From Table 7.16 it can be seen that radical changes in product-market strategies were 
contemplated in all three companies. All three decided to widen their product range, all 
three decided to dramatically increase sourcing from cheaper suppliers and all three 
considered car production abroad, with the Germans putting it into effect.
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The differences between Jaguar and its German rivals are firstly, that the Germans have 
diversified out of dependence on luxury cars by producing niche products with a premium 
price in a much wider range of market segments. Since Jaguar already belongs to a mass 
producer, Ford, it might be hypothesized that it does not need to shift out of its 
dependence on luxury cars, but the relative inflexibility of Jaguar’s product-market 
strategy compared to its German rivals means that Jaguar’s future depends on luxury cars 
and it also depends on the capital injections that Ford is willing to make. Indeed, Jaguar’s 
decision to produce a wider range of luxury cars came only after years of losses. It was 
only made possible by a US$ 1 bn cash injection from Ford.
A second difference is that the independence of Jaguar’s German rivals is underlined by 
their considerable potential to cut costs by producing abroad. By contrast, if  Jaguar is not 
able to make the rate of return that Ford requires from a narrow market niche in which 
competition is intensifying, its future will be in jeapordy. Indeed, Jaguar’s diversification 
to a smaller model was not implemented swiftly21. Jaguar is also constrained in its 
ability to diversify out of the luxury segment since this would cheapen its luxury marque. 
It was this exclusivity which was one of the main reasons that Ford sought to add Jaguar 
to its product range. It is not known whether Ford believed it could enhance Jaguar’s 
performance by reducing Jaguar’s foreign exchange risk.
A third option which Ford appears to be depending on is geographical diversification of 
Jaguar’s markets. Jaguar has secured a better currency balance in its sales by increasing 
sales to continental Europe (Table 7.17), but it is not explained why the company was 
so slow to target markets other than the U.S.
21 According to Burke, Jaguar’s policy was that it was pointless to build more models until union relations 
and the manufacturing process had first been reformed.
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TABLE 7.17
JAGUAR’S SALES DISTRIBUTION BY REGION IN %, 1985-92.
1985 1986 1987 1988
U.K. 17.5 15.8 21.7 28.8
U.S. 62.9 65.5 55.4 43.5
Canada 6.0 7.1 6.0 5.5
Europe 8.2 7.6 10.7 14.0
Other 5.4 3.9 6.2 8.2
1989 1990 1991 1992
U.K. 30.0 24.9 22.6 24.9
u.s 40.0 43.8 36.5 38.6
Canada 3.4 2.4 2.9 2.6
Europe 17.3 18.9 24.6 22.4
Other 9.3 10.0 13.4 11.5
Source:Jaguar Cars
More significantly, the treasuries of BMW and Mercedes-Benz had a comparatively 
minor management problem compared to that of Jaguar. This is because o f the far greater 
success of the German rivals in creating flexibility in their product-market strategy which 
was far closer to a natural hedge than that of Jaguar. This result was not so much an 
intended part of the two German companies’ strategy as a natural and accidental result 
of their business expansion.
Jaguar could never do this alone. It is asserted by Holland (1993:213) that Ford’s 
takeover of Jaguar has now finally solved Jaguar’s currency management problems. The 
reason given by Holland is that the net US$ cash flows from the Jaguar subsidiary were 
not seen as the central currency management problem of a U.S.-based parent with large 
scale cash flows in many other major world currencies. This conclusion does not appear 
to be correct for two reasons. Firstly, Ford does not offer a natural hedge to Jaguar 
because Jaguar’s exports to the U.S. and other dollar-linked countries are not offset by 
a flow of Ford car exports from the U.S. to the U.K. Secondly, Jaguar’s performance 
as measured by its individual profit and loss statement is considered independently of
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other entities in the Ford group, such as Ford U.K. or Ford of Europe.
11. CONCLUSION.
Jaguar suffered a collapse in sales during the 1979-83 sterling overvaluation, was then 
able to enjoy some highly profitable years when the US$ was overvalued, but sales 
collapsed again when the US$ was in prolonged weakness 1986-9222. Jaguar could not 
immunize itself from the misalignments via adjustments to its product-market strategy and 
the burden of management fell exclusively on the treasury. The case-study has 
demonstrated that the treasury was similarly ineffective in economic exposure 
management. In consequence, Jaguar was forced into a second period of massive 
retrenchment. The treasuries of its German rivals were similarly ineffective in managing 
prolonged US$ weakness, but unlike Jaguar, their product-market strategies were 
sufficiently flexible.
Thus the impact of US$ depreciation was far more severe on Jaguar than on its German 
competitors. The German rivals could go on increasing output and profits, whereas 
Jaguar was forced into massive losses and the loss of its independence.
22This is consistent with weak demand for a highly income-elastic product during U.K. recession, strong 
demand during a U.S. boom, and then weakness again during U.S. and U.K. recessions. Whilst the German 
rivals’ cars are also income-elastic, the difference is that they were nowhere near as dependent on the U.K. and 
U.S. markets as Jaguar was and is.
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\CHAPTER EIGHT 
ICI
1. OBJECT OF CASE-STUDY
The previous case-study of Jaguar’s inability to manage currency misalignment is an 
example of major inflexibility in product-market strategy. However, this can be 
considered to be an extreme case owing to Jaguar being a one-product firm. The purpose 
of the present case-study is to demonstrate that vulnerability to currency overvaluation 
can seriously threaten even a diversified and highly successful world-class MNC. It is 
extraordinary that this subject has not yet been documented in the literature. Pettigrew’s 
(1985) mammoth volume on ICI’s strategic change only mentions currency risk in passing 
as an extraneous factor (mentioned only twice, in pages 67-68). Pink’s (1988) account 
of ICI’s strategic change again just mentions currency risk as only one of a number of 
environmental factors. Although the purpose of Pink’s account is to describe a revolution 
in strategy stemming from ICI’s difficulties during sterling misalignment, he neglects to 
provide a treatment of the role of currency overvaluation in this crisis.
The reasons why ICI’s difficulties in managing sterling misalignment have not so far been 
documented can only be speculated upon. One is that published work has focused on 
business strategy, reflecting the specialization of the authors. It is hypothesized here that 
ICI’s treasury could not mitigate significantly the strategic problem created by 
vulnerability to currency misalignment. If corporate planners have neglected ICI’s means 
of managing currency overvaluation because of a lack of knowledge of the functions of 
ICI’s treasury, it is necessary to investigate what ICI’s treasury insiders have written. 
Alan Clements was ICI’s finance director at the time of sterling overvaluation 1979-83 
and treasurer prior to this. In an article dealing in general terms with how corporations 
have adapted to the advent of floating exchange rates in 1973, Clements (1989:159 and
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166) concluded that:
"...through the turbulent 1970s, it was possible to grapple with many of the group’s 
(ICI’s) problems arising from currency volatility, inflation and interest rate changes in 
one centralised operation. Many other companies involved in international trade had 
developed similar systems, or were in the process of doing so."
"systems built up in the 1970s have stood the test of the 1980s remarkably well".
This conclusion refers to treasury systems, as noted by Clements:
"...The systems developed in the 1970s aimed at achieving three broad objectives - 
control over the company’s cash flows and monetary risks, mobility and flexibility in the 
ways in which the company might cope with these risks."
In this statement, Clements has not claimed that the corporate treasury is able to solve - 
if  "solve" is an appropriate term for an enduring phenomenon - all the problems 
stemming from currency overvaluation. It may seem paradoxical that this is not claimed 
yet at the same time Clements concluded that corporate treasuries have been able to meet 
the objectives set for them. The paradox may be explained in that the yardstick of success 
reflects the objectives set for the treasury and these did not include hedging away the 
problems of prolonged currency overvaluation. The hypothesis of this thesis is that the 
treasury does not have the means of doing so, otherwise ICI’s treasury might well have 
suggested it.
If the corporate planner and the treasurer do not have a profit responsibility for managing 
currency misalignment, the question arises as to who bears responsibility for the impact 
of exchange rate changes on profitability. The actors most affected include the business 
divisions, since they are responsible for their own individual profitability. For the 
profitability of the group as a whole, the responsibility lies with senior management, such 
as the chairman and ICI’s several deputy chairmen.
Demonstrating that ICI’s management believed that overvaluation created a crisis within 
the firm, the Chairman’s Foreword in the 1980 Annual Report states:
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"...whilst U.K. costs continued to increase, reflecting a high (though now falling) rate 
of inflation, export realisations and U.K. selling prices were depressed by the strength 
of sterling. Exports account for a vital one-third of our U.K. production, and by the end 
of 1980 much of this business had become profitless."
In the 1981 Annual Report, the Chairman’s Foreword states:
"In the final quarter of 1980, exports from the U.K. were making losses at a rate of £200 
M per annum...The possibility of price increases was limited because of low growth in 
demand and overcapacity in production. Thus cost inflation could not be fully recovered 
in many parts of the business" (page 4).
Further confirmation that ICI’s export profitability and domestic demand were adversely 
affected by sterling overvaluation is provided by Harvey-Jones1 (1991:343-345):
"...As the year (1980) progressed...The only escape was to export and there, because of 
the high exchange rate, we lost money on every ton we sold. Even if  you took out the 
whole of our labour cost, we would still be losing money. It was doubly galling since 
independent surveys o f the heavy chemicals business in Europe had shown us to be in the 
absolute top league technically - in fact in many cases the best - on such crucial 
competitive areas as on-line time and conversion factors. It looked increasingly as though 
we might have to shut down the heavy chemical end altogether unless the exchange rate 
eased back."
Confirmation that ICI’s management perceived the inability to forecast as a major 
problem is confirmed in the following statement by Harvey-Jones:
"...It was plain that we could not look to any return, certainly in the short term, of the 
demand from our customers in the U.K. In fact it was to take a further six years before 
the growth that followed brought us close to the demand figures we had envisaged.
In terms of testing the nerves it was as tough a time as I’ve ever experienced. The whole 
time the problem was to try and balance the present and the future."
This is underpinned by a third statement:
"The time came when we had to take the forceful decision on our dividend and we had
'ICI’s deputy chairman during the rise in sterling 1979/80 and chairman from 1982 to 1987
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to take it against a background where no one could guess when the current pressure
wpyid-atate",
Thus whilst Pettigrew and Pink have only mentioned ICI’s vulnerability to currency risk 
in passing, it has been left to Harvey-Jones (1991) to assign to currency misalignment a 
role in causing ICI’s crisis in the early 1980s.
The purpose of this case-study is to investigate Harvey-Jones* claim. The methodology 
is as follows. Firstly, it is necessary to define the crisis that ICI found itself in. Secondly, 
it is necessary to prove that currency misalignment was a causal factor. It is here that 
differences in perception can exist between corporate planners, treasurers and those with 
overall profit responsibility for the corporation. ICI’s vulnerability to sterling 
overvaluation is investigated. Thirdly, the strategies adopted by ICI’s treasury in the 
years 1979-83 are investigated to demonstrate the inadequacy of external hedging as a 
solution. Fourthly, it is demonstrated that ICI was, in consequence, forced to adapt its 
product-market strategy just to survive. Fifthly, the extent to which sterling overvaluation 
gave German rivals a competitive advantage is investigated. Sixthly, the success of ICI’s 
strategic and organizational change is appraised in the light of how ICI was able to cope 
with a second period of sterling misalignment between 1990-92.
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2. ANATOMY OF CRISIS.
The anatomy of ICI’s financial deterioration is depicted in Table 8.1.
TABLE 8.1
ICI, SUMMARY PROFIT AND LOSS £M 1979-82
1979 1980 1981 1982
Total Sales 5,368 5,715 6,581 7,358
Interest Charges 82 111 129 135
Pre-tax Profit 613 284 335 259
RATIO ANALYSIS
CURRENT RATIO 2.17 2.11 1.94 1.77
QUICK RATIO 1.24 1.25 1.22 1.08
GEARING 32.43 35.69 39.15 34.53
INTEREST COVER 8.47 3.56 3.60 2.92
PROFIT/SALES 11.42 4.97 5.09 3.52
ROA 16.0 8.4 9.1 7.3
SALES/STOCK 4.7 5.34 5.25 5.34
STOCK TURNOVER (IN 
DAYS)
78 68 69 68
SALES/FIXED ASSETS 1.73 1.66 1.74 1.92
Source: calculated from, annual reports?
The data show a major decline in profitability and an increase, though not a major 
increase, in indebtedness. Interest charges rose by 65% and by 1982 amounted to 52% 
of pre-tax profit. The interest cover ratio showed a marked decline, but the decline in 
liquidity was less marked. The profit/sales ratio showed a major deterioration, but the 
stock turnover ratios do not suggest any major problem in selling stock. It can be inferred 
from this that stock was sold at a much lower profit margin.
Given that ICI continued to declare profits in its annual reports over the period of sterling 
overvaluation, it does not appear to be a crisis at all. The nature of the crisis is best put 
in the words of Harvey-Jones (1991:343-345):
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"Quite suddenly, in 1980 and 1981, disaster struck us. The 
Chancellor had increased interest rates starkly to squeeze out inflation, and as a result the 
pound had strengthened far beyond our capacity to compete. In three consecutive quarters 
our annual rate of profit fell from £600 million a year to an annual rate of loss of £200 
million a year. We were losing on virtually all our exports - and only the highest value- 
added products could jump the currency hurdle".
As the purpose of this study is to provide evidence of an inability to effectively manage 
exchange risk, the primary symptom of such an inability is a collapse in profits. Table
8.2 shows that profits expressed in current cost accounting terms (which is approximately 
equivalent to real terms) showed a much greater deterioration than in the summary in 
Table 8.1.
TABLE 8.2
ICI’S PROFIT BEFORE TAX, ON A CURRENT COST ACCOUNTING BASIS, expressed in 1983 £s, £M 
1979-82
1979 1980 1981 1982
549 93 95 103
Source: ICI annual report, 1983.
Whilst no loss was declared for any year, the humiliation for ICI was that in 1980, ICI 
declared losses in two quarters and reluctantly cut its dividend for the first time since the 
1930s. The 1980 annual report described trading conditions as the most difficult since the 
Second World War. The crisis was that profits did not collapse just in 1980, but were 
depressed for three years.
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3. VULNERABILITY OF ICI TO OVERVALUATION IN THE POUND IN TERMS 
OF INFLEXIBILITY IN PRODUCT MARKET STRATEGY, 1979-82
Having defined the visible impact of sterling misalignment on ICI as a profits crisis, the 
purpose of this section is to provide evidence that ICI’s profits crisis and its vulnerability 
arose because ICI lacked sufficient flexibility in its product-market strategy to adapt 
quickly to the real rise in sterling in 1979/80. Selected indicators o f flexibility which 
rendered ICI vulnerable to currency overvaluation are compared with those of ICI’s 
German rivals in Table 8.3:
TABLE 8.3
INDICATORS OF VULNERABILITY TO CURRENCY OVERVALUATION, ICI & GERMAN 
COMPETITORS, AT THE ONSET OF STERLING MISALIGNMENT, 1979
% of world sales 
accounted for by 
domestic 
production
% of trading 
profit deriving 
from domestic 
production
% of sales 
accounted for 
by industrial 
chemicals
% of total 
sales abroad
% of sales in 
N. America 
1980
ICI 63 74 52 58 162
HOECHST 67 52 23 67 10
BASF 75 58 19 70 11
BAYER n.a. 43 38 52 15
In 1979, ICI’s proportion of world sales accounted for by U.K. production was high but 
still lower than that of its German rivals3. Yet the higher German percentages were not 
a problem as the DM was not overvalued. What does indicate ICI’s vulnerability to 
sterling misalignment is its extraordinarily high percentage of trading profit deriving from 
domestic production.
Further, in 1979 ICI’s proportion of sales accounted for by industrial chemicals was not 
only very high but much higher than any of ICI’s German rivals4. This is an important
*Ihis figure includes S. America.
3Data for other years is given in Table 8.10.
4Data for other years is given in Table 8.8.
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indicator of vulnerability since industrial chemicals generally constitute non-differentiated, 
price-sensitive and low-margin production5.
The misalignment syndrome with its U.K. recession eroded ICI’s U.K. customer base yet 
ICI was dependent on the U.K. for a high proportion of group sales (Tables 8.3, 8.11). 
Harvey-Jones (1981:344) confirms that by the end of 1981 one-third of all ICI’s 
customers in the U.K. had gone out of business.
In the face of the above constraints, ICI’s immediate reaction to the rise in sterling was 
to attempt to maintain market share. This necessitated exporting at a loss, which 
magnified the profits crisis. ICI’s exports from the U.K. in 1980 suffered total losses of 
£90M. Sales in many business classes were being maintained principally to hold key 
market positions (ICI’s 1980 annual report, pages 2 and 8).
Fifthly, the dollar misalignment which started in 1980 might be expected to ease the 
problem of sterling misalignment for ICI’s U.S. sales. However, ICI’s main export 
market and source of profit was Europe (Tables 8.24, 8.25). Exports to N.America were 
relatively insignificant compared to ICI’s European sales. Yet Table 8.3 shows that the 
percentage of ICI’s sales to the Americas was higher than that of all its German rivals. 
Data for other years is given in Table 8.16. Thus ICI’s greatest source of profit, Europe, 
is also where it faced its German competitors head-on. The merits and demerits of ICI’s 
U.S. market position are examined in Section 6.4.
The relative vulnerability of ICI at the onset of sterling misalignment in 1979 was 
reduced by two principal factors. Firstly, direct competition between ICI and its German 
rivals was reduced by differing product ranges via patents and other means of 
differentiation. Such differentiation however, tends not to be possible in industrial 
chemicals which are homogenous and price-sensitive. It is particularly in industrial
5ICI classifies bulk, or commodity chemicals, as industrial chemicals. Examples include petrochemicals and 
plastics. These industrial chemicals are distinguished from relatively high-margin speciality chemicals. 
Industrial chemicals tend to make losses in recession but act as cash cows in periods of growth. Speciality 
chemicals are assumed to be less recession prone.
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chemicals that ICI was most vulnerable. Secondly, an unwritten cartel had existed 
between chemical companies in the post-war period not to compete on each other’s 
territory. Thus the oligopolistic market structure favoured ICI in its domestic and 
Commonwealth markets.
Despite the above positive factors for ICI, ICI’s head of planning has concluded that "the 
particular circumstances of the U.K. meant that it had to improve its cost base more 
rapidly than its competitors'* (Pink 1988:19). One factor in this is that in the late 1970s, 
ICI had invested heavily for further growth, particularly in plastics and petrochemicals. 
This growth did not materialize and capacity surpluses worldwide caused intense 
competitive pressure and a resultant squeeze on profit margins (Pink 1988:18). The speed 
and scale of sterling misalignment exacerbated the existing vulnerability o f ICI and turned 
it into a profits crisis. The question arises as to why ICI’s hedging activities could not 
prevent the profits crisis. It is necessary to investigate what actions were taken by ICI 
to manage the rise in sterling firstly, via its treasury and secondly, via internal 
operational and strategic hedging.
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4. THE LIMITED ROLE OF ICI’S TREASURY IN HEDGING STERLING 
MISALIGNMENT 1979-1983*
4.1 Hypotheses.
Survey evidence (Chapter 5) is that the corporate treasury is not able to manage non­
contractual currency exposures beyond the short-term. It is hypothesized that this is also 
the case of ICI’s treasury. A second hypothesis is that the example of ICI, with 
manufacturing operations in 40 countries, supports the hypothesis that internal financial 
hedging would be more important than external hedging (Holland 1992), given the 
motivation of internalization (Coase 1937, Casson 1982:26) to reduce transactions costs 
? A third hypothesis is that internal financial hedging could not make up for the 
inadequacies of external hedging ?
4.2 ICI’s hedging problem.
The extent o f ICI’s currency mismatch can be seen in that in 1979, 63% of sales derived 
from U.K. production and thus had principally a sterling cost base. U.K. sales - which 
could be denominated in sterling - amounted to 42% of total sales. This left a mismatch 
of 21 %. Such matching to create a natural hedge is not under the control of the treasury, 
whose role is merely to manage it. The actions of ICI’s treasury to manage its currency 
risk are already described in Clements (1989:158-159).
The basic problem at the start o f 1979 was one of hedging exports valued at over £1100 
M for four years forward (Table 8.4), which with hindsight was the length of the sterling 
misalignment.
*The assistance of interviews in July and August 1993 with the following is acknowledged:
T. Harrison - Head of Strategic Planning at ICI and formerly Chief Financial Officer and Financial Controller, 
ICI 1979-1994, 19.7.93, 7.6.94;
Alan Clements - Treasurer, ICI, 1976-1979, Finance Director 1979-1990, 5.7.94.
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TABLE 8.4
ICI’S EXPORTS FROM THE U.K. 1979-82, £M fob.
EXPORT MARKET 1979 1980 1981 1982
EEC 501 528 565 626
OTHER W.EUROPE 116 121 127 147
SUB-TOTAL 617 649 692 773
N.AMERICA 75 75 100 134
OTHER 416 431 661 645
TOTAL 1108 1173 1453 1552
Source:iCi annual reports.
An additional problem was to hedge interest rate risk on loans and short-term borrowings 
(Table 8.5). This became problematic both because of the doubling of short term 
borrowings at floating interest rates and because of the more than doubling of nominal 
interest rates. As inflation declined over the period, real interest rates rose more than 
nominal interest rates.
TABLE 8.5
ICI’S BORROWING, 1979-83 £M
1979 1980 1981 1982
LOANS 1145 1307 1497 1536
of which SHORT-TERM 
BORROWINGS
246 294 589 531
Source:ICI annual reports.
ICI’s internal financial hedging is first critically examined, followed by its external 
hedging.
4.3 Internal financial hedging by ICI’s treasury 1979-83.
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Firstly, sterling invoicing was not acceptable and ICI had no option but to invoice in the 
currency of the customer. This maximized the hedging problem. As local ICI subsidiaries 
would be buying and selling in their own local currencies, it had the effect of transferring 
responsibility for currency risk management to the centre, i.e. the parts of ICI that were 
exporting to them. This facilitated the centralization of currency risk management.
Secondly, even though centralization began in 1970 with the establishment of ICI 
Finance7 and even though it reached its highest form of reinvoicing (Hodgson 1980), all 
it could do is eliminate the duplication and inconsistency that would result if  the hedging 
decisions had been left to be decided by the business divisions before currency netting. 
Centralization was geared to short-term reactive management, providing information such 
as which net currency balances were exposed. This permitted these balances to be 
monitored daily for hedging purposes, but this was only of use to the extent that they 
could be effectively hedged.
Thirdly, the hedging time horizon did not go beyond 12 months. All ICI’s businesses 
were required to prepare for the treasury a forecast of their expectations for currency 
receipts and payments for at least the next 12 months. This gave the central treasury a 
currency by currency picture o f the company’s exposure. However, all this did was make 
it possible to decide between various forms of external hedging and/or asset and liability 
management. Acting 12 months in advance was not enough to hedge away 4 years of 
overvaluation.
Fourthly, regarding asset and liability management (see Appendix 3), the dramatic rise 
in ICI’s short-term borrowings indicated in Table 8.5 was only partly hedged by 
borrowing in "hard" currencies such as the DM and Swiss Franc. The basis of the hedge 
was speculation that PPP would not hold, i.e . that the benefit of lower interest rates on 
"hard” currencies would not be cancelled out by repayment in depreciated sterling. This
The primary task of ICI Finance became to integrate the short-run management of currency exposures 
stemming from exports and imports, interest rates, dividends and the forecast of liquidity and what currencies 
liquid assets would be denominated in.
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gamble paid off because sterling remained firm to 1983.
However, this technique would only have been fully effective if  the real sterling 
appreciation in 1979/80 had been accurately forecast and fully hedged and if  ICI had 
perfect foresight of its future cash flows 4 years in advance. Neither was the case (see 
below)8. The same is true of leading the payment of dividends, fees and other payments 
from ICI’s foreign subsidiaries to the central treasury to be held in appreciating sterling, 
and lagging payments overseas in the expectation that a more favourable exchange rate 
could be obtained as sterling appreciated.
4.3.1 Conclusion.
Internal financial hedging was inadequate to immunize ICI from the effects of 
misalignment, though currency borrowing was partially effective.
4.4 How ICI externally hedged its sterling risk.
The hypothesis here is that the hedging instruments available for ICI to purchase could 
not make up for the inadequacy of internal financial hedging. This is owing to five 
principal constraints:
Firstly, the treasury was not allowed to hedge unknown positions i.e . anything beyond 
its forecast 12 months cash flow, and this at the start of 4 years’ of overvaluation. Up 
to 1979, U.K. exchange control prohibited U.K. companies from opening external hedges 
for anything other than transaction exposure, which in ICI’s case was 3 months forward. 
However, after the devaluation of the pound in 1967, ICI obtained permission from the 
Bank of England to hedge 12 months forward instead of only 3 months9.
'Once the decision had been taken to denominate a substantial proportion of borrowings in foreign 
currencies, the problem was knowing when to get out and convert the loans back into sterling. Again a risk 
would be incurred because of the lack of perfect foresight.
9 This permission was however, only granted provided systems were in place to ensure that as much 
currency netting was conducted as possible in ICI. This condition was imposed to prevent I d  engaging in 
speculative hedges against sterling.
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Secondly, a major problem is the fallibility of forecasts. In 1979 it was not forecast that 
sterling would be overvalued for four years. As sterling rose, the treasury took the view 
that 50% of the 12-month cash forecast should be hedged at all times. This proportion 
was gradually increased - as the overvaluation became evident - to 60 % and above but 
again for only 12 months ahead. Even if  the 12 month cash flow had been 100% hedged, 
the hedge would have to be renewed at less favourable rates, particularly if  3 month 
contracts instead of 12 month contracts were used.
Thirdly, forecasting cash flows 12 months forward was highly problematic. This was 
because future foreign currency cash flows depended on forecasts of future exchange 
rates. An additional dynamic arose in that the treasury took a view on sterling for the 
first 3 months and then a different view for later months. When the exchange rate outlook 
became uncertain, it became impossible to obtain reasonably accurate cash flow forecasts, 
particularly since the liquidity management function involved a significant component of 
foreign currency cash flows. As a practical solution, what ICI did was to forecast cash 
flows on a rolling 12 month basis, but every month the figures were changed as exchange 
rate forecasts changed10.
Fourthly, forecast cash flows were only partially hedged. The treasury policy was to 
hedge 50% and to increase this portion when warranted. Only if there had been a 100%
1(>The decision-making process on internal exchange rate forecasts was similarly problematic. An economist 
from the planning department was involved in discussions on sterling forecasts, but ICI’s treasury was not 
obliged to base its planning on these forecasts, nor were the other business divisions of ICI. Coordination had 
to wait until 1983 when centralized budget planning was established. Only then were the same exchange rate 
forecasts used throughout the group.
Up to 1983, the significance of internal real exchange rate forecasts in ICI lay in long-term planning and project 
work for new investments performed by the planning department. Freeman (ICI’s chief economist, interviewed 
8.6.1992) admits that the real exchange rate forecasts are often not accurate, but are the best guide that the 
company has for planning purposes.
ICI’s treasury also invited two banks for quarterly meetings lasting several hours to provide additional input in 
currency forecasts. Detailed scenarios were discussed for the ensuing 6 months, but beyond 6 months, the 
discussions were only in general terms. This underlines the relatively short-term planning horizon of the treasury 
compared to the corporate planning department.
Chapter 8 237
hedging policy at the start of 1979 would the next 12 months* cash flow have been 
protected. It was too late to institute 100% cover once the U.K. government announced 
its policy of monetary tightening in 1979, since the rise in U.K. interest rates and in 
sterling were already reflected in market expectations.
Fifthly, what the treasury role in interest rate risk management cannot resolve is why 
ICI’s borrowings more than doubled within two years in the first place. This underlines 
how the treasury’s role is essentially reactive. The rise in borrowings resulted from the 
downturn in economic activity. This macroeconomic risk could not be hedged away by 
ICI’s treasury. The instruments ICI used to manage the interest rate risk on its medium 
and long-term borrowings were mainly US$ interest rate swaps. The only way interest 
rate swaps could have hedged ICI’s borrowing at the low rates ruling before the dramatic 
rise in interest rates in 1979 is if  the treasury knew all its borrowing requirements for the 
next four years in advance and hedged them accordingly.
Sixthly, during the 1979-83 overvaluation, the swap market, particularly in currency 
swaps, was relatively undeveloped. ICI only used a few token currency swaps in order 
to convert the low dollar interest rates into rates on other currencies.
Seventhly, as ICI’s treasury was not responsible for the cost of hedging, it had no 
incentive to ensure that it hedged away the impact of sterling overvaluation. ICI’s 
treasury gave the product divisions sterling for its foreign currency receipts at the end of 
each quarter, and the sterling rate that was given was based on a forward rate given to 
each division at the start of each month. The cost o f hedging was not borne by the 
treasury. On receipt of foreign currency and conversion back to sterling, the treasury 
received more sterling than that originally given to the division, or it received less. 
Appraisal of the cost of hedging did not go beyond this. The cost of hedging was thus 
borne by the product divisions. The treasury only acted as a service facility offering 
forward rates. If the product divisions could only renew their hedges at less favourable 
rates then these less favourable rates hit their profitability, not the treasury’s. It also 
created disparate results within ICI, since the profit margins of some product divisions
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such as pharmaceuticals could withstand the rise in sterling whereas other product 
divisions could not.
4.5 Conclusions.
The bulk of the hedging that was carried out was not via the use of forward contracts but 
instead balance sheet hedging, i.e . foreign currency borrowing to finance overseas assets. 
Internal financial hedging such as adjusting the currency denomination of the balance 
sheet structure was more effective for ICI over the 1979-83 period as a whole than 
instruments of external hedging.
The hypothesis is confirmed that ICI treasury’s focus was on managing its transaction 
exposure. The experience of ICI confirms that this is inadequate for managing prolonged 
currency overvaluation. Economic exposure was also not managed externally, since under 
ICI’s policy, non-contractual (economic) exposures were only hedged up to 12 months 
out. Beyond that, the treasury had nothing to do with economic exposure management.
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5. DIFFICULTIES IN  CREATING A NATURAL HEDGE 1979-82.
5.1 Hypotheses.
First is that internal operational and strategic hedging could not make up for the inability 
of the treasury to manage overvaluation via external and internal financial hedging.
Second is that ICI could not change its strategy quickly enough such that the effects could 
have insulated ICI from the 1979-83 misalignment.
5.2 Strategic problem.
ICI’s objectives, as outlined by the General Manager of Planning at the time (Pink 
1988:19) were to urgently increase profitability and to achieve a consistent improvement 
in performance in view of the very wide disparity in performance between product 
categories.
The environment in which these objectives were set was adverse not only because of the 
overvaluation of sterling. Recession, overcapacity in industrial chemicals and greater 
competitive pressures were faced by all the major European chemical companies. ICI 
additionally had to face overvaluation of the pound, the collapse of its U.K. customer 
base and a major involvement in sectors with the most overcapacity. ICI’s response, 
given its announced objectives, was to effect changes in its organization and in its 
product-market strategy.
Table 8.6 summarizes the difficulties faced by ICI in creating a natural hedge.
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1 7 %
I n d u s t r i a l  C h e m i c a l s *  
3 0 %
P h a r m a c e u t i c a l s  6 6 1
A g r o c h e m i c a l s  1 3  %
S p e c i a l i t y  C h e m i c a l s  
10%
I m a g i n g  T e c h n o l o g y  
8%
i n d u s t r i a l  C h e m i c a l s *  
3 %
BAYER
Profit
Turnover Profit
m i*
Turnover
::
. P h a r m a c e u t i c a l s  5  %
P h a r m a c e u t i c a l s  2 4  % A g r o c h e m i c a l s  1 0  %
A g r o c h e m i c a l s  6  %
'
P h a r m a c e u t i c a l s  5 8  %
S p e c i a l i t y  C h e m i c a l s  
1 7 %
S p e c i a l i t y  C h e m i c a l s  
2 3 % ■
.
* * 
■
P a i n t s  1 2 %
:
A g r o c h e m i c a l s  2  %
S p e c i a l i t y  C h e m i c a l s  
1 5 %
F i b e r s  1 9 %
C ihare*  1 CO/riDers 1 0  /O
E n g i n e e r i n g  1 5 %
■
I n d u s t r i a l  C h e m i c a l s
•
2 0 %
■
F i b e r s  2 0 %
I n d u s t r i a l  C h e m i c a l s *  
1 7 % E n g i n e e r i n g  1 %
O il & G a s  1 4 %
I n d u s t r i a l  C h e m i c a l s *  4 %
I
A g r o c h e m i c a l s  3  %
S p e c i a l i t y  C h e m i c a l s  
4 6 %
P a i n t s  8 %  
F i b e r s  9 %
• •••■•
I n d u s t r i a l  C h e m i c a l s ’ 
4 6 %
O il & G a s  3 %  
O t h e r  4 %
HOECHST BASF
Losses
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TABLE 8.6
ICI’S RELATIVE INFLEXIBILITY IN INTERNAL OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC HEDGING 
COMPARED TO ITS GERMAN RIVALS AT THE ONSET OF STERLING MISALIGNMENT IN 1979
OPTIONS IN MARKETING 
INITIATIVES
OPTIONS IN PRODUCTION INITIATIVES
Market selection & segmentation 
ICI’s inflexibility stemmed from its high 
dependence on the U.K. market and on 
industrial chemicals.
German rivals.
All three German competitors were 
strong in continental Europe as their 
main market. Market segmentation 
differed in all three. Only BASF bore 
resemblance to ICI in having a high 
percentage of sales in industrial 
chemicals.
Hoechst and Bayer were more diversified 
than ICI.
Product strategy
ICI was inflexible owing to its high 
proportion of total sales in industrial 
chemicals.
German rivals’ product diversification 
into less price-sensitive branded goods 
increased their flexibility to manage 
currency risk.
Pricing strategy
ICI could not raise its export prices to 
pass on the rise in sterling. Its strategy 
was to maintain market share. It was 
forced to abandon this as losses 
mounted.
German rivals benefited from the norm 
of DM pricing for chemicals in Europe 
plus the fact that the DM was not 
overvalued.
INPUT SOURCING
ICI had little flexibility to benefit from the rise in sterling by 
importing inputs at lower sterling prices since it had itself an 
integrated production process and long-term agreements with 
U.K. suppliers. ICI also had little scope to shift production in 
the short-term among its own plants globally owing to 
specialization, eg. Wilton, and the non-existence of flexibility 
in ICI’s overseas plants.
German rivals.
Only inputs sourced from the U.K. were subject to currency 
overvaluation.
PLANT LOCATION
I d  had little flexibility in the short-run to change plant 
location to combat sterling overvaluation. Only after the 
misalignment did ICI change its strategy to invest in higher 
growth markets such as the U.S. and Pacific rim.
German rivals.
The high percentage of sales from domestic production of the 
German rivals was an advantage since it facilitated both 
greater integration in the production process and production 
close to their main markets in the E.C.
RAISING PRODUCTIVITY 
I d .
Cutting costs and raising productivity was an important 
objective in an attempt to offset the rise in sterling. U.K. 
manpower was cut by 30% in 5 years. New plant of the 
1970s became replacements for old capacity.
As German rivals had not overexpanded in industrial & 
petrochemicals to the same extent as ICI, they did not have to 
write off investments as ICI did. They could thus use their 
surpluses to plan ahead for more productive investments.
5.3 How ICI strategically hedged its sterling exchange risk.
Because the unforecast rise in the real sterling exchange rate created a sudden profits 
crisis and difficulties in short-term planning and resource allocation between divisions,
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a major reassessment of short-term profit objectives was carried out.
Two major changes were instigated, but only after Harvey-Jones became chairman in 
1982. One was organizational (see section 10), the other in product-market strategy.
To meet the objectives set out in section 5.2, changes in strategy can be divided into 
short-term and long-term.
In the short-term. ICI’s reaction to sterling overvaluation was twofold. One was to defend 
its export position for as long as possible by not raising local currency prices in line with 
the rise in sterling. The basis of this strategy was that once markets were lost, they would 
be difficult to win back and that recovery would consequently be slow and painful 
(Harvey Jones 1991:343-345). A second short-term strategy was cost cutting and tight 
control over working capital" (Chairman’s Foreword, ICI 1980 Annual Report).
This initial reaction was followed by a change in strategy. In the short-term, "the 
particular circumstances of the U.K. meant that it had to improve its cost base more 
rapidly than its competitors" (Pink 1988:19). Capacity in loss-making businesses (Table 
8.7) was drastically cut back.
TABLE 8.7
INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS - LOSS-MAKING BUSINESS CLASSES OF ICI, £M
1979 1980 1981 1982
FIBRES 38 86 36 25
ORGANIC CHEMICALS (1) 35 30 18
PETROCHEMICALS (94) 44 >54 >139
PLASTICS (51) 35
TOTAL LOSS 38 200 120 182
Source: annual reports 
Figures in brackets are profits
To meet the objectives of improving competitiveness in terms of both costs and value- 
added, the long-term strategy was to change group shape in respect of both product mix 
and geographical spread.
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5.4 Changes in product-market strategy.
Changing the product mix involved reducing the proportion of ICI’s turnover derived 
from low value-added industrial chemicals and increasing that from differentiated 
speciality chemicals. Table 8.8 shows that in 1982} ICI was still more dependent on 
industrial chemicals than any of its German competitors, even after a massive reduction 
in ICI’s proportion since 1979. This illustrates how difficult it was to execute a strategy 
to reduce ICI’s vulnerability to currency overvaluation, given the cyclicality and currency 
risk of industrial chemicals.
TABLE 8.8
COMPARATIVE DEPENDENCE OF ICI ON INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS AS % OF TOTAL SALES, 1979- 
82
1979 1980 1981 1982
ICI 52 46 42 41
HOECHST 23 22 22 24
BASF* 38 35 35 34
BAYER 19 18 17 16
Source: annual reports 
* excluding energy
Similarly, Table 8.9 shows that between 1970 and 1980, ICI dramatically increased the 
proportion of its sales from speciality chemicals. However, this proportion was still lower 
than that of any of its German Competitors.
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TABLE 8.9
SPECIALITY CHEMICALS AS A % OF TOTAL SALES, ICI AND GERMAN COMPETITORS, 1970 & 
1980
1970 1980
I d 17 27
HOECHST 30 40
BAYER 32 42
BASF 20 30
Source: Pettigrew 1985:61
(This data is Pettigrew’s own definition of speciality chemicals and may not correspond with the product 
categories in Charts 8.1 & 8.2).
To reduce vulnerability to sterling, ICI’s strategy was to reduce its proportion of world 
sales from U.K. production. Such a strategy is essentially long-term and requires heavy 
costs in the short-term. Table 8.10 indicates that despite the drastic efforts, little was 
achieved in the four years of overvaluation to 1982. This could only be expected, 
indicating the essentially long-term nature of adjustment. The results are nevertheless 
evident by the second period of overvaluation, from 1990-92. A similar trend is evident 
in the source of profits, though this trend is exaggerated by the fact that 1992 was a 
recession year.
TABLE 8.10
ICI’S DRIVE TO REDUCE ITS PROPORTION OF WORLD SALES FROM U.K. PRODUCTION, 1979 - 
1992
1979 1982 1990 1992
U.K. sales as a % of total sales 42 38 23 18
U.K. exports as a % of total sales 21 21 24 27
Total 63 59 47 45
% of Trading profit deriving from U.K. 
production
74 55 30 17
Source: annual reports
Table 8.11 shows that whilst ICI’s German competitors all increased their proportion of 
sales abroad, none of them did so to the extent of ICI. ICI’s strategy of reducing
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dependence on the U.K. was costly, since its strategy was not to export from the U.K. 
but to produce abroad.
TABLE 8.11
% OF TOTAL SALES ABROAD - ICI AND GERMAN COMPETITORS, 1979 - 1992
1979 1982 1990 1992
i a 58 61 77 81
HOECHST 67 74 75 75
BAYER 70 77 60* 61*
BASF 52 55 n.a. 64
Source: annual reports
* refers to % of total sales outside Europe. The % of total sales outside Germany is not available.
Table 8.12 indicates how drastic ICI’s efforts have been to increase its proportion of 
sales from foreign production. Whilst its German competitors have all internationalized 
their production, none has done so to the extent of ICI.
TABLE 8.12
% OF TOTAL SALES FROM FOREIGN PRODUCTION - ICI AND GERMAN COMPETITORS, 1979 - 
1992
1979 1982 1990 1992
i a 37 41 53 55
HOECHST 33 40 45 50
BAYER * * * 33
BASF 25 25 30 27
Source: annual reports
* % share accounted by foreign subsidiary and affiliated companies:
1979 49%, 1982 57%, 1990 58%. The 1992 figure is not available on a comparative basis.
5.5 Conclusions.
Because the changes in strategy could only bring results in the long-term, they could not 
immunize ICI from the 1979-83 overvaluation. Strategic hedging could thus not make up 
in the short-term for the inadequacy of financial hedging, as evidenced in that ICI’s
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senior management was in a crisis situation with short-term profitability being the main 
concern (Harvey-Jones 1991:343-345).
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6. COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES OF STERLING OVERVALUATION 1979-82 
ACCRUING TO ICI’S GERMAN COMPETITORS.
6.1 Hypotheses.
One part of ICI’s planning department is responsible for monitoring ICI’s competitive 
position. This is performed by calculating competitive ratios from the volume of 
production, investment and marketing costs and overheads of ICI and its competitors. Not 
all competitive differences can be easily quantified, such as differences in the quality of 
research and marketing effort. This section accordingly does not attempt any 
quantification of the competitive effects of sterling overvaluation, since any such 
estimates would be subject to serious qualification. Instead, the purpose is merely to set 
out the broad channels whereby German competitors would enjoy an augmented 
competitive position relative to ICI on account of a rise in the real sterling exchange rate.
A manifestation of ICI’s reduced competitiveness is the profits crisis which was caused 
by the rise in sterling. It is hypothesized firstly, that ICI’s profits crisis was not 
experienced by its German rivals despite recession in the chemical industry.
To underpin the hypothesis on ICI’s reduced competitiveness, it is hypothesized secondly, 
that ICI’s German rivals were not forced into a costly restructuring as ICI was during 
overvaluation.
A third hypothesis is that to the extent that price factors are important, German 
competitors would derive a competitive boost in the U.K. market and ICI’s position 
would correspondingly be weakened in the German market.
A fourth hypothesis is that sterling overvaluation would weaken ICI’s position relative 
to its German rivals in third markets such as N.America.
Each of the four hypotheses is examined in turn:
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6.2 German competitors did not share ICI’s profits crisis.
Table 8.13 shows that ICI’s net income (defined as profits after tax and extraordinary 
items) as a percentage of sales was far more volatile than the net income of its German 
competitors. ICI was in a profits crisis between 1979 and 1980 whereas its three German 
competitors were not.
TABLE 8.13
NET INCOME AS A % OF SALES, ICI AND GERMAN COMPETITORS 1979-83
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
i a 8.2 -0.3 2.8 1.9 4.6
BASF 2.4 13 13 0.8 1.5
HOECHST 2.4 1.9 13 0.9 2.4
BAYER 1.7 2.5 1.5 03 2.0
Source: annual reports
ICI’s generally posts a much higher net income/sales ratio than its German rivals. The 
competitive significance in relation to dividend-payout policy is examined in Appendix
7.
6.3 German competitors were not forced into a costly restructuring.
The fact that ICI’s competitors did not face a profits crisis indicates that they were not 
forced into a major restructuring as ICI was. It is difficult to obtain information on the 
costs of the restructuring that ICI had to bear since they would be included in the annual 
capital expenditure figures. A comparison of such figures between ICI and its German 
competitors would reveal shifts in investment strategy out of certain sectors and into 
others. However they would not reveal differences in the quality of investment and its 
prospective profitability. Because of this methodological problem, a simplistic approach 
of listing the restructuring costs and write-offs declared in ICI’s annual reports 1979-83 
(Table 9.14) is adopted. These nevertheless do not accurately reflect restructuring costs, 
which are hidden instead in new capital expenditure.
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TABLE 8.14
RESTRUCTURING COSTS, ICI 1979-83
YEAR AMOUNT £M DETAIL
1979 16 Loss on sale of stake in potash operation
1980 150 £95M to restructure fibers operations;
£26M write-off of part of investment in Carrington Viyella Ltd.; 
£17M loss on divestment of chlor-alkali business.
1981 6 Rationalization at Carrington Viyella Ltd.
1982 -
1983 19 Losses on sale of stake in U.S. petrochemicals.
< iource: annual reports
The key point to be emphasized is that the £150M write-off in 1980 resulted in a loss in 
that year. The item is described in the 1980 annual report (Chairman’s foreword) as:
"a radical restructuring of our fibres business, including withdrawal from certain 
commodity products in order to concentrate on those for which the company has 
substantial advantages in technology and quality...The organic chemicals business is also 
being reshaped to redirect its marketing thrust as well as to lower its cost base. Our 
Petrochemicals and Plastics Divisions are being combined..."
Not one of ICI’s three German competitors declared a loss in any of the years 1979-83 
and all made net additions to their reserves after provisions for restructuring. As 1980 
was the worst year for the chemicals industry, ICI’s £150M write-off can be compared 
with its German rivals* position in Table 8.15.
TABLE 8.15
PROVISIONS AND ADDITIONS TO RESERVES IN 1980, ICI’s GERMAN COMPETITORS
% change in 
earnings before 
taxes and minority 
interests
% change in 
earnings after 
taxes and minority 
interests
Provision DM 
M
Net addition to 
reserves DM M
BASF -25.4 -42.0 106 88
HOECHST -15.7 -14.4 72 197
BAYER + 11.5 +67.8 none 50
Source: annual reports
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6.4 Sterling overvaluation weakened ICI’s position relative to its German rivals in 
third markets such as North America.
The above hypothesis cannot be strictly tested because ICI does not split its sales figures 
between North and South America, excepting 1983. However, this need not preclude a 
comparison because ICI’s sales in South America are small in relation to those in North 
America. A further difficulty in testing the impact of sterling overvaluation is that data 
on ICI’s exports to N. America and sales deriving from production in N. America are 
combined.
TABLE 8.16
% OF TOTAL SALES IN NORTH AMERICA - ICI AND GERMAN COMPETITORS, 1979-83, 1990 & 
1992
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1990 1992
i  a * 16 13 19 21 10 28 31
HOECHST 10 11 14 13 14 22 21
BASF 11 11 13 13 15 20 18
BAYER 15 15 18 20 21 19 21
"MCI data includes South America, except 1983. 
Source: annual reports.
ICI’s percentage of total sales in the Americas increased significantly from 1979-82, 
when ICI’s total sales over the period were flat in real terms, suggesting that sterling 
overvaluation did not have an adverse impact. However, the low figure of only 10% for 
N. America in 1983 is notable. This was by far the lowest of all four companies and less 
than half the percentage of Bayer. This is remarkable considering that ICI had already 
decided in the early 1980s (Harvey Jones 1989:343-345, Pink 1988:19) that its strategic 
response to misalignment in the pound was diversification out of the U.K. in terms of 
both production and dependence cn the U.K. market. N. America was a major target. 
Three years was clearly not enough to generate resilience to sterling misalignment.
Since 1979, it can be seen that all the four competitors have dramatically increased their 
proportion of total sales deriving from North America. The profitability of the
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N. American market is as important as the percentage of group sales (Table 8.17).
TABLE 8.17
PROFIT FROM SALES IN N. AMERICA AS % OF TOTAL GROUP PROFITS, 1979-83, 1990 & 1992
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1990 1992
ICI 6 15 17 17 17 37 2
HOECHST n.a. (0.06) 4.7 0.66 5 23 27
BASF n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
BAYER n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 17 22
Source: annual reports
The comparison is positive for ICI, except for 1992, when environmental charges almost 
erased ICI’s N. American profits. Hoechst’s declaration of a loss in 1980 is attributed 
(Hoechst 1980 Annual Report:49) to stagnant business activity, high interest rates on 
borrowed capital, the start-up costs on new plant and considerable expenses incurred in 
priming the market for high density polyethylene by selling imports from Germany. 
These factors indicate that Hoechst’s strategy was one of future expansion in the 
N. American market.
It can be concluded that during the 1979-83 sterling overvaluation, there is no evidence 
of any marked decline in ICI’s competitive position in N.America. ICI’s low percentage 
of total sales in N.America is partly accounted for by slowness in diversifying into 
N.America.
However, before conclusions can be drawn on the impact of sterling overvaluation, an 
appraisal of the factors affecting competitive advantage in the N.American market is 
necessary. These factors are much more complicated than a straight comparison that 
sterling was overvalued and the DM was not. The following focuses on four possible 
factors:
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TABLE 8.18
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE EXTENT TO WHICH STERLING MISALIGNMENT CAN ALTER THE 
RELATIVE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF ICI AND ITS GERMAN RIVALS IN THE U.S. MARKET.
FACTOR IMPACT
The currency denomination of the 
competitors’ input pricing and the 
currency denomination of their sales.
N. American companies need to be included in the comparison and 
so whether the US$ is under- or overvalued is a significant factor.
US$ pricing for inputs and also the course of the oil price need to 
be included (see next page)
The extent to which competitors 
engage in FDI in N.America rather 
than export to N.America from the 
U.K. or Germany.
In terms of exporting from the U.K. to the U.S., sterling 
overvaluation placed ICI at a cost disadvantage relative to its 
German and U.S. competitors. This was significant to ICI because 
of recession and reduced margins on chemical prices.
FDI into the U.S. could reduce the impact of sterling overvaluation, 
but FDI is not a sufficient condition since in 1979, ICI already 
produced most of its N.American sales locally (Table 8.19). Even 
with U.S. FDI, if the US$ is overvalued, U.S. sales could be 
threatened by exports from Germany.
The extent to which ICI’s N. 
American sales are diversified out of 
exchange-rate sensitive products.
This could limit the impact of sterling misalignment.
Specific targeting of the U.S. 
market.
ICI deliberately changed its strategy to diversify out of the U.K. 
because of exchange risk (see Table 8.10). The foremost market it 
targeted in this new strategy was N.America (Table 8.16).
By 1992, ICI’s percentage of total sales in N.America was 
significantly higher than of its German competitors.
continued overleaf
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TABLE 8.18 (cont.)
FACTOR IMPACT
Volatility in real 
US$ and in oil 
prices
It is estimated that the European chemical industry pays for around three quarters of 
its oil-based inputs in dollars. The currency denomination of chemical sales is 
generally in DM in Europe but in the U.S. it is in US$.
In 1979/80, the real sterling exchange rate rose sharply against the US$, but not the 
real DM/US$ exchange rate (Charts 1.1 & 1.6). ICI’s US$-denominated costs would 
be reduced in sterling terms, but the Second Oil Shock in 1979 raised the price of oil- 
based products.
From 1981-85. the US$ overvaluation nlus hieh USS inflation in the earlv part of the 
period placed - ceteris paribus - both ICI and German competitors at an advantage 
relative to U.S. chemical producers whose costs were 100% in dollars. German 
producers would be at an even greater advantage than ICI owing to sterling 
misalignment up to 1983. However, this currency advantage could not be fully 
exploited because of depressed chemical prices in the early part of the period.
From 1983. the collaDse in the oil mice was a gain to both U.S. and European 
producers. The gain to U.S. producers relative to European producers was reduced by 
the continuing dollar overvaluation.
From 1986-92. the combination of a weakening dollar and a weak oil mice (which 
was denominated in US$) reduced the oil-based input costs to the European producers 
when translated back into their domestic currency. This might at first be supposed to 
place the Europeans at a competitive advantage in the U.S. market. Instead, the U.S. 
producers gained by even more. The currency swing turned the tables in favour of 
U.S. producers.
This is because 100% of the U.S. producers' oil-based input costs are in depreciating 
dollars compared to only three-quarters of the costs of the European competitors. 
Thus, given dollar pricing of chemicals in the U.S. market, the profit gain from lower 
USS costs would tend to be greater for U.S. producers. U.S. exports would also 
become more profitable in the European market. This is because of DM pricing in the 
European market. It is also a realistic assumption, depending on competitive 
conditions, that DM prices would not be cut by European producers to reflect lower 
US$ input costs, since European producers have an incentive to take a higher profit 
margin.
The above complexity of the impact of currency swings on the relative competitiveness 
of exporters to, and producers in, the U .S. market indicates the difficulties in attempting 
to use treasury strategies to hedge the swings. It also indicates the even greater 
difficulties in deciding strategies of switching production across countries according to 
real currency swings. It is accordingly worthwhile to investigate what strategies ICI and 
its German competitors have adopted.
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One strategic response which reduces the impact of dollar swings is FDI. It is not 
surprising that ICI and the three German competitors have all engaged in massive FDI 
in N.America11. From Table 8.19 it can be seen that ICI’s N.American sales are 
partially hedged against sterling misalignment, since the bulk of sales derived from local 
production.
TABLE 8.19
% OF N. AMERICAN SALES DERIVING FROM LOCAL PRODUCTION, 1979-83, 1990 & 1992
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1990 1992
ICI 83 83 84 85 85 n.a n.a.
HOECHST 80 80 90 80 75 114 n.a.
BASF 57 55 46 43 n.a. n.a 90 x
BAYER 90 88 90 112 I l l 99 100
ICI: data is calculated as sales in Americas less exports from the U.K. to the Americas.
Bayer: data relates to consolidated sales total of Bayer's U.S. subsidiaries, which may have production facilities 
outside the U.S.
Complications in assessing the impact of real currency swings can be seen in the above 
data for Hoechst and Bayer. In the early 1980s, both Hoechst and BASF increased their 
exports from Germany to the U.S. so that the percentages of local U.S. production 
declined. By contrast, Bayer became a net exporter from the U.S. over these years, 
despite the overvalued US$. This can be linked to the fact that Bayer’s U .S. subsidiaries 
were directed from the U.S. and not from Germany.
nICI management in the U.S. was assigned "responsibility for leading the development of ICI's worldwide 
business in speciality chemicals" (ICI Annual Report 1983:15).
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6.5 Overvaluation in the pound 1979-83 benefited German exports to the U.K . and 
disadvantaged ICI’s exports from the U.K .
For ICI, a test of the hypothesis would be an investigation into how ICI’s U.K. exports 
to Germany fared during the sterling overvaluation.
ICI is unwilling to provide data on its sales in Germany. Its annual reports use the 
category "Continental Europe". This might be used as a proxy for a DM-zone given that 
most EU member states were participants within the narrow bands of the ERM from 
1979-92/93. The difficulty is that ICI’s sales data also include sales from production in 
Continental Europe. What is required are data for U.K. exports to Germany. It is not a 
drawback that this is unavailable, since the hypothesis that ICI’s exports were affected 
by sterling overvaluation is already confirmed in numerous sources (for example, ICI’s 
1980 annual report & Harvey-Jones 1991:343-345).
If sterling overvaluation was so inimical to production in the U.K. and led to ICI’s 
strategy of FDI, it would be expected that the corresponding strategy of a German 
producer in the U.K. would also be to cut U.K. capacity and to export more to the U.K. 
from Germany, allowing for time lags and the capability to export to the U.K. from 
Germany. This hypothesis is examined for Hoechst, since during the 1979-83 sterling 
overvaluation, only Hoechst produced in the U.K. (section 7).
6.6 Conclusions.
Sterling overvaluation massively weakened ICI’s competitive position in the years 1979- 
83. ICI’s business in N.America was largely protected, on account o f FDI.
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7. HOECHST.
The hypothesis investigated here is whether the sharp reduction in Hoechst’s U.K. 
production as a percentage of total U.K. sales (Table 8.20) was a strategic response to 
the 1979-83 sterling overvaluation in the form of output cutbacks and an incentive to 
service the U.K. market directly from German production. Hoechst could thereby exploit 
both the high real sterling exchange rate and economies of scale from increased use of 
its German plant.
TABLE 8.20
HOECHST’S PRODUCTION IN THE U.K. AS A % OF SALES IN THE U.K. 1980-92
1980 46
1981 43
1982 40
1983 38
1990 25
1991 29
1992 28
Source: Hoechst AO, Frankfurt
In 1979, Hoechst’s U.K. business consisted of the import and manufacture of chemicals 
(Table 8.21) and the manufacture of paints within a separate subsidiary, Berger, Jensen 
& Nicholson Ltd. The paints business was bigger than the chemicals business in terms 
of sales (data are given in Table 8.22). An additional feature is that only a small 
proportion of Hoechst’s U.K. production was exported.
Hoechst’s strategy to deal with sterling overvaluation also underlines the limited role of 
Hoechst’s treasury in managing currency overvaluation.
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7.1 Limited role of the treasury in hedging Hoechst’s U.K. exports.
Firstly, external hedging was not the responsibility of Hoechst’s U.K. treasury. Up until 
the beginning of 1992, all Hoechst’s U.K. exports were invoiced in sterling (except 
fibers). All foreign exchange risk was centralized in the German head office. Hoechst’s 
exports from the U.K. were netted off for hedging purposes with its exports to the U.K. 
As exports to the U.K. were much larger than exports from the U .K ., Hoechst’s exports 
from the U.K. were not hedged externally during the period of sterling overvaluation. In 
terms of the group as a whole, Hoechst’s exposure to sterling is one arising from the risk 
of DM overvaluation, not sterling overvaluation. An additional limitation to the role of 
the treasury can be seen in that the central treasury in Frankfurt head office does not 
hedge externally non-contractual cash flows, i.e. economic exposure. The treasury’s 
ability to protect Berger was further limited in that its forecasting horizon for hedging 
cash flows is only 12 months12, the same as ICI.
7.2 Hoechst’s internal hedging strategy for U.K. output.
Protection against sterling currency risk was afforded in that industrial chemicals, which 
are highly subject to economies of scale, were exported from Germany. Hoechst could 
opportunistically exploit sterling overvaluation by raising sterling prices in line
TABLE 8.21
HOECHST’S SALES IN THE U.K. £M, 1979-83, CHEMICALS ONLY AND EXCLUDING BERGER
SALES PROFITS
1979 157.1 n.a.
1980 142.8 - 0.356
1981 162.4 0.6
1982 188.5 2.7
1983 207.4 3.6
Source: Hoechst U.K. treasury and annual reports?
with U.K. inflation. Hoechst recognized that cutting prices in a depressed market would 
not raise sales. Hoechst accordingly benefited from a higher profit margin on its German
12Dr. Bruhl, Chairman of the Currency Committee, Hoechst Group, Frankfurt, interviewed 11.4.1991.
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exports to the U.K. and its sales and profits rose over the period as indicated in Table 
8.21. By contrast, ICI ,as noted in Section 1 above, was forced to take losses on its 
exports in order to retain its markets.
"Being near to the market" is the rationale for Hoechst’s U.K. production in both fibers 
and paints. Berger’s vulnerability to sterling overvaluation was limited in that its exports 
comprised mainly of specialist paints. Owing to transport costs, Berger paints were 
already made locally in its main foreign markets. Hoechst’s other production in the U.K. 
was in high value-added pharmaceuticals which it does not manufacture elsewhere. 
Examples include animal health products, vaccines and agrochemicals tailored to the 
U.K. market and in which the costs of production are a relatively small proportion of 
selling prices. Thus the sterling overvaluation could be borne without a profits crisis.
If Hoechst’s internal hedging strategy was successful, how can the pattern of Table 8.20 
be explained, which underpins the hypothesis that sterling overvaluation benefited 
German exports to the U.K.?
It is necessary to investigate what the motives were for Hoechst’s purchase and sale of 
its various businesses in the U.K. to ascertain whether real exchange rate changes played 
a role in the decisions. Between 1978 and 1988, Hoechst bought two U.K. businesses 
(Optrex and Cox Pharmaceuticals) and sold two (Berger and Optrex). In 1978, it jointly 
bought Optrex to gain expertise in eye healthcare products. It sold Optrex in 1983 as the 
business no longer fitted its strategy. In 1985, Hoechst bought Cox Pharmaceuticals, 
again for its specialist expertise. The purchases and sales were unconnected with currency 
factors, except in the possible case of Berger.
In 1979, Berger constituted the larger part of Hoechst’s total paint output. To improve 
economies of scale, should Hoechst have concentrated paints production in the U.K. and 
closed paint manufacture in Germany ? Hoechst’s strategy instead was to cut U.K. 
output o f Berger products. Despite restructuring in 1980, involving costs o f £8.2 M, 
Hoechst failed to make U.K. production profitable. Hoechst decided that Berger could
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not be made viable. A buyer was not found until early 1988 at the peak of a construction 
boom in the U.K .. The sale of Berger mainly explains the sharp decline shown in Table 
8.20 in Hoechst’s production in the U.K. as a percentage of its sales.
The U.K. market was served instead by the export of specialist paints from Germany. 
It is necessary to assess the impact of sterling overvaluation in this decision. As ICI’s 
paints division was also subject to sterling overvaluation, it is appropriate to compare 
how Berger and ICI Paints fared.
7.3 A comparison between Berger and ICI Paints Division 1979-83.
Porter’s (1989) hypothesis that competitive strength derives from rivalry between strong 
competitors which in turn creates and consolidates advantages at both the supplier and 
marketing levels does not appear to be applicable to the paints business owing to transport 
costs and the need for local production. Thus the criteria used here to compare Berger 
and ICI Paints Division are relatively simple: product mix, market position and the 
geographical diversification of production.
TABLE 8.22
COMPARISON OF SALES AND PROFIT IN £M OF BERGER AND ICI PAINTS DIVISION, 1979-83
BERGER i a  PAINTS 
DIVISION
SALES PROFIT SALES PROFIT
1979 223 n.a 416 30
1980 236 -8.2 449 27
1981 269 +6.1 455 27
1982 279 -6.7 500 22
1983 293 loss, figure n.a. 590 26
Source: annual reports
7.3.1 Similarities between Berger and ICI Paints Division.
In product mix, Berger (Hoechst 1979 Annual Report:47) and ICI Paints had similar 
product ranges yet ICI’s paints division was consistently profitable over the years of
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sterling overvaluation whereas Berger’s results turned into loss. One reason for ICI’s 
profitability is its "Dulux" brand leadership and the introduction of leading edge products 
such as solid emulsion (ICI Annual Report 1983:10).
In terms of the proportion of total group sales represented by paints, Hoechst (7.4%) and 
ICI (7.7%) were almost equal in 1979 at the start of sterling overvaluation. Berger 
constituted the bulk of Hoechst’s paint sales in 1979.
7.3.2 Contrasts between Berger and ICI Paints Division.
The main contrasts between Berger and ICI Paints Division lay in market position; 
resilience to exchange risk via restructuring and product innovation; market 
diversification; and geographical diversification of production.
Berger’s market position was only strong in the U.K. and Australasia. This concentration 
on only two markets rendered the group highly vulnerable since when the U.K. came out 
of misalignment in 1983, the Australasian market was in deep recession. Hoechst 1979 
Annual Report (p.47) ascribed the decline in Berger’s net income to the upward 
movement in sterling, extremely high U.K. interest rates and to steep increases in raw 
materials prices. The 1981 Annual Report (p.49) explained the 13.5% sales increase and 
return to profitability to favourable business conditions in export markets. However, in 
1982 and 1983, losses were recorded.
ICI enjoyed a leading position in both Berger’s main markets, the U.K. and Australasia. 
In 1982, for example, at the height of sterling overvaluation, ICI gained a sharp 
improvement in sales and profitability in the U.K. decorative paints sector where ICI’s 
market share increased significantly following the successful launch ofNatural Whites" 
paints (ICI Annual Report 1982:12). In contrast to Berger, ICI also had a strong position 
in other markets. ICI’s strategy was to expand and acquire subsidiaries where these 
would result in leading positions and to concentrate on high-technology sectors of the 
market on an international basis (ICI Annual Report 1982:12). Examples of this strategy 
include the purchase of Arthur Holland & Sons pic in 1982, which strengthened ICI’s
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position in the can coatings market in the U.K., France and Germany. Product innovation 
also improved ICI’s position in the can coatings market (ICI 1981 Annual Report: 15).
In terms of resilience to exchange risk, ICI possessed greater flexibility to restructure that 
part of its paints business which was vulnerable, whereas Berger did not. In 1982, Berger 
discontinued its wallcovering paints business. According to ICI’s 1981 Annual Report, 
ICI’s wallcovering paints business was similarly affected by sterling’s exchange rate 
(p. 15), and suffered heavy losses (ICI Annual Report 1982:12) but ICI did not close it 
down. Instead, ICI merged it with its coated fabrics and PVC business, plus that of 
Marley, with the objective of creating a strong U.K.-based business (p. 12). ICI Paint 
Division’s resilience to exchange risk is similarly observed in innovation and 
manufacturing improvements. In the U.K., the decorative paint plant at Stowmarket was 
reequipped with high capacity computer-controlled filling lines. In the paints division, 
"capital expenditure during the year was directed towards modernising and increasing 
production capacity in the Far East and Indian subcontinent" (ICI Annual Report 
1980:12). This is in line with ICI’s diversification out of the U.K.
Another contrast between ICI Paints and Berger lies in ICI’s much wider diversification 
of markets. Despite the rise in sterling, "in 1980 exports of paints were at record levels, 
with good business being obtained in African and E. European markets" (ICI Annual 
Report 1980:12). In 1981, ICI Paints "showed further improvement, with all the increase 
coming from outside W.Europe. Canada, Australia and S.E. Asia were the principal 
territories contributing to higher profits" (ICI Annual Report 1981:15). By contrast, 
Berger not only had an inferior position to ICI in the Australian market, but it did not 
have significant alternative markets which could offset any downturn in its U.K. and 
Australian sales. Further, a distribution network in other markets would take time for 
Berger to build up.
In terms of geographical diversification of production, Berger had far less flexibility than 
ICI. During the 1979-83 sterling misalignment, Berger’s production was in the U.K. 
only. By contrast,"ICI is one of the world’s leading paints manufacturers with plants in
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W.Europe, N.America, Latin America, the Indian subcontinent, Australasia and the Far 
East. There is also manufacturing in Africa by related companies o f ICI" (ICI Annual 
Report 1983:10).
The conclusion is that Hoechst could not obtain a satisfactory return on sales of its Berger 
paints subsidiary. After its disposal in 1988, Hoechst AG’s Annual Report (1988:21) 
noted that sales of automotive and industrial paints rose, with the main increases recorded 
in Germany, the U.K ., Spain, France and Italy. Thus U.K. sales now came from 
Germany instead of production in the U.K. The 1988 Annual Report also commented 
that "after the sale of Berger, sales for the (paints) business area as a whole were 9% 
lower than in the previous year. Restated on a comparable basis, sales would have risen 
by 8%. We nearly equalled our good profit of the previous year". From this, it can be 
concluded that in total contrast to the position in 1979, by 1988 Berger itself was only 
a peripheral activity within Hoechst’s paints division.
Berger’s relative lack of profitability stemmed from its overdependence on two markets 
and its dependence on only one production location -the U.K .- which was subject to 
currency misalignment. ICI Paints was also subject to currency misalignment, but it 
possessed far greater flexibility in terms of both production location and division of 
markets. ICI Paints’ greater size and profitability engendered further resilience to the 
effects of misalignment: in distribution, in manufacturing and product innovation, and 
brand leadership. Hoechst would have needed to invest substantial sums to make Berger 
similarly resilient to currency risk. However, it can be deduced that there was little point 
in Hoechst investing such sums in the U.K. where there already existed a strong local 
rival and where there was little chance for Berger to become market leader. Unlike the 
auto industry, for example, the paints business is not critically dependent on the presence 
of local suppliers and other supportive factors in the Porter model. Further, it appeared 
that Hoechst did not attach great significance to the Berger brand name in that it was 
ready to sell it. Hoechst could also just as well carry on its paints business from its 
German base.
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7.4 Conclusions.
The main impact of sterling overvaluation was felt on Hoechst’s Berger paints division 
in the U.K. rather than on its U.K. speciality chemicals production. Conclusive evidence 
of the unmanageability of sterling misalignment would be for Hoechst to shut down its 
entire U.K. production and export from Germany. Hoechst did not do this.
Berger was different in that it faced strong market competition from ICI. This magnified 
Berger’s vulnerability to currency overvaluation and contributed to Berger becoming a 
troublesome loss-making subsidiary. Nevertheless, the comparison of Berger with ICI’s 
Paints Division underlines that the role of the treasury in the management of currency 
risk was limited and that the flexibility of the product-market strategy is of far greater 
significance.
The reasons given by Hoechst for Berger’s poor performance are the impact o f sterling 
overvaluation on Berger’s export capability, recession in the U.K ., and high U.K. interest 
rates. Regarding business strategy, this highlights Porter’s neglect o f adverse 
macroeconomic factors and the role of government13 in creating an adverse business 
environment.
In conclusion, the sharp fall in Hoechst’s U.K. production as percentage of total U.K. 
sales 1980-90 was not a strategic response to the 1979-83 sterling overvaluation except 
insofar as misalignment impacted on Berger’s results.
13see Chapter 10.
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8 . BASF & BAYER IN THE U.K .
The example of these two companies lends further weight to the conclusions derived from 
the Hoechst example on its management of sterling overvaluation. This can be seen in 
four main respects:
Firstly, both Bayer and BASF14 have dramatically built-up U.K. production15 from 
virtually nothing at the end of misalignment in 1983 and were thus apparently not 
deterred by the possibility of a recurrence.
Secondly, their U.K. production has arisen primarily from the acquisition of businesses 
which fit their product-market strategies, and which happened to have U.K. production 
facilities, rather than from a puposefiil strategy to produce in the U.K.
Thirdly, both are heavy importers into the U.K. from the German parent.
Fourthly, their treasury functions have only a limited role in protecting their U.K. 
operations from sterling misalignment. Owing to space constraints, the example o f Bayer 
U .K .’s treasury is taken here. Bayer has two major U.K. subsidiaries (Agfa and Miles 
Laboratories U.K .). However, since Bayer U .K .’s treasury has no overview over, or 
control of, their cash flows, it has only a partial capability to manage the Bayer Group’s 
sterling exposure. Neither, similarly to BASF, did Bayer’s treasury have any role in the 
decision to make these acquisitions. Its role was essentially reactive - to manage the 
currency exposures once they had already been created by the heads of the respective 
business divisions.
Bayer’s U.K. treasury is also not responsible for Bayer Group sales direct from Germany 
to U.K. customers which do not pass through Bayer U.K. or appear in its accounts. Thus
14source: J.Holm-Hansen, Corporate Planning Dept., BASF U.K., 22.8.93.
15In 1992, 29% and 30% of total U.K. sales respectively.
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the U.K. treasury’s liquidity management is confined to the data in Bayer U .K .’s annual 
report. This showed U.K. sales of £424M in 1992.
The U.K. treasury’s perception16 of its role is one of mainly managing the risk of a rise 
in the DM against sterling. 70% of Bayer U .K .’s sales consist o f imports into the U.K. 
of products made in Germany. Since 1987, these imports have all been priced in DM. 
Exports from Bayer U.K. are small in relation to imports and do not give rise to a 
currency management problem to the extent that they offset imports in DM from 
Germany. This is because approx. £50 M of annual exports are priced in sterling and 
approx. £20 M are invoiced in foreign currencies. In both cases, it falls on the foreign 
buyer to manage the currency risk, though shifting the risk to buyers does not obviate the 
need to manage the currency problem.
The means of managing the Bayer Group’s sterling exposure is essentially short-term. 
Bayer U .K .’s transaction exposure is over £200 M per annum. Economic exposure is not 
managed by the U.K. treasury since it is not permitted to take any positions beyond that 
of its transaction exposure. This means that the management of the currency exposure is 
only as long as the date at which the contracted-for payment is due. This is a maximum 
of six months forward, but in most cases is much shorter. Whether these short-term 
exposures are hedged or not depends on the treasurer’s perceptions o f the future DM/£ 
exchange rate. Bayer U .K .’s treasurer acknowledges that to the extent that the pound 
does not depreciate in real terms against the DM, then the cost of hedging is a waste. 
Bayer nevertheless does not have a cost of hedging appraisal system. Thus hedge losses 
which might potentially cost the treasurer his job are not fed into the management 
information system.
Another feature of Bayer is that translation exposure management is officially the task 
of head office treasury in Germany, but in fact it is not managed.
lfrThis information derives from Richard Baines, Treasurer, Bayer U.K., interviewed June 1992.
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8.1 Conclusions.
In the early 1980s, BASF, Bayer and Hoechst’s treasury activities were less sophisticated 
than those of ICI, particularly the treasuries o f the German U.K. subsidiaries17, but the 
main difference is that the German companies were able to take advantage of sterling 
overvaluation whereas ICI was not.
Whereas ICI was forced to change its strategy and diversify out o f the U.K ., its German 
rivals were not forced to diversify out of Germany, nor did they experience a profits 
crisis. Instead, given stability in their operating environment, they benefited from 
incremental increases in their total sales.
17T. Harrison, interviewed 5.7.94.
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9. HOW SUCCESSFUL WAS ICI’s FORCED STRATEGIC CHANGE IN MANAGING 
CURRENCY RISK ?
If the view that large MNCs are able to manage currency risk satisfactorily18 is correct, 
then the drastic strategic and organizational changes following the first period of 
overvaluation should have been able to protect ICI from the second period of 
misalignment 1990-92.
The methodology to investigate whether this is true is threefold. A straightforward ratio 
analysis of ICI during the second period of sterling overvaluation 1990-92 is compared 
with that of 1979-83. Second is an appraisal of whether the strategic change ensuing from 
the first period of overvaluation brought ICI closer to a natural hedge. Third is an 
investigation of the extent to which the organizational changes brought about in 1983 
enabled ICI to plan better in the long-term to hedge itself against exchange risk.
18There is a difference between being structurally able or not and being competent to do so and able in 
practice.
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9.1 Effect of sterling overvaluation on ICI 1990-92.
TABLE 8.23
ICI, SUMMARY PROFIT AND LOSS, £M, 1989-1992
1989 1990 1991 1992*
TOTAL SALES 13,171 12,906 12,488 12,061
INTEREST CHARGES 219 206 220 216
PRE-TAX PROFIT 1,425 993 1,006 565
RATIO ANALYSIS
CURRENT RATIO 1.58 1.60 1.63 1.38
QUICK RATIO 0.90 0.93 1.03 0.86
GEARING 32.1 31.4 31.8 39.8
INTEREST COVER 9.93 5.83 4.83 0.22
PROFIT/SALES 12.48 9.3 9.8 7.88
RoA 22.8 14.2 13.0 9.8
SALES/STOCK 5.53 5.83 6.16 5.31
STOCK TURNOVER 
ON DAYS)
66 63 59 69
SALES/FIXED ASSETS 2.35 2.39 2.26 1.98
* The 1992 ratios are calculated before extraordinary restructuring costs of £949M. If these are included, ICI 
made a net loss of £570M.
Compared to the 1979-83 overvaluation, ICI entered this second period of misalignment 
with better RoA, Profit/Sales and Sales/Fixed Assets ratios. Gearing was similar to the 
first period, but liquidity ratios were significantly worse. Interest cover showed a 
particular deterioration, and when restructuring costs for 1992 are included, ICI had a 
much weaker balance sheet compared to 1979-83.
The background to the 1990-92 misalignment is similar to that of 1979-83 in that there 
was also a recession in the U .S ., but unlike the first period, there was no worldwide 
recession. This should have been positive for ICI, as should the fact that ICI benefited 
from high profits during the boom years of the late 1980s. Given ICI’s massive balance 
sheet deterioration, it can be concluded that the restructuring following the 1979-83
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overvaluation was clearly not a permanent solution to protect ICI from future 
misalignments. It is necessary to investigate why the strategic change of the 1980s did 
not work.
ICI’s strategy of geographical and product diversification should have given ICI a better 
natural hedge by 1990 compared with 1979. This hypothesis is examined in relation to 
the strategies of ICI and its German competitors.
9.2 Internationalization of Production.
In 1979, ICI had a much larger proportion of total sales from foreign production than all 
its three German competitors (Table 8.12). ICI also had a relatively low percentage of 
sales outside its home market compared to Hoechst and Bayer19. Yet whilst ICI had a 
stronger natural hedge in 1979 compared to its German rivals, this was not enough to 
prevent it from suffering a major profits crisis at the time of the 1979-83 sterling 
overvaluation.
Closer inspection of the currency matching principle reveals how difficult it is to attain 
a natural hedge in the chemical industry. Firstly, the figure of 63% for ICI’s proportion 
of sales from U.K. production in 1979 (Table 8.10) does not mean that 63% of its costs 
were in £. Nor does it mean that 58% of its sales in 1979 (Table 8.11) were in foreign 
currency. Table 8.18 indicated that a significant part of oil-based input costs are in US$ 
whilst chemical sales in Europe tend to be priced in DM. Thus the extent to which 
sterling prices in the U.K. were subject to DM-price setting by German competitors 
cannot be quantified. If the 42% of ICI’s sales that were in the U.K. were matched with 
£ costs, the question then is to what extent the remaining 58% of costs and revenues were 
unmatched in terms of currency denomination. Table 8.12 shows that 37% of ICI’s total 
sales in 1979 were produced abroad. If these were matched in currency terms, which is 
a reasonable hypothesis to make, then only 58-37=21% of ICI’s sales in 1979 can be
19BASF may be considered an artificial exception in that a large part of its turnover comprised highly 
profitable energy sales destined for the German market. This distorted its sales pattern toward the domestic 
market.
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considered to be subject to currency mismatches.
By 1992, ICI’s proportion of total sales from foreign production (Table 8.12) increased 
in relation to all its three German competitors, but massively so in relation to Bayer and 
BASF. Thus ICI seemingly became far less dependent on sterling costs. By the same 
token, ICI became far less dependent on domestic revenues. By 1992, an enormous 81% 
of ICI’s total sales were abroad. This percentage represented a massive increase in 
relation to Bayer and BASF.
It might be concluded from this that in the 1990-92 period of sterling overvaluation, ICI 
had diversified itself out of the U.K. economy and should therefore have been relatively 
immune to it. Yet ICI still experienced a dramatic decline in profitability over this 
period. In the 1990-92 annual reports, ICI attributes this to the "world recession". It has 
already been noted above that there was no world recession at the time, since Germany 
in particular was experiencing a boom and Italy, France and Japan were not in recession. 
Instead, ICI’s internationalization of production and of diversification out of the U.K. 
made ICI much more dependent than its German rivals on four markets, all of which 
were in recession - the U .K ., U .S ., Canada and Australia.
The massive increase in the percentage of ICI’s sales outside the U.K. does not indicate 
in what currencies these sales were denominated. With DM pricing in Europe, 
geographical diversification could have increased ICI’s exposure to DM price-setting. 
Instead, Table 8.24 indicates a dramatic decline in the percentage of ICI’s total sales in 
the E.U. By contrast, the pattern of the three German competitors has been for the share 
of total sales in the E.U. to remain roughly constant. The linking o f E.U. currencies to 
the DM in the ERM served as a natural hedge to the German competitors so long as the 
narrow bands existed up to 1992/93, since well over 60% of their sales were in DM or 
in currencies linked to the DM.
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TABLE 8.24
% OF TOTAL SALES IN E.U. - ICI AND GERMAN COMPETITORS, 1979-92
1979 1982 1990 1992
ICI 57 69 49 45
BASF 66 70 65 68
BAYER 51 44 67 66
HOECHST 65 58 53 63
Source: annual reports
TABLE 8.25
% OF TOTAL PROFITS DERIVING FROM E.U. - ICI AND GERMAN COMPETITORS, 1979-92
1979 1982 1990 1992
ICI 79 54 45 38
BASF na na na 100
BAYER na na 70 58
HOECHST na na 68 49
Source: annual reports
Table 8.25 indicates that in 1992, a much higher proportion of the German chemicals 
companies’ profits derived from the E.U. compared to ICI. This suggests that they are 
more vulnerable to recession in Germany and the E.U. than ICI. By contrast, ICI is more 
vulnerable to recession in the Americas (Table 8.16).
More important than the comparisons of natural hedges via geographical diversification 
is how the companies themselves perceive whether their strategies have been guided by 
such a motive. The former Chief Planner of ICI20 states categorically that ICI has never 
had a conscious policy of matching the currency denomination of costs and revenues, 
though ICI does have a goal of production close to the customer, which is broadly 
similar. Instead, ICI’s investments and divestments have been motivated by business 
considerations in line with its general strategy. It should nevertheless be stressed that this 
strategy has put diversification out of the U.K. as a primary objective following the 1979- 
83 misalignment.
2<T. Harrison, interviewed 19.7.1993
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Similarly, ICI’s German rivals have also not had a purposeful objective of creating a 
natural hedge by strategic means21. However, for the U .S. market at least, they have 
a conscious policy of exploiting the U.S. market via local production where possible, 
instead of export from Germany, because of the risk that real exchange rate changes 
might have a harmful effect on maintaining market share.
In the last 10 years, BASF has purposefully pursued a policy of FDI in the U.S. and of 
sourcing U .S. production locally. The result is that by 1992, at least 90% of BASF’s 
N.American sales derived from local production (Table 8.19). The reason for BASF’s 
strategy is categorically stated as the need to avoid sharp fluctuations in earnings and to 
report a stable growth in turnover and income to shareholders22.
9.2.1 Conclusion.
ICI’s internationalization of production made it more vulnerable to recession by 1990, 
not less, even if  ICI was less vulnerable to sterling misalignment in 1990 compared to 
1979. The greater vulnerability is specific to 1990, since it was ICI’s misfortune that its 
diversification was into a mix of markets which were in recession simultaneously.
9.3 Product Diversification as a means of reducing real exchange risk.
Charts 8.1 & 8.2 below indicate how the product turnover split for the four companies 
has changed between 1979 and 1992. Strict comparisons are not possible since the 
product categories differ in the competitors’ annual reports. The comparison is 
accordingly made as a rough guide only. Broad conclusions that emerge are as follows: 
Firstly, ICI and its German competitors’ have all increased the proportion of their 
turnover derived from high value-added, less exchange rate-sensitive products. The 
biggest shift by far appears to have been made by ICI.
21Holm-Hansen, Planning Dept., BASF, interviewed 22.8.1993, Dr.Bruhl, Hoechst, 11.4.91.
“ "A quarter of BASF's sales are in the U.S. and that the impact of fluctuations in the real US$/DM 
exchange rate would be to cause undesirable fluctuations in group results when denominated in DM”. (Holm- 
Hansen, ibid.)
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Secondly, in 1979 the company resembling ICI most closely in its product mix was BASF 
and the least resembling ICI was Bayer. By 1992, ICI and Bayer were both highly similar 
in their product split and in the shares of profit from product categories. By contrast, in 
1992 BASF derived the bulk of its profits from industrial chemicals.
Thirdly, whilst ICI’s percentage of turnover in 1992 in industrial chemicals was higher 
than that of BASF, ICI made a loss on this turnover equal to 3 % of total profits. By 
contrast, industrial chemicals constituted one of BASF’s largest sources of profit in 1992. 
This indicates that ICI’s strategy of reducing the percentage of sales from industrial 
chemicals and increasing that of high-margin products as a cyclical and exchange rate 
hedge is not universally applicable in view of BASF’s high profits .
One explanation for this paradox is as follows. If all chemical companies were competing 
in homogenous industrial chemicals on price alone, then sales and profits would be 
vulnerable to currency risk. However, the chemical companies are no longer producing 
homogenous products but have become highly differentiated oligopolists. Whereas 
product differentiation was previously confined to categories such as pharmaceuticals, 
there is increasing evidence that chemical companies are carving up the markets of 
industrial chemicals in order to create dominant positions for themselves in certain 
segments. For example, ICI swapped its fibers business for Dupont’s acrylics business 
(FT.22 Oct. 1992:22). To augment further its market position in acrylics, ICI has also 
swapped its European polypropylene business for BASF’s European acrylics business 
(FT.22 Jan. 1993:15). By the same token, BASF has become the second largest 
polypropylene supplier.
9.3.1 Conclusions.
ICI’s product diversification into high value-added products whose costs and demand are 
less exchange rate sensitive made it less vulnerable to sterling misalignment by 1990 
compared to 1979. Whereas pharmaceuticals can be highly profitable, this did not 
necessarily lead to advantage over German competitors since the Germans pursued the 
same strategy.
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10. THE ROLE OF ICI’S ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES IN MANAGING 
CURRENCY RISK.
To what extent have the organizational changes brought about in response to the profits 
crisis during the 1979-83 overvaluation improved ICI’s long-term planning to hedge 
currency risk ? Decisions to manage economic exposure could only be taken by two sets 
of actors - by the business divisions themselves and by top-down decisons directly from 
the board. The following examines how effective this decision-making was.
The organizational problem was that the business divisions had to reduce their 
vulnerability to sterling overvaluation. These business divisions are largely autonomous. 
The businesses which were least vulnerable did not have an incentive to do this, whereas 
the businesses which were most vulnerable did not have the resources to do it. The most 
vulnerable businesses were already loss-makers (Table 8.7). Thus the business divisions, 
acting independently, could not manage economic exposure for the group as a whole. It 
was necessary to have top-down decision-making. Yet ICI’s treasury, although given the 
responsibility for currency risk management, did not have the powers nor the capability 
to give such top-down instructions to the business divisions.
The investigation is focused on three aspects. One is on the changed role of ICI’s 
Executive Board. Second is on the changed role of ICI’s planning department. Third is 
on the changed role of ICI’s business divisions. In each case, the question that is 
investigated is to what extent the changes made were consistent with the long-term needs 
of economic exposure management.
The first organizational changes were not instigated until 1983, i.e. four years after 
sterling started its real appreciation in 1979. One was a complete restructuring of the 
financial budget and budget monitoring process. Second was to transfer profit and 
operating responsibility for business units to the level of management immediately below 
the main board.
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10.1 Changed role of ICI’s Executive Board.
The 1983 changes cut the size of the board from 14 to 8 members. These 8 members no 
longer had personal profit accountability for various sectors of ICI’s operations. Prior to 
this change, the board had exercised more of a control23 function over the businesses. 
Now its role became to push the company far more positively in the direction the board 
decided it ought to go (Turner 1984:16). The board could now increase resources to 
divisions which it regards as having potential and cut resources to divisions which it does 
not, thus making drastic cost-cutting easier in response to currency overvaluation. 
According to Lorenz (FT 26.2.1993:14), ICI’s managers running pharmaceuticals, 
agrochemicals, paints and some specialities felt frustrated in the 40 years up to 1983 at 
the priority given to industrial chemicals by the ICI board, which was dominated by 
industrial chemicals people. Pettigrew (FT 26.2.1993:14) states that as long ago as the 
1960s, managers of speciality chemicals felt neglected and starved of funds. This attitude 
fermented up to 1983 as the internal power of industrial chemicals managers persisted 
long past the point at which their side of the business was the more important in terms 
of profitability and growth potential.
The means of strategic control is via two sources of reserve power - budgeting and 
planning controls. The critique of the board’s post-1983 role is focused here on two 
concerns. One is that its power to steer the whole group, and to ensure that individual 
parts of the group are following strategies which are consistent with group strategy, does 
not guarantee that ICI will not be vulnerable to currency risk in the long-term. Two 
examples are given to underpin this assertion. The board’s decision to shift resources 
from industrial to speciality chemicals has not been a success24; ICI’s speciality 
chemicals have earned low returns and were loss-making in the last quarter of 1992. 
Further, the board’s decision to split ICI into two has left ICI with price-sensitive and 
cyclical industrial chemicals.
^Harvey-Jones is quoted as saying how wrong he was in the 1970s to assume that the ICI board was a 
proactive body.
“ Speciality chemicals were only up from 8 to 10% of turnover from 1979 to 1992.
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The second concern is the Executive Board’s power to reallocate resources in its annual 
strategy review. This is made according to HICI’s Group strategic aims" (Pink 1988:21). 
Nowhere is the management of economic exposure, or of currency risk in general, 
mentioned in these "strategic aims". If protection against currency misalignment follows 
automatically, then such protection would be the result of accident rather than design. 
Indeed, the executive board is not prohibited from pursuing strategic currency risk 
management within these "strategic aims", so the omission appears to be one of neglect.
10.2 Changed role of ICI’s planning department.
Three changes were made in 1983. Prior to 1983, the department emphasized the role of 
techniques in the planning process such as operational research and critical path diagrams 
(Hayes 1984:12). After 1983, "professional" planning was downgraded in that a 
businessman was made chief planner on the grounds that "business deals are made from 
the guts and that’s how people make millions" (Hayes 1984:13).
The second change is that the function of the planning department as secretariat for ICI’s 
16 Policy Groups was abolished. Their abolition meant that control and monitoring of the 
performance of ICI’s various businesses was no longer in the hands of the board directors 
individually, but collectively.
The third change is that the planning department no longer merely monitors how and 
where ICI deploys its capital expenditure. Instead, Pink (1988:23) lists 16 proactive roles 
but among the 16, only one is concerned with currency risk. This the role of providing 
"worldwide economic assumptions for planning and budgeting, and continuous assessment 
of the implications of economic trends on group strategy."
The critique of the above changes hinges on whether they are able to prevent ICI from 
suffering a repeat of the profits crisis that occurred during the 1979-83 sterling 
overvaluation. Doubts arise on the following fronts. Firstly, the effectiveness of a 
planning department can only be as good as the forecasts it provides and, secondly, it is 
no good just making forecasts and attempting to change the strategic plan as a result of
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such forecasts. There must also be the means and an impetus to implement the advice of 
the planning department, otherwise the divisions can simply ignore the planning function 
altogether. Indeed, whilst the budgets of ICI’s divisions are set autonomously and 
compulsorily on 3 year currency forecasts from the planning department25, if  individual 
divisions believe that the exchange rate assumptions are not relevant to their businesses, 
then they can submit a second "shadow" budget based on their own expectations (Turner 
1984:17).
Given the lack of cohesiveness to act on currency forecasts and the difficulties in 
obtaining accurate forecasts, the 1983 changes cannot be considered satisfactory as far 
as the management of currency risk is concerned. More significantly, even if 
cohesiveness to act on changed forecasts existed, it is impossible to make major 
opportunistic changes in product-market strategy in time. This is because budgeting 3 
years ahead is in any case only part of the planning process, which has a 10-year horizon 
owing to the length of time it can take to bring a product from invention to market. ICI 
did not believe it was worth making currency and financial forecasts further ahead 
because of uncertainty (Turner 1984:15).
10.3 Changed role of ICI’s business divisions.
Prior to 1983, the 16 Policy Groups, each headed by a main board director, decided their 
own expenditure proposals. This resembled a conglomerate, rather than an integrated 
company.
The abolition of the Policy Groups meant that the business divisions were now 
subservient to the 8 members of the Executive Board in budgeting, monitoring and 
planning. At the same time, the power of the divisions has been increased relative to 
national "country managers" and functional managers. The logic is that where products
25 This is necessary because if there were no common set of currency assumptions, there would be no 
consistency in budgeting. A paradox exists in that the businesses are not allowed to claim wrong currency 
forecasts as a reason for their not meeting their agreed targets.
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are standardized and do not need to be customized to local markets, a product division 
which is global can take maximum advantage of economies of scale.
However, the shift away from vertical integration does not necessarily make it easier to 
manage exchange risk. Nine business groups were set up, four of which were 
headquartered outside Britain. It can be hypothesized that headquartering businesses 
outside the U.K. would reduce ICI’s vulnerability to currency misalignment on account 
of the portfolio effect. However, if  both the U.K. and U.S. are in recession at the same 
time and their currencies overvalued, such diversification magnifies vulnerability rather 
than reduces it. It also affects the capability of the global division to market the product 
across countries.
The necessary requirement for a global divisional structure is an ability to adjust prices 
to reflect real exchange rate changes. Exchange rate pass-through is facilitated by market 
power. Indeed, the strategies which the chemicals companies have been pursuing of 
divesting themselves of businesses in which their market power is weak and buying 
businesses in which their market power is already strong is consistent with the creation 
of a natural hedge. Doubts arise on the extent to which ICI can do this on a global scale. 
Such a strategy would be facilitated if the global chemical industry became a perfect 
oligopoly. However, differing degrees of local competition and national competition 
policy suggest that market power in a certain product is likely to differ markedly across 
national boundaries. In consequence, a conflict in the optimal organizational structure 
arises in that national responsiveness is still likely to be necessary. Bartlett and Goshal 
(1992) argue that there can be no such thing as a universal "global manager" and that it 
is necessary to have specialist managers at three levels - country, functional and at global 
business level. If ICI’s Executive Board is then responsible for resolving most of the 
complexities and internal conflicts of balancing global, regional and local requirements, 
it is still not properly equipped to deal with the possibility of future currency 
misalignment. The main interaction is between the Executive Board and those running 
the global divisions. No proactive role is assigned to the treasury, which is perceived as 
a subservient service function - which it would seem to be. The treasury’s role in ICI is
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to manage the currency exposures which have already been created, and then its 
management is restricted to only 12 months forward.
10.4 Conclusions.
ICI’s organizational changes did not have any effect during the 1979-83 sterling 
misalignment. The results could only be measured when sterling became overvalued again 
in 1990-92.
To the extent that the smaller executive board and the enhanced power of the product 
divisions focused ICI on its strengths, ICI’s capability to withstand the misalignment 
syndrome should have been enhanced. Whilst this is true for the U .K ., what occurred 
instead is that proactive strategy geared to exploiting ICI’s business strengths rendered 
ICI vulnerable to recession in 1990-92 when its main markets went into recession 
simultaneously.
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11. CONCLUSIONS.
ICI suffered a profits crisis during the 1979-83 misalignment and despite drastic strategic 
changes to diversify out of the U.K ., ICI again could not manage the 1990-92 
overvaluation without suffering a major deterioration in its balance sheet.
None of ICI’s German competitors suffered as ICI did and whilst they were subject to 
the same commodity and oil cycle, they did not experience the massive decline in sales 
and profitability that ICI did. The reactive adjustment of strategy that was forced on ICI 
was costly and this burden was not imposed on ICI’s German rivals.
Given ICI’s efforts at product diversification, particularly out of industrial chemicals, the 
question arises as to why in 1993 ICI divested itself of high value-added products to a 
separate company, Zeneca. Owen & Harrison (1994) note the critical role of the stock 
market. This necessitates a comparison of the impact of the stock market and financial 
policy with Germany (see Appendix 6).
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CHAPTER NINE
IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE POLICY
1. INTRODUCTION.
The purpose of this chapter is threefold. One is to bring together the conclusions of the 
case studies to investigate if  a common pattern exists and whether such a pattern is 
generalizable.
Second is to make recommendations of what corporations can do on their own account 
to reduce their vulnerability to prolonged currency overvaluation.
In view of the difficulties in immunizing themselves against prolonged overvaluation, 
evidence on corporate preferences regarding U.K. exchange rate policy is summarized.
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2. GENERALIZING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PROLONGED CURRENCY 
OVERVALUATION IN THE CASE-STUDIES.
The hypotheses in Chapter 4 are confirmed in the three case-studies. The research 
problematique in Chapter 1 is also illustrated in the case-studies.
If corporate treasuries were proactive instead of reactive, could they have prevented the 
profits crises that occurred in all three firms ? What corporate treasuries need to manage 
prolonged currency overvaluation is a necessarily cheap option which can enable them 
to benefit from current exchange rates for, say, 5 years into the future and beyond, and 
decide not to use if it is not in their interest to do so. It is unlikely that means will ever 
be found for banks to bear such counterparty risks at a cheap price. Thus firms have no 
alternative but to strategically manage prolonged currency overvaluation themselves.
However, the finding of the case-studies is that the firms experienced major difficulties 
in strategically hedging prolonged overvaluation. First was in recognizing the changed 
environment as a discontinuity, and then in reacting to it appropriately. Operational 
"hedging" was not hedging at all but instead comprised desperate reactive measures of 
attempting to maintain sales via reduced margins. When this proved disastrous, there was 
no alternative to output cutbacks. But not even this delayed response was enough to save 
Lesney.J
Second is that in all three, the short-term imperative of cost-cutting for survival mitigated 
against expenditure necessary for successful long-term proactive hedging.
Regarding product diversification, Jaguar was the least able to diversify its product range, 
whilst Lesney’s diversification into metals in the U.K. and dolls in the U.S. was a 
disaster. The textbook remedy in a crisis is for the firm to stick to what it knows best. 
This remedy nevertheless indicates continuing inflexibility in product-market strategy. 
This might suggest that overtrading in the 1970s was Lesney’s root problem. If so, it can
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be hypothesized that had output been cut back sharply to a profitable level, then Lesney*s 
failure need not have occurred - but the case-study found that there was hardly scope for 
further cost-cutting.
Where firms have diversified from their main activity, examples exist in which they have 
increased their exposure to exchange risk rather than reduced it, thereby potentially 
magnifying their vulnerability. This is demonstrated by the example of British 
Aerospace’s diversification into cars with its Rover purchase. Over half of Rover output 
is exported, but costs for both Rover and British Aerospace are mainly in sterling. Rover 
also stretched British Aerospace’s financial resources, leading to the need for Rover’s 
disposal. Similarly, Daimler-Benz’s diversification into aerospace with its purchase of 
Deutsche Aerospace - with DM costs and US$-denominated sales - increased the group’s 
currency exposure.
None of the case-study companies had an objective of creating a natural hedge to 
currency risk. Jaguar and Lesney did not have the resources to create a natural hedge 
even if they wanted to. Being "bought out", as Jaguar was, is unlikely to be regarded 
favourably by most firms as a means of securing a natural hedge, for obvious reasons. 
Moreover, the results of an improvement in the currency balance of cash flows through 
geographical diversification was only possible after a delay of several years. Even so, the 
case-studies showed that there is no guarantee that FDI can serve as an effective means 
of managing overvaluation in the domestic currency. Lesney found that its production 
ventures overseas were a disaster in being a drain on cashflow. In ICI, far greater scope 
existed for producing in the currencies of its markets, which it attempted to do, but at 
immense cost. The nature of the chemical industry is such that strategic change cannot 
be brought about quickly1, whereas in Jaguar, operational, as well as financial 
constraints meant that it could not be brought about at all.
!In the chemicals business, creating a natural hedge in Europe for ICI in which chemicals are DM- 
priced would require matching DM revenues with DM costs. This was only possible if ICI shifted all its 
production out of the U.K. and into Germany, or if the pound became permanently aligned to the DM.
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Testing whether high combinations of currency matching and product diversification are 
associated with high degrees of balance sheet strength also does not yield meaningful 
conclusions. BASF and Bayer have traditionally had the strongest balance sheets of all 
four companies in the ICI case-study, yet both are at opposite spectra as regards 
geographical diversification and product mix.
2.1 Conclusions.
The problem identified, and confirmed in the case-studies, is that corporations could not 
manage the currency overvaluations via the conventional function assigned to manage 
currency risk, the treasury, whilst the nature of the business meant that it was not easy 
to adjust product-market strategy in the short-run. Further, the treasury in any case had 
only a marginal role, if  any, in product-market strategy.
The generalizability of the case-studies is indicated in that not even ICI, as a world class 
MNC, with substantial geographic and product diversification, could immunize itself 
against prolonged overvaluation.
The persistence of strategic inflexibility meant that U.K. firms continued to be vulnerable 
at the time of the second sterling overvaluation in 1990-92.
If corporations are not able to manage prolonged sterling overvaluation themselves, a 
remaining strategy is to lobby the government. This was found to be ineffective 
(Appendix 5). There was thus little more in the short-term that corporations could do 
other than retrench to survive.
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3. LIMITATIONS TO THE GENERALIZABILITY OF THE IMPACT OF 
PROLONGED CURRENCY OVERVALUATION.
Four principal limitations are discussed - market structure, the level of aggregate demand, 
non-price factors in competitiveness, and business risks other than currency risks.
3.1 Market structure.
If all firms were monopolies, then they could pass on the effects of currency 
overvaluation to the consumer. Only governments and consumer lobby groups need then 
be concerned about the effects of currency risk. Similarly, both competition and currency 
risk can be reduced by producing non-traded goods. This analogy does not yield useful 
prescriptive properties, since all firms cannot become monopolies, nor can they all 
specialize in producing non-traded goods. Further, whilst firms strive to attain dominant 
positions in their chosen market niches, it is not easy for individual firms to attain such 
positions if  all firms are trying to do it. Large corporations have, a priori, greater 
resources and flexibility to attain dominant positions in their market niches, implying that 
prolonged currency overvaluation can have the effect of weeding out smaller firms. 
However, the ICI case study demonstrates that not even the monopoly power accruing 
from patents in pharmaceuticals was sufficient to immunize the firm from currency 
overvaluation2.
3.2 Aggregate demand.
Aggregate demand can also be of far greater significance than currency risk. The US$ 
Overvaluation between 1980-85 coincided with a Keynesian boom. By contrast, the 
overvaluations in sterling 1979-83 and 1990-92 are linked with high real interest rates and 
recession.
^CI’s share of total profits from pharmaceuticals in 1979 and 1992 was reportedly 10% and 67% 
respectively on turnover shares of 5 % and 14 % respectively. The large profits from pharmaceuticals in 
1992 were insufficient to prevent a collapse in total profits in 1992.
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3.3 Non-price factors.
Non-price factors can be classified in three principal categories. Firstly, there are 
institutional factors which can override price in the winning of export orders. These 
include the existence of contacts such as regional chambers of commerce and trade 
associations. Yet insofar as the U.K. lacks these (FT 5.5.94:19) compared to its German 
and French competitors, then it is a factor which serves as a competitive disadvantage to 
U.K. firms on top of currency overvaluation. The existence of credit, such as via export 
credit guarantee schemes, can be more important than price in securing exports, but the 
fact that most governments run such schemes reduces its importance as a limitation to the 
significance of currency overvaluation.
Secondly, once market access has been gained, other factors can override price such as 
the reliability of supply, a low record of strikes, the perceived quality of the product and 
the existence of a service network which may be vital in purchase decisions.
Thirdly, it is important to stress that whilst U.K. unit labour costs can be significantly 
below those of Germany, this is only relevant at the margin. This is not a limitation to 
the significance of prolonged currency overvaluation but serves to accentuate its 
significance. To take full advantage of the labour cost differential in favour of the U .K ., 
the U.K. must have the production capacity in place and the personnel who are able to 
design, produce and market goods at equivalent or superior quality to those of Germany 
in order to attain dominant market positions. Yet the NDESR (1994) finds in the chemical 
and engineering industries that U.K. manufacturers continue to trail their German 
opposite numbers in the training of technicians and in the use of postgraduate engineers 
and scientists. To the extent that U.K. firms are "followers" in technical innovation, and 
in attitudes toward it, the U .K .’s favourable labour cost differential is not a critical factor 
and German labour costs are able to remain higher on account of the product demand 
stemming from "leader" status.
3.4 Business risks.
Whilst the lowest currency risks are in non-traded goods, business risk can nevertheless
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be substantial; yet external hedges do not exist for such risks. ICI, for example, did not 
forecast the massive overcapacity emerging in petrochemicals, nor could it hedge against 
its big customers going out of business. Business risks such as Lesney’s purchase of a 
loss-making U.S. acquisition and in its disastrous diversification into metals pressings 
further indicate the great difficulty in diversification as a strategy to manage exchange 
rate misalignment. The recession associated with overvaluation makes it more likely that 
diversification efforts will go wrong as the diversification can be just as much or even 
more affected by recession than the core business. A further example is Ford’s "operation 
location strategy". This has led Ford to produce globally, with the exception of Japan 
and S.E. Asia. However, geographical diversification is no substitute to being able to 
produce competitive products, to which the differing profit performance in the early 
1990s of Ford and General Motors in Europe (General Motors cars sold better than Ford 
cars) testifies (FT 6.5.1994:25). Nevertheless, producing the right product is not a 
sufficient condition for managing misalignment. FMT Holdings, a U.K. machine tool 
manufacturer with technology and expertise in advance of U.S. and European competitors 
and equal to any technology employed by the Japanese, was forced into receivership in 
1994 by a lack of working capital. This prevented it from taking advantage of any upturn 
in business3. It is also noted that the number of business failures following the 1979-83 
misalignment did not peak until 1985 (FT 14.5.93).
3.5 Conclusion.
It is not concluded that the 1979-83 overvaluation was the only problem facing the case 
study companies nor is it concluded that Jaguar’s and ICI’s profits crisis was solely 
owing to currency overvaluation. Jaguar was part of BL, which itself was virtually 
bankrupt without government support. By contrast, ICI had a very strong balance sheet 
at the time of the 1979-83 overvaluation, which aided its ability to restructure, but 
overvaluation came at the same time as its overdependence on petrochemicals. Financial 
risks other than currency risks need also to be examined, since these can be lower for 
German competitors (see Appendix 6).
3S.J. Brown, Director General, Machine Tool Technologies Association, U.K. in FT: 11.2.94:16.
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The significance of risks other than currency risks and of the impact of currency 
overvaluation itself varies according to industry and firm and this serves as a limit to the 
generalizability of the case studies.-
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4. WHY HAS THE ROLE OF THE TREASURY IN CURRENCY RISK 
MANAGEMENT REMAINED LIMITED FOR SO LONG?
Firstly, treasurers themselves are not equipped for effective strategic management. This 
stems both from their role as treasurers and from their training. The treasury is generally 
the unit in the firm responsible for gathering information on exchange rates and 
disseminating information on the currency risk of the business divisions. Thus if  the 
treasury were able to forecast exchange rates, the treasury could proactively influence the 
business divisions to quickly institute operational and strategic hedges. Even if accurate 
forecasting were possible, it would be difficult to operationalize such an advantage in 
terms of product-market strategy owing to the time lags before new plants come 
onstream. Secondly, imperfect information and a learning curve have to be overcome 
before treasurers are able to understand the product-market business of their firms to the 
same extent as line managers in the business divisions.
These reasons go some way to explain the pattern found by Edelshain (in pre-survey 
interviews to his thesis) in U.K. corporations, in which treasurers openly admitted that 
they knew little of the product-market business of the firm they were working in and they 
perceived their career pattern as one of moving from firm to firm within the treasury 
function, regardless of the line of business in which that firm is engaged. This suggests 
that treasurers do not seek to assume a proactive role in a firm’s product-market strategy. 
Instead, it appears they are content to restrict themselves, as far as currency risk is 
concerned, merely to an advisory role on the hedging capabilities of financial markets. 
If financial markets do not have the means to effectively hedge a company’s risks, then 
by implication, the treasurer does not have a role either. It is in this sense that the role 
of the treasury in currency risk management is limited. The significance is observed in 
the Jaguar case study. The finding that the management of economic exposure could only 
be effectively conducted in terms of product-market strategy put Jaguar at a competitive 
disadvantage to both BMW and Mercedes-Benz which were well placed for such 
management.
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A third reason why the role of the treasury in currency hedging is limited arises not so 
much because of the limitations of financial markets in terms of depth in far-off future 
dates, but because of the innate risk aversion of the treasurer. This is exemplified in the 
reluctance to lock into current forward rates for fear of locking into a loss.
Fourthly, what needs explaining is why treasurers are content to restrict themselves to 
financial hedging. One explanation is that it is in the interests of powerful groups that the 
role remains limited to the finance function. Banks have an interest in expanding their 
sales of treasury products. Secondly, senior managers and finance directors have confined 
appraisal of the treasury’s role to financial areas4. This may be because they perceive 
treasurers as being financial specialists and because of a natural caution on the part of 
senior managers arising from fears of losses if the treasury is instructed to concern itself 
with strategic hedging. Thirdly, government has an interest in maintaining the status quo. 
The U.K. government takes the view that it is up to business to manage itself and that 
implies that business must manage overvaluations created by government policy, since 
if  government did take a responsibility, it would have to underwrite firms* losses 
(Lawson 1992).
A fifth reason why the role of the treasury in currency hedging is limited is because 
treasury staff are often drawn from a bank background and, instead of a professional 
bank training, they may just have the necessary product knowledge required for treasury 
sales. It is found in Appendix 5 that treasurers form a very weak lobbying group and that 
it was the chairmen of large MNCs and the CBI which lobbied during U.K. 
overvaluations, not treasurers. Instead of lobbying for changes in exchange rate policy, 
treasurers are ready to acquiesce in a corporate reaction of retrenchment and job losses. 
This may be owing to two reasons. One is that treasurers may not feel that they are 
empowered within their organizations to do anything outside their narrow job
Performance evaluation comprises, for example, whether the treasury obtained a higher return on 
surplus funds than LIBOR over a quarterly period.
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specification5. Secondly, treasurers’ conservatism (Panic 1991) fits in with a preference 
for retrenchment and job losses, rather than lobbying against currency overvaluation. This 
preference also accords with socio-cultural norms in the U.K., but not those of Germany. 
This underpins the need for a comparison of the organizational and institutional features 
of finance in the U.K. and Germany.
5Those who are empowered, such as directors, may have a training in accountancy. However, their 
general level of education in currency risk management is indicated in that there are no compulsory papers 
in foreign exchange risk management in the examinations of any of the U.K. accountancy bodies. However, 
there may be compulsory questions on foreign exchange consolidation.
Consolidation in the number of accountancy bodies may lead to reform.
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5. TREASURERS* PREFERENCES ON EXCHANGE RATE AND REGIME POLICY.
Given the finding that neither external nor strategic hedging was able to immunize the 
case-study firms from prolonged currency overvaluation, the last resort was to attempt 
to influence government exchange rate policy.
5.1 Evidence on U.K. corporate preferences on U.K. exchange rate policy.
Three main surveys have investigated this topic (CBI 1980, 1987, 1990a). The main 
conclusions are that U.K. corporations seek exchange rate stability and, in the survey 
periods, they also sought a lower sterling exchange rate. In the 1987 survey, 63% of 
respondents considered the level of sterling to be a very important factor in their 
company’s operations.
What has not been explained is why the U.K. government has ignored corporations’ 
overwhelming desire for exchange rate stability as indicated in these surveys. Thus much 
more than changing exchange rate policy is required - it is necessary to harness policy 
into an exchange regime which can serve to prevent the U.K. government from 
embarking on policies leading to currency overvaluation.
5.2 Evidence on U.K. corporate treasurers’ preferences on EMU.
If the currency management problems experienced at corporate level ensue because of 
exchange rate volatility, then by definition, these problems should be solved by the 
imposition of a fixed exchange rate regime. A necessary condition is that the regime 
facilitates economic convergence such that real exchange rates remain constant and 
overvaluation does not arise.
Fixed exchange rates in the E.U. would not satisfy these requirements6 as financial
6and were rejected in the Delors Report (1989:21, paras.25 & 26).
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markets would perceive, even with full coordination of economic policy, that certain 
countries* economic policies might not be sustainable in relation to their economic 
fundamentals. The existence of separate national currencies would facilitate, and act as 
an incentive to, speculation against the currencies of the countries concerned. Thus a 
regime of fixed exchange rates in the E.U. would not be permanent (Gros & Thygesen 
1991:96-98). This provides the rationale for the Association for the Monetary Union of 
Europe’s (AMUE) support of monetary integration in the E.U.
Because no survey of U.K. corporations had been conducted on what U.K. corporate 
treasurers perceive of regime change7, part of this thesis comprises a new survey. The 
results confirm recognition in 1990 among U.K. treasurers of the need for monetary 
integration (57% of respondents) rather than a regime of fixed exchange rates in the E.U. 
(37% of respondents). 90% of respondents agreed that the success of the single market 
is dependent on currency stability and, in the long-term, 53% stated that they did not 
believe that currency stability can be achieved without a single currency. 86% believed 
that sterling should join the ERM and 75% believed that the rate should be at DM2.80 
or below, i.e. the overwhelming majority would have stated that the U.K. government’s 
chosen rate of DM2.95 was too high.
Three other significant findings emerged. Firstly, treasurers took an opposite policy line 
to the U.K. government in two main areas. Only 7% of respondents preferred the 
government’s policy of competing currencies and a hard ECU which was put forward, 
but jettisoned, at the Maastricht Summit. Only 12% agreed with U.K. government policy 
of being against a more independent Bank of England.
A second finding is a realization among treasurers of the U.K. government’s role in 
mismanagement of monetary and exchange rate policy. This is indicated in the 
overwhelming preference for an independent central bank in the U.K. and a majority
Two questions were asked in a 1991 survey on the perception of U.K. Times 1000 companies of entry 
to the ERM (Edelshain 1995). Belk also conducted a later survey.
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preference for delegation to a European Central Bank. Further, only 33% believed that 
a European Central Bank should be accountable to national parliaments.
A third significant finding is that only 3% of treasurers prefer a monetary free-for-all. 
This underlines the preeminence among the treasury profession of the objective of risk 
aversion and of the minimization of currency exposure. This contradicts any notion that 
the treasury profession as a whole, in line with banks, prefers exchange rate volatility 
because treasurers can profit from it.
The findings of a later survey by the CBI (1993b) are consistent with the conclusions of 
the survey of U.K. treasurers. The 1993 survey was the first time the CBI asked its 
members’ preferences8 on a single currency. Most respondents believe that Europe 
would be the focal point of British trade and investment in the future, most favour 
currency stability and this is why they favour a single currency. The CBI noted that 
British businesses are clearly at odds with the U.K. government on the future of Europe 
(FT 12.11.93:18), and that the demise of the ERM should not preclude attempts to move 
ahead towards EMU.
5.3 Conclusions.
It is not surprising that U.K. corporate treasurers were found to be overwhelmingly in 
favour of regime change in view of the evidence in this thesis of how limited treasurers* 
options are in managing prolonged currency overvaluation. What is even more galling 
is that the regime change that was believed to preclude overvaluation, joining the ERM, 
actually created it, since the government deliberately chose an overvalued rate for 
sterling’s entry. Interest rates consequently had to be maintained at an onerous level in 
order to sustain the overvaluation.
Why treasurers and corporate actors are so ineffective in lobbying on exchange rate 
policy is addressed in Appendix 5.
*200 large U.K. firms were selected for the survey.
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6. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CORPORATIONS TO REDUCE 
VULNERABILITY TO PROLONGED EXCHANGE RATE OVERVALUATION.
The ideal would be complete matching of revenues and costs in different currencies, and 
given the difficulties of doing so indicated in Chapter 4, recommendations to reduce 
vulnerability are inevitably sub-optimal to the ideal.
At its extreme, what firms need are perfect foresight and perfect flexibility in production. 
In the short-term, the treasury can improve the firm’s capacity to react to prolonged 
currency overvaluation via improved cash management. This can provide a quick 
feedback of a corporation’s earnings trend, so that the information is available to permit 
a timely reaction.
Given that perfect foresight can never be attained, emphasis should be placed on risk 
reduction. In the short-term, one proactive measure is to ensure that the company is not 
dependent on short-term financing and is thus not burdened with excessive interest 
payments when interest rates rise as part of the misalignment syndrome. However, it is 
difficult for the treasurer to ensure this, since the treasury is merely a service function 
for the needs of the business. For example, if the heads of the business divisions decide 
to make an acquisition financed by borrowing9 just before a period of prolonged 
overvaluation occurs, there is little that the treasurer can do but to warn business 
divisions of the downside risk. The problem is then one of not being able to forecast the 
overvaluation. As regards preventing acquisitions, the treasurer, perhaps via the finance 
director, would need a veto, since the latter’s vote on the board may be only one out of 
many.
Risk reduction can also be facilitated by adjusting the currency denomination of the firm’s
’Equity finance and long-term debt is preferable to borrowing, but market conditions may not permit 
long-term finance at the exact time at which the business divisions seek to make an acquisition.
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capital structure (Appendix 3). The ability to match large mismatches in the currency 
denomination of costs and revenues by balance sheet hedging depends on the ability to 
borrow. Yet it is at a time of recession and high interest rates thiat a firm’s borrowing 
capability is likely to be limited. For this reason, firms should maintain strong balance 
sheets as a key policy objective10
However, a survey in Business Banking Review (1992) concluded that it is the small 
enterprise which tends to be overdependent on short-term fickle and often expensive 
liabilities, suffers from a shortage of equity funds and long-term debt and is more likely 
to have vulnerable cash flows than large firms11. It is accordingly recommended that 
small firms develop treasury expertise. Whilst they cannot justify employing a treasurer, 
yet most will have an in-house accountant, it is recommended that the accountancy bodies 
initiate their students into treasury work as a compulsory part of their training.
In the long-term, corporations cannot solve their problem of currency risk by building 
bigger and bigger treasuries, as for example, General Electric of the U.S. has with GE 
Capital Corporation. Corporations can nevertheless act proactively on two fronts - to 
target non-financial indicators such as market share etc. and to increase operational and 
strategic flexibility to improve reaction time and as a proactive strategy12.
10Hanson pic is doing exactly this, particularly in view of its cyclical businesses such as brick 
manufacture. Whilst bricks may be insulated against foreign exchange risk, brick sales are not insulated 
from the misalignment syndrome.
11A survey by National Westminster Bank of 850 businesses, most with annual sales of less than 
£750,000, found that 61% of small companies had an overdraft, whilst only 30% had term loans 
(FT:27.1.92).
12Examples of proactive strategies include those of Hanson and Redland. Hanson's strategy is to avoid 
exporting by its purchase of businesses which focus on domestic sales and by disposing of those parts of 
its acquisitions which are export-oriented. This partly explains why Hanson has not lobbied against currency 
overvaluation (when the US$ is overvalued, the profits of Hanson's U.S. businesses increase in sterling 
terms) and is not a supporter of monetary integration in the E.U. Hanson’s strategy is hardly replicable 
for most firms seeking to expand organically. In a saturated domestic market, exporting may be the only 
way to increase sales.
Redland pic has reduced its vulnerability to currency risk by the nature of its activity, which is building 
materials. These are non-traded, cyclicality is reduced by geographical diversification and competition is
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Since strategic flexibility may require shifting production abroad, it is recommended that 
firms with limited resources seek foreign partners to bear part of the risk in joint- 
ventures.
A fourth proactive strategy is to continue lobbying government, as per CBI (1993b) to 
bring about a European monetary discipline on U.K. politicians and an ECU D-Day.
For the very long-term, the above recommendations, aside from FDI, are largely 
cosmetic and organizational change in the firm is needed.
7.1 Conclusions.
Instead of paying more attention to strategic currency hedging, what has happened since 
1973 is that the corporate response to floating has been to pay much more attention to 
financial strategy. The treasury function, which was previously involved mainly with cash 
management and the financing of the corporation, was greatly expanded to include the 
management of foreign exchange risk, though primarily the management of only short­
term currency risk. This is evidenced in the focus on external and internal financial 
hedging.
The main question is whether the treasury’s role should be expanded to include 
responsibility for the strategic management of currency risk or whether it should remain 
as it is.
If it remains as it is, with the Currency Committee having only an advisory role, a worst 
case scenario could be that the Currency Committee meets only infrequently and thus 
holds up the decision-making process. Certain members of the committee - such as the 
heads of the business divisions - may take only a half-hearted view of its role and send 
subordinates to deputize for them who lack the necessary knowledge for rapid and
reduced by securing leading positions in the markets in which it operates. Again, Redland’s strategy cannot 
realistically be replicated by other firms in other industries.
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effective decision-making.
One possibility is that the role of the treasurer be extended to providing input on currency 
matching and in so doing take part in a much wider strategic management of currency 
risk. The argument in favour of reform is that the treasury profession has already come 
a long way very quickly with its own specific responsibilities within the corporate 
hierarchy13. The question to be addressed is how the treasurer’s role can be enhanced 
to include internal strategic hedging. The answer rests on what the treasury would hope 
to achieve by proactive management. One is a natural hedge for the business. The scope 
for a proactive role can be seen in that no plans existed in any of the case-study firms for 
the creation of a natural hedge and that in general, economic exposure is not effectively 
managed. Thus one possibility is that the role of the treasurer be augmented to include 
the design of benchmark natural hedges as standard treasury practice and that the 
management of economic exposure become an integral part of the treasury function, as 
the management of transaction and translation exposure currently is14.
For this recommendation to become reality, several changes are necessary at the 
educational and practical level.
At the educational level, compared to transaction and translation exposure, economic 
exposure is a neglected topic by all the key personnel who could or should be responsible 
for managing it. A re-education process is necessary for corporate planners, 
accountants15 and treasurers.
Corporate planners have tended to ignore the problem of currency risk. In the U.K.,
13In 1986, the U.K. Association of Corporate Treasurers reported that 90% of its members* treasury 
departments had been formed since 1970.
14Economic exposure management is not necessarily the same as the creation of a natural hedge, since
a natural hedge may increase costs and sacrifice economies of scale. The natural hedge may not preclude 
an improvement in a competitor’s position on account of a favourable movement in its currency of costs.
15see Edelshain 1994a.
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accountancy training also neglects currency risk management, yet it is rare for anyone 
to become a finance director of a corporation unless already a qualified accountant. 
Presumably it is assumed that currency risk matters can be delegated to treasurers and 
that accountants do not need to know about them. An alternative explanation is that little 
thought is given to the subject.
The point here is that currency risk matters cannot even be left to treasurers because 
neither their training nor their role equips them adequately for the task of economic 
exposure management. In the training of treasurers, less than one page is devoted in the 
student’s manual (ACT Currency Management 1990:2301,2302) to the measurement and 
reporting of economic exposure. The section on reporting economic exposure merely 
contains the following:
"There is probably little value to regularly reporting longer-term economic exposures; the 
aim should be to establish a reporting system which enables the treasurer to comment at 
an early stage in the planning process on the nature of economic risk implicit in any 
proposed activity. The importance of this involvement cannot be overestimated.
The economic exposure implied by established patterns of sales and purchases should be 
the subject of careful conservative forecasting, and can then be reported in a similar way 
to transaction risks - although the two should never be aggregated but always separately 
identified".
Similarly, the ACT’s written work in its correspondence course simply requires a 
knowledge by future treasurers of what economic exposure is and asks them to provide 
a mere listing of the techniques that could be used to manage it. There are no practical 
exercises which could give candidates practice in setting up a measuring and reporting 
system of economic exposure from given data. Still less is there any requirement for a 
critical appraisal of whether the existing techniques of currency management are 
adequate. Nor is there any requirement that treasurers are trained in business strategy16.
16 The rationale for such training can be seen in the critical role of market structure, since market 
structure is an important determinant of a firm's vulnerability to exchange risk.
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Thus in terms of formal training, unless they have obtained a training in strategy 
elsewhere, treasurers can be concluded to be completely unprepared for dealing with 
exchange rate misalignment and economic exposure management. Hence it is hoped that 
the lessons learnt from the critical evaluation of currency risk management in the case- 
studies in this thesis will serve as a guide to the inadequacies of existing instruments and 
techniques and organizational forms for dealing with prolonged currency overvaluation. 
However, these lessons are limited in that they indicate what not to do, rather than what 
to do, given the difficulties of currency matching.
At the practical level, several barriers exist to the above suggestions becoming reality. 
A problem exists in first convincing firms that a need exists for organizational change in 
order to manage economic exposure and exchange rate misalignment. A second problem 
lies in finding a consensus on the appropriate shape that this organizational change should 
take.
A lesson from the case-studies is that despite the acute problems exhibited at the time of 
the 1979-83 sterling overvaluation, there has been no major rethink of the role of the 
treasury in currency management. ICI’s reaction, namely the organizational changes in 
the business divisions, were brought about top-down in the form of geographic 
diversification of ICI’s businesses. The reality of empirical behaviour thus does not live 
up to the recommendations in ACT 2301/2302 listed above. ICI’s treasury, for example, 
has had very little contact with ICI’s corporate planners, but more with ICI’s economics 
department17. This lack of contact with corporate strategists has been left untouched. 
Indeed, the mechanism of currency risk management in firms has gone on as before as 
if  the 1979-83 overvaluation never occurred. This mechanism tends to be one of reliance 
on the treasury.
There has been no top-down insistence on a change in the organizational form whereby 
currency risk is managed in the firm. This is presumably because the corporate strategists
17T. Harrison, interviewed 7.6.1994.
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have not recommended such a change to senior management. This may be because the 
corporate strategists do not want to get involved in currency matters, because of lack of 
specialist expertise. Further, there has been no grass-roots pressure for change in the 
organizational form either. It was noted above that treasurers are content with the status 
quo. Even though they are responsible for currency risk management and even though 
they are aware that the most effective means of performing the task is strategic, 
treasurers have not campaigned for greater powers within the firm’s hierarchy to permit 
them to perform strategic currency management. Thus an incentive needs to exist for 
organizational change. A most powerful weapon already exists to act as a catalyst for 
change. This is that benchmarks for evaluating currency hedge performance are currently 
not implemented in most firms18. If they were, the treasury profession could no longer 
orient itself to purely financial hedging, but would be forced to include strategic hedging 
in its frame of reference.
The question arises as to how a system for evaluating external and strategic currency 
hedges be instituted, since the treasury profession has little incentive to lobby for an 
additional form of appraisal. Such an appraisal could reveal that external hedges have 
produced large losses in relation to the actual outum of exchange rates. The principal 
reason why the corporate treasury would not wish to institute such a system is that under 
current organizational arrangements, in which the treasurer is solely responsible for 
deciding what hedges to put on and when, the treasurer would have to take sole 
responsibility for hedge losses. Given the possible large figures involved and the potential 
for their dramatization both within the firm and in the press, the treasurer would feel 
obliged to, or under pressure to, resign. In consequence, it is recommended that a system 
of joint decision-making on the implementation of hedges be set up. One means of doing 
so would be for the Currency Committee to initiate and endorse currency hedging 
measures, and become the primary originator of strategy within the firm with specific 
responsibility for the strategic management of currency risk.
18Only 29% of a sample of the top 250 U.K. corporations measure currency risk management 
performance against an independent yardstick (Touche Ross 1991).
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CHAPTER TEN
IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY
1. INTRODUCTION.
To indicate that prolonged exchange rate overvaluation matters for public policy, it is 
necessary to demonstrate that the case study firms were not special cases; that 
retrenchment by individual firms is replicated at industry-level and at national-level, and 
also across countries to demonstrate that the U.K. itself is not a special case. Currency 
misalignments in the U.S. and the former East Germany1 are thus investigated to 
examine if the adverse effects observed in the U.K. are replicated.
If the data confirms that the adverse effects are generalized across countries, the question 
arises as to why governments did not take measures to prevent the currency 
overvaluations. Thus it is necessary to investigate why the currency overvaluations 
occurred in the first place. A taxonomy of causal factors is presented in Section 4.
The hypothesis is examined that government policy is itself a primary cause of the 
violations in the three major cases. The paradox of why governments should pursue 
policies leading to prolonged currency overvaluation, despite the adverse consequences 
for firms and for public policy, is investigated for the three major cases in Section 5.
Conclusions are summarized in Section 6. Recommendations for public policy are made 
in Chapter 11.
IThis will henceforth be referred to as the Neue Lander (of Germany).
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2. REPLICATING THE FIRM-LEVEL EFFECTS OF PROLONGED EXCHANGE 
RATE OVERVALUATION TO INDUSTRIES.
This section investigates whether the findings of the case study firms are also replicated 
at industry level.
2.1 Existing research.
A literature search has failed to uncover any research on the impact of prolonged 
overvaluation on industries in the U.K. This in itself is extraordinary. Not even the CBI 
researched the topic at the time of the overvaluations, despite the CBI’s research role on 
behalf of U.K. corporations. Two relevant industry-level studies exist using U.S. data:
2.1.1 The Ceglowski & Hilton study.
An attempt to isolate the impact of the rise in the dollar exchange rate on three particular 
U.S. industries (but not firms) has nevertheless been made in Ceglowski & Hilton (1987). 
It was found that performance in two of the three industries2 selected is increasingly 
determined by trade and exchange rate factors (p.405).
It was found in the two industries that US$ overvaluation led to higher import 
penetration, bankruptcies in the U.S. domestic industry, and remaining firms operated 
well below capacity. Other findings were a switch to foreign sourcing of standardized 
equipment and concentration on the specialized end of the market (p.445).
Ceglowski & Hilton’s study does not find that FDI was initiated by dollar overvaluation. 
One reason is that U.S. firms had already set up plants in Mexico to take advantage of 
cheap labour.
2The third industry specializes in tailor-made, non-traded goods (fabricated structural metal products) 
and was selected to provide a standard against which the other two industries can be compared (p.407). The 
other two are metalworking equipment and electrical power transmission apparatus.
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Whilst the Ceglowski & Hilton study is the first providing statistical evidence of the role 
of currency risk in the decline of two U.S. industries, it does not consider the constraints 
on individual firms in these industries which prevented them from effectively reacting to, 
or overcoming, the overvaluation of the dollar. Yet causality can only be proven at the 
level of the firm. Moreover, the study misses the point of economic exposure entirely. 
It ignores the change in the competitive position of the individual firm as a result of 
unexpected changes in real exchange rates. This has already been investigated in the case 
studies for Jaguar and ICI and so the task here is merely to investigate if the impact of 
overvaluation on Jaguar and ICI is replicated in the U.K. auto and chemical industries. 
Existing relevant studies are first summarized.
2.1.2 Richardson’s study of the U.S. auto industry.
Richardson (1988) investigated how changes in exchange rates, factor costs and Japanese 
export restraints affected competitiveness in the U.S. auto industry, using aggregate 
industry data from 1976-85. Richardson found that U.S. unit labour costs rose faster than 
competitors even before the 1980-1985 US$ overvaluation. This trend increase was not 
matched by a corresponding change in the relative prices of U.S. and imported cars 
during the overvaluation. Competitiveness of the U.S. industry deteriorated in line with 
exchange rates and relative labour costs.
Richardson acknowledged that his focus on unit labour costs has neglected other factors 
important in competitiveness such as trends in quality, product mix and market share (for 
servicing). Lawrence (1988:238) commented that the focus on unit labour costs and on 
the nominal, instead of the real US$ exchange rate are flaws in Richardson’s analysis. 
Two other omissions also underline the partiality of an aggregate industry-level approach. 
Firstly, consumer buying patterns changed during the overvaluation to favour smaller cars 
which had to be imported. Secondly, it is individual U.S. firms which have to manage 
the overvaluation, not the industry. The advantage of the portfolio approach to managing 
economic exposure can be seen in that the Ford Motor Co. was kept solvent over the 
period of overvaluation by the profits of its European operations (Lawrence 1988:238).
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2.2 The U.K. auto industry.
Given the need to reject the industry-level approach of the above two studies, this section 
examines the changing position of the U.K. auto industry from shifts in the corporate 
strategy of the main U.K. producers. A threefold strategy is evident from U.K. auto 
manufacturers at the time of the 1979-83 sterling overvaluation. Firstly, all four 
manufacturers cut exports from the U.K. in the years 1980-83, with the cuts of three 
producers being particularly drastic. A second strategy is massive output cutbacks, though 
this is not reflected in the sales figures in Table 10.1 as they include tied company 
imports. These were substantial, except in the case of Rover. For example, the bulk of 
Vauxhall’s increase in sales in 1983 over 1982 was accounted for by imports. Thus a 
third strategy is to increasingly source the U.K. market from imports. In view of the 
balance of payments and employment effects, a major policy problem was created.
The competitive disadvantage to U.K. auto producers from the misalignment syndrome 
is indicated in that German auto producers suffered only a slight setback to production 
from recession in 1979-80 (Chart 10.1) and the uptrend in German output continued, 
whereas U.K. output reached a trough3.
3The most significant collapse in output in the chart, however, occurred in the U.S. 1979-83, coinciding 
with monetary tightening and US$ overvaluation.
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TABLE 10.1
U.K.UNIT SALES AND EXPORTS BY FOUR LARGEST U.K. AUTO MANUFACTURERS DURING 1980- 
83 AND ENSUING 3 YEARS.
1980 1981 1982 1983
Rover 395,820 x 413,440 x 383,074 445,364
157,829 126,249 96,897 78,664
Ford 342,767 342,171 306,635 318,674
85,373 82,354 60,937 31,717
Vauxhall 55,002 69,932 112,669 126,524
9,690 5,536 300 320
Peugeot 125,314 117,439 56,235 120,503
94,589 80,799 27,216 85,296
1984 1985 1986
Rover 383,324 465,104 404,454
78,664 112,783 123,558
Ford 273,767 317,689 346,267
16,984 14,233 6,425
Vauxhall 117,114 152,587 161,857
283 257 220
Peugeot 95,122 67,066 58,426
67,728 47,280 20,330
Source :SMMT
Bold data refers to exports from the U.K.
x = including Jaguar sales and exports. Jaguar data is excluded from 1982 onwards.
U.K. auto demand increased after 1983, aided by a fiscal-led boom, but the overvaluation 
continued to have an impact on firms’ strategies. Table 10.1 depicts how the four largest 
manufacturers in the U.K. responded to misalignment and the later recovery in demand. 
Unit sales were roughly constant in the two producers that formed the backbone of the 
U.K. car industry, i.e. Rover and Ford, and whilst Rover’s exports recovered, Ford’s 
strategy was to massively cut U.K. exports. This is also the case of Vauxhall and 
Peugeot. All three increasingly sourced U.K. sales with tied imports (SMMT 1989).
Table 10.2 shows that the percentage of total U.K. exports accounted for by the motor 
industry fell significantly over the period 1979-83.
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TABLE 10.2
% OF TOTAL U.K. EXPORTS ACCOUNTED FOR BY THE AUTO 
INDUSTRY, 1964-1988
1964 16.8
1968 14.5
1972 13.5
1976 13.1
1979 9.5
1980 8.6
1981 8.1
1982 7.3
1983 6.7
1984 6.3
1985 6.4
1986 7.2
1987 7.8
1988 8.4
Source :SMMT
The U.K. changed from being a net exporter to a net importer of motor vehicles.
2.2.1 Conclusion.
The impact of the currency misalignment syndrome that was observed in the Jaguar case- 
. study is replicated in the U.K. auto industry. See Sections 3.1 and 3.5 for comment on 
whether the devastating effects on total U.K. production noted in the 1979-82 
overvaluation were repeated in the 1990-92 overvaluation.
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2.3 The U.K. chemical industry
Chart 10.2 shows that U.K. chemical industry output fell dramatically 1979/80, thus 
generalizing the experience of ICI. German chemical output, by contrast, was relatively 
stable. U .S. chemical output did not suffer dramatically from US$ overvaluation which 
started in 1980. This does not negate the hypothesis of the impact of overvaluation, but 
highlights the special features of the U .S. One is that overvaluation was accompanied 
by boom not prolonged recession. Second is that the size of the U.S. market had attracted 
FDI from European chemical producers in place of exports from Europe. Charts 10.3 
and 10.5 confirm the dramatic rise in import penetration in the U.K. chemical industry 
and the stagnation in home sales. Chart 10.4 confirms a deterioration in the U .K . 
chemicals trade balance in 1983 over 1982, particularly to the E.U .
In conclusion, the problems faced by ICI documented in the case study are replicated in 
the U.K. chemicals industry.
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CHART 10.3
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CHART 10.4
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CHART 10.5
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3. THE IMPACT ON MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS.
The economics literature has focused principally on two factors which suggest that 
currency overvaluation should be a major cause of concern for public policy. One is 
hysteresis. On the demand side, real appreciation may allow foreign firms to establish a 
"beachhead" in the market because consumers develop loyalties to particular brands of 
a product. On the supply side, foreign firms may set up a distribution network which 
remains in place when the real appreciation is reversed. Bean (1988) found only tentative 
evidence for such hysteresis for the U.K., but he used aggregate macroeconomic data, 
not data for individual firms. A similar approach for the U.S. economy was used by 
Krugman (1988) who found no evidence of hysteresis.
Second is the reallocation of capital from the tradables to the non-tradables sector of the 
economy, which may result in less efficiency. Krugman (1988) found no evidence for 
such a reallocation for the U.S. economy 1980-85. The level of manufacturing investment 
was maintained, but using aggregate, not firm-level data. One reason for maintained 
investment was however, increased military spending.
The remainder of this section summarizes the evidence on macroeconomic indicators such 
as GNP and capacity utilization to investigate whether output cutbacks at firm and 
industry-level were also replicated at the national level.
3.1 U.K. 1979-82 and 1990-92.
The years 1979-82 represent the sharpest and most severe downturn in economic activity 
since the slump of the early 1930s. Chart 10.6 for U.K. industrial production shows 
marked declines, manufacturers’ margins (Chart 10.7) were negative and total company 
liquidations (Chart 10.8) rose dramatically.
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3.2 U.S. 1980-85.
Up to m id-1983, according to Summers (1984), "the U .S. suffered the most severe 
economic downturn of the post World W ar II period. Virtually every economic statistic 
associated with the production of goods and services declined further than in any previous 
recession. The downturn was also unmatched in its duration". U.S. real GDP showed 
marked declines up to m id-1983 (Chart 10.9) and capacity utilization fell to its lowest 
level since collection of the data began (Chart 10.10).
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CHART 10.10
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3.3 Germany following monetary unification 1990.
From October 1989, prior to monetary integration, an unofficial or "market" exchange 
rate prevailed between the DM and the Eastmark of between 5 to 7 Eastmarks per DM. 
This narrowed to 2 Eastmarks per DM in the few weeks before monetary integration in 
July 1990. At integration, the federal government chose an exchange rate of one-to-one4. 
If the "black market" exchange rate had been appropriate, then at the new official rate 
of exchange, the Eastmark was grossly overvalued.
Industrial production in the Neue Lander fell by 43 % between July 1990 and February 
1991. GNP of the Neue Lander fell 15% between 1989 and 1990 and fell by an even 
greater percentage in 1990-1991 (Wolf 1991).
The problem, however, was not merely one of a misaligned exchange rate with the DM. 
Additional factors were the loss of Comecon markets and a sharp rise in wages in the 
Neue Lander. The overvaluation in turn fuelled the preference among east German 
consumers for west German goods.
The extent of bankruptcy in the Neue Lander has been limited by government wage 
subsidies. Calculations by Akerlof et al.(1991) show that a wage subsidy of 75% would 
have been necessary to make the 88 most resilient conglomerate companies in the Neue 
Lander, employing 77 % of the labour force, viable at their costs immediately following 
integration. The wage level needed to keep much of the Neue Lander industry afloat 
would have been 10% of that in the former West Germany. Schatz and Schmidt (1991) 
argue that even this estimate is probably too optimistic. Moreover, it does not even take 
into account the sharp wage increases that have taken place after monetary integration. 
The conclusion of the above studies is that the Eastmark was at least ten times overvalued 
at the exchange rate chosen for integration.
4except for household savings. These were to be converted at two Eastmarks per DM for savings above 
Eastmarks 4000.
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Other reasons why the German government might consider the consequences of 
overvaluation in the Neue Lander and the transfer payments to finance it as a policy 
problem are principally fourfold. The German current account moved from a surplus of 
5% of (West) German GNP in early 1989 to a deficit of 1.5% in the first quarter of 
1991. Secondly, from a small surplus in 1989, a fiscal deficit of 4% of GNP emerged 
in 19915. Thirdly, long term interest rates rose by 2 percentage points once monetary 
union was in prospect. 3 month short-term Eurocurrency rates doubled from around 4% 
in mid-1988 to 9% in 1991. Fourthly, the German chancellor promised ahead of the all- 
German elections in 1990 that taxes would not have to rise to pay for unification, but was 
forced to introduce "Unity” taxes6 as early as July 1, 1991. The higher taxes, being part 
of the cost of living index, raised German inflation. Political concern focused on the need 
for Germany to maintain high interest rates for several years to stem inflation.
3.4 Conclusions.
To bring the impact of the U.K. and U.S. overvaluations into perpective, U.K. and U.S. 
GNP is compared with that of a country whose currency was not overvalued over the 
period, namely Germany as a whole (since the Neue Lander only constituted a part). 
Chart 10.11 indicates that the U.S. suffered a bigger output gap than the U.K. in 1981- 
83. At the time of the 1990-92 sterling overvaluation, the U.K. suffered a major output 
gap whereas Germany reached the peak of its cycle.
The above data merely confirms that total output deteriorated at times of currency 
overvaluation, but this can be considered to be coincidental without a model of how 
overvaluation affects output. Such a model then needs to be tested for fit with the actual 
pattern of behaviour that occurred over the period. For example, the U.S. suffered an 
output gap 1991-1993 even though the US$ displayed prolonged weakness.
5In proportion to GNP, the overall German deficit in 1991 was higher than the equivalent figure in the 
U.S. during the Reagan years.
Comprising a 12 month 7.5% income tax surcharge and rises in state insurance and fuel taxes.
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CHART 10.11
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Returning to overvaluation, Summers (1984:182) identified the channels whereby US$ 
overvaluation led to a decline in U.S. competitiveness as follows. Monetary tightening 
and high real interest rates bid up the dollar and brought on recession. The burden of 
recession fell largely on investment and net exports. Despite the recession, real 
consumption rose in each of the years 1980-83. Consumption increased partly because 
the overvalued dollar stimulated import demand. At the same time the overvalued dollar 
reduced export demand and U.S. competitiveness. In consequence, unemployment rose 
to unprecedented heights. When recovery came, net exports continued to be very weak, 
with long-term implications for the balance of payments. This pattern is consistent with 
an overvalued dollar having negative effects on the rest of the economy.
3.5 The impact on FDI.
A conventional strategy to counter prolonged currency overvaluation is to shift production 
abroad, since foreign assets may be relatively cheap to acquire. Thus it can be 
hypothesized that increases in FDI should be observed at firm, industry and national 
level, depending on time lags. Data for outward FDI from the U.K. show that FDI 
reached a trough during overvaluations (1982, 1991):
TABLE 10.3
OUTWARD DIRECT INVESTMENT OVERSEAS BY U.K. COMPANIES, £M
1979 3,035
1980 3,391
1981 4,671
1982 2,122
1983 3,498
1984 5,813
1985 8,625
1986 11,798
1987 19,159
1988 20,915
1989 21,491
1990 10,108
1991 9,304
1992 10,139
SourceTTTTT^usmessTIomtoFTIA2T992^ :
Data is not net, i.e. it does not include inward direct investment into the U.K.
The currency misalignment in the Neue Lander was accompanied by massive inflows of
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FDI from the former West Germany for political reasons. This confirms that the example 
of overvaluation in the Neue Lander is a special case. According to Siebert (1991) more 
than half of the Neue Lander GNP in the first half of 1991 consisted of transfer payments 
from Bonn. Wolf (1991) notes that this is the largest transfer programme, in relation to 
the income of the recipient, in history. The scale of the transfers roughly equalled the 
whole of Polish GDP. West German firms have nevertheless been reluctant to exploit 
the glaring imperfections in factor and product markets between the Neue Lander and 
West Germany by FDI7 and have serviced the Neue Lander market with West German 
production8. This confirms that currency overvaluation can act as a major inhibitor to 
inward FDI.
Data for global FDI is given in Chart 10.12. This shows substantial increases from 1985 
to 1990. This suggests that there are a whole range of motivations for FDI (Julius 1990, 
Stopford 1993) and that avoidance of prolonged currency overvaluation is likely to be 
only one of them and a minor one at that.
To assess the impact of prolonged currency overvaluation on FDI, it is necessary to 
return to the firm and industry level. In the case-studies, it has already been noted that 
FDI was not practicable for Lesney and Jaguar. The fact that ICI engaged in massive FDI 
supports the expectation that prolonged currency overvaluation should lead to increased 
outward FDI. The evidence for ICI can be generalized to the whole U.K. chemical
7Possible reasons are that whilst investment is based on long-term time horizons, its location is subject 
to competing forces. The inevitability of significant market growth in east Germany in the long-term is not 
a sufficient condition to invest in the short-term. "East Germany’s wages are 5 times those in Poland. The 
industrial capital stock of East German industry is worthless at these wage levels" (Wolf 1991). Additional 
inhibitors to inward FDI in the Neue Lander are uncertainty on property rights, poor infrastructure and an 
inadequate public administration.
8For example, in the optical lens market, Zeiss in the former West Germany preferred to see the 
original Zeiss firm in the Neue Lander go bankrupt and to increase production from its West German plant.
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industry (Table 10.4)9.
TABLE 10.4
OUTWARD DIRECT INVESTMENT BY U.K. COMPANIES IN THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY £M
1979 254 1990 1572
1980 112 1991 1569
1981 756 1992 1808
1982 245 1993 1821
1983 460
1984 563
1985 1474
1986 1885
1987 1551
1988 2071
1989 1599
Source:DTI Business Monitor MA4, Overseas Transactions.
In the U.K. auto industry, the hypothesis that currency overvaluation would lead to 
increased outward FDI is confirmed for the 1979-83 overvaluation10, but not for the 
1990-92 overvaluation. This apparent inconsistency is in line with the conclusion on 
global FDI, that it is motivated by a whole range of factors which can be both defensive 
and offensive. In the 1979-83 overvaluation, U.K. auto producers, except Rover, 
increased tied imports into the U.K. One reason why Rover broke the pattern is that the 
foreign-owned auto producers in the U.K. had the flexibility to import from foreign 
plant, whereas Rover did not.
During the 1990-92 overvaluation, net inward FDI in the U.K. auto industry occurred
9DTI data for FDI outflows come from DTI surveys only and care thus needs to be taken in its 
interpretation.
,0Similar DTI data was not used for the U.K. auto industry because the increased imports into the U.K. 
need not have involved FDI and the U.S. parentage of two U.K. auto producers would not have indicated 
FDI from the U.K. even when the strategy of General Motors was indeed one of new FDI in Spain to 
service the U.K. market. Instead of DTI data, the shrinkage of U.K. capacity and increase in tied imports 
is more important than FDI.
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on account of Japanese investment (see Thomsen & Nicolaides 1991). This does not 
invalidate the hypothesis that firms find it difficult, if not impossible, to manage the 
currency misalignment syndrome. One motive of Japanese firms’ inward investment into 
the U.K. was to take advantage of cheap labour costs relative to other sources of skilled 
labour in the E.U., i.e. they were exploiting an underpriced asset, whilst benefiting from 
the E.U. market. Japanese firms were using their firm-specific advantages to create value 
in the U.K. at a time of an overvalued currency, suggesting that the Japanese firms had 
firm-specific skills which were superior to those of their U.K. rivals.
Thus new U.K. production by Japanese companies and greater U.K. production in place 
of tied imports by foreign-owned producers meant that the devastating effects on total 
U.K. auto production noted in the 1979-82 overvaluation were not repeated in the 1990- 
92 overvaluation. Thus the reactions of firms to prolonged currency overvaluation depend 
on a combination of circumstances and each situation of overvaluation must be analyzed 
independently.
3.5.1 Conclusion.
Recession appears to be an important factor in cutting investment plans and FDI, even 
though geographical diversification of production is one strategy to address the 
misalignment syndrome. Whether the increased outward FDI from the U.K. after 1982 
is a delayed response to sterling overvaluation is uncertain. Evidence at firm-level in the 
case studies indicates that firms could not easily engage in FDI as a solution. For 
example, ICI’s decision to dramatically reduce its dependence on the U.K. was not taken 
instantaneously, but only taken after a delay of two years in 1981 and it required a new 
chairman to make it. Thus it may take several years before cash comes onstream from 
an FDI made in response to prolonged currency overvaluation.
3.6 The impact on employment levels.
In all three cases of currency overvaluation, unemployment rose dramatically. In the
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U.K., in the early 1980s unemployment, both in absolute numbers and as a percentage 
of the workforce, exceeded that seen in the inter-war period. In the U .S., the civilian 
unemployment rate rose to an all-time high. Branson & Love (1988) calculate that 1M 
jobs were lost in U.S manufacturing between 1980-85 directly as a result of the US$ 
overvaluation. In, the Neue Lander, registered unemployment rose from 2.8% of the 
labour force in July 1990 to 8.1% in May 1991 (Wolf 1991).
3.7 The impact on international monetary relations.
It can be hypothesized that economic policies which weaken U.S. manufacturing 
competitiveness, which also weaken the position of the U.S. in global economic rankings 
and which also contribute to the U.S. becoming the world’s largest net debtor can be 
harmful to that country in terms of its power base in international relations. This question 
is considered by Gilpin (1987).
This section focuses instead on the inconsistency of currency overvaluation with the 
requirements for long-term stability in international monetary relations. In the U.K. and 
U.S., the currency overvaluations of the early 1980s cannot be construed as a shift by 
these countries either toward stable economic policies or to any new initiative toward 
creating a more stable world monetary order.
In the U.S., Reagan made no policy statement that the U.S. would be set on a stable 
monetary path and with a stable exchange rate as an objective. As Summers (1984:180) 
notes, there was widescale incredulity that Reagan’s policies could be successful. 
Instability is indicated in terms of Kindleberger’s (1970) norm that creditor status is a 
requirement for the maintenance of a hegemonic position in international monetary 
relations. The U.S. trade deficits of the 1980s changed the country’s position from the 
world’s largest creditor to its largest net debtor, reversing the results of 60 years of 
investment abroad in only 4 years (Krugman 1991).
Similar instability is exhibited in U.K. policy. The policy of drastic disinflation and high
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real interest rates ushered in in 1979 was not part of any plan for sterling to become part 
of a stable exchange rate regime. If sterling had been in the ERM, the rules would not 
have allowed the dramatic real appreciation that occurred and other member states would 
have been able to request that U.K. overvaluationary policies be changed (Kaldor 1985).
The consequences of overvaluation in the Neue Lander are of major significance for the 
international monetary system, since high German interest rates and the non-revaluation 
of the DM in the EMS were a principal contributory factor to the official break-up of the 
narrow 2.25% bands and also the withdrawal of shadowing countries such as Sweden and 
Finland.
3.8 Conclusion.
The evidence confirms that retrenchment by individual firms in the case studies is 
replicated at industry and macro-economic level and also across countries. Governments 
should be concerned about the potential for prolonged currency overvaluation to cause 
the break-up of international monetary regimes.
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4. CAUSAL FACTORS IN PROLONGED EXCHANGE RATE OVERVALUATION.
Given the adverse and often drastic consequences for GNP from currency overvaluation 
documented above, it is necessary to investigate why governments did not take measures 
to prevent the overvaluations from arising. As a starting point, this section investigates 
the causes of overvaluation.
4.1 Finance and economic theory and causes of exchange rate overvaluation.
In Chapter 2 it was noted that the finance theory explanation of currency overvaluation 
in terms of divergences from the parity conditions does not explain why these divergences 
arise in the first place. Economics would attempt to explain the divergences from the 
parity conditions in terms of divergences in monetary and fiscal policy across countries. 
This in turn does not explain why monetary and fiscal policies diverge.
The following taxonomy investigates the hypothesis that parity divergences can lead to 
currency overvaluation only insofar as government policy is permissive.
4.2 Shifts in commercial policy and currency overvaluation.
Commercial policy measures of governments can drive a wedge between world and 
domestic prices of the same goods (for attempts at quantification for the E.U., see 
Greenaway & Hindley 1985). Thus the PPP condition, that there is perfect arbitrage to 
ensure price equality, cannot hold. Richardson (1981) has demonstrated that tariffs and 
quotas can have effects on the real exchange rate.
Given that industrial countries tend to be committed to a liberal world trading order, it 
might be assumed that commercial policy would not be relevant as a cause for economic 
exposure. The Neue Lander instance is the exception, but in an opposite direction than 
that expected. Commercial policy had protected industry in the Neue Lander against 
superior western products. The sudden lifting of this protection came at the same time 
as monetary integration at an overvalued exchange rate. This enabled West German 
products to be sold in the Neue Lander at competitive prices. The sudden competition
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from west German goods can thus be categorized as an external shock.
4.3 External shocks and currency overvaluation.
A purer example of an external shock assisting in giving rise to currency overvaluation 
is the Second Oil Shock in 1978. A dramatic rise in the price of a key raw material could 
raise the price of a country’s finished goods and drive a wedge between its prices and 
those of its competitors. The difficulty with appraising the Second Oil Shock in this light 
is that the rise in world oil prices applied to industrial nations generally.
However, the U.K.’s self-sufficiency in oil in the 1980s eliminated the balance of 
payments constraint on economic policy-making which would otherwise have existed. The 
U.K. would have been free to cut interest rates to low levels to reduce the demand for 
sterling arising from the projected oil surplus. Instead, the U.K. decided to tighten 
monetary policy and interest rates were doubled. Accordingly, the Second Oil Shock 
cannot be seen as the cause of the U .K .’s exchange rate misalignment between 1979-83. 
In any event, the shock occurred in 1978, well before the monetary tightening ushered 
in by the change of government in 1979.
4.4 Divergences in monetary and fiscal policy across countries and currency 
overvaluation.
U.K. and U.S. policies in 1979 which led to divergences in monetary and fiscal policy 
were similar in their object to reduce the rate of inflation, but the strategies were 
different. The U.K. overvaluations were the result of monetary and fiscal tightening 
whereas the U.S. strategy was one of monetary tightening and fiscal laxity. Monetarism 
cannot be seen as the cause of the overvaluations since the Bundesbank has adopted 
monetarist policies over the post-war period, but the DM has not exhibited any period 
of prolonged overvaluation over the same period.
The case of the Neue Lander is dissimilar to the U.K. and U.S. cases in that the Neue 
Lander overvaluation was not the result of market forces bidding up the East German 
currency to parity with the DM. Instead, the creation of parity was by government fiat.
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4.5 Conclusions.
In the three cases, government policy either played a causal role in currency 
overvaluation, or where it did not, governments could have adjusted their economic 
policies to prevent or curtail currency overvaluation.
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5. GOVERNMENTS AS CREATORS OF CURRENCY OVERVALUATION.
Why governments played a causal role in currency overvaluation can be seen partly in 
the economic objectives and partly in the relative strengths of gainers and losers from 
currency overvaluation.
In the case of both the U.S. in 1979 and the U.K. in 1979 and 1990, the macroeconomic 
objectives became focused almost exclusively on reducing inflation, and in Germany in 
1990 on reunification. In all three examples, opposition parties offered an alternative 
strategy (except in the U.K. 1990-92). Despite the overvaluations, electoral circumstances 
permitted the ruling party to be re-elected.
5.1 Gainers and losers from currency overvaluation.
The anti-inflationary policy that brought on the U.K. and U.S. overvaluations benefited 
those on fixed incomes. Overvaluation similarly benefited importers and, potentially, 
consumers of imported goods, except to the extent that recession in the misalignment 
syndrome curbed dampened consumption of imported goods. Losers include not only 
small firms without treasuries but also large U.K. corporations. Governments are also 
losers in terms of lost revenue under recession and the potential loss of votes from those 
who become unemployed, or who are dissatisfied with economic performance. If the 
prospect existed of hyperinflation, then it can be concluded that in the long-run, all were 
gainers by the anti-inflationary policies, but in 1979, hyper-inflation was not in prospect. 
The gainers therefore were rival firms in rival states with relatively stable real exchange 
. rates.
The size of the market has an influence on the gains and losses from misalignment. 
Whereas U.K. firms were forced to diversify out of the U.K., the larger U.S. market 
yields a differing response. Foreign corporations whose exports to the U.S. are a high 
proportion of total sales have an incentive to engage in outward FDI to the U.S. The 
differing relevance of misalignment to governments is also indicated in the differing 
degree of dependence on trade:
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TABLE 10.5
TRADE AS A % OF GDP, 1990, SELECTED COUNTRIES AND THE E.U.
u .s 16.7
Japan 18.0
E.U. external trade 18.6
Average external trade of E.U. member-states i.e. 
E.U. and extra-E.U.
46.2
Germany 50.1
U.K. 41.5
trade = sum of total imports and exports, net of import content of exports Source: OECD
The U.S. can be seen as a gainer from prolonged overvaluation in the 1980-85 period, 
“since the U.S. external deficit was matched by surpluses in Germany and Japan. These 
surpluses made the U.S. deficit more easily financable. By contrast, in the east German 
overvaluation a decade later, Germany ’s move into both internal and external deficit put 
upward pressure on European interest rates. The U.K. was among the losers as the U.K. 
later put the pound into the ERM at an overvalued rate and had to sustain it at interest 
rates which prolonged its recession (Goodhart 1991a).
The ways in which actors in financial markets (banks and securities firms) can gain from 
misalignment whereas industrial corporations can lose is indicated in a comparison of 
portfolio managers and corporate treasurers. Firstly, the portfolio manager has full 
control over the management of the security portfolio, whereas the treasurer does not 
have full control of the bundle of assets that constitutes the firm. Secondly, the portfolio 
manager can both exploit and protect against currency trends by the selection of assets 
which are highly liquid and which have relatively low transaction costs. By contrast, the 
treasurer has no such flexibility owing to indivisibilities in the production process and 
high costs in switching production. Thirdly, a natural hedge can often be an elusive 
concept for a manufacturing enterprise, whereas a portfolio manager can rapidly construct 
a diversified portfolio and can also immunize it against currency risk.
llnot only because it could consume much more than it produced. The U.K. and Germany also gained 
to the extent that Reaganomics brought the world out of recession.
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In terms of vested U.K. interests, the City of London has little incentive to lobby against 
prolonged overvaluation. Similarly, in industry, the U.K.’s comparative advantage is in 
pharmaceuticals, defence and luxury hand-finished goods (Porter 1990), i.e. all industries 
whose success may depend on non-price factors. In consequence, vulnerability to 
prolonged overvaluation is reduced.
To understand the main issues which led governments to allow prolonged currency 
overvaluation, it is necessary to investigate each case individually:
5.2 U.K.
Three principal reasons can be advanced to explain the government role in the 1979-82 
sterling overvaluation. Firstly, the U.K. government did not have to face a general 
election for five years from 1979. Secondly, it won the 1979 election on an anti- 
inflationary platform. Its willingness to countenance retrenchment can be seen in terms 
of the failure of previous incomes policies to work and in terms of the need for a 
weapon, i.e. unemployment, to readjust inflationary expectations downwards. Thirdly, 
the opposition party was unpopular. A factor which could not have been forseen in 1979, 
but which assisted the government’s re-election in 1983, was the Falklands victory.
The reason why the government allowed the 1990-92 sterling overvaluation to occur 
stems from ineptitude, rather than a policy gamble. The government could no longer take 
an electoral gamble as it did in 1979 since an election was due by 1992 and the 
opposition was in a much stronger position. The purpose of joining the ERM was to lend 
credibility to anti-inflationary policy (Taylor & Artis 1988, Bank of England 1991a), but 
the exchange rate chosen to join in 1990 was overvalued, which necessitated high interest 
rates, thereby prolonging recession. The question is why the U.K. government chose an 
overvalued rate. It can be speculated that it believed a high rate was necessary since it 
could not forecast that U.K. inflation would ease so quickly. In this respect, membership 
of the ERM was highly successful in aiding U.K. anti-inflationary policy.
Chapter 10 332
5.3 U.S. 1980-85.
Six major reasons can be advanced to explain why the U.S. administration allowed the 
overvaluation of the dollar in the 1980-85 period to occur. Firstly, U.S. trade as a 
percentage of GNP at 16.7% is a much smaller proportion than in most industrial 
countries and the political repercussions of overvaluation would accordingly be less. 
Secondly, the labour market in the U.S. is much more flexible than in its European 
competitors. This reduced the political repercussions of high unemployment. Thirdly, the 
preferences of the electorate had shifted in favour of lower inflation rather than lower 
unemployment (Summers 1984). Fourthly, the losers from US$ overvaluation, i.e. 
exporters and import-competing industries, were in a small minority in relation to the 
numbers who perceived the overvalued dollar as positive. In the U .S., manufacturing 
firms hit by US$ overvaluation were dispersed and heterogenous, rather than focused in 
electorally significant regions, and did not have the political weight to force a policy 
change at national level. The federal government could logically believe that automatic 
fiscal transfers and stabilizers were sufficient to ameliorate the political repercussions by 
the time of the next election.
Fifthly, the implementation of ’Reaganomics’ tended to generate electoral support. 
Broadly, the implementation consisted, on the one hand, of a looser fiscal and a tighter 
monetary policy and on the other, a reform of the tax and transfer system in order to give 
greater incentives to productive economic activity. This proved popular for four main 
reasons. Reaganomics was synonomous to the electorate with tax reductions. Tax 
reductions were not matched by lower government spending, thereby facilitating strong 
growth in demand. The resulting deficits bid up interest rates, which in turn underpinned 
an almost doubling in the value of the dollar. Political imperatives can thus outweigh 
economic ones. Paradoxically, in the 1984 election, the "strong" dollar was perceived 
within the U.S. as a sign of the confidence of the rest of the world in the U.S. economy. 
Thirdly, Reaganomics was synonomous with higher consumption, facilitated by the lower 
relative price of foreign goods. Fourthly, Reaganomics was synonomous to the electorate 
with a stronger U.S.A. The deficit spending of the administration also did not detract 
from the electorate’s perception of the U.S. as a stronger power, since this deficit
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spending financed the U .S .’s military build-up.
Finally, Reaganomics could be sustained by U.S. "structural power" (Strange 1988), 
based on the unique U.S. power of seigniorage. The Fed, being less rigid than the 
Bundesbank, could have switched to a low interest rate policy to prevent the USS 
overvaluation, but it chose not to do so.
5.4 Neue Lander.
Three main reasons explain why the West German government ignored the advice of the 
Bundesbank12 and proceeded with a one to one exchange rate for monetary integration. 
One is short-termism, that the government faced all-German elections in October 1990 
and sought the support of the electorate in the Neue Lander13. Secondly, the objective 
was political integration, and political integration would not be achieved under a system 
in which workers in the eastern part would be paid substantially less than in the western 
part for identical work. A third reason is that the early forecasts underestimated the costs 
of a one to one exchange rate14.
Thus whilst political pressures forced east German firms to suffer massive currency 
overvaluation, this was politically more preferable than following the Bundesbank’s
12The Bundesbank argued the case for the exchange rate to be based on economic fundamentals. Its 
case was supported by the West German economic research institutes and almost unanimously by the 
country’s professional economists. Siebert (1991) notes that at the time of monetary integration, overall 
output per head in the Neue Lander was around one third of that in West Germany, but the corresponding 
figure in manufacturing industry was much worse.
13Chancellor Kohl promised in the election campaign that no East German would be worse off as a 
result of unification (FT: 1.7.1991:16).
14The state secretary at the economic ministry at the time, Otto Schlecht, stated (FT:29.4.1991:4): 
"We deceived ourselves about the size and depth of the restructuring crisis. We...underestimated the effect 
of the shock of liberalizing overnight a command economy which had been barred from the world for 40 
years."
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advice15.
5.5 Conclusions.
The three major cases of currency overvaluation cited in this chapter are all the result of 
deliberate policy actions by government, since in Germany, an exchange rate which was 
not overvalued could have been chosen, whilst in the U.K. and U .S., interest rates could 
have been cut to prevent overvaluation. This conclusion would be weakened if  any other 
examples of currency overvaluation existed which have not been caused by government 
policy.
In the late 1970s, US$ weakness and a capital flight into the Swiss franc on the safe 
haven motive caused a sharp real rise in the Swiss franc. It could be argued that the 
Swiss franc overvaluation was not caused by Swiss government policy but by external 
factors, namely US$ weakness. Indeed, the contrast with the U.K. and U.S. cases is that 
the Swiss government took measures, such as a new withholding tax, to curtail the Swiss 
franc overvaluation.
Common to all three cases is that electorates will generally not know what economic 
exposure is, or the implications of currency overvaluation. There is confusion as to its
15Industry in the Neue Lander constituted a very weak lobbying group. Its employees had expectations 
of West German standards of living, as confirmed by their electoral choice of the party offering the quickest 
route to integration, namely the CDU. The more hesitant SPD was routed in the first all-German elections. 
So long as the old regime of enterprise was maintained, then the expectations on the part of the electorate 
could not be secured. Direction would have to come from West German enterprise. The risk that 
overvaluation of the currency could deter West German industrial investment was not a factor in the 
election. It would appear to the electorate in the Neue Lander to be not in their short-term interests to lobby 
for an exchange rate that would keep their own industry viable. This highlights the complexity of currency 
overvaluation as a political issue. It is not a concept that politicians can expect the average voter to 
understand.
Thus whilst the risk existed that the CDU could lose the election by following the advice of the Bundesbank 
and the economics institutes, the strength of political support for a unified Germany meant that the election 
was unlikely to be lost by appearing generous to the east. Furthermore, the federal government, in its 
calculations ahead of monetary integration, believed that it could afford to pay for the consequences of a 
one-to-one exchange rate. In the interests of self-preservation, it could not afford to lose the election.
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meaning even among those directly affected by it16. Thus it may appear that economic 
exposure is not a public policy issue at all.
16Thus the chairman of the U.K. state-owned vehicle producer, British Leyland, publicly lobbied the 
government to leave North Sea oil in the ground.
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6. CONCLUSIONS.
Evidence is presented which confirms the hypothesis that the adverse impact on firms in 
the auto and chemical industries is replicated at the industry and macroeconomic level. 
Whilst it is acknowledged that there are potential gainers from overvaluation such as 
importers, the conclusion for many U.K. corporations is nevertheless a serious one - they 
must find strategic means of protecting themselves from the misalignment syndrome, 
particularly in view of the undesirability of recession. For importers, the adverse effects 
of recession may also be greater than the benefits of prolonged overvaluation.
Regarding the cause of prolonged overvaluation, it was found in the three major cases 
cited in this study that it arose as an indirect effect of government policy.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
CONCLUSIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1. CONCLUSIONS FOR CORPORATE POLICY.
The corporate treasury’s role is currently restricted to internal and external financial 
hedging and does not extend to strategic hedging. This thesis has strongly indicated the 
need for the proactive strategic management of prolonged currency overvaluation. The 
principal conclusion is that firms must generate product-market flexibility1 and if they 
are not able to do so, the consequences are potentially serious.
A question for future research is the appropriate organizational form for strategic 
management of currency risk. Economic exposure can only be moderated by relocating 
production costs and by other corporate strategies which are beyond the control of the 
corporate treasury. Thus a new organizational form needs to generate flexibility by 
providing a means to focus on economic exposure management, whereas currently the 
corporate focus is primarily on transaction exposure.
It would be impractical for the treasury’s role to be upgraded to determine product- 
market strategy, since the treasurer cannot be presumed to have a better knowledge than 
the heads of business divisions. Business divisions should not therefore have to account 
to the treasury for their decisions, and the treasury’s role should therefore remain as a
‘Taking the case of Laker Airways in Chapter 1, the design of the business from the start should have 
been to establish a network of marketing outlets in N.America to match US$ costs. Laker was however 
constrained in marketing strategy. Laker’s strength was that its name was well-known in the U.K. but not 
in N.America.
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service function. A service role is consistent with the tendency of the treasury to be risk 
averse.
There nevertheless remains the need for a strategic risk management focus within the 
firm, particularly if a continuation of the uncertainty in the U.K. in terms of both the risk 
of future currency overvaluations and in institutional features such as hostile takeovers 
is likely. Such a focus could take the form of an advisory board, or Currency Committee, 
which could formalize links for planning purposes (whereas no formal links may at 
present exist) between the treasury, corporate strategy department and the heads of 
business divisions.
Instigating a new organizational framework, however, is only a second-best solution. In 
Germany, corporations have tended to have a lower profile treasury than in the U.K. but 
German corporations in the case-studies have benefited from a lower strategic exposure 
to currency risk. Thus the first-best strategy for U.K. corporations may not be to 
introduce or upgrade the status of Currency Committees, but arguably to instigate reform 
in U.K. public policy. This is considered in the following section.
As it may not be realistic to conclude that firms can change public policy, the first-best 
strategy is not a solution. The solution for large firms is an upgraded organizational form 
of risk management. Small firms do not have the resources and options that are open to 
multinationals. If they cannot generate product-market flexibility - and it is not easy to 
change strategy, since not all firms together can switch to non-tradables - small firms 
have little other recourse than to bring pressure to bear on government exchange rate 
policy during prolonged currency overvaluation. However, there is little in pressure 
group theory or in practice2 to indicate that there is any possibility, certainly in the 
U.K., of successful lobbying of government to change monetary policy in order to 
minimize business risks.
2see Appendix 5.
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2. CONCLUSIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY
The policy implications for governments are individual to each country but need to be 
researched within an international framework in order to examine whether national 
policies are globally compatible.
A question for research is whether prolonged overvaluation can bring benefits which 
outweigh the costs. A country which is the sole producer of a good which has a relative 
price inelastic demand and which has no other significant exports could, in principle, 
benefit from prolonged currency overvaluation. However, such a polar case is not a 
realistic policy prescription. One of the nearest examples would be that of Zambia, whose 
cash export is principally copper. Even though Zambia has a significant position in world 
copper supply, Zambia is a price-taker in the copper market and the world copper price 
is highly volatile, depending on the economic cycle and other sources of supply.
A second question is whether prolonged currency overvaluation brings benefits for anti- 
inflationary policy which outweigh the adverse effects on firms of the overvaluation. This 
is a separate question from one of the Endings of this thesis, which is that the suddeness 
and sharpness of the change in government policy itself had adverse effects because it 
could not be managed by firms.
Given that a principal cause of prolonged overvaluation is government policy (Chapter 
10), it would appear rational for firms to lobby to prevent it occurring in the first place. 
However, the finding in Appendix 5 is that corporate lobbying to change monetary and 
exchange rate policy is ineffective. Thus corporations which do not have the flexibility 
to protect themselves strategically have little protection in the event of overvaluation.
The conclusion for public policy is less serious - governments have pursued policies 
leading to prolonged overvaluation yet have still been re-elected. This suggests that a 
recurrence of prolonged overvaluation cannot be ruled out.
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If corporations cannot collectively change government policy, then corporations have an 
interest in the establishment of an exchange regime which will keep government exchange 
rate policy in line with those of their principal international competitors. The principal 
exchange regimes of the twentieth century are investigated in Appendix 4 to examine 
whether their operation and their international obligations are sufficient to prevent 
governments from pursuing policies which lead to prolonged overvaluation. It is found 
that currency overvaluation has occurred in all global exchange regimes this century. 
However, the magnitude and persistence of overvaluation, particularly in sterling, has 
been far greater under post-Bretton Woods floating than under fixed exchange rates. Thus 
the form and design of regime can be critical in preventing prolonged overvaluation.
In a world of completely free capital movements, market economists can argue that 
governments and central banks are not able to make independent decisions on the virtues 
of alternative macroeconomic policies. The logical conclusion of this is that governments 
are at the mercy of the financial markets and that discontinuities such as currency 
overvaluations will remain, with even a potential world government likely to experience 
difficulties, (such as that of the federal government within the single currency U.S.A.).
It was already noted in Chapter 2 that a significant factor determining the direction of 
portfolio capital flows is the interest rate differential adjusted for exchange rate 
expectations. Governments have the power to adjust interest rates, which in turn affects 
exchange rate expectations. If, for domestic political reasons, a government does not cut 
interest rates to stem speculative capital inflows and thus prevent overvaluation, there is 
no guarantee that the foreign exchange market will value a currency appropriately based 
on export and import fundamentals. Ito (1988), Frankel & Froot (1986) and Takagi 
(1991) cite evidence that exchange rate expectations are not obviously rational. If these 
expectations are not rational, then the Chicago school hypothesis, that markets know best 
(Friedman 1953), loses validity. Indeed, Tobin (1982) and Dombusch (1990,1993) argue 
that capital movements have developed too much independence.
A question for future research is the public policy response to "irrational" exchange rate
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expectations, since this response appears to be contradictory. On the one hand, the 
governmental role is proactive. Governments have, through the abolition of exchange 
controls, created a licence for currency speculation. Through the pursuit of divergent 
economic policies, governments also create the basic conditions necessary for lucrative 
speculation in currency movements. On the other hand, the governmental role is reactive 
and defensive. Governments sometimes seek to manage exchange rates, even when the 
prevailing regime is a floating one, eg. the Plaza and Louvre Accords. Yet where a semi­
fixed exchange regime exists, such as the Exchange Rate Mechanism in the E.U., 
governmental attempts to defend a parity that the market decides is untenable create one­
way bets for speculators3.
Governments have not attempted to regulate the foreign exchange market to prevent such 
speculation. This is in marked contrast to other financial markets4.
Given the determining role of governments in interest rate policy, what, if anything, can 
governments do to minimize the damage on firms that has been documented in this thesis 
? The principal lesson is that firms cannot manage discontinuities and that anti- 
inflationary policy must be gradual and not imposed in short, sharp shocks5. A question 
remains as to whether the self-imposition of an external discipline on U.K. governments 
can prevent the recurrence of prolonged currency overvaluation. To engender a more 
secure environment for U.K. corporations against other sources of financial risk, a 
further question of research is whether U.K. public policy should attempt to emulate the 
social and institutional features which reduce the vulnerability of German firms to 
financial instability.
A system for exchange rate management is needed that can assist in engendering stability
3 So lucrative has this speculation become that in the turmoil ahead of the French referendum on 
Maastricht, the Bundesbank revealed that it spent DM 60 bn in intervention in the exchange markets (FT 
21.9.92/22).
4 In the bond and equity markets, for example, short trading of stock which the trader does not possess
is regulated. Furthermore, after the 1987 stock market crash, U.S. regulators pinpointed portfolio insurance 
as the trigger for substantial price falls and promptly started to regulate portfolio insurance.
5see Chapter 10, sections 3 and 5.
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in the world economy, rather than permitting freedom for instability. Thus is an external 
discipline on U.K. politicians more feasible via world monetary reform, or via monetary 
reform at the European level ?
2.1 Prospects for world monetary reform as a discipline against currency 
overvaluation.
Williamson (1985:63) notes that the present arrangements of exchange rate management 
at a global level are a "non-system". The world functions at present without a monetary 
constitution: there are no international rules governing the choice of exchange rate 
regime, of a peg, or of margins; there are no substantive international restrictions or 
pressures on intervention policy, or on monetary-fiscal policy; and there are no limits on 
.the choice of reserve assets, or of reserve switching. Williamson also doubts that the 
markets can reconcile that which is deliberately uncoordinated. The precept of the "global 
monetarist" school and of gold standard resurrectionists are rejected on the basis of 
unrealistic assumptions, particularly on their assumption of no divergence from the 
international parity conditions. Further, no limit on global reserves can hope to 
coordinate national economic policies when the combination of high capital mobility and 
floating exchange rates makes the quantity of reserves demand determined.
Under the current non-system, for the U.K. to continue with flexible exchange rates 
means more of the same, i.e. freedom for the U.K. government to reflate and inflate 
ahead of elections, or deflate to reduce inflation without any regard as to whether sterling 
becomes overvalued or regard to the impact of prolonged overvaluation on U.K. firms. 
This lack of attention to the impact of currency overvaluation is not confined to the 
U.K.6 Indeed, governments have not learned from the previous examples of economic 
exposure in other countries. The prolonged overvaluation of the U.S. dollar from 1980-85 
was followed by years of prolonged undervaluation to 1992. There are no international 
arrangements to prevent the U.S. government again embarking on policies which lead to 
a period of prolonged dollar over- or undervaluation. In the U.K., the government 
appears to have learned virtually nothing from the 1979-83 overvaluation since it
6eg. France and Germany in 1994/5.
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deliberately chose an overvalued rate for sterling membership of the ERM in 1990-927. 
Similarly, the policy discussions on monetary integration in Germany could have 
benefited from an understanding of the experience in the U.S. and U.K. some ten years 
earlier. The consequences -(eg.hysteresis)- of currency overvaluation, or of sharp 
discontinuities in exchange rate policy, must be taken into account in formulating policy.
The question then is what the macroeconomic policy should be which can avoid the 
discontinuities which are damaging at the corporate level8. At the international level, 
with free capital movements, some, such as the proponents of fixed exchange regimes, 
might argue the need for world government. However, the conventional response is to 
state that a world government is not a forseeable option and to dismiss a fixed exchange 
regime as unrealistic.
In the absence of a world government, one proposal is the international harmonization 
and coordination (Steinherr 1987b), of national monetary policies (Frenkel et al. 1988, 
IMF 1988, Frenkel & Goldstein 1989, Claasen 1990) such that a stable low rate of 
inflation in a broad basket of tradable goods exists. When this condition is satisfied, the 
main cause of divergences in PPP is removed. However, convergence on low inflation 
rates is insufficient to produce stable exchange rates. Coordination of fiscal policies is 
also necessary, and difficulty in attaining such coordination is also delaying EMU.
This underlines two realities which suggest that a fixed exchange regime in Europe based 
on a DM-zone cannot be recommended at world level. Firstly, the divergence between 
countries in their preferred inflation/growth combinations and attitudes to policy 
imbalances remains. Indeed, the Bretton Woods regime was abandoned precisely to 
permit governments, particularly the U.S., to follow divergent inflationary paths without
7Whilst the U.K. is unlikely to repeat that mistake near-term, and whilst being out of the ERM has led 
to possible undervaluation in sterling, a risk exists that without an external discipline, policies may again 
be pursued which lead to overvaluation.
•Fiscal and monetaiy policy should aim to generate a steady expansion of total demand at a sustainable 
rate. Net export demand should grow fast enough to keep the balance of payments in order and domestic 
demand nicely balanced between consumption and investment (Godley FT:21.2.1995:21). However, this 
is only at a national level.
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coming under a balance of payments constraint. Thus it is not feasible to obtain economic 
convergence via strengthening the role of the G-7 from one of mere cooperation to one 
of coordination. Cooperation has not led to coordination, partly because the commitment 
to manage exchange rates in the E.U. has not been shared by the U .S., which remains 
convinced of the merits of floating for the dollar9. The Plaza and Louvre Accords were 
merely an attempt to prevent the US dollar becoming even more grossly misaligned than 
it was.
A second reality is that the alternative to world convergence, namely for a single 
dominant country to provide a common nominal anchor, appears infeasible. A divergence 
in the power base underlying a multi-polar world exists with no forseeable likelihood that 
the U.S., Europe and Japan10 will combine to serve as a collective hegemon11 to a 
future world regime of fixed exchange rates. A continuation of flexible exchange rates 
between the three poles thus appears realistic, since the partnership between the three 
remains undefined.
In addition to monetary policy coordination, two additional policies, implemented at 
world level, have been proposed to stem speculation.
One is the introduction of target exchange rate zones (Williamson 1985, Williamson & 
Miller 1987). The purpose of target zones is to make divergences in monetary and fiscal 
policy across countries more transparent. If a zone is breached, then this serves as a 
signal to countries to correct policy imbalances. However, countries can and will simply 
refuse to adjust their economic policy if it suits them to do so. Even in the EMS, target 
zones failed because of the absence of a linked monetary policy.
9Tn 1973, floating suited the U.S. idea of monetary sovereignty but not that of E.U. member states 
(barring the U.K., which has also pursued policies leading to currency overvaluation). The notion that the 
U.S. cannot be relied upon is elaborated in Triffin (1983) and Strange (1985, 1987).
“Constitutional reform in the U.S. and Japan is necessary for international monetary reform. Strange 
(1990) suggests that the E.U. should overcome the lack of U.S. leadership by forging links with Japan.
uThe U.S. appears unwilling to manage the US$ in a way that will provide a reliable store of value. 
Risk diversification into other currencies is thus encouraged.
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Second is the introduction of a transactions tax on international capital flows (Tobin 
1982) and on foreign exchange dealings (Dombusch 1990). The rationale for such a tax 
is to address the bandwagon effects and overshooting of exchange rates which can lead 
to prolonged overvaluation. The central bank can similarly deter speculation by setting 
trading limits based on the bank’s capital and by raising overnight interbank rates to a 
penal level. However, the Bank of England’s regulatory concern is to protect the savings 
of depositors rather than to control trading in currencies12. Further, the benefits of free 
foreign exchange markets occur unequally, giving rise to a free rider problem. The 
U .K .’s desire to maintain the largest share of the market is reflected in its supposed 
regulatory stance that the market will tend to shift to where it is least regulated and taxed.
2.1.1 Conclusion
Doubts arise as to the relative feasibility of implementing any of the above 
recommendations at world level and accordingly they do not fulfil the need for an 
external discipline on the U.K. government. Given the unlikelihood of obtaining U.S. 
agreement on coordination (Strange 1988:114, 235), the E.U. (i.e. the DM zone) has 
seemingly little alternative to pursuing a go-it-alone policy.
2.2 European monetary reform as a discipline against currency overvaluation.
With a single currency in Europe, it would become easier for the E.U. to negotiate with 
the other poles of N.America and Japan on means of regulating and taxing foreign 
exchange transactions. One reason to assume greater E.U. negotiating strength is that a 
single currency in Europe should become at least as attractive as the dollar, both as a 
reserve currency and for invoicing trade13(Goodhart 1991b).
12Why governments have not sought to regulate the foreign exchange market to the same degree as 
equity and bond markets is partly a product of history. At the time of the 1929 crash, which precipitated 
national legislation to deter short trading in equity and bond markets, foreign exchange markets were 
relatively minor on account of exchange control.
13Total E.U. GDP is greater than that of the U.S. The E.U. is a net foreign creditor and the world’s 
biggest exporter. With a single monetary policy, the E.U. will also be home to the world’s biggest financial 
market. Apart from these structural factors, the attractiveness of the European single currency will be its 
more stable monetary policy than the Fed’s.
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Regarding a discipline on the U.K., what was missing in Bretton-Woods and what is 
missing at world-level, but present at E.U. level, is the hegemony of Germany in the 
formation and operation of the European Central Bank. This provides the motivation for 
a fixed exchange regime at E.U.-level14.
It remains to be seen whether a single monetary policy - more explicitly committed to 
both anti-inflationary policies and to stability than the U.S. Fed - means no repeat of the 
U.K. soft-currency policies and reversals which have led to the U.K. stop-go cycle and 
overvaluations in the past.
A third feature which can protect U.K. firms from overvaluation within a monetary union 
is that given the importance of expectations in inflation, the costs of reducing inflation 
and wage rigidities are significantly lower if there is a credible policy commitment to 
doing so. Keynesians argue15 that a country needs to maintain the flexibility of exchange 
rate adjustment since otherwise the risk arises of differential cost pressures leading to the 
inflationary parts of a monetary union becoming depressed regions (equivalent to having 
an overvalued currency). However, if real wages are not flexible downwards, i.e. money 
wage illusion does not exist, then a devaluation is ineffective. The policy conclusion is 
that the U.K. cannot price itself back into world markets simply by devaluing16. This 
underlines the case that U.K. firms would be better protected from overvaluation under 
a single European currency. Similarly, a small open economy is unlikely to be a feasible 
currency area since it cannot, by varying its exchange rate, bring about changes in 
relative prices (Maynard 1974). This provides a further rationale for monetary
Strange disagrees that a European currency would become as attractive as the dollar, citing that most trade 
is in US$, the U.S. is the largest open and rich market and therefore the premier attraction for MNCs, and 
that U.S. political stability is unchallenged.
14It is acknowledged that a hegemonic system is vulnerable to upheavals in the centre country, such as 
German monetary union. However, this does not invalidate the possibility that aligning to German monetary 
policy can serve as a discipline on the U.K. See Goodhart (1993a, 1993b). The U.K. could not politically 
withstand the discipline 1990-92 - but it had itself chosen an overvalued exchange rate for ERM entry. 
Whereas France could politically withstand the discipline, deflation has dampened employment levels.
13For example, Feldstein (1992).
1<5The period since sterling’s departure from the ERM in 1992 is exceptional in U.K. history in that the 
real depreciation has not been erased by higher U.K. inflation.
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integration.
Further research is needed on the main risks, at the level of the corporation, from 
monetary integration. These risks relate principally to the strategy for integration and the 
time period over which this strategy comes into effect. Instead of monetary integration 
conventionally occurring as a crowning process to a long period of economic 
integration17, the Maastricht strategy (Delors 1989a: 12) is monetary convergence as a 
tool for achieving economic convergence (and this as a means to political union). As 
economic convergence requires that poorer regions grow faster than the center, the 
question is whether monetary convergence will worsen regional growth rates and increase 
economic disparities. The answer depends on how quickly the structural advantages to 
the periphery from monetary convergence listed above can take effect. The arguments 
which suggest that the process will be slow are principally twofold.
One is that if the periphery’s capacity and productivity is too low to compete effectively 
with the center economies, then deflationary policies will place a greater burden on the 
periphery than on the centre.
Second is the process of commercial momentum, that firms in the center increase their 
advantage. This is because firms in the center cannot relocate to where factors may be 
cheaper in the periphery because the required specialist personnel may not be available 
in the periphery (Porter’s "cluster effect").
Can the pronounced segmentation in product and factor markets be more quickly broken 
by not having a single monetary policy than by having one ? Collignon (1990:216-236) 
argues the case that with a credible monetary policy, risk premia on interest rates in the 
periphery would fall and, in spurring economic growth in the periphery, reduce the 
significance of labour immobility (Delors 1989b). This would be a difficult and lengthy
17The desirability of political and economic integration (as per the U.S. example of monetary 
integration) is acknowledged, though monetary integration existed between the U.K. and Ireland without 
political integration. This lasted until the U.K. embarked on policies leading to prolonged overvaluation in 
1979.
Chapter 11 348
process in a multicurrency system18. Thus contrary to the conventional doctrine, it is 
not the tight monetary policy of the center which prevents the periphery catching up with 
the center, but the laxities in monetary and fiscal policies in the periphery, which are the 
cause of the periphery’s high hierarchy premium19 (Collignon 1990:227).
What Collignon omits to add is that it is not so much the difference between the expected 
profitability of investment (Keynes’ marginal efficiency of capital) and the nominal 
interest rate which determines the level of investment in the periphery. Instead, firms 
plan and invest ahead if they see secure market growth for the output of the investment. 
This study has stressed that U.K. overvaluations and the accompanying recessions 
represent major discontinuities in which firms cannot plan and invest for secure market 
growth. For this reason, if firms came to perceive that a single European currency 
removes the historic U.K. stop-go cycle, an incentive exists to exploit the differences 
which give rise to the pronounced factor and product market segmentation in the E.U.
Thus factor and product market divergences can be more effectively arbitraged away via 
a stable macroeconomic policy from monetary integration rather than via the E.U. policy 
to remove barriers in financial markets.
Thus the case for monetary integration as a means of preventing exchange rate 
overvaluation in the U.K. is political in that it writes a credible anti-inflationary policy 
and monetary stability into the U.K. constitution. Melitz (1988) argued that the high- 
inflation members obtain benefits of increased monetary discipline, while the others 
experience improvements in their international competitiveness. However, for the high- 
inflation members, the gains from membership depend on a variety of factors whose net 
effect is uncertain (Melitz 1988) .
18This is because the structural determinants of the "currency hierarchy" may persist even with a sound 
economic policy for a long period, as it takes up time to build up trust and confidence in a specific 
currency.
19The external value premium expresses the utility of either holding liquidity or financial assets in the 
form and denomination of a specific currency. It expresses the foreign currency substitution effect. The 
relative advantage of a higher external value premium is called the hierarchy premium (p.26).
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One uncertain effect is the risks to U.K. firms from cost-push inflation and labour 
immobility. The determinants of the labour market, for example, are not amenable to 
economic analysis so much as to socio-politico analysis. Space does not permit an 
analysis of comparative risks to U.K. and German firms from differing socio-politico 
factors bearing on inflation20.
If the U.K. rejects the European option, feasible strategies for generating the necessary 
discipline on government economic policy are limited. The constraint of the foreign 
exchange market is the creation of "risk premia" on interest rates. But this has not 
constrained the U.S. and U.K. governments, even though it raises governments’ 
borrowing costs.
Financial market disintegration (i.e. divergences from the neoclassical equilibrium parity 
conditions) was clearly in the interests of both the U.S. and U.K. governments, but the 
ensuing currency misalignment was not in the interests of domestic corporations. Thus, 
if  it is not foreign exchange markets which act as a discipline on governments21, what 
recourse do corporations have to prevent the exchange rate misalignment brought about 
by go-it-alone policy stances ? Evidence is presented (Appendix 5) that corporate power 
is weak and fragmented. If the corporate voice alone is not enough to influence the U.K. 
government, an additional ingredient in the E.U. is the political pressure to complete the 
Single Market via monetary integration. The imperative of product market integration is 
tending to dislodge financial market disintegration within the E.U. By the same process, 
the soft currency policies of countries such as the U.K. are being dislodged by the 
triumph of hard currency policies under German leadership.
a(This warrants separate dissertations in industrial relations and in economics.
2,Dombusch (1993:101) nevertheless asserts that the disciplining device in a tri-polar world is extreme 
exchange rate movements and that this is the best system to coordinate the blocs. Brittan (1994) concludes 
that since the 1987 stock market crash, markets behave in such a way to make inflationary policies to 
stimulate an economy difficult to pursue, whatever the urge on the part of governments to do so. The check 
operates through two principal channels. One is via a wealth effect, when a collapse in the value of bonds 
reduces the propensity to spend. Second is via an inhibititory effect on monetary policy, since interest rate 
cuts when the market expects a long-term rise in rates are unlikely to have any worthwhile stimulative 
effect.
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A second policy direction for the U.K. is to at least match the measures inherent in 
German public policy which could improve the capability of U.K. firms to withstand 
financial shocks. It is not feasible to legislate to emulate all the factors noted in Appendix 
6 which assist in protecting German firms from financial shocks.
One reason is that financial market regulation, in theory, is the prerogative of the E.U. 
given the agreed goal to create a single market22. The proposed E.U. regulations23 
which propose removing barriers to takeovers have focused only on removing technical 
barriers, leaving the structural barriers in Germany in place (Jenkinson 1992). This has 
the effect of perpetuating the protection of German firms from hostile takeover. The 
vulnerability of U.K. firms to takeover would remain and the incentive for some U.K. 
firms to make high dividend-payout ratios to protect themselves from takeover would also 
remain.
A second reason why the U.K. cannot effectively legislate is because many of the factors 
shown to be beneficial to German firms are structural and arise from social and 
institutional rather than legal forces. Positive aspects of German bankruptcy law and late 
payment could nevertheless be transferred to the U.K. It would be less easy for the U.K. 
government, without grass roots support, to legislate to change U.K. accounting practice 
to the German model. It would be even less easy to change structural factors in the U.K. 
which favour a free market in corporate control. One such structural factor is the sheer 
size of the U.K. equity market in relation to GDP compared to Germany. Nevertheless, 
so long as the government acknowledges the beneficial effects on U.K. firms of 
promoting the interests of their long-term stakeholders, then it can elect to arbitrate on 
hostile takeovers on the basis of pre-agreed criteria of corporate expenditure on research 
and training, for example.
22The regulatory process of creating financial market integration in the E.U. is outlined in Neven 
(1992). In terms of the definition by Oxelheim outlined in Chapter 2 above, the Commission's proposals 
come nowhere near to creating financial market integration and are merely an attempt at capital market 
integration.
23These are the "Thirteenth Directive on Company Law, Concerning Takeover and Other General Bids” 
and the "Proposal for a Regulation on the Statute* for a European Company". However, the latter has never 
been adopted or implemented.
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A second approach is to recognize that many U.K. corporations are dependent on retained 
earnings, not on the stock market, as a source of investment funds. Public policy 
measures could then be taken to assist U.K. companies to abandon the stock exchange 
as a means of raising capital24. Such measures could be incentives to go private, or 
incentives to ensure that only a minority of shares are actually traded, thereby serving 
to reduce the pressure for high dividend-payout ratios.
It is reasonable to assume that U.K. policy to emulate the German insider model should 
not be piecemeal or partial. It remains unproven that factors which promote corporate 
success in a German business culture would do the same in a U.K. business culture. For 
example, if the U.K. legislates against hostile takeovers, a mechanism for the correction 
of managerial failure will not exist unless the U.K. also legislates to put in place the bank 
mechanism that exists in Germany for correcting managerial failure. However, the latter 
would be difficult to legislate since it depends on cultural factors which have existed in 
Germany for at least a century and which cannot be introduced into the U.K. overnight.
2.2.1 Conclusion.
International monetary reform can feasibly aid in preventing exchange rate overvaluation 
and as far as the U.K. is concerned, the more feasible form of regime change is at E.U. 
level, not at world level.
At present, U.K. policy emphasizes monetary sovereignty, no commitment to EMU, and 
is supportive of the U.S. short-termist model of a free market in corporate control and 
of the rights of shareholders over stakeholders.
This thesis finds that U.K. monetary management was a disaster for the U.K. case-study 
corporations in that it produced prolonged currency overvaluation; and that it is necessary 
to address a root cause of U.K. currency overvaluation, namely that of U.K. economic 
policy-making. Given the reluctance of the U.K. to legislate in an independent central
24The proportion of corporate investment financed by new issues is abysmally low at approx. 4% 
(Wadwhani 1987).
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bank25, it appears that the most realistic hope of removing control of monetary and 
fiscal policy from U.K. politicians will be the pressure among fast-track E.U. member 
states for a European central bank26. Thus corporate treasurers are entirely logical to 
be in favour of EMU; but that EMU is not a total solution and that public policy to 
improve competitiveness would be more effective by focusing on financial risks in 
addition to currency risk. To create a similar risk environment for corporations in the 
U.K. as in Germany requires not only stability in macroeconomic policy but also legal 
and institutional changes and changes in socio-cultural norms in the U.K. U.K. norms 
largely perceive a company as a capitalist enterprise, but the comparison of U.K./German 
corporations in the case-studies underpin the Cadbury conclusion in favour of a shift 
toward the continental European view of the enterprise as a coalition of interests and a 
partnership between capital and labour27.
A quick route to the creation of a similar risk environment is via increased U.K. policy 
convergence with German/E.U. norms. E.U. policy on financial market integration 
safeguards the German capital market model, i.e. security from hostile takeover. U.K. 
participation in monetary integration offers the prospect of removing the threat of 
currency overvaluation from U.K. firms. It could then be a matter of time for U.K. 
social norms to adapt to those of the continental model and provide a means for attaining 
long-term stability in the firm’s planning environment.
Without such changes, the conventional self-imposed restriction of the corporate treasury 
role to financial rather than strategic hedging - and the failure to institutionalize proactive 
strategic hedging elsewhere in the firm - will tend to reinforce the higher risk 
environment facing U.K. firms compared to their German and continental rivals.
23The case in favour of an independent central bank in the U.K., plus the arguments against, is made 
in Fischer (1994), though the political analysis could be upgraded.
26A caveat to the case for a European central bank is the essential need for it to maintain a broadly 
based political coalition in support of its counter-inflationary policies (Goodhart 1993a). The risk is that 
such a coalition may be weaker when other countries are added.
^Cadbury, chairman of the U.K. committee on corporate governance, FT 3.6.1994.
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3. CONTRIBUTION OF THESIS
3.1 Findings.
The principal contribution of this thesis is a demonstration that even large corporations 
and MNCs cannot manage prolonged exchange rate overvaluation28.
Previous studies (eg. Walsh 1986:123) have concluded on a priori grounds, or on the 
basis of surveys, that economic exposure presents a major problem of management. This 
thesis demonstrates for the first time by means of case-study of actual corporations that 
the misalignment syndrome can substantially contribute to withdrawal from a business and 
even corporate failure. Further, whereas models of economic exposure alone cannot 
adequately capture competitors’ reactions, this study has included a comparison with 
German competitors. In both the auto and chemical industries, German rivals were able 
to improve their competitive position relative to the subject U.K. firms during sterling 
overvaluation and US$ undervaluation29.
Inherent in such a demonstration is evidence that financial instruments provide scant 
protection in the face of prolonged exchange rate overvaluation. In consequence, the role 
of the treasury, which is responsible for external and internal financial hedging, is 
limited.
Evidence is also provided to rebut the assertions of Capel (199130), George & Schroth 
(1991)31 and Mello & Parsons (1992) that firms can simply increase, decrease or switch 
production in various currency zones in order to obtain advantage from changes in real
Previously it was generally believed that only small enterprises would not be able to immunize 
themselves against exchange risk since they do not have treasuries or specialist personnel who are 
experienced in using risk management instruments. All the case-study firms in this thesis had treasuries, 
with ICI’s treasury being in the highest league of sophistication.
Pince the EMS realignments of 1992, currency overvaluation has now become a problem facing 
German firms.
*^.5 & conclusions.
31who assert that firms "can avoid the negative effects" of foreign exchange risk.
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exchange rates. Instead, it is found that the suddeness of overvaluation and the difficulty 
in forecasting its duration prompted a response of massive cost-cutting in all the subject 
firms. That the Jaguar and ICI case studies are not an aberration is confirmed by similar 
developments in the U.K. auto and chemical industries.
The case studies thus qualify the conclusions of Blin et al (1982:4) and de Lattre 
(1985:71) that firms have found reasonably satisfactory answers to the risks of floating. 
Some have, but certainly not most, in cases of prolonged overvaluation.
A fourth contribution is a comparison of treasury hedging between competing firms in 
two industries in the U.K. and Germany. Despite the similarity in treasury hedging in 
focusing on transaction exposure (Herrmann 1988, Beck 1989, Glaum & Roth 1993), an 
interesting finding is that a wide difference in hedging performance can exist. This is 
illustrated in how currency movements affect the U.K./German competitors differently. 
The difference can arise from differing vulnerability to and management of economic 
exposure. This can stem from German rivals having a more flexible product-market 
strategy. Not only are U.K. firms subject to much wider swings in real exchange rates 
and to exchange rate misalignment, but also the structure of the selected U.K. businesses 
in terms of their currency risk profiles is much weaker compared to that of their German 
competitors32.
Remedying the disadvantage of the U.K. firms requires action on two fronts. One is on 
the causes of periods of prolonged currency overvaluation and the other is on reducing 
the vulnerability of the businesses to economic exposure.
On the latter point, given the finding that responsibility within the corporation for 
economic exposure management is diffuse in both countries, the much lower vulnerability 
of the German competitors to economic exposure can be concluded to be the product of
“ There are, of course, U.K. companies and industries, such as pharmaceuticals, which may have more 
balanced currency risk profiles than their German competitors. Exceptions to the generalizability of the case 
studies are considered in Chapter 9. Other favourable U.K. comparisons with Germany are in retail, food 
and drink, and insurance industries.
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accident rather than design. Further, U.K. management in the ICI and Jaguar case-studies 
did not indicate recognition that the structure of their business in terms of their currency 
risk profile was far more vulnerable than that of their German competitors. They 
accordingly did not monitor the currency vulnerability of their German competitors, 
indicating the urgent need for management education on the topic.
Regarding the causes of prolonged overvaluation, a fourth contribution of this study is 
to bring the role of government policy into the forefront as a major actor in the currency 
environment facing the firm. Previous writers such as Walsh (1986), Capel (1991) and 
Holland (1993) have regarded the currency environment as extraneous and given. Early 
writers on the policy implications of the 1980s phenomenon of massive shifts in capital 
flows stressed the constraint of such flows on government policy33. The findings of the 
specific cases of overvaluation in the U.S., U.K. and former GDR of this study confirm 
the opposite conclusion. This is that national policy autonomy can actually be facilitated 
by the combination of capital market liberalization and divergences from neoclassical 
equilibrium in financial markets (i.e. non-integration of financial markets). Thus in the 
U.S., the Reagan administration was able to adopt an independent policy of Keynesian 
expansion without an outflow of capital, without a withdrawal of credit and without an 
inflationary collapse in the dollar. This is because financial market disintegration meant 
precisely that U.S. policy autonomy could be sustained via interest rate differentials, i.e. 
the U.S. was able to run an independent monetary policy without reference to any other 
states. This is true only of the U.S., but the first Thatcher government deliberately, 
(though was obliged to), exploit divergences from neoclassical equilibrium to sustain and 
intensify its restrictive policies34. Germany could pursue Keynesian deficit financing to
^For example, Helleiner (1989) writes (though referring to Canada and the U.K.):
"...one of the goals of the Bretton Woods agreement - that of promoting policy autonomy for each nation - 
has been undermined by the internationalization of finance...
...By constraining U.S. policy autonomy, undermining national Keynesianism” (p.20).
"...the very size and quickness of the global financial flows has turned the markets into a modem equivalent 
of the gold standard...they discipline states, forcing them to maintain economic policies which conform to 
the needs of an integrated world economy" (p.22).
34An asymmetry between the responses of financial markets to restrictive and expansionist policies, to 
large and small countries and to governments of differing political shades clearly exists, since the Mitterand 
attempt in 1983 to create a Keynesian boom was thwarted as risk premia on French franc-denominated 
assets were bid up to levels which thwarted expansion.
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pay for integration at an overvalued exchange rate by raising interest rates to attract 
foreign capital.
The notion that all governments are always at the mercy of the foreign exchange market 
is therefore not valid from the U.S. example of overvaluation cited in this thesis. The 
U.S. and U.K. cases are concerned with the threat of speculative capital inflows, the 
opposite of the policy problem facing the French government in 1982-8335. The 
evidence does not support the view that portfolio capital can flow into a currency and that 
governments are powerless to react or prevent long-term overvaluation in their 
currencies. Portfolio capital moves in response to interest rate differentials adjusted for 
risk and this risk includes expectations of future exchange rate movements. Governments 
have the power to reduce interest rates if they seek to prevent overvaluation of their 
currencies. The constraints on this power should nevertheless not be underestimated, as 
exemplified in Japan in the early 1990s in view of its other objectives, such as anti- 
inflationary policy.
Regarding the damage created by overvaluation, neither the case-study firms nor their 
pressure groups could influence U.K. exchange rate policy. Further, the finding from a 
survey of U.K. treasurers is that they support the need for an external control on U.K. 
economic policy, such as monetary integration in the E.U. However, the (direct) 
contribution of corporate treasurers to monetary integration is limited.
The contribution of this study to the finance literature is to document the decision-making 
process whereby corporations in three industries attempt to manage currency 
misalignment. The significance of empirical research into decision-making processes is 
put into perspective by D ’Ambrosio & Hodges (1988:386-387). In their conclusion on 
"what we do and do not know about finance", they head the list of what we do not know 
as follows:
"We know that finance managers make financial decisions but we do not know precisely 
how they make them. We know how they should make them; but the process they
“Markets may respond perversely to both higher and lower interest rates.
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actually use eludes us, especially when it comes to strategic financial planning".
For example, this study finds that instead of consciously creating a natural hedge, or 
trying to reach such a match incrementally, firms base their decisions on acquisitions and 
new business possibilities predominantly on criteria of market competition. Even where 
currency considerations were important, there is evidence for the sample firms that 
currency factors were (nevertheless correctly) considered only as one out of a number of 
other market factors.
The contribution to the international business literature is to underline the practical 
limitations of portfolio theory as the basis of strategy for firms to overcome currency 
misalignment. The reality is that the conventional model of the global firm is flawed, 
since a natural home-country bias, in conjunction with various constraints36, hinders 
companies’ efforts to become global. Further, conglomerate companies cannot be 
advocated as a solution, given the problems37 of managing diverse businesses. Thus if  
the 1950s literature of product-market strategy is myopic in not being able to deal 
adequately with prolonged currency overvaluation, the evidence of the case-studies 
underpins three other conclusions. Firstly, they demonstrate that U.K. firms found 
themselves floundering in a risky environment under emergent strategies (Mintzberg 
1990a). By contrast, German rivals in the case-studies were able to take strategy in their
36These include increased bureaucracy; the need to produce individually for specific markets to meet 
local tastes; and that the required level of scale varies not only between industries, but also between the 
various businesses within each industry. Thus the scope of a global firm can be too broad. It may be 
geographically diverse, but in some or all of its various businesses it may be too small to build up 
leadership positions.
■^Problems of conglomerates include firstly, creating a synergy between diverse businesses and, 
secondly, that geographical diversification for conglomerates is limited. Outside the U.K., conglomerates 
have only found it possible to pursue takeover strategies in the U.S., owing to the similar stock market 
culture.
Further, factors which favoured the growth of U.K. conglomerates in the 1980s are losing validity. In the 
1980s, conglomerates could issue paper on a high P/E ratio to buy companies on a low P/E ratio. 
Conglomerates could generate cash from the acquisitions to repay debt by strict financial controls, 
exploiting pension fund surpluses, and exploiting accounting loopholes to create smooth earnings growth 
histories. Conglomerates have tended to pay a premium for acquisitions, but given investor recognition that 
takeovers cannot generate instant returns, there are few long-term benefits for shareholders in the acquiring 
companies.
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stride with the sense of mission that has been enunciated by Hamel & Pralahad (1989). 
Secondly, it suggests that globalism is less appropriate as a model for a single firm to 
achieve than one of achieving globalism by creating a network of strategic alliances38. 
One form of this is exactly what ICI and its German rivals are doing in swapping parts 
of their businesses. Thirdly, the U.K./German comparison underpins the benefits of 
"architecture”, i.e. relational contracts (Kay 1993) as a foundation of corporate 
advantage39 and, contrary to Porter, it suggests that strong domestic competition is not 
necessarily a source of domestic competitive advantage, other things being equal, since 
the U.K. economy has a poor trade-off between competition and investment (Helm et al 
1991).
3.2 Application of research.
The implications of the research findings for corporate and public policy are summarized 
in sections 1 and 2.
One application of the case studies is as training material for future treasurers, since there 
are currently no texts which demonstrate how the conventional orthodoxy of external 
hedging can be inadequate. Similarly, there are no texts which indicate the consequences 
of this inadequacy for the firms concerned. In particular, the slowness in adjusting 
product-market strategy to real exchange rate changes, or the impossibility of making 
changes at all, is not part of treasury training, since it is "believed" that adjusting 
product-market strategy is not the role of the treasurer. If it is the role of the corporate 
strategy department instead, then improved and formalized channels of communication 
need to exist between the two departments and the business divisions.
how ever, the inability to manage prolonged overvaluation may mean that it is impossible to make a 
strategic alliance and the firm fails, eg. Lesney; or where the firm has a valuable asset such as Jaguar's 
brand name, a takeover, not a strategic alliance, is a necessity.
how ever, U.K. firms are not going as far as their E.U. rivals in holding each other's shares as cross­
shareholdings and having representatives, as suppliers and purchasers etc., on each others' boards.
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4. QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH.
This section focuses on seven directions for future research which are indicated by this 
study.
4.1 Organization theory.
Given the need for product-market flexibility, a significant question is how flexible the 
firm can or should be. The answer is essentially individual to each firm and it would be 
a valuable exercise for firms to conduct.
On the cost side, further information is needed to assess how much of a firm’s output is 
vulnerable to prolonged currency overvaluation. Full data is not available on the extent 
to which the percentage of sales in any market may be accounted for by exports, or by 
local production, or even whether firms export from local FDI. In the ICI case-study, 
Hoechst provided the fullest information, but the information provided by the other 
chemical companies is incomplete.
Given the finding that responsibility for economic exposure management, i.e. the strategic 
management of currency risk, within the firm is diffused, the primary objective is to 
investigate how to institutionalize responsibility for it. Following the Allied (Lyons) 
Domecq debacle, the Association of Corporate Treasurers (1992) has issued guidelines 
for outside investors to be able to judge how sophisticated a firm is in its currency 
management. It is notable that these guidelines do not include a scrutiny of how economic 
exposure is managed. All they are are a means of checking that glaring gaps on account 
of management negligence do not exist. These possible gaps are in the management of 
transaction and translation exposure and in the effectiveness of financial instruments used 
to manage these exposures. Indeed, the purpose of the guidelines is merely to allay fears 
among stock analysts and investors that the lack of disclosure on currency management 
practices could lead to another case of misinformed profits forecasts and a falling share 
price on the scale of the Allied Domecq debacle.
If full disclosure on currency management were available, the actors who would be
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interested in such information - and who could act as tools for institutionalizing 
responsibility for economic exposure management within the firm - are four. These are 
the executive and non-executive directors (managing and supervisory board in Germany), 
the Currency Committee and the Audit Committee. The two-tier boards in both countries 
do not have close and detailed knowledge of day-to-day transactions in the treasury. To 
facilitate division of labour in decision-taking, responsibility has to be delegated to the 
treasury, which operates within guidelines laid down by the board. The Audit Committee 
would be responsible for ensuring compliance to these guidelines. The difficulty in 
control is that no evidence was found that any of the subject companies had formulated 
written guidelines for economic exposure management to the treasury or to any other 
locus of responsibility within the firm. Executive directors would be responsible for the 
overall performance of the firm, including that of economic exposure management. The 
executives would need to have at their disposal the information necessary to enable them 
to manage prolonged overvaluation. However, the managing board is unlikely to obtain 
this information from the treasury if  the treasury is not assigned the task of strategic 
management of currency risk. It is even less likely that the non-executives (or supervisory 
board) would have the information which would permit them to challenge executive 
policy. A difference ’retween the U.K. non-executives and the German supervisory board 
is that members of the supervisory board comprise bank40 and trade union 
representatives whose appointment does not depend on the personal favour of the head 
of the managing board. Common to both U.K. and German non-executives is that for 
them to be able to monitor the performance of the company in managing economic 
exposure, they would need information on currency hedging, both external and strategic. 
The source of such information is likely to be the accountants/internal auditors and the 
Currency Committee. However, in both the U.K. and Germany, contact between the non­
executives and internal bodies is channelled through the executive/managing board, yet 
it is the management which the non-executives are supposed to oversee.
The Currency Committee is a relatively recent institution in firms and has proliferated
40If bank-appointed directors do not have the information on hedges which go wrong (or which were 
never instituted), it has significant institutional importance for Germany. The role of the banks in the 
correction of managerial failure in Germany is indicated in Appendix 7.
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in both the U.K. and Germany. As little is known about these committees, a first step in 
formalizing economic exposure management within the corporation is to research the role 
of these committees in a large sample of organizations. For example, did BMW’s 
Currency Committee have a determining role in BMW’s decision to set up a production 
plant in the U.S. and if so, how did it come to this decision and based on what 
information ? Similarly, did BMW’s Currency Committee have a role in BMW’s 
decision to purchase the Rover company in the U.K. ? Organizational behaviour 
techniques could be applied to investigate the effectiveness of Currency Committees in 
relation to the objectives that they are set, and whether the objectives are adequate in 
relation to the economic exposure management needs of the corporation. For example, 
what is the composition of Currency Committees41; what powers do their members have 
in the corporate hierarchy; what is the quality of information they receive on which they 
base their decisions; what kinds of decisions do they make, are these binding or merely 
advisory; and how are these decisions implemented and monitored within the 
organization ?
4.2 Strategic management accounting.
If the Currency Committee were assigned an advisory function, or responsibility for 
managing economic exposure and if the Audit Committee were assigned responsibility 
for ensuring that the business units within the corporation complied with such strategic 
management, a potential conflict of interest could exist within the firm. The 
entrepreneurship of the business units could be sapped by regulations, for example, 
dictating matches between the currency of costs and revenues. To avoid unnecessary 
bureaucracy, the management accounting information on which the Currency Committee 
should base its decision-making must necessarily be strategic. According to Dent 
(1990:4), the influence of strategy research in the accounting literature appears to be 
marginal (aside from pure technique). Future research is needed to explore ways of 
designing an accounting system which reconciles information on the firm’s economic 
exposures - (with the object of limiting these exposures) - with the potential for taking 
advantage of new business opportunities and acquisitions which might at the same time
41the senior management accountant should be a member (IFAC 1995)
Chapter 11 362
increase economic exposure (see IF AC 1995). The need to identify competitor’s short- 
run cost behaviour and its strategic significance is the most urgent task (Simmonds 1989). 
Edelshain’s survey of U.K. corporations (1995)42 finds that few corporations are doing 
this, and then primarily the larger ones, and so it is necessary to research how firms can 
be induced to use such methods.
4.3 Finance : Agency theory
Neoclassical methodology assumes that agents act rationally and that the interests of the 
firm and its shareholders are the same. These assumptions appear inconsistent with the 
observations that firms are not managing their economic exposure. The strict assumptions 
of neoclassical methodology can be relaxed by introducing concepts such as agency 
theory.
The review of empirical research in Chapter 4 concluded that firms are inconsistent in 
that they state that they are risk averse yet at the same time do not manage their 
economic exposure. To investigate whether this is caused by competing interests within 
the firm, such as management and employees being risk averse, but also unaware of the 
risks from economic exposure, it is necessary to research how, if  at all, performance in 
strategic hedging is measured and if it is not measured, how it may be possible to devise 
an evaluation system.
4.4 Business Strategy
In terms of the link between strategy and structure, the need for research on Currency 
Committees was indicated above. Further evidence is also needed to ascertain whether 
a conflict exists between product-market strategy and a risk reduction/efficiency trade-off. 
For example, are the choices available in product-market strategy constrained by the 
firm’s declared financial strategy, such as the need to balance assets and liabilities in the
°The survey found that only 37 % formally examined the cost/pricing decisions of their competitors and 
only 45% reported that they examined the impact of possible exchange rate scenarios on their own 
competitive position.
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same currency, or is financial strategy determined by product-market strategy, as is 
conventionally believed ? More information is needed on the extent to which the need 
for the strategic management of currency risk via geographical diversification can lead 
to conflict with the need for economies of scale in production. For example, Philips 
NV43 originally sought a single production facility in Germany for one of its products 
in order to maximize economies of scale. It decided instead to split production between 
two locations in the U.S. and Germany for fear of losing market share in the U.S. if  the 
U.S. currency displayed prolonged undervaluation. The degree of conflict may depend 
on the extent to which competitive advantage is attained through overall cost leadership 
rather than through product differentiation. According to Porter (1980, 1985), though not 
others, these two strategies are mutually incompatible. Empirical information is needed 
on the relative importance of these two strategies in industries where costs are important 
and where the risk of misalignment can impose a constraint on globalization44.
4.4.1 Contingency theory.
Contingency theory suggests that organizations’s structures are contingent upon contextual 
factors (Pugh et al 1969). Given rapid currency movements over time, the danger exists 
that entities within the firm will be conditioned by the nature of the organization in which 
they work and not by changes in the external environment. A system of early warning 
signals of the impact on the firm of changes in real exchange rates is necessary. Such a 
system would also need to incorporate means whereby the signals are acted upon in a 
timely manner and not simply after losses have already been incurred. For the signals to 
be acted upon, future research is needed to explore the effectiveness of contingency plans 
and whether and how these are regularly updated in the light of the firm’s changing 
circumstances. As a first step, it would be worthwhile knowing what percentage of firms 
actually do monitor changes in real exchange rates45 and how information on real 
exchange rate changes can be more readily disseminated to smaller firms.
*M. Inwards, Philips U.K., interviewed 2.2.1990.
^More information is also needed on the comparative costs and effects of differing means of 
implementing matches in the currency denomination of costs and revenues.
^Edelshain (1995) found that 36 % of respondents did not know whether changes in real exchange rates 
impacted their business, so they did not even monitor them.
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4.5 Economics - social and institutional factors in currency risk.
One of the findings of this study is that the case-study German firms prospered without 
managing their economic exposure46, whereas their U.K. competitors suffered severe 
profits crises relating to sterling overvaluation. Social and institutional factors need to be 
investigated to explain the paradoxes that exist to the hypothesis that firms cannot manage 
economic exposure.
For example, the success of the Mittelstand companies in Germany is notable, and 
supports the hypothesis of the limited role of the corporate treasury since these companies 
are mostly too small to have treasuries, nor can they emulate German MNCs’ 
geographical diversification. What social and institutional factors peculiar to Germany 
explain the success of the German Middelstand companies ? Similarly, evidence from 
Porter (1990) shows that small and medium-sized family enterprises contribute the largest 
share to Italian exports, yet it is small firms that are the least sophisticated in currency 
risk management. It is notable that the Italian government has been ready to allow 
nominal depreciation in the lire, in contrast to the British position in which the exchange 
rate 1979-82, 1990-92 has not offset differential inflation rates, thereby producing 
misalignment. What social and institutional factors explain the contrasting U.K./Italian 
positions ?
The social and institutional approach can also usefully be extended to analyze how 
Japanese corporations are managing the rise in the real yen/US$ rate in the early 1990s 
(eg Marston 1990) and to compare the effectiveness of such management with that of the 
Japanese corporations’ U.S. and European competitors.
4.6 Empirical testing of models.
A sixth direction for future research is to empirically test those models in economic 
exposure management which have already been designed. It is noteworthy that none of 
the economics and finance models bearing on foreign exchange risk which are outlined
46This is consistent with Glaum & Roth’s (1993) survey (Table 10, p. 1197) in which 18 out of 22 
respondents ignored economic exposure. 9 respondents nevertheless stated that economic exposure is "very 
important" (Table 9, p. 1194).
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in Table 4.1 above has been empirically tested, including those of Walsh and Mello & 
Parsons.
Current data is not likely to be available, since models require data from competitors (for 
example, Walsh’s model). Ex post data relating to a specific period in the past, which 
has no bearing on the current competitive situation, can then be used to examine the 
predictive performance of the model, given the known outcome.
4.7 International Relations
Corporate/government relations in lobbying for monetary integration in the U.K. are 
weak and fragmented (Appendix 5)47. The analysis could be extended backwards to 
monetary policy itself to specify the differences in corporate/government relations 
between the U.K. and Germany which have provided the foundation in Germany in the 
post-1945 period for a stable monetary policy and a stable exchange rate policy.
It is also concluded that there is nothing in current international monetary relations to 
prevent misalignment occurring again in key currencies, as witnessed in the yen and DM 
in 1995. What needs explaining is how U.S. corporations were completely ineffective in 
preventing the U.S. administration from imposing policies which led to prolonged 
overvaluation between 1980-85, particularly in view of the sheer magnitude of real 
fluctuations in the US$. Research so far on this topic, such as Moens’ (Table 2.3) 
econometric relationship (which shows that U.S. corporate profits rose when the US$ was 
overvalued), has not explained why and in what cases profits rose with overvaluation, 
such as data for domestic/foreign sales splits. Yet the prospect of a recurrence of US$ 
overvaluation has serious implications for U.S. corporate strategy and for the corporate 
lobbying process.
47In Edelshain’s (1995) survey, 3 % of respondents stated that they no longer sought government help.
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APPENDIX 1
ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE TREASURERS 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR A.C.T. MEMBERS - APRIL 1990
"Attitudes to Monetary Union"
How important do you think the development of the Single Market in Europe will be to your 
company over the rest of the decade?
%
3.
a) critically important 7
b) very important 49
c> quite important 30
d) marginal 13
e) no importance 1
How quickly do you see the importance of the Single Market reaching a peak for your <
%
a> already there 24
b) by 1992 21
c> by 1995 31
d) by 2000 14
«) after 2000 3
f) no view 7
How dependent do you think the success of the Single Market is on currency stability -
(i) - within the Community?
%
a) very dependent 54
b) somewhat dependent 36
c) not dependent 9
d) no view 1
(2) - between the Community and other maior markets?
%
a) very dependent 16
b) somewhat dependent 51
c) not dependent 33
d) no view 0
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4. Do you believe that currency stability within the Community can be achieved without a single
currency?
Yes
%
No
%
No Vi
%
a) in the short term (3 -5  years) 61 31 8
b) in the medium term (5 -10 years) 51 37 12
<0 in the long term (10 years plus) 31 53 16
Do you believe that sterling should join the ERM?
%
a) Yes - immediately 44
b) Yes - but when inflation is lower 41
c) Yes - but not before the next election 1
d) Not for the time being 9
e) Never 3
f) No view 2
6. If sterling was to join the ERM before the end of 1990, what sterling/DM central rate would you
prefer?
%
a) Z50 6
b) .2.60 22
<0 2.70 25
d) 2.80 22
e) 2.90 5
0 3.00 11
g) 3.10 0
b) 3.20 1
0 other *2
j) no view 6
* 4 notes were cast for other rates as follows:
2 for 2.85 
1 for 3.40
1 for as high as possible
7. Which option would you favour initially for sterling within the ERM?
%
a) normal 2Y*% band 53
b) 6% band (like Spain) 43
c) no view 2
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8. Regarding the future monetary arrangements within the Community which option below mo;
%
a) a monetary free-for-all 3
b) ’competing currencies’ as proposed by the Treasury
7
c) stay with the EMS/ERM (excluding sterling) 2
d) stay with the EMS/ERM (including sterling) 46
e) move gradually towards monetary union/single currency
32
f) move rapidly toward monetary union/single currency
10
Given the possibility of a single currency in the Community, which of the following would you 
prefer?
a) the DM 6
b) the ECU 51*
c) existing currencies at fixed parities 24
d) existing currencies fixed, where practical, 
at whole number parities (eg. 10 Fr.Fr. = £1.00)
14
«) Some other, please specify **0
f) No view 5
* some called for revised weighting
** one vote was for sterling and one for a new artificial currency with no history.
10. Would you personally favour the delegation of monetary policy and management of the money
supply -
Yes No No View 
% % %
a) within the United Kingdom to 81 12 7
a more independent Bank of
England?
b) - within the European 60 27 13
Community to a European 
System of Central Banks?
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11. In respect of the European Community, which of the following propositions most closely accoi 
with your personal view?
%
a) a single currency is only possible with political
union and a European government 31
b) a single currency can be achieved without political 
union provided that monetary policy is delegated to
an independent system of central banks. 62
c) some other view 7*
* fourteen replies expressed a variety of views mainly against the idea of a single currenc
particularly in the near term.
12. Do you believe that a European System of Central Banks (as proposed in the Delors Report) 
should be accountable to:
(more than one tick is acceptable)
%
a) European Commission 13
b) European Council 13
c) European Parliament 37
d) National Parliaments 33
e) No view 15
f) Other 5
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APPENDIX 2 PREVIOUS SURVEYS
Table A .l summarizes the principal surveys that have been undertaken of how 
corporations manage currency risk.
TABLE A.1 (continued next page)
SURVEYS INVESTIGATING THE APPROACH OF CORPORATIONS TO CURRENCY RISK 
MANAGEMENT
Survey Author & 
Date
Jilling & 
Folks 1977
Rodriguez
1980
British/
North 
America 
Committee 1982
Broder
1984
Cezairli 1988
Sample & Size U.S.
MNCs
U.S. MNCs 11 U.S.,
13 U.K.,
3 Canadian MNCs
47 U.K. MNCs 63 Foreign 
subsidiaries of 
U.S.MNCs
Which Exposures 
Investigated
miscell. & 
not grouped
translation
&
transaction
only
translation
transaction
economic
translation
transaction
economic
translation
transaction
economic
Exposure
Management
Methods
Investigated
21 methods Yes Yes, but scant 
attention to 
economic exposure
Yes 10 translation 
transaction 7 
economic
Effectiveness of
Methods
Investigated
Yes No No No Yes
Strategic
Management
Investigated
No No Yes Yes Yes
Risk Aversion 
Investigated
Yes Yes Yes No Yes
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TABLE A.1 (continued from previous page)
SURVEYS INVESTIGATING THE APPROACH OF CORPORATIONS TO CURRENCY RISK 
MANAGEMENT
Survey author & 
date
Soenen & 
Aggarwal 
1989
Beck
1989
Lessard
1990
Belk & 
Glaum 
1990
Edelshain
1995
Sample & Size 56 U.K., 
103 Dutch, 
58 Belgian 
firms
10 German 
MNCs
48 U.S. 
MNCs
17 U.K. 
MNCs
119 U.K. 
"Times 1000" 
firms
Which Exposures 
Investigated
translation
&
transaction
only
translation
transaction
economic
translation
transaction
economic
translation
transaction
economic
23 categories
Exposure
Management
Methods
Investigated
5 methods transaction
economic
9 methods briefly 43
categories
Effectiveness of
Methods
Investigated
only
indirectly
No Yes No Yes
43
Strategic
Management
Investigated
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Risk Aversion 
Investigated
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
"The results (of the Belk & Glaum and Edelshain surveys) are surprisingly consistent across the two samples” 
(Belk & Edelshain 1993)
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TABLE A.2
SURVEY EVIDENCE ON CURRENCY RISK MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES 
% of survey respondents stating specified objectives as being important, 
na = not asked.
Survey & date British North 
America 
Committee 1980
Cezairli
1988
Edelshain
1995
Avoid major forex losses 33 88 na
Reduce net economic exposure 27 na 55
Minimize earnings fluctuations 11 na 40
Maximize home currency equivalent income 11 na na
Balance sheet protection 9 51 39
Preserve cash flow generation 4 na na
Reduce translation exposure 4 na na
Strengthening the company’s competitiveness in 
global markets
58 63 na
Profiting from exchange rate volatility na 13 26
Hedge all exposures from currency trading na na 53
No formal objectives re. currency exposure na na 15
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TABLE A.3
SURVEY EVIDENCE ON THE MOST FREQUENTLY USED METHODS FOR MANAGING CURRENCY 
RISK.
% of respondents using stated methods, 
na = not asked.
Survey & 
date
J & F
1977
BNAC
1981
Broder
1984
S & A  
1989
Lessard
1990
Edelshain
1995
Short-term
contractual
Forward contract 82 93 96 83 95 78
Currency borrowing 83 34 88 47 94 61
Leading/lagging
intra-finn
externally
71
51
na 58 35 na 20
price adjustment in 
export market
48 na na 42 82 23
dividend adjustment 
intra-firm
83 na na na na 26
Lons term 
non-contractual
Currency borrowing na 89 na na 60
Flexibility in sourcing na na na 62 12
J + F = Jilling & Folks 
BNAC = Blin et al 
S & A — Soenen & Aggarwal
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TABLE A.4
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF SURVEYS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF METHODS 
% of respondents stating specified methods are effective.
M = medium effectiveness 
H =  high effectiveness 
L = low effectiveness
Survey & date Jilling & 
Folks 77
Cezairli
1988
Lessard
1990
pricing in home currency M 51
netting 33
leading & lagging H 25
currency borrowing H 67
intra-firm transfers M 18
forwards H 82 58
futures 17
currency swaps 37
currency options 27
price adjustment H 60 48
flexibility in sourcing 33 33
adjusting capacity utilization 11 27
investment decisions 24
product diversification 18
geographical diversification 26
natural hedge M 48
unhedged long term currency 
borrowing
H 26
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TABLE A.5
EDELSHAIN’S (1995) RESULTS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF METHODS TO MANAGE CURRENCY 
RISK IN "TIMES 1000" CORPORATIONS.
Percentage Responding
METHODS USED FINDING
EFFECTIVE
Forward contracts 78 67
Spot 74 44
Option 51 35
Selective hedging 46 30
Swaps 40 29
Parallel loans 17 9
Insurance 17 7
Futures 15 12
Collars 14 8
Pricing in a different currency 34 13
Netting 31 19
Timing of dividend remittances 26 8
Indexing contracts 21 11
Leading/lagging payments/receipts 20 6
Delaying/speeding purchases/sales 14 3
Using reference to a currency basket 12 5
Using reference to a stable currency 16 10
Using international group transfer pricing 10 4
Matching currency denomination of revenues and 
costs and assets and liabilities
61 41
Issuing local currency debt 60 43
Use of tax schemes 19 12
Selective subcontracting 14 7
Selective overseas plant location 12 4
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APPENDIX 3
The mechanics of aggressive or defensive asset and liability management for currency 
overvaluation are indicated in the following tables:
TABLE A.6
TREASURY RISK POSTURE IN ASSET AND LIABILITY MANAGEMENT
Risk Posture AGGRESSIVE AGGRESSIVE DEFENSIVE
Increase the following 
denominated in 
strengthening 
currencies
Increase the 
following 
denominated in 
weakening 
currencies
To minimize foreign exchange gains 
and losses
Balance Sheet 
Exposure
Assets Liabilities Match the currency denomination
Income
Statement
Exposure
Revenues Costs Match the currency denomination
Cash flow 
Exposure
cash inflows cash outflows Match the currency denomination
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TABLE A.7
METHODS OF PURSUING AN AGGRESSIVE TREASURY STANCE 
VIA CHANGES IN OPERATING VARIABLES
OPERATING VARIABLES 
eg. trade receivables and payables 
inventory 
fixed assets
CHANGES - examples 
£ OVERVALUATION AGAINST THE DM
COSTS OF CHANGES
These must be compared with the potential currency 
gains.
Suitable imports may not be available.
Shortening length of credit terms may cut sales, 
discounts will add to costs.
Deferring payment may mean missing discounts and 
losing goodwill.
Currency denomination is largely determined by the 
nature of the firm's business and may not be easily 
changed. Possible changes include:
Cash flow exposure
Example is of a U.K. exporter to Germany.
To obviate high hedging costs of exports from high 
forward discount and interest rate differential, the 
U.K. company should find imports in DM to match 
the £/DM risk of exports.
Translation exposure
Example is of a U.K. subsidiary in Germany when 
sterling overvaluation is forecast.
"All-current" translation method generates positive 
balance sheet exposures.
Method : Reduce DM asset exposure.
Reduce DM receivables by shortening length of 
credit terms, offering discounts.
Reduce DM inventories.
Increase DM payables by deferring payment
Appendix 3 378
TABLE A.8
METHODS OF PURSUING AN AGGRESSIVE TREASURY STANCE 
VIA CHANGES IN FINANCIAL VARIABLES
FINANCIAL VARIABLES 
eg. cash
short-term investments 
debt
CHANGES - examples
Example is of a U.K. subsidiary in Germany 
when prolonged £ overvaluation is forecast
COSTS OF CHANGES
Changes to Operating variables in Table A.7 eg. 
increasing DM trade payables and DM borrowings 
and reducing DM receivables, will tend to increase 
DM cash flow of U.K. subsidiary. Excess cash can 
be reduced by transferring to parent and converting 
into £.
The principle cannot be applied to all countries. 
Some prohibit high dividend payments.
In practice, capital market borrowing is "lumpy” and 
it is more flexible to use local bank borrowing in 
DM. The U.K. MNC parent would also find it 
difficult to issue debt/equity in all its subsidiaries' 
currencies exactly when it wants to. If sterling 
overvaluation coincides with recession, it may not be 
able to raise funds in the capital markets at all.
Discretion over currency denomination is greater 
than with operating variables. The treasury role is 
therefore enhanced.
Cash Flow Exposure.
Objective: reduce net exposed DM assets.
Reduce DM cash/near cash. Increase DM debt.
Balance Sheet Exposure.
Take measures to facilitate transmission of earnings 
back to parent eg. pay out extra dividends from 
reserves. Thus it is desirable to ensure that reserves 
are not capitalized.
Repay parent company debt, since repayments are 
not normally taxed.
Thus it is desirable to fix a high ratio of 
intercompany debt to parent equity in the 
subsidiary’s capital structure.
Currency of financing policy.
To increase DM debt, the U.K. parent should 
borrow DM long-term in capital markets, since the 
subsidiary in Germany is likely to be restricted to 
local bank borrowing.
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APPENDIX FOUR
ROLE OF EXCHANGE REGIME IN PROLONGED CURRENCY
OVERVALUATION.
1. Objectives.
Given that governments have ignored the need to prevent currency overvaluation yet have 
still been re-elected, the realistic hope for corporations to influence exchange rate policy 
to prevent currency overvaluation is by lobbying for an exchange regime which binds 
governments to a set of rules which preclude overvaluation. The purpose of this section 
is to investigate the role of exchange regimes1 in the twentieth century in the prevention 
or curtailment of currency overvaluation, with reference to the U.K.:
2. The Gold Standard and prolonged overvaluation.
According to the theoretical blueprint (see Robbins 1963), exchange rates could not 
become overvalued because of the unrealistic assumption of perfect flexibility in 
production. However, the U.K. government had chosen an overvalued pre-war exchange 
rate to return sterling to the gold standard and was only forced off it in 1931 after all its 
gold reserves had been depleted.
Given that the burden of adjustment falls directly on the firm, not on governments and 
that the perfect flexibility assumed in Hume’s model does not exist, the capacity 
reductions, bankruptcy and unemployment that were a feature of the cycle are consistent 
with the existence of currency overvaluation. Further, the existence of banks and credit 
creation meant that the rules of monetary expansion and contraction proportionate to the 
inflow and outflow of metal did not apply. Thus the system could never be self- 
correcting.
’space does not permit a review of regime theory. See Strange 1982a.
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In conclusion, the actual workings of the gold standard bore no reality to the theoretical 
basis of the regime. Exchange rate overvaluation could exist, and the regime created 
cycles which are undesirable from the point of view of both corporations and 
governments.
3. Flexible exchange regimes and prolonged overvaluation.
In the inter-war period, a clean floating regime existed between 1920-25 and then, after 
the breakdown of the gold exchange standard from 1931, a regime of dirty floating 
followed, i.e. one in which governments manipulated exchange rates to obtain a trade 
advantage over competitors. Devaluation to create an advantage implies undervaluation 
of an exchange rate. However, the reality of downward rigidity in wages and prices 
implies inflexibility in real adjustment. To the extent that floating exchange rates do not 
fully reflect this downward rigidity, currency overvaluation can result.
4. Bretton Woods and prolonged overvaluation.
The benefit to corporations of the Bretton Woods regime can be seen on two fronts. 
Macroeconomic risk was much reduced by the Keynesian revolution and the new counter­
cyclical objectives of governments to prevent the slumps and prolonged depressions that 
characterized the operation of the gold standard.
Secondly, the advantage of the gold standard, exchange rate fixity, was retained. A 
disadvantage of the gold standard, that governments selected the (overvalued) exchange 
rate to join the regime, was tackled by having "fixed, but adjustable" exchange rates, i.e. 
the possibility of adjustment was built into the regime. This possibility could be exploited 
to prevent a currency becoming overvalued. Adjustments were to occur only very 
infrequently to limit exchange risk. With both macroeconomic and exchange risk now 
limited, firms faced the lowest "financial" risk environment of all time. The burden of 
adjustment had been shifted from the corporation to governments.
In practice, prolonged exchange rate overvaluation could still occur, either through 
seniorage in the U.S. case, or in the U.K. case in the 1960s, owing to political 
unwillingness to devalue in line with U.K. economic fundamentals and because the
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Bretton Woods regime facilitated discretionary economic policies, but did not have the 
means to secure macro-economic policy coordination.
5. Post-Bretton Woods floating and prolonged overvaluation.
The attraction of floating in 1973 was that it did not matter if policy coordination could 
not be secured, since floating was supposed to permit autonomy in economic policies. 
Secondly, floating was assumed, particularly by Chicago school proponents (Friedman 
1953, Melamed 1988) to bring about smooth adjustment without government intervention. 
It was believed (see Williamson 1985 :48) that the adjustment problems of floating in the 
inter-war period, namely downward wage and price rigidity, would be more than offset 
in the post-Bretton Woods regime of floating by the macro-policy benefits, i.e. 
governments believed that they would not have to sacrifice monetary sovereignty. It is 
noted here that whereas the macro-policy benefits essentially accrue to governments, the 
costs of rigidity in the price adjustment mechanism accrue to corporations. The macro­
policy benefits involved an end to the crises of confidence in a currency which are 
politically painful to governments; no one-way bets for speculators; no requirement for 
policy-makers or central banks to intervene, since "markets cannot be wrong" (Friedman 
1953); and less concern on international liquidity, since floating permitted a reduction in 
reserves.
In reality, the reversion to floating which followed Bretton Woods led to divergences of 
exchange rates (from the equilibrium values indicated by trade flows) of a far higher 
magnitude than that seen in earlier regimes.
Why prolonged overvaluations emerged can be seen principally in terms of the 
temptations offered to governments to pursue their own uncoordinated policies and 
secondly to the changes in the background environment2 which acted as permissive 
factors to sustain the prolonged overvaluations.
The temptations were that floating was supposed to remove the balance of payments
2See Chapter 2 and Strange 1988.
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constraint on growth so that countries could pursue differing inflation targets which would 
be fully offset by exchange rate adjustment. The only additional problem that 
corporations had to manage, compared to the Bretton Woods regime, would then be 
volatility in nominal exchange rates.
Instead, the U.K. and U.S. are examples of differing inflation rates not being fully offset 
by exchange rate adjustment owing to governmental manipulation of interest rate policy. 
Thus the burden of adjustment and of management of economic divergences and shocks 
was, in certain countries, switched from governments back to corporations.
The background trends which have enabled currencies to become persistently overvalued 
under floating are as follows. Firstly, product market integration3 and the increased 
internationalization of corporations4 has been engendered by, and tends to reinforce, 
trade liberalization. Secondly, trade liberalization can exert pressures for the abolition of 
exchange control. Thirdly, the abolition of exchange control and the deregulation of 
financial markets permits increased capital mobility and speculation. Fourthly, the asset 
market approach to the balance of payments (summarized in Chapter 2) indicates how 
governments can exploit capital mobility by manipulating interest rates to attract capital 
inflows. In the long term, capital inflows can thereby coexist with massive structural 
balance of trade deficits and in turn sustain prolonged currency overvaluation.
The economic integration that benefited corporations has continued apace under floating 
exchange rates. What this suggests is that governments were willing to dispense with the 
international monetary system because it was not essential to economic growth and 
because it interfered with domestic sovereignty. By contrast, the trade system remained 
intact. The other institution set up at Bretton Woods, the GATT, has continued to exist
international product market integration is an idealized state which would exist when the degree of 
international arbitrage is sufficient to ensure the equality of prices of the same goods across countries, after 
adjusting for transport costs. This notion of price equality is known as the Law of One Price. Other conditions 
necessary for it to exist include the absence of market imperfections and the presence of other parity conditions 
such as purchasing power parity. See Diagram 2.1
4see Turner & Hodges (1992:12-21) for an account of globalization and the role of the corporation in 
increased product market integration.
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because it is an inter-governmental contract which governments recognize that they 
need5.
The question then is how floating has not hampered continued economic integration. 
Economic integration continued apace because the economic shocks facing firms in those 
countries with misaligned currencies were, in global terms, localized. In addition, 
economic integration continued apace as one of its catalysts, the free movement of 
capital, was unleashed under floating.
6. Conclusion.
U.K. experience in four consecutive exchange regimes is that sterling overvaluation has 
occurred under all of them. The design of the regimes made unrealistic assumptions 
regarding the workings of the economic system and of public policy-making. The 
practical implications strongly suggest the need for coordinated government management.
5Strange (1990) argues that financial stability is more important for trade growth than details such as the 
Uruguay Round.
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APPENDIX 5
WHY LOBBYING ON EXCHANGE RATE POLICY AND MONETARY 
INTEGRATION WAS INEFFECTIVE.
For efficacy, application of pressure group theory1 indicates that corporations and 
corporate pressure groups should lobby at both national and at European level and that 
the links between corporations and pressure groups and between pressure groups on the 
issue of exchange rate policy and monetary integration should be strong at both the 
national and at the European level. The actual pattern of corporate and pressure group 
lobbying is now compared against these yardsticks, with emphasis on the U.K. example 
of overvaluation.
Corporations can attempt to influence government policy directly, or they can lobby 
governmental institutions via industry and national/international pressure groups.
1. Direct lobbying.
The preparedness of government to listen to direct communication depends on several 
factors, such as the strategic importance of the industry and firm, its numbers of 
employees, its location in marginal parliamentary seats, its contacts with MPs and 
government ministers. On these criteria, Lesney Products & Co.. Ltd. had little weight 
and it did not engage in direct lobbying of the government. By contrast, both BL, (as 
parent of Jaguar) and ICI had significant weight and both did engage in direct lobbying, 
eg. during the 1979-83 sterling overvaluation:
"...our prospects, speed of recovery and international competitiveness will be 
considerably affected by what happens to the value and volatility of sterling, by the level 
of U.K. interest rates, by the size and vitality of our customer base and the extent to 
which the rate of inflation of Government controlled costs can be reduced. The Company 
stands to benefit markedly from success in the Government’s efforts to reduce the rate 
of U.K. inflation, an objective which we fully support. Nevertheless, we have drawn
'eg. Butt 1985, Streeck & Schmitter 1991, Mazey & Richardson 1992.
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Government’s attention in the strongest terms to the dramatic effect on our business of 
some of the mechanisms which are being used.” (Chairman’s Foreword, ICI 1980 
Annual Report).
Similarly, the BL chairman sought a meeting with the Industry Secretary:
"...We told him that the remarkable appreciation of the pound since January (1979) had 
had traumatic consequences for BL. Conventional wisdom stated that the competitive 
effect of strong sterling would be offset by cheaper imports of raw materials. But our raw 
materials were indigenous, and more than 90% of our components manufactured in 
Britain...But this Government wouldn’t budge. Any discussion on the subject met with 
a stonewalling response." (Edwardes 1983:96)
Later, during the 1990-92 overvaluation, ICI did not attempt to lobby against the 
exchange rate that was chosen for entry until July 1992 (FT:31.7.92:1). The reason for 
the delay is that ICI believed that sterling’s membership of the ERM was the correct 
policy2 for long-term strategic reasons.
ICI and BL’s fruitless direct campaigning during the 1979-83 sterling overvaluation was 
supplemented by vigorous action on the part of national pressure groups (CBI1981) such 
as the Confederation of British Industry and Institute of Directors. These are likely to be 
more influential than narrow specialist trade associations. This is because of the need to 
influence public opinion in order to change government economic policy.
Despite the intense lobbying, there is no evidence that pressure groups were able to 
influence exchange rate policy. It was not until 1983 that the Chancellor brought the 
pound significantly lower. This was via a relaxation in monetary policy with significant 
interest rate cuts. The change in policy was brought about not by pressure groups, but 
prompted partly by a collapse in the market price of North Sea oil.
2T. Harrison, interviewed 7.6.1994.
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2. Why corporate pressure group lobbying against currency overvaluation has been 
ineffective.
Corporate pressure groups can pursue four main objectives to secure monetary integration 
as a means for U.K. firms to avoid sterling overvaluation.
One is lobbying to speed up attainment of the Maastricht convergence criteria. However, 
the reduction of fiscal deficits Europe-wide during a recession would serve to prolong 
recession. Corporations thus have little interest in ensuring that the Maastricht target of 
monetary integration by 1997 is achieved on time, let alone speeded up3.
Secondly, corporations can lobby government to take measures which would enable them 
to use the ECU in place of national currencies. However, governments do not wish to 
take such measures.
Thirdly, pressure groups could facilitate cooperation between firms to bring about inter­
firm invoicing and payment in ECU. This has not been attempted by pressure groups. 
The AMUE has not got beyond the mere dissemination of information on the ECU to 
primary users and has not attempted to lobby end-users. At the end-user stage, the only 
research so far has been surveys by the European Commission (1985) to ascertain public 
attitudes to the ECU.
Fourthly, lobbying efforts have focused on only two of the three sets of actors, namely 
governmental agencies4 and, in the case of the AMUE, on other corporations5. There 
is little evidence of lobbying on the third tier, that of corporations’ employees and 
consumers. It appears that pressure groups, both national and at E.U. level, have given
3The Director General of the CBI commented "it would cause us no concern if the Maastricht timetable 
were formally abandoned" (FT 15.11.93:7).
4In the U.K., both the CBI (1993a) and Institute of Directors (FT:16.6.93:18) have called for an 
independent central bank. The IoD also calls for tax payments to be made in ECU (IoD 1991:29-34).
5 However, the lobbying of other corporations by the AMUE is part of its quest for new members, rather 
than to persuade corporations to use ECU strategies in their treasuries. Indeed, the AMUE’s existing members 
are not even doing this.
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up the idea of lobbying at voter level.
Voters and corporations, in terms of employment and profits, are the most likely to suffer 
from prolonged currency overvaluation. Yet there does not appear to be a general 
perception among these groups that adherence to the discipline of a single monetary 
policy in Europe could prevent prolonged overvaluation. Instead, the debate in the U.K. 
has focused on the loss of political sovereignty and such a loss has tended to be perceived 
as negative.
The principal reasons for the neglect to tap the potential support in the U.K. for monetary 
integration on the rationale of preventing overvaluation are issue saliency, the relative 
strengths of pressure groups and the receptiveness of appropriate governmental 
institutions to pressure group lobbying.
Issue saliency against overvaluation might be expected to be significant for the following 
reasons. One is that prolonged overvaluation affects all corporations in the economy 
concerned. Second is that because all corporations are affected by it, a policy community 
exists in which corporations can collectively attempt to address the problem. Third is that 
if corporations cannot collectively manage the problem themselves, their collective action 
is likely to be focused on the government. This in turn will tend to focus attention on the 
causes of the prolonged overvaluation. Fourth is that to the extent that the government 
realizes that currency overvaluation is having an adverse impact on the competitiveness 
of the economy, it is more likely to be motivated to address the problem.
Why pressure groups have been ineffective in capitalizing on this consensus against 
prolonged currency overvaluation by means of monetary integration can be analyzed as 
follows. The CBI and other pressure groups did not lobby for sterling to join the ERM 
in 1979 because of the previous experience of sterling being forced out of the Snake. 
From 1983-90, currency overvaluation lost its saliency. At the time of the 1990-92 
sterling overvaluation, the CBI, which had been lobbying since 1986 for U.K. entry to 
the ERM, did not lobby against the sterling overvaluation within the ERM. Such lobbying
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could have undermined the entire ERM policy6.
A second reason is that whilst U.K. corporations and voters are likely to find a consensus 
against the adverse effects of prolonged overvaluation, they are less likely to perceive 
monetary integration as a cure. It is notable that the CBI has never surveyed its 
membership on whether it is in favour of the ERM. Instead, the CBI adopted its position 
in support of sterling participation in both the ERM and EMU with the justification that 
its surveys indicate overwhelming support of its membership for exchange rate stability.
Given the lack of perception in the U.K. of monetary integration as a means to preclude 
overvaluation, why have pressure groups not been active in propagating such a rationale? 
To answer this, the policies of corporate pressure groups at industry level, national and 
European level are examined.
At the industry level, there are over 2000 trade associations in the U.K. These are 
fragmented and, according to the U.K. trade minister, tend to be narrowly focused, 
poorly resourced and ill-equipped to improve their members’ competitiveness 
(FT: 19.7.93). The relevant pressure groups for the case study firms are the Society of 
Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) and Chemical Industries Association (CIA). 
Despite the large resources of these bodies - (the annual income of the CIA is £4M) - 
neither has published any report on how currency factors affect the U.K. industry they 
represent7. One reason is because currency factors would affect their members in 
different ways, depending on their degree of geographical diversification. The SMMT 
has never stated its policy on exchange rates, whereas the CIA has. A rationale for 
sterling membership of the ERM from 1979 can be seen in the CIA’s own words:
"...The chemical industry generally finds beneficial a weak dollar in order to secure 
cheap raw material inputs where they are priced internationally and a strong DM to 
enable competitive pricing of exports to the E.C. which takes more than 50% of U.K.
6CBI Director General quoted in FT: 12.8.92:17.
7The information in this section is derived from Michael Hollingsworth, chief economist, SMMT, 
interviewed 21.7.92, and N. Sturgeon, economist, CIA, interviewed 29.7.91.
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chemical industry exports" (CIA, private correspondence 30.7.1991)
What occurred instead was that the US$ rose in real terms 1980-85 and sterling 
appreciated against the DM. This indicates a difference between the CIA’s interests and 
those of its German equivalent, the Verband der Chemischen Industrie (VdCI). Whilst 
the term "a strong DM" is a misnomer, it is in the interests of the German chemical 
industry that the DM is not overvalued in relation to PPP. However, it is not necessarily 
in the interests of the VdCI that the pound is overvalued, since overvaluation has been 
associated with U.K. recession, which would tend to have an adverse impact on German 
exports to the U.K. At the European level, the CIA lobbies via the Conseil Europeen 
Federations Industries Chimiques (CEFIC), but similar differences exist as with VdCI, 
since DM pricing of chemicals is the norm in continental Europe. Thus the common 
ground between them is a preference for exchange rate stability.
A second question is why the U.K. industry pressure groups did not lobby the employees 
(voters) and trade unions of their members to generate grass roots support against sterling 
overvaluation and in favour of monetary integration8. The explanation lies with the 
perceived objectives of the industry pressure groups. These objectives tend to be 
dominated by technical concerns. The SMMT states that the governmental policies with 
which it is concerned are transport policy, environmental policy and trade policy - for 
example, European access for the cars of its Japanese manufacturers in the U.K. It does 
not concern itself with issues of economic competitiveness.
At the European level, whilst the SMMT has close contact with its German equivalent, 
the Verein Deutscher Automobilhersteller (VDA) and contact on technical issues with the 
Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs d’Automobiles (OICA), its sharing of 
information is restricted to the above policy areas and these do not include exchange rate 
policy or the advocacy of monetary integration. Whilst the CBI and its German 
equivalent, the BDI, do lobby on monetary integration9, the links between the national
8The German pressure groups have little incentive to do so, whilst German voters have already been lobbied 
by the popular press on the risks of replacing the DM with a European currency.
’Dr. Massenberg and Dr. Kudis, private correspondence 3.4.1991. Policy is set out in BDI (1990).
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industry pressure groups and these employers’ federations on exchange rate policy are 
weak. The salient issues in which the SMMT, for example, has close links with CBI 
committees are tax and transport policy10.
The question then arises as to why the CBI has not compensated for the gap left by 
industry pressure groups and attempted to muster grass-roots support for monetary 
integration as a tool to preclude overvaluation. Such a tactic would reflect the CBI’s 
effectiveness as a publicity machine. One reason why the CBI has not attempted this is 
that it perceives the lobbying of employees as the function of trade unions. A second 
reason is that national pressure groups are themselves divided. In opposition to the CBI, 
the Institute of Directors (1991:5)n has been effective in propagating the view that the 
loss of the exchange rate instrument in the U.K. would remove one means of restoring 
competitiveness in the event of a divergence in inflation rates between the U.K. and the 
rest of the E.U. The U.K. government is reluctant to lose this additional flexibility, 
which it could regard as critical ahead of an election. What the CBI recognizes (CBI 
1989b: 15 paras. 66-69), but has failed to propagate, is the advantage of the discipline of 
monetary integration. The discipline could be crucial in preventing the divergence in 
inflation rates occurring in the first place. By contrast, monetary sovereignty in the U.K., 
which the IoD seeks to prolong, could tend to facilitate such a divergence.
Given the findings of the survey of U.K. corporate treasurers, that the preferences of the 
overwhelming majority of ACT members regarding exchange regime are at odds with 
U.K. government policy, why has the ACT been ineffective in influencing U.K. 
government policy 12?
One is the strength of the government’s self-interest in maintaining monetary sovereignty.
10Margaret Line, economist, SMMT, interviewed 21.7.92.
nThe IoD’s own view is that the attainment of the necessary economic convergence for EMU can only be 
secured in the long-term and that it is necessary to retain exchange rate flexibility until that time. In the 
meantime, it advocates the ECU as a parallel currency (IoD 1993:4).
12The findings of the survey provided the input of the ACT to the U.K. Treasury as part of the consultancy 
process which the treasury used (but completely ignored) in policy formulation ahead of Maastricht.
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Secondly, the ACT is not a political body and was not founded to engage in lobbying. 
In any case, monetary integration would be classified as only a minor issue in the goals 
of the ACT. The ACT perceives its role as one of education and of fostering the 
development of the treasury profession in the U.K.
Similarly, for the CBI, monetary integration is only one issue out of many and the CBI 
itself views EMU as a distant prospect (CBI 1990b: 13 Para.4). Further, whilst the CBI 
supports monetary integration, it perceives other aspects of E.U. policy, such as social 
legislation, as far more significant to its members’ interests (FT:20.4.94:7). Similarly, 
whilst the European Round Table of 40 top industrialists supports monetary integration, 
it believes that "competitiveness should be at the top of the E .U .’s policy agenda" 
(FT:4.12.93:24). Lobbying at the European level is also hampered by differences 
between the interests of the national employers’ federations. The CBI supports economic 
integration and would ideally like to see German standards of industrial production and 
economic stability in the U.K. However, the price the CBI is prepared to pay for 
economic integration does not include acceptance of German corporate social obligations, 
such as supervisory boards. This puts the CBI at odds with the BDI and DIHT in 
Germany and, at the European level, with Unice. The pressures for positive integration,
i.e. the creation of E.U. policies, favoured by the German pressure groups are being 
countered by CBI pressure for negative integration, i.e. integration via the erosion of 
national policies, such as the levelling down of social policies. The CBI thus seeks to 
prevent the imposition of policies of positive integration on itself13. By contrast, it is in 
the interests of German pressure groups that social costs throughout the E.U. are levelled 
up towards German standards.
Why then has the AMUE, which focuses exclusively on monetary integration, not taken 
up the mantle left by the CBI, Round Table and Unice ?
Firstly, the AMUE is very weak in terms of its membership at national level, particularly 
in the U.K. Unlike the CBI, the AMUE counts only few industrial corporations among
13The President of the CBI stated that it was necessary to "persuade our sister federations in Unice...of the 
importance of avoiding "own goals" through the Social Chapter, or other related legislation" (FT:20.5.93:19)
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its U.K. members. Even the CBI has allowed its membership subscription to the AMUE 
to lapse. A reason for the lack of U.K. corporate interest is the lack of cohesiveness of 
corporations on EMU14.
Secondly, the AMUE’s U.K. membership itself is not at all cohesive. A large number 
are banks. This might seem paradoxical in view of a survey (Arthur Anderson 1993) of 
400 banks in 21 European countries which found that most believed that EMU would not 
be in their interest since they hope to increase profits from trading in individual European 
currencies. 86% also responded that the goal of monetary integration was unlikely. The 
banks that are members of the AMUE in the U.K., such as San Paolo, Chase and 
Barclays, are clearly those which hope to profit by capitalizing on their expertise in the 
ECU in readiness for a governmental decision to introduce a single currency. By contrast, 
industrial corporations have little incentive to introduce the ECU as a parallel currency 
because of the extra costs15.
The fact that both banks and industrial corporations are members of the AMUE should 
nevertheless strengthen the AMUE. Yet such supposed strength has not been sufficient 
to enable the AMUE to overcome other obstacles to cohesiveness.
A third reason for the ineffectiveness of the AMUE is a lack of agreement between 
corporations on what they are seeking from EMU. For example, whereas Alcatel has 
pioneered the use of the ECU in its treasury, and both its finance director and treasurer 
strongly favour monetary integration, Alcatel’s chairman, Pierre Suard, is one of the 
most prominent anti-Maastricht Treaty campaigners in French business. His view stems 
principally from the free trade bias in the Treaty:
"In some sectors, like electronic components, it is too late. The Community’s free market 
policy is suicidal, notably in the face of the Japanese" (Suard in FT 8.9.92:2).
14The anti-EMU stance of Hanson and Redland’s treasurer is noted in Chapter 10.
15see Chapter 9.
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4.5 Conclusions.
The basis for the ineffectiveness is that firms themselves are incohesive both in terms of 
their currency risk profile and in terms of their degree of preference for changes in 
exchange regime. Each individual firm’s foreign exchange exposure is unique, depending 
on the options and constraints it faces. Similarly, at a European level, the degree of 
exchange risk is unique in differing economies, partly depending on government exchange 
rate policy. There is evidence that EMU is not universally perceived in the U.K. as a 
solution to overvaluation; that EMU is not perceived as a high priority issue; and that 
partly stemming from this, corporate lobbying groups are incohesive and weak on the 
issue of EMU, both at the U.K. and at the European level.
The pluralistic structure of European politics indicates that the large and homogenous 
common-interest groups that might be expected in the business sector do not in fact exist 
on the issue of EMU, and that the ideology of Europe is not strong enough for U.K. 
politicians to make the commitments necessary for EMU. U.K. politicians can openly 
ignore the CBI, even though such pressure groups are insiders, not outsiders, in that they 
normally form part of the government’s policy formulation process (Peters 1977). 
Further, monetary integration is an issue of "high" politics, but it is much more difficult 
for both national pressure groups and those operating at the European level to influence 
issues other than "low” politics (Hoffmann 1966). One reason is that the consultation 
process on policy proposals is not open to bargaining in "high" politics, except on details 
of execution. This suggests that the role of corporate pressure groups in monetary 
integration is not as strong as the hypothesis of Dekker16, that the main force in 
integration since the early 1980s is business interests, whereas prior to this, the main 
impetus was political.
The weak role of business in exchange regime policy is already witnessed in the switch 
to floating in 1972/73. Concern that individual firms would not be able to manage the
16Wisse Dekker, then chairman of Philips and of the Association for the Monetary Union of Europe, 
"Europe’s Economic Power: Potential and Perspectives", speech delivered to the Swiss Institute of International 
Studies, Geneva 25.10.1988.
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risks involved led to fears that world trade would show dramatic declines. Yet 
corporations had little input into the decision taken to float, since governments went 
ahead anyway since they were forced by events.
Why then U.K. firms and pressure groups bothered to lobby can be seen in the quotes 
from ICI and BL above - that they lobbied out of sheer desperation; that it was a last 
hope for an instant change, whereas the measures that firms could take themselves could 
only take effect in the long-term.
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APPENDIX 6
CURRENCY RISK IN PERSPECTIVE TO OTHER RISKS STEMMING FROM 
PUBLIC POLICY - A COMPARISON OF CORPORATE VULNERABILITY IN 
GERMANY/U.K.
1. Objectives.
It would be simplistic to infer from the case studies that the improved competitive 
position of German competitors to the U.K. firms stems from the absence of DM 
overvaluation. A multiplicity of other contributory factors exists. Mention has already 
been made in Chapter 3 of the self-reinforcing features illustrated in Porter’s diamond.
The purpose of this section is to put the currency misalignment syndrome into perspective 
with other financial risk which is determined by or is under the jurisdiction of public 
policy. Here existing research on comparative German and U.K. public policy relevant 
to the financial risks affecting firms is summarized.
2. Comparative vulnerability of U.K. and German firms to hostile takeover.
U.K. companies are uniquely vulnerable to hostile acquisition (Franks & Mayer 1990, 
Jenkinson 1992), and the role the stock market is performing in the U.K. is not a 
financing function, except in a very limited sense, but instead the role is one of a market 
for ownership and control (Mayer & Alexander 1991).
The question for public policy is whether this role of the U.K. stock market is a desirable 
one. The effect of the U.K. model is to allow markets in corporate strategies to emerge. 
A company believing it has a better strategy than others is free to make takeover bids. 
The drawback is that there is no commitment of shareholders to the firm. Further, the 
other stakeholders such as suppliers, purchasers and employees are not represented in 
ownership decisions. For these reasons, the U.K. model can be termed an outsider 
system, whereas that of Germany is an insider system in which the degree of outside
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control by shareholders is much more circumscribed.
To test the short-termism hypothesis1, the impact of the insider and outsider systems of 
corporate control on entrepreneurship and economic performance needs to be compared. 
Mayer & Alexander (1991) concluded that the German insider model favours highly 
specialized high value-added production where involvement of highly trained employees 
is crucial. It also facilitates the concerted development and implementation of activities 
by stakeholders, providing the security for a firm’s suppliers to risk investing in 
innovation to upgrade products. Secondly, the insider system consolidates market 
strength, since in the creation of markets, long-term relationships have to be built up with 
suppliers and customers. By contrast, in the U.K. outsider model, U.K. quoted firms 
display a better performance than non-quoted firms because they can grow by takeover 
rather than organic growth.
2.1 Conclusion.
In contrast to German firms, U.K. firms have not only had to manage prolonged currency 
overvaluation but also have to face the threat of hostile takeover and a more uncertain 
planning environment.
3. Comparative vulnerability of U.K. and German firms to make high dividend- 
payout ratios.
In finance theory, dividend policy should be a residual in the sense that profits remaining 
over and above the need to fund investment are paid out to shareholders. Thus investment 
needs should be the determining factor in the amount paid out in dividends. Contrary to 
theory, Mayer (1991) found in practice in the U.K. that dividend policy is not at all a
^his hypothesis is that if firms are protected from hostile takeover, management is given 
a more secure and, arguably, effective opportunity to plan and invest for the long term than 
if it were continually forced to prioritize short term profits as a means of keeping takeover 
threats at bay. To test this hypothesis, it is necessary to compare the beneficial effects on the 
firm of the German model of long-term stakeholder relationships with the mechanism to 
correct managerial failure presented by the U.K.’s free market in corporate control.
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residual but decided instead at the highest level in companies. Further, the dividend- 
pay out ratio of U.K. firms is on average twice as high as that of the German firms 
(Mayer & Alexander 1990). This difference could not be explained by hypothesizing that 
U.K. companies do not need to invest as much as in Germany, nor by differences in tax 
regime. Instead, German companies tend to cut dividends when profits were depressed 
whereas U.K. corporations maintained or increased them (Mayer 1991).
In the 1990-92 sterling overvaluation, U.K. dividend-payout ratios were double the level 
during the 1979-83 overvaluation, and the ratios have tended to increase as the 
profitability of U.K. companies has declined during recession (DorrelkFT: 15.5.1994).
Ownership and control structures influence the U.K. dividend-payout ratio in that the 
dividend-payout ratio of U.K. quoted companies is twice as high as that of unquoted 
companies (Mayer & Alexander 1990).
4. Comparison of institutional factors affecting corporate failure in U.K. and 
German firms.
This section summarizes evidence which suggests that in the event that firms encounter 
liquidity problems on account of, for example, currency overvaluation, then social and 
institutional factors relating to public policy give the German firm greater security than 
its U.K. counterpart. Four principal factors are considered here: bankruptcy law, bank 
relations, accounting practice and legal constraints on late payment.
4.1 Bankruptcy law.
In summary, German legal procedures when a company is in financial difficulty are 
biased towards a rescue culture, whereas in the U.K. the culture is more biased towards 
liquidiation to repay creditors.
In Germany, the de facto position, if not the legal one, is that employees have an 
enhanced status in an insolvency in relation to other creditors. This acts as an incentive
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for banks and other creditors to maintain the firm as a going concern.
In the U.K., banks assess creditworthiness on the basis of asset values, since liquidation 
would destroy goodwill, whilst leaving assets intact. Underlying this bias is that banks 
in the U.K. have an incentive to institute liquidation, since in so doing, they have the 
first claim on the company’s assets. A further bias toward liquidation exists in a potential 
conflict of interest in the common U.K. practice whereby accountancy firms advise banks 
on the viability of client companies and then accept the resulting contract for receivership 
or administration.
4.2 Bank relations and withdrawal of credit.
In Germany, bank borrowing as a source of finance for AGs is found to be less important 
than it is for companies which do not have supervisory boards (eg. most GmbHs), thus 
diminishing the significance of the bank representative on the supervisory board in 
providing bank finance (Edwards & Fischer 1992). The main difference between the role 
of banks in the U.K. and Germany is that when a German firm falls into difficulties, it 
is far less vulnerable to the withdrawal of bank credit than its U.K. counterpart. This 
does not stem so much from the Hausbank role as from evidence that in Germany, much 
more bank lending is long-term, i.e. beyond 4 years. When firms fall into financial 
difficulties, German banks can decide to withdraw loans at any time, but unlike the U.K., 
German banks have to prove to the courts that a firm’s borrowing conditions have 
deteriorated. Available data cited by Edwards & Fischer (p. 14) indicate that only 23% 
of problem loans are rescued and that German banks often do not attempt a rescue.
Given this reluctance, Edwards & Fischer conclude that German banks exercise a means 
of discipline and control on the managers of larger firms much as the hostile takeover 
mechanism acts as a discipline in the U.K. Moreover, German banks exercise the 
function of ensuring that managers do a good job much more efficiently than a hostile 
takeover mechanism (p. 17) and that this mechanism is exercised not so much via loans 
as by their voting power on management selection (p. 18).
Appendix 6 399
4.3 Accounting practice.
This section summarizes evidence that German accounting practices are biased toward 
limiting large fluctuations in reporting variables and are more consistent than U.K. 
practice in generating resilience in the face of shocks such as currency misalignment. 
This bias stems from differences in management accounting practices (Strange N. 1991, 
1992) and in financial accounting.
In financial accounting, cultural factors present a bias toward stability. The relationship 
between notional operating profit in management accounts to the published P & L is 
usually opaque. German financial accounts are biased towards minimizing operating profit 
for tax reasons. Thus in the ICI case study, it was shown in Table 8.13 that for the three 
German rivals, net income as a percentage of sales in 1979-83 was generally lower than 
that for ICI and far less volatile.
In management accounting, cultural differences exist between the U.K. and Germany in 
terms of goals; in the way, and by whom, the systems are designed; in the ways they are 
used and in the accuracy and relevance of the information produced (Strange N. 1991).
The way management uses accounting systems indicates that in the U.K., the purely 
financial performance of the company matters more, to more people extending further 
down the hierarchy than in Germany. The main reason is that in the U.K., capital 
productivity measures are used down to surprisingly low levels. Whilst German and U.K. 
main boards have similar "top four" performance measures, sharing an overwhelming 
interest in ROCE, German boards do not attach so much significance to EPS and 
cashflow as in the U.K. One level below the main board, ROCE falls to seventh place 
as a performance measure and to twelfth place two levels below main board. At this 
level, no profitablity measures reach the top four performance measures in Germany 
whereas ROCE and cashflow are prominent in the U.K.
The main cultural factors underlying the above differences are consistent with U.K. firms 
being more vulnerable to shocks such as currency overvaluation. The U.K. emphasis on 
capital productivity reflects the relatively high cost in the U.K. of borrowed funds and
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its volatility. The U.K. emphasis on EPS and cashflow is consistent with the evidence 
that the dividend-payout ratio in the U.K. is much higher than in Germany.
Whilst German companies are less interested in financial performance than in the U.K., 
Strange found that they are more interested in real measures of performance. For 
example, German management at all levels is significantly more interested in personnel 
and fixed asset productivity than U.K. management. By contrast, U.K. firms focus on 
current asset productivity, presumably because of its potential for rapid change. A 
cultural factor underlying the German focus is that German bonus schemes are often 
based on task completion, or at the highest levels, on absolute profit. By contrast, 
remuneration schemes at the highest level in U.K. corporations are often related to the 
company’s share price.
Strange argues that the main difference between U.K. and German management 
accounting is in the structure and content of accounts. Firstly, German management 
accounts tend to make new investment in productive capacity appear more attractive and 
further, a much stronger influence of strategic considerations is found to exist in 
Germany.
The technical reasons underlying the greater willingness in Germany to invest are 
twofold. The majority of the sampled German companies use replacement values in their 
management accounts and these values are depreciated on a notational basis often far 
below zero value. As a result, it is possible for innovators to argue that replacing 
obsolescent plant will barely cause depreciation to rise, although the financial accounts 
show the plant to be fully depreciated.
It might be argued that the use of DCF investment appraisal techniques could prevent 
such an error. These techniques are less used in Germany, though DCF calculations are 
used to support funding applications in both countries. The relevance is that applications 
tend to be initially launched because of their positive impact on expected profit under the 
existing rules of the management accounting system. In Germany, the comparison base 
is depressed by replacement values and notional depreciation. Furthermore, since the
Appendix 6 401
financial goal is absolute profit or profit as a percentage of sales, the propensity to apply 
for investment funds is correspondingly higher than in the U.K. This is because of the 
U.K. ’s focus on historic, financial values and capital productivity goals. Thus at a crucial 
stage in investment decision-making, German management accounting in some respects 
"simulates" a lower cost of capital.
Evidence for the much stronger influence of strategic considerations in German 
management accounting is also found in investment appraisal. For example, there is 
evidence (to take just one example, see Daimler-Benz in Table 7.16), that historically 
German industry has found that technical product or production excellence usually leads 
to adequate profit. Once the strategic decision has been taken to excel in particular areas, 
there is often little attempt to justify individual reequipment decisions in terms of capital 
productivity.
An additional area in which German management accounting strategically leads the U.K. 
is in the widespread use of flexible budgets. In industrial corporations, the very structure 
of the profit and loss (P & L) statement, by being based on cost of goods produced rather 
than cost of goods sold, allows a simpler link to budgeting and monthly control. A 
cultural factor emphasizing the German preference for stability is that inflation accounting 
has been in place for more than 50 years.
Relatively low declared figures for operating income permit the transfer of part of the 
surpluses to reserves, which are opaque. The reserves serve as a cushion for German 
firms against unforseen contingencies. By contrast, U.K. firms have no equivalent.
4.4 Comparative vulnerability of U.K. and German firms to late payment.
In Germany, firms have a statutory right to interest on overdue payments, whereas in the 
U.K., they do not. The CBI presented evidence in 1994 that late payment threatens the 
survival of one in five U.K. companies. Further, the U.K. has the worst record in the 
E.U. for the late payment of bills (FT 28.3.1994:13).
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5. Conclusion.
In several key areas under the jurisdiction of public policy, German practice reinforces 
a stable planning environment for the firm whereas that in the U.K. reinforces 
uncertainty.
Appendix 6 403
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
ACT 1 ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE TREASURERS 1990 "Currency Management", Internal 
Teaching Manual for Part 2 exams.
ACT 2 ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE TREASURERS 1991 "Corporate Finance", Internal 
Teaching Manual for Part 2 exams.
ACT 3 ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE TREASURERS 1991 "Capital Markets and Funding", 
Internal Teaching Manual for Part 2 exams.
ACT 4 ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE TREASURERS 1989 "Liquidity Management", Internal 
Teaching Manual for Part 2 exams.
ACT 5 ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE TREASURERS 1993 "Corporate Finance and Funding" 
Manual VI for Part 1 exams.
ACT 1992 "Foreign Exchange Management in Non-Financial Corporations: A Checklist of Major Issues 
for Institutional Investors"
ADLER, M. & B. DUMAS 1983 "International Portfolio Choice and Corporation Finance" p.925-984 
in Journal of Finance, June 1983
________ . 1984 "Exposure to Currency Risks - Definition and Measurement" Financial Management,
vol. 13, Summer 1984:41-50
AGNELLI, G. 1991 "Will Economic and Monetary Union Strengthen European Industry’s 
Competitiveness?" in "European Union in a Turbulent World Economy" Brussels:De Pecunia:65-74
AHLANDER, K. 1990 "Aspects of Modem Treasury Management - Organizational and External 
Financial Activities in Swedish MNCs" Stockholm:IIB, Institute of International Business
AKERLOF, G.A., A.K. ROSE, J.L . YELLEN & H. HESSENIUS 1991 "East Germany in from the 
Cold : The Economic Aftermath of Currency Union" Brookings Papers On Economic Activity, 1:1991
AKHTAR, M.A. 1987 "International Integration of Financial Markets and Domestic Monetary Policy 
: An Overview" in "Research Papers on International Integration of Financial Markets and U.S. Monetary 
Policy" Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Dec.
AKHTAR M.A. & R.S. HILTON 1984 "Exchange Rate Uncertainty and International Trade" 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Research Paper 8403
ALIBER, R.Z. 1970 "A Theory of Foreign Direct Investment" in KINDLEBERGER, C.P. (ed.) 
"The International Firm"
________ . 1978 "The Integration of National Financial Markets: A Review of Theory and Findings"
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 112:98-110
________ . 1978b "Exchange Risk and Corporate International Finance" London:Macmillan
________ . 1978c "The Firm under Pegged and Floating Exchange Rates" Scandinavian Journal of
Economics 1978 2:309-326
AMUE 1992 "For the Success of the Unified EEC Market of 1992"
404
ANKROM, R. 1974 "Top-level Approach to the Foreign Exchange Problem" in Harvard Business 
Review, Vol.52, No.4, July/August 1974:79-90
_______ . 1978 "The True Cost of Hedging" in Ensor, R. & B.Antl "The Management of Foreign
Exchange Risk" First Ed. London:Euromoney Publications:53-55
ARGYRIS, C. 1977 "Double Loop Learning in Organizations" Harvard Business Review Sep-Oct:115- 
125
ARTHUR ANDERSEN CONSULTANTS 1993 "European Banking and Capital Markets" EIU, London
ARTUS, J.R. 1978 "Methods of Assessing the long-run equilibrium value of an exchange rate" Journal 
of International Economics 8:277-299
BALASSA, B. 1964 "The Purchasing Power Parity Doctrine: A Reappraisal" Journal of Political 
Economy 72: Dec. 584-96
_______ . 1980 "Flexible Exchange Rates and International Trade" in CHIPMAN, J.S. &
KINDLEBERGER, C.P. (EDS.) "Flexible Exchange Rates and the Balance of Payments" Amsterdam: North 
Holland
BALDWIN, R. 1988 "Hysteresis in Import Prices: The Beachhead Effect" American Economic Review, 
Vol.78, No.4, September:773-785
BALDWIN, R. & P. KRUGMAN 1989 "Persistent Trade Effects of Large Exchange Rate Shocks" The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 104, No.4, Nov.:635-654
BANK OF ENGLAND, Quarterly Bulletin 
_______ . 1986 "The Market in Foreign Exchange in London" Sep.
________ . 1989 "The Market in Foreign Exchange in London" Nov.
_______ . 1990 ditto Aug. :345-351
________ . 1991a "The Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS: a review of the literature" Feb.:73-82
________ . 1992 "The Foreign Exchange Market in London" Nov. :408-415
BARTLETT, C.A. & GHOSHAL, S. 1991 "Global Strategic Management:Impact on the New Frontiers 
of Strategy Research", p.5-16 in Strategic Management Journal
BAUMOL, W.J. 1959 "Business Behaviour, Value and Growth" New York:Macmillan
BDI 1990 "European Economic and Monetary Union - Preconditions for a ’Community of Stability’" 
Koln:BDI e.V.
BEAN, C.R. 1988 "Sterling Misalignment and British Trade Performance" p.39-76 in R.C. Marston 
"Misalignment of Exchange Rates:Effects on Trade and Industry" NBER Chicago:Chicago UP
BECK, M.S. 1989 "Devisenmanagement: Wechselkursrisiken aus Operativer und Strategischer Sicht" 
Band 5 in Schriftenreihe fur Kreditwirtschaft und Finanzierung. Wiesbaden:Gabler Verlag 
(translation: "Currency Management: Exchange Risk from an Operational and Strategic Perspective")
BELK, P.A. & D.E. EDELSHAIN 1993 "A Comparative Analysis of two contemporaneous, 
independently conducted empirical studies of U.K. MNCs’ Foreign Exchange Risk Management Practices" 
Paper 15, Loughborough University Business School
405
BELK, P.A & M. GLAUM 1990 "The Management of Foreign Exchange Risk in U.K. Multinationals: 
An Empirical Investigation" p.3-13 in Accounting and Business Research Vol21, No.81, Winter 1990
________  1992 "Accounting versus Cash Flow Exposure" p.7-8 in The Treasurer, March 1992
BELL, G. & J. CAMPA 1991 "Capacity and Exchange Rate Volatility: A Study of the Chemical 
Processing Industry" unpublished mimeo, Harvard University
BERGSTEN F. & J. WILLIAMSON 1992 The Economist, September 26 1992, page 6.
BERGSTRAND J.H . 1983 "Is Exchange Rate Volatility ‘Excessive’?" New England Economic Review 
Sep./Oct. 83
BIGMAN, D. & S.P. LEITE 1978 "Welfare and Trade Effects of Exchange Rate Uncertainty" Southern 
Economic Journal 45: 534-541
BINI SMAGHI, L. 1990 "Exchange Rate Variability and Trade: Why is it so difficult to find any 
empirical relationship?" Banca d’ltalia Internal Discussion Paper No. 145, December 1990
BLACK, S. 1977 "Flexible Exchange Rates and Economic Policy"
Council on Foreign Relations Book. New Haven: Yale University Press
BLAKE, J.G . 1982 "Cash flow exposures case study" p.32-34 in ANTL, B. & R. ENSOR 
"Management of Foreign Exchange Risk" Second Ed. London:Euromoney Publications
BLIN, J.M ., S.I. GREENBAUM & D.P. JACOBS 1981 "Flexible Exchange Rates and International 
Business" Washington D.C.: British-N.American Committee
BOFINGER, P. 1994 "Is Europe an Optimum Currency Area?" Discussion Paper No.915, 
London :CEPR
BN AC see Blin et al.
BORDO, M.D. 1980 "The Effects of Monetary Change on Relative Commodity Prices and the Role of 
Long-Term Contracts” Journal of Political Economy 88:1088-1109
BRANSON, W.H. & J.P. LOVE 1988 "U.S. Manufacturing and the Real Exchange Rate" p.241-276 
in R.C. Marston "Misalignment of Exchange Rates:Effects on Trade and Industry" Chicago:Chicago UP
BRAYBROOK, D. & C.E. LINDBLOM 1963 "A Strategy for Revision" New York:The Free Press
BREALEY R. & S. MYERS 1984 "Principles of Corporate Finance" 2nd.edition New York: McGraw- 
Hill
BRITT AN, S. 1994 "The Policy Is Dead Theory Arrives" FT 6.6.1994:22
BRODER, P. 1984 "Aspects of International Finance: An Empirical Analysis of the Relationship between 
Prices and Exchange Rates 1974-1982 and An Investigation of the Foreign Exchange Risk Management 
Function in U.K. Multinationals" unpublished PhD thesis, University of Wales Institute of Science and 
Technology
BROMWICH, M. 1977 "The Use of Present Value Valuation Models in Published Accounting Repots" 
p.587-596 in The Accounting Review, July.
BROMWICH, M. & A. BHIMANI 1989 "Strategic Investment Appraisal" LSE Discussion Papers in 
Accounting and Finance 1989/1.
406
BROMWICH, M. & M.C. WELLS 1983 "The Usefulness of a Measure of Wealth" p. 119-129 in 
Abacus, December.
BUCKLEY, A. 1986 "Multinational Finance" Oxford:Philip Allan
BUCKLEY, P.J. & M.C. CASSON 1976 "The Future of the Multinational Enterprise"
London: Macmillan
BURT, J ., KAEN, F.R., BOOTH, G.G. 1977 "Foreign Exchange Market Efficiency under Flexible
Exchange Rates" Journal of Finance Vol.32 No.4 Sep.: 1325-1330
BUSINESS BANKING REVIEW 1992 "Banking Survey - Essex and Hertfordshire"
BUTT, P.A. 1985 "Pressure Groups in the European Community", London:UACES Occasional Paper 
2 .
BUXTON, T., P. CHAPMAN & P. TEMPLE (eds.) 1994 "Britain’s Economic Performance" 
London: Routledge
CAMEN, U. & H. GENBERG 1990 "Over- and Undervalued Currencies: Theory, Measurement and 
Policy Implications" in CLAASEN, E.M.(ed.) 1990 "International and European Monetary Systems" 
Heinemann
CAPEL, J. 1991 "Principles For Profitable Exposure Management" unpublished mimeo, University of 
Reading
CASSEL, G. 1921 "The World’s Monetary Problems" London: Constable & Co.
CASSON, M.C. 1982 "The Theory of Foreign Direct Investment" in BLACK, J. & J.H. DUNNING 
(eds.) International Capital Movements
CBI 1980 "Business Views on Exchange Rate Policy", in Economic Situation Report" May 
CBI 1981 "Exchange Rate Policy" in Economic Situation Report" Section VI:36-38 
CBI 1987 "The Impact of U.K. Monetary Policy" CBI Survey, May
CBI 1989b "EMU: A Business Perspective". Report of the CBI EMU Working Group, November
CBI 1990a "The ERM and U.K. Manufacturing Exporters", CBI/Price Waterhouse Special Survey, 
March
CBI 1990b "EMU- The Next Steps", Confidential Report to CBI Council Meeting, 25 July 1990 
CBI 1990c "U.K. Inflation Performance", September 
CBI 1993a "Review of U.K. Monetary Policy", November
CBI 1993b CBI Survey "GATT Settlement Should be Europe’s Top Priority", November
CBI 1994 Survey on U.K. Manufacturers’ Investment Appraisal, July
CEGLOWSKI, J . & R.S. HILTON 1987 "Interest Rate and Exchange Rates in Selected Manufacturing 
Industries" Paper 11 in "Research Papers on International Integration of Financial Markets and U.S. 
Monetary Policy", Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Dec. 1987
407
CEZAIRLI, A. 1988 "Foreign Exchange Exposure Management in Multinational Corporations" 
unpublished PhD thesis, Case Western Reserve University, USA
CHANDLER, A.D. 1962 "Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of Industrial Enterprise" 
Boston:MIT Press
CLAASEN, E.M. 1990 "Exchange Rate Management and International Coordination" in CLAASEN, 
E.M. 1990 "International and European Monetary Systems" Oxford:Heinemann
CLEMENTS, A.W. 1989 "Money in International Trade" p. 139-166 in D.T. Llewellyn ed. "Reflections 
on Money" London:Macmillan & Economic Research Council
COASE, R.H. 1937 "The Nature of the Firm" p.386-405 in Economica Vol.4, No.4.
COHN, R.A. & J .J . PRINGLE 1973 "Imperfections in International Capital Markets: Implications for 
Risk Premia and the Cost of Capital to Firms" Journal of Finance, March, 28:59-66
COLLIER, P. & E.W. DAVIES 1985 "The Management of Currency Transaction Risk by U.K.
Multinational Companies" p.327-334 in Accounting and Business Research, Vol. 15
1988
COLLIER, P. E.W. DAVIS, J.B. COATES, S.G. LONGDEN 1990 "The Management of Currency 
Risk: Case studies of U.S. and U.K. Multinationals" p.206-210 in Accounting and Business Research, 
Vol.21
COLLIGNON, S. 1990 "The Economic Consequences of a Single European Currency on Centre- 
Periphery Relations Within the Community" p.216-235 in AMUE 1990 "A Strategy for the ECU" 
London:Kogan Page
COMPANY REPORTING 1994 Survey, June 1994, 68 Dundas St., Edinburgh EH3 6QZ
CONSTABLE, C.J. 1980 "Lesney Products & Co." in STOPFORD, J., CHANNON & CONSTABLE 
"Cases in Strategic Management" Chichester:John Wiley
COOPER, I. & J. FRANKS 1987 "Treasury Performance Measurement" p.29-43 in Midland Corporate 
Finance Journal, Winter
CORDEN, M. & P. NEARY 1982 "Booming Sector & Deindustrialization in a small open economy" 
Economic Journal 1982
CORNELL, B. 1977 "Spot Rates, Forward Rates and Exchange Market Efficiency" Journal of Financial 
Economics 5:55-65
CORNELL, B. & A.C. SHAPIRO 1983 "Managing Foreign Exchange Risks" p. 16-31 in Midland 
Corporate Finance Journal Fall 1983, Vol.l, No.3
CRAFTS, N. 1992 "Productivity Growth Reconsidered" p.387-426 in Economic Policy, Oct. 1992
CURCIO, R. & C.A.E. GOODHART 1991 "Chartism: A Controlled Experiment" LSE Financial 
Markets Group, Discussion Paper 124
________ . 1992 "When Support/Resistance Levels are Broken, Can Profits be Made? Evidence from the
Foreign Exchange Market" LSE Financial Markets Group Discussion Paper No. 142
CUSHMAN, D.O. 1983 "The effects of real exchange rate risk on international trade" p.45-63 in Journal 
of International Economics, No. 15
408
________ . 1985 "The Effects of Real Exchange Rate Risk, Expectations and the level of Direct
Investment" p .297-308 in Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.67, May
________ . 1986 "Has Exchange Risk Depressed International Trade?" Journal of International Money and
Finance
CYERT, R.M . & J.G . MARCH 1963 "A Behavioural Theory of the Firm" Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall
DAIMLER BENZ 1990 "Auswirkungen von Wahrungsanderungen auf Branchen" Internal Paper, 
Economic Policy, November
(translation: The Effects of Currency Changes on Business Divisions")
D’AMBROSIO, C.A. & S.D. HODGES 1988 "Study Guide to Accompany Brealey & Myers Principles 
of Corporate Finance" 3rd edition. New York: McGraw Hill
DARBY, M.R. 1980 "Does PPP work?" National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 
607, NBER,Mass.
DEBREU, G. 1959 "The Theory of Value" New York:Wiley
DELORS, J. et al 1989a "Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the E.C."
DELORS, J. 1989b "Regional Implications of Economic and Monetary Integration" p.81-89 in 
Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union 1989 "Report on Economic and Monetary 
Union in the E.C." Part 2 Collection of Papers Submitted to the Committee
DE GRAUWE, P. 1988 "Exchange Rate Variability and the Slowdown in Growth of International Trade" 
IMF Staff Papers, March 1988
DE GRAUWE, P. 1989 "International Money : Post-War Trends and Theories" Oxford:OUP
________ . & DE BELLEFROID 1987 "Long run Exchange Rate Variability and International Trade"
in S.ARNDT & D.RICHARDSON (eds.) 1987 "Real Financial Linkages among Open Economies" MIT 
University Press
________ . & T. PEETERS (eds.) 1987 "The ECU and European Monetary Integration"
________ . & G. VERFAILLE 1988 "Exchange Rate Variability, Misalignment and the EMS" in
MARSTON, R. (ed.) "Misalignment of Exchange Rates" Chicago: Chicago University Press
DE JONQUIERES, G. 1989 "How European Monetary Union might benefit Industry" Financial Times, 
28 July 1989
de LATTRE, A. 1985 "Floating, Uncertainty and the Real Sector", p.71-102 in TSOUKALIS, L. 1985 
"The Political Economy of International Money" London: RIIA
De LONG, B. & L. SUMMERS 1991 "Plant and Equipment Investment and Economic Growth" 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 106, May:445-502
DENT, J.F . 1990 "Strategy, Organization and Control: Some Possibilities for Accounting Research" p.3- 
25 in Accounting, Organizations and Society, Vol. 15, no. 1/2.
DEUTSCH, K.W. et al 1957 "Political Community and the North Atlantic Area" Princeton University 
Press
409
DINCE, R.R. & P.N.UMOH 1981 "Foreign Echange Risk and the Portfolio Approach" p.24-41 in 
Columbia Journal of World Business, Spring 1981
DIXIT, A. 1989 "Hysteresis, Import Penetration and Exchange Rate Pass-Through" p.205-228 in The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 104, No.2, May.
DONALDSON, J.A. 1982 "Using Currency Forecasts at ICI" p. 146-147 in ANTL, B. & R. ENSOR 
"Management of Foreign Exchange Risk" Second Ed. London:Euromoney Publications
DORNBUSCH, R. 1976 "Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics" p. 1161-76 in Journal of Political 
Economy 84, Dec.
________ . 1980 "Exchange Rate Economics:Where Do We Stand?" p. 143-186 Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity No.l 1980
________ . 1988 "New Directions for Research" p.299-307 in R.S.Marston (ed.) "Misalignment of
Exchange Rates:Effects on Trade and Industry" Chicago:U.of Chicago Press
________ . 1990 "It’s Time for a Financial Transactions Tax" p.95-96 in International Economy, Aug-Sep.
________ . 1991 "ECU and the Emerging World Monetary Order" p.87-94 in RIIA/Association for the
Monetary Union of Europe conference, London, May 1991 "European Monetary Union in a Turbulent 
World Economy" Brussels: De Pecunia
________ . 1993 "Comment on the Bretton woods International Monetary System" p.99-104 in BORDO,
M.D. & B. EICHENGREEN "A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System"
DOUKAS, P.G. 1984 "The Exposure of U.S. Multinational Companies to Foreign Exchange Fluctuations 
arising from the Translation of the Financial Statements of their Offshore Subsidiaries", unpublished Ph.D 
thesis, New York University.
DUFEY, G. 1972 "Corporate Finance and Exchange Rate Variations" p.51-57 in Financial Management, 
Summer 1972
DUFEY, G. & I.H. GIDDY 1978 "The International Money Market" Prentice-Hall Foundations of 
Finance Series Englewood Cliffs,N.J.:Prentice-Hall, Inc.
DUFEY, G. & S.L. SRINTVASULU 1983 "The Case for Corporate Management of Foreign Exchange 
Risk" p.55-62 in Financial Management 12, no.4 Winter 1983
DUNNETT, P.J.S. 1980 "The Decline of the British Motor Industry - The Effects of Government Policy 
1945-79" London:Croom Helm
DUNNING, J.H . 1981 "International Production and the Multinational Enterprise" London: Allen and 
Unwin
_______. 1990 "The Globalization of Firms and the Competitiveness of Nations" p. 9-57 in DUNNING,
J.H., B. KOGUT, & M. BLOMSTROM 1990 same title as above Crafoord Lectures 1989, 
Lund institute of Economic Research, Lund University
________. & P. ROBSON (eds.) 1987 "Multinational Corporate Integration and Regional Economic
Integration"
EASTON, G. 1982 "Learning from Case Studies" London:Prentice/Hall
EDELSHAIN, D.J. 1995 "British Corporate Currency Exposure and Foreign Exchange Risk
410
Management" unpublished Ph.D thesis, London Business School
EDWARDS, J.S.S. & K. FISCHER 1991 "An Overview of the German Financial System" mimeo
ELTIS, W.E. 1989 "The Obstacles to E.M.U." p. 17-28 in International Currency Review, 1989 II
________ . 1992 "The Financial Foundations of Industrial Success" The Esmee Fairbaim Lecture,
Lancaster University, 12.11.1992
ENSOR, R. 1982 "The Management of Foreign Exchange Risk" Euromoney Books 2nd edition 1982
ESRC 1994 "Final Report of the Research Evaluation Division" by Prof. G. Bain
EUROPEAN ECONOMY 1990 "One Market, One Money" No. 44, October 1990
ERRUNZA V.R. & L.W. SENBET 1981 "The Effect of International Operations on the Market Value 
of the Firm: Theory and Evidence" Journal of Finance 36:401-418
FAMA, E.F. 1970 "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work" Journal of 
Finance 25 No.2 May:383-417
________ . & A. FARBER 1978 "Money, Bonds and Foreign Exchange" The American Economic
Review 69 Sep 1979:639-49
FARRELL, V.S., D.A. DEROSA & T.A. MCCOWN 1983 "Effects of Exchange Rate Variability on 
International Trade and other economic variables: A Review of the Literature", Staff Studies 130, Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
FEENSTRA, R. 1987 "Symmetric Pass-Through of Tariffs and Exchange Rates under Imperfect 
Competition : An Empirical Test" NBER Working Paper No. 2453 Dec. 1987
FEIGER G. & B. JACQUILLAT 1981 "International Finance: Texts and Cases"
FELDSTEIN, M. 1992 "The Ultimate Opt-Out" FT 14.12.1992
FISCHER, S. 1994 "Modem Central Banking, Tercentenary of the Bank of England Central Banking 
Symposium" June 1994
FLEMING, J.M . 1962 "Domestic Financial Policies under Fixed and under Floating Exchange Rates" 
IMF Staff Papers 9 No.3, Nov.
FRANKEL, J . 1979 "The Diversifiability of Exchange Risk" Journal of International Economics 
9:379-393
________ . & K. FROOT 1986 "Interpreting Tests of Forward Discount Bias Using Survey Data on
Exchange Rate Expectations" NBER Working Paper No. 1963, 1986b
________ . & R. MEESE 1987 "Are Exchange Rates Excessively Variable?" NBER Working Paper No.
2249, April
FRANKS, J. & C. MAYER 1990 "Capital Markets and Corporate Control: A Study of France, 
Germany and the U.K." Economic Policy, April
FRENKEL, J.A. 1981 "The Collapse of Purchasing Power Parities During the Seventies" European 
Economic Review, 16:145-166
411
FRENKEL, J.A. & M. GOLDSTEIN 1989 "Exchange Rate Volatility and Misalignment: Evaluating 
some Proposals for Reform" NBER Working Paper 2894
FRENKEL, J.A ., M. GOLDSTEIN & P. MASSON 1988 "International Coordination of Economic 
Policies:scope, methods and effects" in W. GUTH (ed.) "International Coordination of Economic Policies" 
Washington, DC:IMF
FRENKEL, J.A ., & M. MUSSA 1980 "The Efficiency of Foreign Exchange Markets and Measures of 
Turbulence" American Economic Review, vol.70, no.2, May
FRIEDMAN, M. 1953 "The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates" in Essays in Positive Economics" 
University of Chicago Press
________ . 1970 "The International Adjustment Mechanism" in Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Conference Series, Vol.4:109-119
FUKAO, M. & M. HANZAKI 1987 "Internationalization of Financial Markets and the Allocation of 
Capital" OECD Economic Studies 8-spring
GAGNON, J.E . 1989 "Exchange Rate Variability and the level of International Trade" International 
Finance Discussion Paper 369, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
GARNER, C.K. & A.C. SHAPIRO 1984 "A practical Method of Assessing Foreign Exchange Risk" 
p .6-17 in Midland Corporate Finance Journal, Fall 1984.
GEORGE, A.M. & C.W. SCHROTH 1991 "Managing Foreign Exchange for Competitive Advantage" 
Sloan Management Review, No. 105, Winter
GEROSKI, P.A. & A. JACQUEMIN 1985 "Corporate Competitiveness in Europe" in Economic Policy, 
N o.l, Nov. 1985
GIDDENS, A. 1984 "Against micro and macro: Social and system integration" in A. Giddens "The 
Constitution of Society" Berkeley:U. of California Press: 139-145
GIDDY, I.H. 1976 "Why it doesn’t pay to make a habit of Forward Hedging" Euromoney, 
Dec. 1976:96-100
________ . 1977 "Exchange Risk: Whose View?" Financial Management, Summer 1977
________ . 1982 "Forward Hedging" p. 175-178 in ANTL, B. & R. ENSOR "Management of Foreign
Exchange Risk" Second Ed. London:Euromoney Publications
GILPIN, R. 1987 "The Political Economy of International Relations" Princeton:PUP
GLAUM, M. & P.A. BELK 1992 "Financial Innovations: Some Empirical Evidence from the U.K." 
p .71-86 in Managerial Finance, Vol. 18, No.3/4
GLAUM, M. & A. ROTH 1993 "Wechselkursrisiko-Management in deutschen intemationalen 
Untemehmungen" Sonderdruck, Zeitschrift fiir Betriebswirtschaft, Wiesbaden:Gabler Verlag.
(Currency Risk Management in German international firms)
GOLDSTEIN, H. 1978 "Fluctuating Exchange Rates and Export Pricing: Comment" Economic Inquiry 
16:458-469
GOLDSTEIN, M. 1980 "Have Flexible Exchange Rates Handicapped Macroeconomic Policy?" Special 
Papers in International Economics, Princeton University, 1980
412
GOODHART, C.H. 1988 "An Approach to European Currency Unification" L.S.E. Financial Markets 
Group, Special Paper No. 12
________ . 1990 "EMU in Europe" L.S.E. Financial Markets Group, Special Paper No.24
________ . 1991a "The Economic Consequences of John Major and N.Lamont" L.S.E. Financial Markets
Group, Special Paper No.40
________ . 1991b "The External Dimension of EMU" L.S.E. Financial Markets Group, Special Paper
No.42
________ . 1993a "Central Bank Independence" L.S.E. Financial Markets Group, Special Paper No. 57
________ . 1993b "ERM and EMU" L.S.E. Financial Markets Group, Special Paper No. 58
GOODHART, C.A.E. & L. FTGLIUOLI 1991 "Every Minute Counts in Financial Markets" p.23-52 
in Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 10 No.l March 1991
GOODMAN, S. 1982 "Evaluating the Performance of the Technical Analysts" p. 135-142 in ANTL & 
ENSOR 1982 "Management of Foreign Exchange Risk" 2nd ed. London:Euromoney Books
GOSLING, S. 1986 "The Effects of Exchange Rate Volatility on U.K. Exports" National Economic 
Development Office Working Paper
GREENAWAY, D. & B.V. HINDLEY 1985 "What Britain pays for Voluntary Export Restraint"
GROS, D. 1987 "Exchange Rate Variability and Foreign Trade in the Presence of Adjustment Costs" 
CEPS, Brussels
GROS, D. & N. THYGESEN 1991 "Towards Monetary Union in the European Community: Why and 
How" p.95-129 in WELFENS, P.J.J. (ed.) 1991 "European Monetary Integration - From German 
Dominance to an E.C. Central Bank" Berlin:Springer
GRUBEL, H. 1968 "Internationally Diversified Portfolios : Welfare Gains and Capital Flows" 
American Economic Review, Dec.
HAMEL, G. & C.K. PRAHALAD 1985 "Do You Really Have A Global Strategy?" p. 139-148 in 
Harvard Business Review, July-August 1985
_______ . 1989 "Strategic Intent" p.63-76 in Harvard Business Review, May-June 1989
HAMEL, J. 1993 with S. Dufour and D. Fortin "Case Study Methods" Qualitative Research Methods 
No. 32 Newbery Park, CA:Sage
HARVEY-JONES, J. 1991 "Getting It Together" London:Heinemann
HAVLICECK L.L. & N.L. PETERSON 1976 "Robustness of the Pearson correlation against violations 
of assumptions" p. 1319-1334 in Perceptual and Motor Skills No.43 and also referred to in Broder, P. 
1986:394-395
HELLEINER, E. 1989 "The Internationalization of Private Finance: The Unplanned Child of the Post- 
War Order" paper given at ISA/BISA conference, London 28.3-1.4.1989, mimeo at London School of 
Economics library
HELM, D., C. MAYER & K. MAYHEW 1991 "Time to Correct the Economic Policy Failures of the 
1980s" FT:20.11.1991:23 (also Economic Policy, Nov. 1991)
413
HERRMANN, A. 1988 "Wechselkursrisiko und Untemehmensverhalten: Ergebnisse einer Befragung". 
Diskussionsbeitrage des Sonderforschungsbereichs "Interaationalisierung der Wirtschaft" an der Universitat 
Konstanz, Serie II, Nr.64
(Currency Risk and Corporate Behaviour: Results of a Survey)
HELLEY, J.R ., C.R. BEIDLEMAN & J.A. GREENLEAF 1981 "Why There Is No Long Forward 
Market In Foreign Exchange" Euromoney, Jan. 1981 : 94-103
HOFFMAN, S. 1966 "Obstinate or Obsolete? The fate of the nation-state and the case of W. Europe" 
Daedalus vol.95, 3 862-915
HOLLAND, J . 1993 "International Financial Management" Oxford:Blackwell
HOOPER, P. & S. KOHLHAGEN 1978 "The Effect of Exchange Rate Uncertainty on the Prices and 
Volume of International Trade" Journal of International Economics 8:483-511
HOULE, G. 1986 "Life Stories: The Compelling Rediscovery of Common Sense" in D.Desmarais & P. 
Grell (eds.) "Life Stories":35-51
HOUSE OF COMMONS 1982 Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Treasury and Civil Service 
Committee, Session 1981-82 "Corporate Responses to International Monetary Arrangements" Evidence 
submitted by Treasury, Bank of England, Ford Motor Co.,CBI, E.C., Deutsche Bundesbank.
________ . 1985 Memorandum Submitted to Treasury and Civil Service Committee, Session 1984-85
"The financial and economic consequences of U.K. membership of the E.C. - ’The EMS’"
HOUSTON, C.O. 1989 "Foreign Currency Translation Research: Review and Synthesis" Journal of 
Accounting Literature, Vol.6
HUGHES, J.S. & D.E. LOGUE & R.J. SWEENEY 1975 "Corporate International Diversification and 
Market Assigned Measures of Risk and Diversification" Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 
Nov.
HYMER, S. 1960 "The International Operations of National Firms: a study of direct foreign investment" 
Cambridge,MA:MIT Press
IFAC 1995 INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF ACCOUNTANTS, Financial and Management 
Accounting Committee, Update to "Statement on International Management Accounting Practice No.3" 
"Foreign Currency Exposure and Risk Management"
INSTITUT DER WIRTSCHAFTSPRUFER IN DEUTSCHLAND e.V. 1984
Dusseldorf:Hauptfachausschuss der IdW
(translation: Institute of Chartered Accountants in Germany)
________ 1985 "Wirtschaftspriifer-Handbuch 1985-86 Band I, 9.Auflage Dusseldorf
INSTITUTE OF DIRECTORS 1991 "The Road to Monetary Union" by J. Chown and G.E. Wood
________ . 1993 "The Road to Monetary Union Revisited", Conference Papers, May
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 1984 "Exchange Rate Volatility and World Trade" 
Occasional Paper No.28
________ . 1988 "Policy Coordination in the EMS" IMF Ocaasional Paper No.61
ITAGAKI, T. 1981 "The Theory of the Multinational Firm under Exchange Rate Uncertainty" p.276-297
414
in Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 14, No.2, May.
ITO, T. 1990 "Foreign Exchange Rate Expectations:Micro-Survey Data" p.434-449 in American 
Economic Review, June
JACQUE, L.L. 1979 "Why Hedgers are not Speculators" p. 108-116 in Columbia Journal of World 
Business, Vol. 14 no.4, Winter
________ . 1981 "Management of Foreign Exchange Risk: A Review Article" Journal of International
Business Studies, Spring/Summer 1981
JACQUILLAT, B. & B. SOLNIK 1978 "Multinationals are Poor Tools for Diversification" Journal 
of Portfolio Management Winter 4:8-12
JENKINSON, T. 1992 "Regulating Hostile Takeovers in the E.C." p. 13-17 in Stock Exchange Quarterly, 
Spring 1992
JILLING, M. & FOLKS, W.R. 1977 "A Survey of Corporate Exchange Rate Forecasting Practices" 
Working Paper No.3, Center for International Business Studies, University of South Carolina, Columbia
JULIUS, D. 1990 "Global Companies and Public Policy" London:Royal Institute of International Affairs
KALDOR, N. 1985 "Advantages of EMS Membership" Appendix 19 p.89-91 in Appendices to the 
minutes of evidence taken before the Treasury and Civil Service Sub-Committee, House of Commons
KAY, J . 1993 "Foundations of Corporate Success: How Business Strategies Add Value" Oxford:OUP
KENEN, P. (ed.) 1975 "International Trade and Finance: Frontiers for Research" Cambridge University 
Press
KENEN, P. & D. RODRIK 1986 "Measuring and Analyzing the Effects of Short-Term Volatility in 
Real Exchange Rates" in Review of Economics and Statistics, May 1986
KENYON, A. 1990 "Currency Risk and Business Management" Oxford:Blackwell
IQNDLEBERGER, C.P. 1969 "American Business Abroad" New Haven CT:Yale UP
________ . 1970 "Power and Money : The Politics of International Economics and The Economics of
International Politics" New York: Basic Books
________ . 1973 "The World in Depression 1929-39" Berkeley:U. of California Press
KNIGHT, F. 1921 "Risk, Uncertainty and Profit" Boston:Houghton Fifflin Co.
KOHLHAGEN, S.W. 1975 "Evidence on the Cost of Forward Cover in a Floating System" p. 138-141 
in Euromoney, September 1975.
________ . 1977 "The Effects of Exchange Rate Adjustment on International Investment - Comment " in
"The Effects of Exchange Rate Adjustments", Washington DC,: U.S. Printing Office
________ . 1981 "Exchange Rate Changes, Profitability and Direct Foreign Investment" Southern
Economic Journal 1981:43-52
KRUGMAN, P. 1981 "The Age of Diminished Expectations - U.S. Economic Policy in the 1990s" 
Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press
415
________ . 1987 "Pricing to Market when the Exchange Rate changes" in S. ARNDT & D.
RICHARDSON (eds.) "Real Financial Linkages Among Open Economies" MIT Press 1987
_______ . 1988 "Long-Run Effects of the Strong Dollar" p.277-294 in R.C. Marston "Misalignment of
Exchange Rates:Effects on Trade and Industry" Chicago:Chicago UP
_______ . 1991 "Has the Adjustment Process Worked?" Washington:Institute for International
Economics
_______ . 1994 "Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession", p.29-44 in Foreign Affairs, March-April
1994
LANYI, A. 1969 "The Case for Floating Exchange Rates Reconsidered" Princeton Essays in 
International Finance, Vol.72, Princeton University Press
LASSEN, R. 1982 "Currency Management" Cambridge:Woodhead-Faulkner
LAWRENCE, R. 1988 "Comment" on Richardson, D.J. 1988 (ibid)
LAWSON, N. 1992 "The View From No. 11, Memoirs of a Tory Radical" London: Bantam
LEE, W. & K. SACHDEVA 1977 "The Role of the Multinational Firm in the Integration of Segmented 
Capital Markets" Journal of Finance May: 1657-1669
LESSARD, D.R. 1990 "The Tactician" vol.3, no.3, Citibank Q3
LESSARD, D.R. & J.B. LIGHTSTONE 1986 "Volatile Exchange Rates Can Put Operations At Risk" 
Harvard Business Review, Vol.64, Number 4, July-Aug, p. 107-114
LEVICH, R.M. 1982 "Evaluating the Performance of the Forecasters" p. 121-134 in ANTL, B. & R. 
ENSOR 1982 "The Management of Foreign Exchange Risk" London:Euromoney
_______ . 1985 "Empirical Studies of Exchange Rates: Price Behavior, Rate Determination and Market
Efficiency" in JONES, R. & P. KENEN (eds.) Handbook of International Economics, Vol.2, Ch. 19 
Amsterdam:North Holland, also as NBER Working Paper Series No. 1112, April 1983
LEVY, H. & M. SARNAT 1970 "International Diversification of Investment Portfolios" American 
Economic Review, Sep.
LEWENT, J. & A. KEARNEY 1990 "Merck & Co. - a Case in Foreign Exchange Risk Management" 
p. 19-28 in Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 2(4)
LIETAER, B. A. 1971 "Financial Management of Foreign Exchange: An Operational Technique to Reduce 
Risk" Cambridge:MIT Press
LOGUE, D.E., M.A. SALANT & R.J. SWEENEY 1976 "International Integration of Financial 
markets: Survey, Synthesis & Results" in STEM, C.H. et al (eds.) "Eurocurrencies and the International 
Monetary System" Washington: American Enterprise Institute
LYLE, N. 1992 "Translation Exposure: Should it be Managed?" p. 17-18 in The Treasurer, March 1992
MACDONALD, R. & M.P. TAYLOR 1989 "Economic Analysis of Foreign Exchange Markets: An 
Expository Survey" in MACDONALD, R. & M.P. TAYLOR 1989 "Exchange Rates and Open Economy 
Macroeconomics" London:Blackwell
McRAE, T.W. & D.P. WALKER 1980 "Foreign Exchange Management" Englewood Cliffs,
416
N.J.:Prentice Hall International
MANZUR, M. 1993 "Exchange Rates, Prices and World Trade" London:Routledge
MAZEY, S. & J. RICHARDSON 1992 "European Interest Groups and European Integration", paper 
presented to Political Studies Association Annual Conference, Belfast, April 1992
MAKIN, J. 1978 "Portfolio Theory and the Problem of Foreign Exchange Risk" Journal of Finance 
33 May 1978:517/34
MARCH, J.G . & H.A SIMON 1958 "Organizations" New York:Wiley
MARIN, D. 1982 "Wirtschaftsintegration von oekonomischer und strategischer Sicht" Frankfurt: Campus 
Verlag
(translation: "Economic integration from an economic and strategic perspective") Postdoctoral thesis, 
Vienna
MARSTON, R. 1990 "Pricing to Market in Japanese Manufacturing" p. 175-191 in Journal of 
International Economics, Vol.29, No.3/4, November.
MARKOWITZ, H. 1952 "Portfolio Selection" Journal of Finance, March
MAYER, C. 1991 "Stock Markets, Financial Institutions and Corporate Performance" Paper presented 
at NEDC Conference "The City and Industry: Capital Markets and Corporate Success" London, Nov.
MAYER, C. & ALEXANDER, I. 1990 "Banks and Markets: Corporate Financing in Germany and the 
U.K." The Journal of Japanese and International Economies
________ . 1991 "Stock Markets and Corporate Performance: A Comparison of Quoted and Unquoted
Companies" CEPR Discussion Paper No.571, Aug.
MAYER, C. & DAVIS, E.P. 1991 See Davis & Mayer
MAYER, C. & D. NEVEN 1991 "The Design and Implementation of Financial Regulation" mimeo, City 
Univ. Business School
MAYNARD, G.W. 1974 "Monetary Policy" in DUNNING, J.H. (ed.) "Economic Analysis and the 
Multinational Enterprise"
MAZEY, S. & J. RICHARDSON 1992 "Interest Groups and European Integration" Paper presented to 
Political Studies Association, Annual Conference, Belfast, April
MELAMED, L. 1988 ed. "The Merits of Flexible Exchange Rates, An Anthology"
MELITZ, J . 1988 "Monetary Discipline and Cooperation in the EMS: A Synthesis" Discussion Paper 
219, London:CEPR
MELLO, A.S. & J.E . PARSONS 1992 "An Integrated Model of Multinational Flexibility and Financial 
Hedging" unpublished mimeo, L.S.E. Financial Markets Group
MILES, D. 1993 "Testing for Short Termism in the U.K. Stock Market" p. 1379-1397 in Economic 
Journal, Nov.
MILLMAN, G.J. 1990 "The Floating Battlefield: Corporate Strategies in the Currency Wars" New 
York:Amacom, American Management Association.
417
MINTZBERG, H. 1990a "The Design School: Reconsidering the Basic Premises of Strategic 
Management" p .171-195 in Strategic Management Journal
________ . 1990b "Strategy Formation: Schools of Thought" p.39-80 in J.W. Fredrickson (ed.) 1990
"Perspectives on Strategic Management" Harper Business
MOENS, L.C. 1993 "Exchange Rate Variations and U.S. Multinational Corporations’ Profits:The Case 
of the 1980s" p.47-58 in FATEMEMI, K. & D. SALVATORE 1993 "Foreign Exchange Issues, Capital 
Markets and International Banking in the 1990s" Washington DC:Taylor & Francis
MOHR, L.G. 1985 "The Reliability of the Case Study as a source of Information" in COULAN, R. & 
R. Smith (eds). "Advances in Information Processing in Organizations" Vol.2 London:JAI Press
MUELLBAUER, J. 1992 "Crunch for Sterling" p. 14 in Financial Times, 14 September 1992
MUNDELL, R. 1961 "A Theory of Optimal Currency Areas" American Economic Review, Sep.
NAUMANN-ETlENNE, R. 1974 "A Framework for Financial Decisions in Multinational Corporations - 
Summary of Recent Research" Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Nov.:854-874
________ . 1977 "Exchange Risk in Foreign Operations of Multinational Companies" Ph.D thesis, U.of
Michigan
NELSON, R.R. & S.G. WINTER 1982 "An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change" Cambridge, 
MA:Harvard
NEVEN, D. 1992 Lecture given at City U.B.S. on the "Functioning and Efficiency of Financial Markets" 
Feb.
N.I.E.S.R. 1994 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH "Innovation 
and the Skill Mix: Chemicals and Engineering in Britain and Germany" NIESR Review May 1994
NOBES, C. & R. PARKER 1991 "Comparative International Accounting" 3rd ed. London:Prentice Hall 
International (U.K.) Ltd.
NURSKE, R. 1944 "International Currency Experience" Geneva: League of Nations
OFFICER, L.H. 1976 "The Purchasing Power Parity Theory of Exchange Rates: A Review Article" 
IMF Staff Papers 23:1-60
OWEN, G. & T. HARRISON 1994 "The ICI Demerger", Draft Paper, Business Performance Group, 
L.S.E.
OXELHEIM, L. 1990 "International Financial Integration" Berlin: Springer
OXELHEIM, L. & C.G. WIHLBORG 1987 "Macroeconomic Uncertainty: International Risks and 
Opportunities for the Corporation" New York:John Wiley & Sons
PANIC, M. 1991 "The Impact of Multinational Corporations on National Economic Policies" p.204-222 
in BURGENMEIER, B. & J.L. MUCCHIELLI 1991 "Multinationals and Europe 1992 - Strategies for 
the Future" London:Routledge
PEREE, E. & A. STEINHERR 1989 "Exchange Rate Uncertainty and Foreign Trade" p. 1241-64 in 
European Economic Review No.33
________ . 1994 "Has Exchange Rate Uncertainty Increased in the EMS since September 1992?" p.21-25
418
in ECU No.26
PETERS, B.G. 1977 "Insiders and Outsiders: The Politics of Pressure Groups’ Influence on 
Bureaucracy" in Administration and Society, Vol.9, No.2:191-218, August 1977
PETTIGREW, A. 1985 "The Awakening Giant: Continuity and Change in ICI" Oxford:Basil Blackwell
PETTIGREW, A. & R. WHIPP 1992 "Managing Change for Competitive Success" Oxford:Basil 
Blackwell
PINDYCK 1988 "Irreversible Investment, Capacity Choice, and the Value of the Firm" p.969-985 in 
American Economic Review, Vol.78, No.5, Dec.
PINK, A.I.H. 1988 "Strategic Leadership through Corporate Planning at ICI" p. 18-25 in Long Range 
Planning, Vol.21, No.l
PORTER, M.E. 1980 "Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors" New 
York: Free Press
________ . 1985 "Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance" New York:Free
Press
________ . 1990 "The Competitive Advantage of Nations" London:Macmillan
PUGH, D.S., D.J. HICKSON, C.R. HININGS 1969 "The Context of Organizational Structures" p.91- 
114 in Administrative Science Quarterly
RICHARDSON, J.D. 1981 "Four Observations On Modem International Commercial Policy Under 
Floating Exchange Rates" NBER Working Paper Nr.715, Cambridge, Mass.
________ . 1988 "Exchange Rates and U.S. Auto Competitiveness" p.215-237 in R. Marston (ed.)
"Misalignment of Exchange Rates:Effects on Trade and Industry" Chicago:Chicago UP
ROBBINS, L. 1963 "Liberalism and the International Problem" p. 134-155 in ROBBINS, L. 1963 
"Politics and Economics - Papers in Political Economy".
RODRIGUEZ, R.M. 1980 "Foreign Exchange Management in U.S. Multinationals" Lexington: 
Lexington Books
RTVETT, D. with S. DOMBERGER 1983 "Lesney Products or The Relevance of Macroeconomics to 
Corporate Managers", MBA teaching material, City U.B.S.
ROGOFF, K. 1985 "Can International Monetary Policy Cooperation Be Counterproductive?" Journal 
of International Economics
SCAPENS, R.W. 1989 "Researching Management Accounting Practice: The Role of Case Study 
Research" mimeo, University of Manchester, Sep.
SCHATZ, K-W. & K-D. SCHMIDT 1991 "German Economic Integration : Real Economic Adjustment 
of the East German Economy in the Short and in the Long Run" Paper in Conference "Transformation 
of Socialist Economies",26-28 June 1991, Kiel Institute for the World Economy
SCOTT, I. 1987 "Managing Economic Exposure - Jaguar Cars" The Treasurer, Feb.
SENBET, L.W. 1979 "International Capital Market Equilibrium and the Multinational Firm Financing 
and Investment Policies" Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 14: 455-465
419
SHAPIRO, A.C. 1992 "Multinational Financial Management" 4th ed. London:Allyn & Bacon
SHARPE, W.F. 1964 "Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of 
Risk" Journal of Finance, Sep.
SHERMAN, H., R. BROWN, P.JACQUET & D. JULIUS 1990 "Monetary Implications of the 1992 
Process" London: Pinter
SIEBERT, H. 1991 "German Unification : The Economics of Transition" Economic Policy
SIEGEL, M.H. 1983 "Foreign Exchange Risk and Direct Foreign Investment" Ann Arbor:UMI 
Research Press
SIMMONDS, K. 1987 "The Accounting Assessment of Competitive Position" in ARNOLD, 
J.,R.SCAPENS & D. COOPER (eds) 1987 "Management Accounting:Expanding the Horizons" Volume 
3 London:Chartered Institute of Management Accounting
________ . 1989 "Strategic Management Accounting: The Emerging Paradigm" Plenary lecture at
European Accounting Association, 12th Annual Conference, University of Stuttgart 5 April 1989.
SMMT 1989 "Guide to Motor Manufacturing in Britain", SMMT, London
SOENEN, L.A. 1979 "Foreign Exchange Exposure Management: A Portfolio Approach" Sijthoff and 
Nordhoff, 1979
SOENEN, L.A. & R. AGGARWAL 1989 "Cash and foreign exchange management: theory and 
corporate practice in three countries" Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Vol. 16, No.5.
SOLNIK, B.H. 1974 "Why not Diversify Internationally Rather than Domestically?" Financial 
Analysts Journal, July/Aug.
________ . 1978 "International Parity Conditions and Exchange Risk" p.281-293 in Journal of Banking
and Finance, Oct.
SRINTVASULU, S.L. 1981 "Strategic Response to Foreign Exchange Risks" p. 13-23 in Columbia 
Journal of World Business
STEVENS, G.V.G. 1977 "The Effects of Exchange Rate Adjustment on International Investment - 
Comment" in CLARK, P.B., D. LOGUE & R. SWEENEY (eds.) "The Effects of Exchange Rate 
Adjustments": 183-189 Washington, DC:U.S. Printing Office, 1977
STOPFORD, J. 1993 "Rival States Revisited" p. 171-181 in "New Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War 
World", Essays for Susan Strange New York:St.Martin’s Press
STOPFORD, J. & L. WELLS 1972 "Managing the Multinational Enterprise" London:Longmans
STRANGE, N. 1991 "Management Accounting in Competitive Advantage: A Comparison of British and 
German Management Accounting" mimeo
________ . 1992 "German Management Accounting" in Management Accounting, October 1992
STRANGE, S. 1970 "International Economics and International Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglect" 
International Affairs, vol.46:304-315
________ . 1971 "Sterling and British Policy" London:Oxford OUP
420
________ . 1972 "International Economic Relations, I: The Need for an Interdisciplinary Approach" in
R. Morgan (ed.) "The Study of International Affairs" London:OUP:63-84
________ . 1982a "Cave! Hie Dragones. A Critique of Regime Analysis" International Organization,
vol. 36/2:479-95
________ . 1982b "The Politics of Economics. A Sectoral Analysis" in HANRIEDER, W.F. (ed.)
"Economic Issues in the Atlantic Community" New YorkiPraeger: 15-26
________ . 1985 "Interpretations of a Decade" in TSOUKALIS, L. 1985 "The Political Economy of
International Money" London:RIIA: 1-44
________ . 1986 "Casino Capitalism" Oxford:Blackwell
________ . 1987 "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony" International Organization, vol.41/4:551-74
________ . 1988 "States and Markets" London:Pinter
________ . 1990 "Don’t Lose Much Sleep Over the Uruguay Round" International Herald Tribune,
28.11.1990:6
________ . 1992 "States, Firms and Diplomacy" International Affairs, Vol.68/1, Jan.: 1-15
STRANGE, S., J.M . STOPFORD, with J.S. HENLEY 1991 "Rival States, Rival Firms" 
Cambridge:CUP
STREECK, W. & P.C. SCHMITTER 1991 "From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism: 
Organized Interests in the Single European Market, p. 133-164 in Politics and Society, vol. 19, no.2
SUMMERS, L.H. 1984 "The Legacy of Current Macroeconomic Policies" in HULTEN, C.R. & I.V. 
SAWHILL (eds.) 1984 "The Legacy of Reaganomics" The Urban Institute Press, Washington, D.C.
SWISS BANK CORPORATION 1987 "Foreign Exchange and Money Market Operations"
________ . 1994 "PPP Chart Book”, Feb.
TAKAGI, S. 1991 "Exchange Rate Expectations" p. 156-183 in IMF Staff Papers No.38, March
TAYLOR, M.P. & M .J. ARTIS 1988 "What has the EMS Achieved ?" Bank of England Discussion 
Paper, March
THOMSEN, S. & P. NICOLAIDES 1991 "The Evolution of Japanese Direct Investment in Europe" 
London: RIIA/Harvester-Wheatsheaf
TOBIN, J. 1982 "A Proposal for International Monetary Reform" in J.Tobin (ed.) Essays in 
Economics:Theory and Policy, Cambridge, MA:MIT Press
TOMKINS, C. 1991 "Corporate Resource Allocation" Oxford:Basil Blackwell
TOUCHE ROSS 1991 "Touche Ross Survey of Major Public Company Controls on Foreign Exchange 
Transactions" Public Affairs Dept., London:Touche Ross Management Consultants, March
TRlFFlN, R. 1960 "Gold and the Dollar Crisis" New Haven:Yale University Press
________ . 1983 "How To End the World Infession: Palliatives of Fundamental Reforms" CEPS
Working Documents No.l, CEPS, Brussels
421
TRIFFTN, R., R. VAUBEL & J. WILLIAMSON 1987 "The ECU and the International Monetary 
System - A panel Discussion" p.201-203 in De Grauwe, P. & T. Peeters (ibid)
TURNER, G. 1984 "ICI Becomes Proactive" p. 12-16 in Long Range Planning, Vol. 17, No.6
TURNER, L. & M.R. HODGES 1992 "Global Shakeout" London:RIIA
VAN DER KLUGT, C.J. 1989 "The Importance of Monetary Integration for European Industry" speech 
to CBI conference on European Monetary Integration, London
VAN DEN BEMPT, P. & M. QUINTYN 1989 "European Financial Integration and Monetary 
Cooperation" London: IFR Publishing Ltd.
VERNON, R. 1966 "International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle" Quarterly 
Journal of Economics Vol.80 no.2 May 1966:190-207
WADWHANI, S. 1987 "On the Inefficiency of Financial Markets" L.S.E. Financial Markets Group 
Special Paper No. 1
WADWHANI, S. & M. MULLINS 1989 "The Effect of the Stock Market on Investment - A 
Comparative Study" L.S.E. Financial Markets Group Special Paper No. 32
WALSH, E .J. 1986 "Foreign Exchange Risk Management in U.K. MNCs" unpublished PhD thesis, 
University of Glasgow
WEINBLATT, J. & R.E. LIPSEY 1980 "A Model of Firms’ Decision to Export or Produce Abroad" 
NBER Working Paper No. 511 Cambridge,Mass.
WELLS, L .T., JR. 1972 "The Product Life Cycle and International Trade" Survey Article, Harvard 
Business School, Boston
WHITE, B.B. & J.R . WOODBURY 1980 "Exchange Rate Systems and International Capital Market 
Integration" Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 12:175-183
WIHLBORG, C. 1978 "Currency Risks in International Financial Markets" Princeton Studies in 
International Finance No. 44
WILLIAMS, K. & J. WILLIAMS & C. HASLAM 1987 "The Breakdown of Austin Rover. A Case- 
Study in the Failure of Business Strategy and Industrial Policy" Leamington Spa:Berg Publishers Ltd.
WILLIAMSON, J. 1983 "The Exchange Rate System" Policy Analyses in International Economics 
Series No.5 Washington,D.C.institute for International Economics
________ . 1985 "The Theorists and the Real World" p.45-69 in TSOUKALIS, L. 1985 "The Political
Economy of International Money" London: RIIA/Sage
________ . 1987 "The ECU and the International Monetary System - A Panel Discussion" p.208-213 in
DE GRAUWE, P. & T. PEETERS (ibid)
WILLIAMSON, J. & M.H. MILLER 1987 "Targets and Indicators: A Blueprint for the International 
Coordination of Economic Policy" Policy Analyses in International Economics No.22, Institute for 
International Economics
WILLIAMSON, O.E. 1963 "Managerial Discretion and Business Behaviour" American Economic 
Review, December 1963
422
________. 1975 "Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications" New York:Free Press
WILSON, J. & W. TAKACS 1980 "Expectations and the Adjustment of Trade-Flows under Floating 
Exchange Rates: Leads and Lags and the J-Curve" International Finance Discussion Paper No. 160, Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, April
WINTERS, L.A. 1991 "International Economics" 4th edition London:Harper Collins 
WOLF, M. 1991 "A Nation Unified, And Not Yet Apart" FT: 1.7.1991
WOOD, G.E. 1988 "European Monetary Arrangements: Their Functioning and Future" p .33-48 in 
FAIR, D.E. & C. DE BOISSIEU (eds) 1988 "International Monetary and Financial Integration - The 
European Dimension" Amsterdam:Kluwer
YIN, R.K. 1989 "Case Study Research: Design and Method Newbury Park, CA:Sage
________ . 1993 "Applications of case study research" Vol.34, Applied Social Research Methods Series
Newbury Park, CA:Sage
423
